Interview with William C. (William Childs) Westmoreland, 1981
Summary
General William C. Westmoreland directed the American military presence on the ground in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. Here he discusses the situation in Vietnam in 1964 and various events during the War, including the Marine landing at Da Nang in 1965, Operation Rolling Thunder, and the Tet Offensive. He describes the successes and failures of American military efforts in Vietnam and the strengths of various units. Finally, he reflects on the Johnson Administration’s 1968 decision not to pursue a war-winning strategy.
Topics
Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American, United States--History--1945-, United States--History, Military--20th century, Vietnam--History--1945-1975, Military missions, Military ethics, Military assistance, American, United States. Marine Corps, Escalation (Military science), Military art and science, Logistics, Bombing, Aerial--Vietnam, United States. President (1963-1969 : Johnson), United States--Armed Forces--Officers, United States--Politics and government, Vietnam--Politics and government
Annotations
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Transcript
The political and military situation in 1964
Vietnam, T-885, SR #2607, Gen. Westmoreland. Okay. This is SR 42607.
Vietnam T-885. An. Today’s April 27,
1981. We’re on Camera Roll 614. 24 Francs. Tone at minus 0. Slate
goes on. Clap sticks.
Interviewer:
General Westmoreland, in the, in March of
1964 Secretary McNamara was in Saigon and South Vietnam barnstorming around with, with
General Khanh, what did
you think of that?
Westmoreland:
The
thing that we needed most in Vietnam at that time was political
stability. Khanh had
taken over by ah virtually a bloodless coup from the junta that followed
the overthrow of President Diem, and ah, the administration in Washington and Mr. McNamara was there to
represent Mr. Johnson
and his administration, was doing everything he could to build up the
prestige of General Khanh
and make it known to General Khanh and to the people of South Vietnam that America was
behind Vietnam, and in particular, behind General Khanh who had taken over as
ah president.
Interviewer:
Did,
what effect do you think that had on the stability of the Khanh government?
Westmoreland:
Well, I
don’t think it was necessarily ah a wasted effort. I think ah for a
short period of time that it had an impact. Particularly, among Khanh’s colleagues, his
fellow officers. It indicated to them that ah America was going to
support General Khanh and
was not going to support any other faction to displace him. So, I think,
in the short range, it ah it had a positive effect.
Interviewer:
Your
predecessor, General Harkins was generally regarded as being over overly optimistic.
What did he say in his leave taking dinner at the Caravelle?
Westmoreland:
Genera...Har...Har...General Harkins, Paul Harkins, ah, of course, had served under General Patton during WWII. He was his deputy chief of
staff. At the farewell dinner that was held for him at the Caravelle
Hotel, he did say that he was ah a very optimistic person and had been
optimistic ah while he was in command and he continued to be optimistic.
My contacts with General Harkins...ah bore that out. His contacts with Mr. McNamara were ah ah
excessively, in my opinion, optimistic, but certainly, General Harkins was a very
honorable man, an experienced soldier and he passed his judgments in
good faith.
Interviewer:
You
wrote that during the McNamara visit to Saigon and Honolulu in June of ’64 thinking in
Washington on
increasing troop commitments was more advanced than anything you were
considering in Saigon.
What were they thinking at that time, and how did you feel about it?
This is June ’64.
Westmoreland:
They
were grasping for straws. They realized that a commitment had been made
to the South Vietnamese people. Ah. There was political instability
which was ah rampant. It was realized that we had to build up the South
Vietnamese forces and programs were projected ah in order to in,
increase their military strength. On the other hand, intelligence
indicated that that ah the enemy was getting more active and North
Vietnamese troops were beginning to move down through Laos.
There was a feeling at the time that bombing might ah be able to do the
trick and pass a message to the leaders in Hanoi that America had great military power and
that they should be ah more careful or that power would be used against
them.
But
ah (sigh) this message was of small magnitude with respect to bombing
and the message, of course, was never transmitted ah during that time
frame, and matter of fact, ah, a very small degree thereafter, because
the bombing was on and off.
Interviewer:
But,
at, at at that time, were, w...were you thinking, recommending bombing?
Ah. You were trying to get the government together, sort of a revolving
door government and so on. Did, did...?
Westmoreland:
When
the bombing program started I was in, that was the strategy that the
Johnson ah
Administration wanted to pursue. I realized that the airfields,
and we had three jet capable airfields, were extremely vulnerable.
If
that strategy ah was to be a viable one, we had to protect those
airfields. I feared that the Vietnamese ah did not have the capability
of protecting ah the American aircraft on those airfields and,
therefore, my first request for troops were ah associated with the
essentiality of protecting the airfields.
American reactions to North Vietnamese attacks in late '64
Interviewer:
Well,
we’ll look into the troops a little later. I’ve got a couple of specific
questions, and then I want to get into the bombing in some detail. The
ahm ah you wrote that nobody would have thought less of us if we had
made a graceful exit in early ’65 during the
political chaos. Did you feel that way at the time?
Westmoreland:
No.
That’s basically a retrospective judgment. Those of us in Vietnam were
people that had a mission given by our government and ah we were doing
our utmost to carry it out and we had expectations that we could carry
it out.
Interviewer:
Tell
us what your retrospective judgment was.
Westmoreland:
Politically, Saigon
was in a state of dis, disarray. Ah. Characterized by political chaos.
It was like ah trying to push a piece of spaghetti. We not, we were not
quite sure who was running the country and the ah province chiefs ah in
the various provinces weren’t, were not sure themselves.
Therefore, they were reluctant to make decisions. So, ah, the
government was pretty much at a standstill and actions throughout the
countryside were ah ah were pretty well ah at a standstill by virtue of,
of a very cautious approach ah by the Vietnamese ah in the, in the
provinces.
In
retrospect, of course, because of this political chaos which ah
prevailed for well ah approximately two years, I think it could have
been justified that ah we renege on our commitment and withdraw and it
would ah have been far better to have done it at that time than to do it
when we did after the commitment of considerable resources and the loss
of many lives, but to the best of my knowledge that was not considered
by the administration, although it may have been in Washington.
I,
wa...am aware of no messages from Washington to Saigon to the ambassador
asking for our advice in that regard. However, the, the, the ambassador
at that time ah would ah know better than I in that connection.
Interviewer:
The
ah—at the end of ’64, early ’65, there was what I gather a particularly important battle
at Binh Gia. What was the
significance of that?
Westmoreland:
That
occurred in late ’63. It occurred in the Delta
region, the IV Corps area...
Interviewer:
That
was late ’64. December
28, ’64?
Westmoreland:
Oh,
oh in Binh Gia, I’m sorry.
Yes, yes. At Binh Gia, yes.
That was a, a, a, an action by main forces of the basically ah North
Vietnamese. Ah, eh, there were some local forces involved, but it was
basically a, a North Vietnamese battalion that attacked the hamlet and
ah overran it and ah some of the reinforcements were ambushed and a
battalion was virtually destroyed, but during that time frame, there
were a number of battalions destroyed, ah being destroyed ah at about
one a week.
It
appeared that ah the communists were moving into phase three of Mao Tse Tung’s doctrine for
insurgency warfare. The ah third phase being to move into conventional
warfare.
Now, I didn’t feel that there was going to be an abrupt move in that
direction but this was ah the use of battalion-sized units, reinforced
battalion sized units, by the enemy, and the successful use that I
feared would ah, would spread and was perhaps a beginning of a gradual
movement toward a major effort, using not guerrillas, not small units,
but ah large units.
Interviewer:
Let’s
talk about the beginning of the bombing for a minute. There were calls
for reprisal bombing after the Bien
Hoa attack on November 1, ’64.
Did you recommend reprisal bombing then?
Westmoreland:
I
refer to it as (clears throat) tit for tat. If they carried out ah a
major piece of sabotage ah by bombing a hotel or ah mortaring ah an air
base, that we would immediately respond ah by hitting a target that
would ah be harmful to them. But, it had to be done immediately in order
to have the enemy relate their actions in the South to our reprisal in
the North. But, it would be done in a very discriminating way.
Interviewer:
But...
Westmoreland:
I, I,
I was for that program. I was not for any general bombing at that time
for the simple reason that I did not want to prov—provoke a reaction and
the only reaction that they were capable of taking was to move more
troops to the South and we were not prepared to handle more enemy troops
at that time.
Interviewer:
But,
the Bien Hoa attack you were,
what was your reaction? Just want to repeat it, because my question
interrupted you.
Westmoreland:
The
Bien Hoa attack, yes, I, I
thought they should be a, a, a reprisal, another that wou...that would
be immediate, and as a reaction to.
Interviewer:
We're out of film.
Camera Roll 615 starts up. Speak
Interviewer:
Did
you recommend reprisal bombing after the Bien Hoa attack in November 1st?
Westmoreland:
Yes,
I did based on the tit-for-tat concept. They commit an action against
and we retaliate with an action immediately that will be related by the
enemy to their initiative in the South.
Interviewer:
Now,
what about after the Brinks Hotel bombing in Christmas of ’64.
Westmoreland:
Ah.
I, I was in favor of hitting a selected target following that,
yes.
Interviewer:
Ah.
But, curiously at this time LBJ rejected it and said he ra...he was interested in troops
wasn’t he? Didn’t he wire you, wire you and said...?
Westmoreland:
Well,
the tit-for-tat program didn’t work because there was so much discussion
as to the targets where Washington got involved in a lot of detail that
time went by and ah the relationship between the enemy’s action in the
South and our retaliatory action was lost. So, the entire effect of the
tit-for-tat bombing ah ah fell by the wayside.
Interviewer:
But...
Westmoreland:
But,
but, but during that time frame, ah, Mr. Johnson did make it known that he ah didn’t
think the bombing would do the job and he felt that ah ground action in
the South ah or some reinforcement on the ground in the South ah would
be a more prudent and more effective policy. And, his initiative in that
regard was the first associated with his subsequent, subsequent
commitment ah of ah American ground forces.
Interviewer:
Good.
As I remember it, after the Brinks bombing, you, you asked for reprisal
bombing and, and he said he’d entertain request for troops. Was that a
surprise?
Westmoreland:
Yes,
it was. It was a surprise. However, ah it was not something that I
hadn’t considered and ah we had been ah thinking in terms of troops and
where we would put them and ah the number that we would be able to
support logistically. I had asked for a ah logistic organization and for
an engineer brigade so that we would be prepared to logistically support
troops, if and when, they were required and authorized. So, ah, yes, his
initiative came as a surprise, but ah I don’t want to give you the
impression that we had not considered that. We had considered all
options.
Interviewer:
Now,
ah after Pleiku did you
recommend a reprisal tit for tat bombing?
Westmoreland:
After
Pleiku, yes. Ah. I, I, I was
very much in favor of a, of a, of a, of a reprisal effort. I felt it
should be rather discriminating though. I did not think it should be ah,
the beginning of a more general bombing campaign.
I
was not enthusiastic about trying to accomplish our mission in the South
through the use of bombing, and I felt there was considerable danger in
bombing nor...the North to the point where the North Vietnamese
authorities felt that they would have to retaliate and the only way they
could retaliate was to move massive ground troops down to the South.
And, I was in no position to accommodate that type of action by them.
Later on, when I had enough troops to take care of ourselves and protect
our installations and ah defeat any massive movement of troops to the
South, I was very much in favor of a substantial bombing program.
Westmoreland on Operation Rolling Thunder
Interviewer:
But,
when Rolling Thunder began in, in March of
1965, it was really sort of an arm-twisting, a graduated
response. Did you think that would work?
Westmoreland:
Ah. I
did not. I did not, and I was very lukewarm about it. Ahh. Ap...I became
very strongly in support of 19—early 1966, at
which time I had the beginnings of a list of...logistical structure. I
had enough troops to take care of any retaliatory action on the ground
ah by the Hanoi regime. But, initially, before early 1967, I was not enthusiastic about the bombing program.
Now, the bombing program in the North was not under me. Ah. It was
under the Commander in Chief
Pacific. Now, there is a school of thought that ah massive
bombing at that time ah may have dissuaded the Hanoi regime ah to change
their strategy. Ah, that would have re...required ah rather substantial
bombing effort to give it any prospect of success.
I
saw no disposition by the Johnson Administration at that time to engage in any
extensive and massive ah bombing campaign. But...
We
should cut.
Speed. Mark it. One more time.
Second.
Second.
Interviewer:
General Westmoreland, the bombing strategy was a graduated response,
sort of an arm-twisting. How did you feel about that?
Westmoreland:
Something had to be done to bolster the South Vietnamese government and
give them more confidence. Ah. It was felt in Washington that ah the
gradual bombing campaign that could be ah increased over a period of
time and expanded ah would serve that purpose.
My
interest, however, was more than bringing about a, a, a stable and
strong regime in the South, which was at that time very fragile, and my
feeling was that we should get well established in the South, build up
ah the Vietnamese army, give the people confidence in ah defeating the,
the enemy troops on their soil before we proceeded to take the war to
the North.
So,
I was lukewarm about the ah so called Rolling Thunder campaign during
1965, but at the beginning of 1936 with
General Thieu and ah
and ah, Air Marshall Ky
having taken over the leadership of the country.
Interviewer:
You
said 1936. You mean 1966?
Westmoreland:
19...1966. 1966.
I, I, I felt that we were in sufficiently stable position in the South.
We were not dealing with a fragile government. That the bombing campaign
was important and at that time I was in full support of the bombing
campaign, but I wanted to use the shock action, as opposed to creeping
escalation, as, as, if you will.
Interviewer:
You
would have been in favor of more massive action like the kind Nixon took later on?
Westmoreland:
After
1966, but not before.
Interviewer:
But
after, I don’t want to lose my question. You have to say what you were
in favor of? What kind of bombing action we...were you in favor of after
1966?
Westmoreland:
To
hit those targets associated with a military effort, that include
military targets, bases, marshalling areas of, of petroleum farms, port
facilities, ah, and anything associated with their ability to wage
war.
Interviewer:
What
kind of control did you have over, over bombing targets?
Westmoreland:
I had
no control over the targets in North Vietnam except in the extended
battle area that area just north of the demilitarized zone and in, in Laos. The bombing campaign to the north was
under the command of the Commander in
Chief Pacific who carried it out through his navy and air
components.
They both had aircraft, the navy aboard carriers and the air force
based in Vietnam and, subsequently, in Thailand, and with B-52’s later from Guam. Those targets were selected ah
by Admiral Sharp but had
to be approved by Washington. I was not associated with that, but I was
aware of the targets and I was in a position to recommend targets, if I
thought they were important.
Interviewer:
But,
did you feel your hands were tied a little bit. I mean it’s a long,
circuitous route and you’re the commander on the scene?
Westmoreland:
Well,
I was commander of the ah ground forces in Vietnam, but I was not
commander of the air forces. Ah. See, the unified command was in Honolulu and headed by Admiral
Sharp. The chain of
command and the general military organization during the Vietnam is
another subject ah, ah, in my opinion. It was not a strong
organizational arrangement, in order to prosecute a war.
Marines land at Da Nang
Interviewer:
Ah.
We’ll get to that later. When the troops came in to defend Da Nang were you the one that,
that, that um...who first asked for the troops to come in to the Da Nang Air Base?
Westmoreland:
I
did. I wanted to protect the Da
Nang Air Base, which was essential to prosecution of the air
war.
Interviewer:
Were
you there to greet them?
Westmoreland:
I was
not, no.
Interviewer:
Tell
us about that.
Westmoreland:
Well,
the troops moved in from the sea and the chain of command was from the
Commander in Chief Pacific
to his navy component commander to the seventh fleet and down to the
amphibious force. And, under the military and naval doctrine those
troops are under, under command of the Admiral at Sea until they are ah
established ashore. And, therefore, I was not associated with ah the
details of their moving ashore.
I,
I, I wasn’t aware that they were going to necessarily move ashore in
battle formation. It was not essential that they do so. Ah. The exercise
was to get them ashore and get them deployed around the air base in
order to secure that air base, in view of the fact that our plans were
based on air action. And, the Da
Nang Air Base was a very important one.
Interviewer:
Did,
didn’t it ah.
We
got ten feet.
Interviewer:
Did
you think they were... What do you feel about the manner of their
arriving?
Westmoreland:
Well,
it, it didn’t bother me. It didn’t bother me. I, I, I think it bothered
ah ah perhaps some members of the embassy, but ah it didn’t bother me ah
if they go on to make a, a training exercise out of a landing on the
beach, and it was an excellent beach. Ah. They got a plus from, by
military standpoint of the training, as well as their moving ashore, but
ah [coughing in background]...
End of SR #2607.
Vietnam, T-885, SR #2608, Gen. Westmoreland. This is Sound Roll 2608.
T-885. We have 616. Camera Roll. April 27, 1981, 24 frames.
I suppose they justified it. Tone.
I suppose they justified it. Tone.
Interviewer:
General, when the Marines
first landed what did it remind you of? The WWII reference that you used in your book and I
wanted you to tell us about it. They stormed the shores as if they were
taking Iwo Jima. Do you feel
comfortable giving that...?
Westmoreland:
Well,
ah, ah, of course, the Marines
and the army troops made innumerable amphibious landings during the
course of WWII, particularly in
the South Pacific,
and ah, this was ah, it was a re-enactment of ah the assault on the
beach, and it played a training role in that regard.
I
mean, normally, that’s the way Marines come ashore. It wasn’t necessary, for my purposes,
that they come ashore in battle formation. They could have been landed
at a dock, but the training value was of significance to the Marines and ah so they did make
a practice assault landing.
Troop build-up as a consequence of fears of North Vietnam
Interviewer:
Ah.
Did you see the, the Marines
landing at Da Nang or, or the
Marines coming in to
defend the air base as, as the beginning of a troop buildup or at the
time was it sort of the tag end of the, of the bombing? A logical
consequence of the bombing decisions?
Westmoreland:
It
was associated with the bombing decisions because of the importance of
the Da Nang Air Field. Of
course, needless to say, I hoped that ah, that that measure, that next
step would suffice, but ah I was realistic, I didn’t think it would.
And, I certainly did not rule out additional troops and we were
preparing plans to stop there or to bring in additional troops, if we
deemed it necessary to carry out the mission of our government.
And, Mc...Mr. McNamara advised me on that occasion and on innumerable
occasions during his visits to Saigon that I should ask for whatever troops,
whatever military forces that I thought were needed in order to carry
out ah our national objective.
Interviewer:
What
were the factors that, that made you ask for additional troops?
Wha...what happened after the Marines came to, that made you say I want more troops?
Westmoreland:
Primarily, our intelligence that the North Vietnamese were moving more
and more troops down through Laos.
They were building up their military forces in the South at a rather
rapid pace.
Far
more rapid than we could build up the South Vietnamese forces, and in
order to assure that there would be no setback, if the South Vietnamese
could not cope with it and we could not build them up at the pace that
the ah the enemy troops were being built up, the only answer was to
supplement ah the Vietnamese with more American troops.
Interviewer:
Did
the ah, were there some key battles in in the spring of ’65 that, that really made it necessary to, to, to
bring in more Americans, I mean...?
Westmoreland:
Yes.
There were a number of setbacks, ah, involving ah major or, or
conventional type formations, battalions and even regimental ah ah
formations by the enemy. And ah during that time frame, ah there were
South Vietnamese battalions being lost and depleted at a more rapid rate
than ah Vietnamese forces could be ah recruited and constituted into
fighting units to replace them. So, in effect, we were losing ground,
and ah the only answer was to, to supplement the South Vietnamese with
American forces.
Interviewer:
What
was your fear at that time? Were, were you...were you worried about the,
the North Vietnamese were coming in your intelligence said, but
wha...what did you think their objective was? What were you trying to
prevent?
Westmoreland:
Well,
the, the objective of Hanoi from the very beginning was to take over the
South and unify Vietnam, which they, of course, they subsequently did
after we had pulled out. Ah. They, they, their plans were very clear,
their objective was very clear that they were going to take over the
South through subversion and invasion.
Interviewer:
We,
they were going to cut South Vietnam in half?
Westmoreland:
Yes.
Ah. We’re getting into ah what I perceived is tactical plans during the
’65 period ah evidence in intelligence
suggested that they wanted to cut Vietnam in half between Pleiku and Kon Tum and, and the coast. And, ah, that meant
that ah we had to give consideration to the Highlands area because
the Highlands area
adjacent to the route down through Laos and then into Cambodia, and that was a, a matter of ah concern and that
required troops with some mobility. Now, the American troops had that
abi...mobility.
The
Vietnamese troops, except for the, the airborne troops which ah
consisted of only one brigade, ah, and subsequently expanded to a
division, but in ah later years expanded to a division. Ah. They had had
mobility but other than that ah the Vietnamese did not have that
mobility to, to fight far away from their bases. Ah.
And, their logistic organization was very marginal to do that. This
encouraged me to develop (a) a logistic base that would allow us to
fight anywhere in Vietnam as, as required, and as a reaction to the
enemy initiatives. Ah. It also motivated me to ask for American troops
that had that capability.
Interviewer:
Did
you um...I want to get you to say that you felt at some point we had to
put our finger in the dike. That’s...
Westmoreland:
Yes.
Interviewer:
But
you have to say it.
Westmoreland:
Well,
ah, during that time things were becoming unraveled and I did use the
expression at that time ah we’ve got to put our finger in the dike and
that meant that we had to supplement the Vietnamese who were losing
ground with American forces.
Interviewer:
Ah.
What was the significance of the, of the battle of Dong Xoai or Binh Gia?
Westmoreland:
Well,
that was just north of ah Saigon. We’re getting rather close to Saigon in a highly
populated area. It was an outpost, however, I mean the immediate area
was not highly populated, but it was adjacent to a highly populated area
and there was ah a ranger battalion there and ah quite an intensive
fight, ah, which was won by the ah Vietnamese rangers, but ah because of
our advisers and special forces. So, that was another example of the...a
gradual movement to phase three, the use of the enemy of regular
formations, regular tactical formations, battalions and higher units, as
opposed to being just a guerrilla war.
Interviewer:
But,
I mean, faced with all that you’re, you’re regular battalions, it’s no
longer guerrilla war, you’re the commander in the field, wh—how did you
feel? What did you ask for? What did you think you needed in order to
stem the tide?
Westmoreland:
Well,
I wanted to pro—I wanted to ah have the capability of moving American
troops into the Highlands. I wanted to protect Vung Cao [sic] and the air place, air base at Bien Hoa. These air bases were important to us.
And, my initial, my initial request for troops ah following a Marines ah that came into Da Nang ah was ah, an airborne
brigade ah ah to move into the Bien
Hoa and to the Vung
Tao area ah to, to give us a stronger posture and to ah have a,
a, a, a military force that was capable of, of reacting to further
initiatives.
My
fear was that, with all the troops that the North Vietnamese were
beginning to move down to what we called the Ho Chi Minh Trail
through to Laos, that ah their
buildup was more rapid than the buildup of the Vietnamese.
The
Vietnamese were being ah defeated ah on a piece meal basis. They were
losing forces more rapidly than they could be recruited and retrained,
and I was very concerned that we would find ourselves at the point of no
return. Ah. That did not happen, primarily, because we did bring in
reinforcements.
Interviewer:
Ah.
You...
Westmoreland's strategy of offensive troop deployments
Westmoreland:
I
can’t get animated, unless you say...
Speed. Tone.
Interviewer:
General, in the spring of ’65 Ambassador Taylor was interested in
troop deployment in enclaves and you favored an offensive strategy. What
was wrong with the enclave?
Westmoreland:
Well,
the enclave was, was an essential interim step and ah certainly until we
could get some logistic bases organized and ah we could get our troops
ashore ah enclaves ah were an essential ah step, but, the idea of
staying in enclaves where you’d be on the defensive and where the enemy
would have full reign of the countryside to include the Highlands, he, we would
just be setting up ah the enemy to cut us in two, cut the country in
half. Ah.
And, the enemy would always have ah the initiative on our troops who
would be basically fixed in a defensive position. You, you don’t win
wars that way. I don’t think there was any particular disagreement
between ah, ah, ah General Taylor and myself. Ah. General Taylor was very, very loath to be a party to
committing ground forces in the first instance and so was I, but, from a
military standpoint, there was no choice. Ah.
On
the other hand, ah to be more specific ah as to ah some disagreement as
to troop deployments, ah, when the 1st Cavalry moved in ah it was the
feeling...
Camera Roll 617 coming up. 617. Take six. Speed. Clap sticks.
Interviewer:
Ah.
You want to com—?
Westmoreland:
Ya.
When the 1st Cavalry
moved in, they had great mobility and there was a feeling in some
quarters that I should deploy the 1st Cavalry along the coast. I did not want to do
that. I wanted to move them inland where they would be in a position to
fight, yes, along the coast, but they would be in a position to fight in
the Highlands and
along the Cambodian border,
because of the tremendous mobility that they had.
So,
initially, they went in about halfway between the Highlands and the
coast, at a place called An Khe
but they were not there ah they were very long. I moved them to the
Highlands where
they had their first big fight with the North Vietnamese ah regular
troops.
Interviewer:
That
was the battle of the Ia
Drang?
Westmoreland:
That
is correct, and following the seizure of Plei Me.
Interviewer:
What
ah ah did you win the battle
of the Ia Drang Valley?
Westmoreland:
Ya.
Without any question. The ah, the enemy took a tremendous beating there.
Tremendous losses. Matter of fact ah a statement was made that ah they
learned lessons that were so valuable that they accepted the losses as
essential to learn lessons on how to fight American troops. It was the
first time they had encountered American troops, and I think they were
quite shocked by it, and they were badly hurt by it.
Westmoreland's impressions of specific American divisions
Interviewer:
Was
the 1st Air Cav a good
outfit?
Westmoreland:
Ya.
Excellent. Superb.
Interviewer:
How,
how did you feel about your boys at that point, at the end of
sixty...?
Westmoreland:
Well, we, we, at that time we had first class ah fighting forces, first
class troops. I would say until the ahh early ’68, I don’t think the American army or the American military has
ever put ah a better-qualified, more professional force in the field
than we had during that time frame.
Interviewer:
The
um, when the troops first started coming in, the 173rd Airborne and ah
the 101st Airborne and
the Koreans and the first
infantry division, did, did you, you know back in the, in the spring, in
the early summer, how did you feel about them? Were you you, were you
pleased with the quality of the troops?
Westmoreland:
Well, I was. There a few commanders that didn’t measure up but ah we
had to make some ahhh adjustments with respect to commanders, but I was
very pleased with the troops. Ah. They adjusted themselves well, they ah
were well disciplined and they were led by officers and noncommissioned
officers.
Interviewer:
Is
the 173rd airborne a good outfit? Tell us about...please...?
Westmoreland:
Well, the 173rd was stationed at that time ah in Okinawa and they only had two battalions, and
they moved in, but subsequently, were reinforced by a third battalion. I
deployed them initially in ah along the coast, a place called Vung Tao and then at Bien Hoa.
Interviewer:
Were
they a good outfit?
Westmoreland:
They
were excellent. And, they, they fought in many parts of the country
during the subsequent yea...years.
Interviewer:
How
about the 101st?
Westmoreland:
101st...ah...1st
battalion moved in initially and they were also a top flight
organization with ah superb officers and ah non commissioned officers. A
first brigade of the 101st initially came into the Can Ranh bay area because I wanted to secure that area and
that put them in a cen...central location ah where they could move in
most any direction.
Now, subsequently, the entire 101st Airborne Division arrived. They were programmed to
arrive in ’68. When I received intelligence on
the, what subsequently resulted in the Tet Offensive ah intelligence that the enemy was
building up, I asked that the deployment of the 101st be accelerated and
they came in December of ’67.
Interviewer:
What
about the Koreans? Were, were
you pleased when they arrived?
Westmoreland:
I
was. Of course, I was in the Korean
War. I, I knew the Korean soldier and I knew a, a number of their officers. Ah.
They came in first with the, the capital division ah then, subsequently,
ah they were reinforced by a second division. I employed them along the
coast to protect ah the lines of communication north and south, in the
II Corps region.
They were well-disciplined soldiers. They ah, of course, did not have
the mobility ah because of a lack of helicopters that, that my troops
had. But, we reinforced them with American helicopters from time to
time.
Long-term effect of the changing U.S. strategy in 1965
Interviewer:
In
June of ’65 you asked for ah B-52’s for
tactical support. Why did you do that?
Westmoreland:
I
wanted to use fire power rather than manpower in taking the fight to the
enemy. Ah. Men’s lives on the battlefield ah are, are, are very, very
precious and every commander gives every consideration to getting his
military job done at minimum cost. And, in the main, the way to do that
is to use firepower in a discriminating way. Extraordinary steps were
taken to avoid civilian casualties. Unhappily, some did evolve, as in
all wars.
Ah, the enemy took cover in the jungles and ah Vietnam has more than
their share of ah jungle terrain.We were able to pick up intelligence as
to the general location of the enemy units ah where they had their
training camps, and their ah, their so called bivouac areas, ah staging
areas. And, when we could acquire that intelligence ah you couldn’t see
it from overhead, but ah if you knew the general area by using a B-52’s
could strike an area target. And, those B-52’s were an innovation and ah
during the course of the Vietnam War and ah it destroyed and disrupted a
lot of the enemy actions ah I, I call them spoiling attacks.
You can have the spoiling attack with a B-52 raid, or you can have a,
a, a, spoiling attack by hitting an enemy unit by ground action while
they’re getting prepared for ah an offensive action themselves. Of
course, one of the problems was, if they moved across into Lao—Laos or Cambodia they ah they had a sanctuary ah which
gave the enemy considerable advantage and which was the bane of my
existence as a military man to have those sanctuaries nearby.
But, the B-52 was ah, a, a no...a, a, an innovation, an extremely
effective, greatly feared by the enemy, and ah, those B-52 strikes were
great, a great asset to every military ca—commander and ah much sought
after.
Interviewer:
They
couldn’t hear them, could they?
Westmoreland:
They
couldn’t hear them until they ah exploded, no.
Logistical problems of fighting in Vietnam
Interviewer:
Um.
At the end of ’65 there were pretty massive
American troop involvement. Did you, what effect did you think this was
going to have on, on the morale of, of ARVN? Did you think that we were
taking over the war indiscriminately?
Westmoreland:
Well, there, there was always a danger that the deployment of American
troops would be used as a crutch for ARVN, and we, we were very
cognizant of that. I was very sensitive to it and I talked to my
counterpart, General Vien
, who was a, a splendid officer on, on many occasions about that. We did
not want to put us in the position where we would do most of the
fighting.
On
the other hand, American troops were better prepared to fight ah in the,
in the hinterland. Ah, and the Vietnamese troops ah I felt were more
adept at fighting among their own people ah near the populated areas.
And, we were a...not able to draw a distinctive line in that regard and
I did not want to do that, but at the a, same time we had a capability
of, of, of fighting away from our bases that they they did not possess
ah in [incomprehensible]. Their ah airborne formations being an
exception.
Wha...inevitably, however, as we displayed ah more American forces ah,
ah, there was an attitude ah that tended to pervade the Vietnamese ranks
that we were taking over the war. And, we did everything we could to
avoid that, and for that reason, I had long talks with Thieu and Vien and, subsequently, we,
I made the point to them that we were not going to be there forever and
ah the time would come when we would start progressively thinning our
troops, as they were capable of taking over the fight themselves.
They welcomed that. They’re proud people. They did not want us to take
over ah command of their forces ah as the French did, and we did everything we could not to
cast ourselves in the eyes of the Vietnamese in the role of their French masters ah which
situation prevailed for about 100 years.
Interviewer:
Excuse me...
We're going to need a new battery...
Take 730. Tone.
Interviewer:
By
the end of ’65, you had succeeded in your
objective of, of trying to prevent South Vietnam from being cut in half.
Did, did the strategy change after that?
Westmoreland:
The
latter part of 1965 there was a very serious
threat to cut the ah country in two by the North Vietnamese and ah, of
course, that was, ah was, frustrated by our initiatives. In 1966 we had a logistic base that was ah on the
verge of completion and for the first time, adequate to support ah
operations ah in most parts of the country, not all parts of the
country, and we had sufficient forces, really, to change our strategy
from one of defense, but with ah sporadic offensive actions ah to one of
ah that would emphasize the offense.
Of
course, ah, there were certain key areas, logistic areas, bases and so
forth that ah and communication centers that had to be secured, but we
were in the position at that time with the troops and the mobility and
the logistics in order to start taking the fight to the enemy in South
Vietnam. Now, this was not a linear war like WWI and WWII or Korea.
This was an area war. Ah. Somewhat like the, the Civil War. We did not have
enough troops to occupy all the country. We did not have enough troops
to defend ah the demilitarized
zone and the Cambo...Cambodian
Lao borders. Ah. So, when ah the
enemy ah ah raised his head well, ah, our intelligence ah hopefully,
would be aware of his presence and we could react by fire maneuver
against him.
Interviewer:
We’re going to have to...
End of SR #2608.
Vietnam, Y-885, SR #2609, Gen. Westmoreland. This is Sound Roll #2609.
Vietnam T-885. 7½ IPS. 60. 24 frames. Camera roll 618. Today is the 27th
of April, 1981. This is take eight.
Interviewer:
General, you often said we could conquer territory, but not hold it.
How can you win a war like that?
Westmoreland:
Well, we had no choice, uh frankly. Uh, our purpose was to defeat the
enemy and pacify the country. And the country couldn’t be pacified until
the enemy was defeated...Uh, when the enemy, uh...was detected, well
uh...we went after him with firepower or with maneuver. I tried to do it
with firepower, but uh...firepower has its limitations.
Course, the whole matter was complicated by the Laos and Cambodia sanctuaries and North Vietnam, which is also a
sanctuary for...for our ground forces. I felt that that was a temporary
situation. And I prepared my plans and my troop lists and my logistics
to so that we could, ah, move into the sanctuaries at a later time. With
a new administration, um, moving into power...of our change in the, um,
the...strategy of the Johnson
Administration.
Uh, the character of the war was...uh, not like WWII or Korea... or WWI, which
were linear wars. This was an area war, something like the Civil War.
If
we had, ah, tried to fight a linear war, it would’ve taken, ah...I would
say three or four full, ah...the troops that we had on the ground. It
would, ah...it would instead of having, ah, say ultimately...roughly
half a million troops, it would probably have taken two million troops
to fight a linear war.
Interviewer:
I
have two more questions on the ’65 period. When
you first went in, did you think it was going to be a long haul, and did
you tell the President it would be a long haul?
Westmoreland:
Well, my first private session with McNamara, this was the spring of 1964, I, I told Mr. McNamara I thought it was going to be a long,
drawn out affair. That, uh, the task in front of us was formidable...
It
was going to take time, and I was afraid that, uh, it was going try the
patience of the American people. I then suggested that the
Administration might want to consider a people-to-people program to get
the American people involved. I could see no other way of keeping them
interested and involved, which, uh...I felt was necessary,
particularly...the strategy that had been enunciated at that time...that
uh, American people would get tired of a long, drawn out war.
And, uh, a people-to-people program could've gotten a, uh...American
people, uh...emotionally involved. But, apparently that, according to
Mr. McNamara had been
ruled out.
Interviewer:
What
about in June or July of ’65 when he was over in Saigon just before the major troop build up, did
you stress then that this was going to be a long haul?
Westmoreland:
Well, ah...I, I, I can’t say that I, I did...ah, it was something that
was on my mind, and he and I had many discussions. I, I did, ah, during
that general time frame, and, and later...talked to him about the fact
that...I, I was interested in having only those forces deployed in
Vietnam that we could sustain on an indefinite basis. And I, frankly, I
had some communications with, ah, General Johnson, Chief Staff of the Army, trying to
determine what could be sustained on an indefinite basis...
But, ah...a matter...I don’t want to oversimplify the matter, because
the bombing campaign was a very important item in this regard. Because
the strategy of the Administration was to hurt the enemy until he...ah,
was encouraged to come to the bargaining table...and, ah, the strategy
was to use, ah, all of our bombing and our efforts in the South to try
to convince the leaders in Hanoi
that they could not win, and ah, get them to the bargaining table and
then bargain from a position of strength and come to, ah, some agreement
at the conference table. That was the strategy.
But that meant that we had to...make that strategy credible...by
convincing the enemy by our actions that we had the capability of
hurting them more than we were, and we were prepared to do that, and
that’s what brought about the escalation in the ground forces; and that
is what brought the escalation in the bombing campaign. The bombing
campaign, however, was not affected because it was off and on depending
upon public reactions at home.
And, as you well recall...on the ’66, ’67,
’68 time frame every time a bombing campaign was started
there would be marches on the Pentagon and demonstrations, and the politicians
were inclined to back off. Also, during that time frame, ah, there were
cease-fires called for, ah...Tet. New Year’s, and ah...um, Christmas,
etc., etc., all of which I objected to.
One occasion, ah, President Johnson, ah, went to see the Pope. The Pope made a special request for a cease fire,
which the President honored...and this weakened, ah...ah, this
perception that we were trying to impose on the enemy that, ah, we had
the power to, ah, to hurt him, ah, to hurt him progressively more if he
did not come to his senses and come to the conference table.
Westmoreland's speech to the National Press Club, November 1967
Interviewer:
Let’s move ahead a little bit to the end of 1967. You gave an optimistic speech at the Press Club in Washington. Did you feel
comfortable making it? Were you under any pressure...?
Westmoreland:
No,
I was under no pressure at all. Um, I, I, I wanted...
Interviewer:
Could you start that again?
Westmoreland:
I
was in no...apropos of a speech that I had made in...ah, November of ’67 to the National Press Club, um, ah,
I, I wrote the speech. It was, uh, upon my initiative I was not asked to
make, ah, a speech of any particular type. I wanted to make...make it
known that, ah, it was, ah, not our plan to stay in Vietnam
indefinitely. That we wanted to pass the war to the Vietnamese as fast
as practical. I wanted the Vietnamese to get that, ah...message also.
When I returned to, ah, to Saigon, uh, uh, President Thieu thanked me. He said, “We...we are
complimented by this, and we now have a more precise objective to move
toward.” Now, I made no particular prediction when we would be able to
turn the war over to them. I, I felt that, uh...perhaps in a period of
two years or less, uh...we...the enemy could be hurt to the point...and
weakened to the point, and the Vietnamese could be built up, ah, to the
point where a token amount of troops might be withdrawn.
But the withdrawal of the troops, would be contingent upon the ability
of the Vietnamese to take over the role from us...and to the extent that
the enemy had been weakened.
The Tet Offensive
Interviewer:
As
far as, let’s get on to Tet. Did you have any intelligence indicating that there might
be an offensive the time of Tet?
Westmoreland:
We
started picking up information the latter part of 1967 that the enemy was building up for some, ah, initiatives we
thought might be...might be of major nature. And there was certain
fighting along, ah, the Cambodian and Laos
borders, ah, that suggested that, ah, there were tremendous
reinforcements moving to the South. That was corroborated by other
intelligence.
I,
therefore, asked that the 101st Airborne Division, that already had one brigade
deployed in Vietnam, but I asked for the rest of the division to be
deployed, uh, in the latter part of ’67. They
had been programmed to come in in ’68. So,
their deployment was moved up at my request, based on this
intelligence...
Of
course, ah, in ah, January of 1968 we picked
up considerable intelligence on build up... Ah, we had defectors that
came in and gave us information. It became very clear that the enemy was
preparing for ah...ah, a rather major offensive.
Interviewer:
Did
you take any precautions?
Westmoreland:
Oh,
ah many, many...ah, I, ah, I, I, had, ah, any number of, ah...of
operations that I had...had planned...um...and uh I cancelled those
operations in view of this intelligence. Ah, I moved the 101st Airborne Division,
that I said before, came in, ah, latter part of 1967 into the III Corps area, the populated area.
I
had some, ah...operations planned along the Cambodia border, which I, I cancelled and
repositioned the troops along the approaches to Saigon... Ah, as ah...as
the...as Tet approached
it became very evident that although the enemy had, ah...ah said that
they were going to have a cease-fire for seven days...and we were under
great pressure from ah, Washington politically to have a cease fire
ourselves. And, of course, the Vietnamese had traditionally, ah, had,
ah, a cease-fire because of Tet and the celebrations that go on there. I was able to get
that squeezed down...uh, with the cooperation of the ambassador...and
ah, ah, accepted by President Thieu to thirty-six hours.
Ah, as it became very clear that, ah, it was going to be a major
offensive action, ah...either on Tet or before or immediately before or after, all of my
troops were put on 100 percent alert. All passes were cancelled...I was
able to get General Vien,
who was my counterpart, who was head of the Vietnamese forces, ah, to
ah, to keep 50 percent of his people there, and keep them on full alert.
He felt for purposes of morale that, ah, he had to let some go for Tet, ah, magnitude of 50
percent...ah, certain...redisposition of forces, ah, were made at the
last minute, based on intelligence that we acquired...
In
addition to that, ah, as ah, intelligence built up, and we were able to
better refine our estimates on the timing of the attack...I got Thieu to agree to
canceling all leaves and putting all forces, ah, and stopping all...men
that were leaving, their units for Tet, in the I Corps area.
Interviewer:
We
gotta change...
Take nine coming up. Speed. Tone.
Westmoreland:
With
respect to the northern part of the country, the I Corps area...we were
able to get the Vietnamese to stop all leaves, and have ah...100 percent
of their forces on alert. This was, ah, before the offensive took place.
Meanwhile, there was a high degree of alert at Khe Sanh. Several weeks before that we had, ah,
received intelligence from a defector that, ah, that there was going to
be a major attack on Khe Sanh.
I moved in some, ah, reconnaissance units...had the Marines reinforce the area.
We
then set up an air plan to...make air strikes using tactical bombers and
B-52’s in the vicinity of Khe
Sanh whether it was...ah, relatively no population. In addition
to that, our sensors were shifted from the Ho Chi Minh Trail, that
we called in Laos...ah, to the
environs of the Khe Sanh which
could pick up any movement. Ah, these efforts proved to be extremely
effective.
I
never thought that Khe Sanh
was going to be another Bien Dien Phu [sic] but I did feel it was, ah...ah, a target that the enemy was
very much interested in, that he would want to seize it. And I wanted to
fight him in the hinterland rather than allow him to get down among the
people, which would have been very costly in casualties...ah, by...my
forces, and the Vietnamese forces, ah...and also there would have been
many, many civilian casualties and civilian property destroyed if we had
allowed those two divisions to move down into the lowlands.
Interviewer:
You
never thought that the garrison there would be overrun?
Westmoreland:
Not
in the least. Ah, not in the least. I felt very secure about it. And we
were all very well prepared to...ah, land supplies initially on the air
strip there, which we’d upgraded, ah, in order to allow 130’s to land.
Then when the enemy brought in artillery, we were able to supply, ah,
that particular garrison, which consisted of four Marine battalions and
one Vietnamese ranger battalion, and a few Special Forces.We were able
to reinforce them...ah, by air drop of logistics...not by the landing of
aircraft.
But, I felt very secure about this. But Washington became very, very
nervous about it. And I tried to calm them down, because I had perfect
confidence that, ah, we could, ah, hold Khe Sanh and the enemy was going to be severely
hurt. But it was given so much visibility by the media, the President
became very nervous.
Interviewer:
Did
the President, was the President worried that it might be another Dien Bien Phu?
Westmoreland:
Ah,
there were indications of that, yes. He had a special War Room set up,
run by, ah, General Taylor. And he was trying to follow in the White House the
developments...step by step and in great detail.
Interviewer:
The
attack on the Embassy
got a lot of visibility, and so on, in the American media, but how did
you evaluate this in terms of the overall military picture at the
time?
Westmoreland:
Well, I think it was relatively insignificant.
Interviewer:
Could you start and say... “The attack on the embassy...”
Westmoreland:
The
attack on the Embassy
was a very dramatic, ah, development and given a lot of visibility by
the media—a lot of gloom and doom statements. The attack was launched
by, ah, ...ah, a handful of sappers...all they had on was shorts, they
blasted a hole in the wall surrounding the Embassy yard, and they
crawled through this particular hole in the wall...and, ah, by mid
morning they were all killed.
I,
personally, ah, went through the Embassy from top to bottom, and nobody got in the
Embassy. Ah, there
was a pane glass window that was broken and uh,...in the process of the
fight that went on, uh, which was conducted by the Marine guards and by
a...MP company that we had designated to reinforce anywhere in Saigon, if required. But
basically, the security of the Embassy was the responsibility of the, of the
Vietnamese.
This was, ah...politically, ah...very dramatic incident. It was
terribly overplayed, ah, militarily it has very little significance—but
politically, it did have great significance. Because it gave the
impression...that we were not able to defend even our own embassy. And,
of course...any embassy in any capitol of the world could, could, could
be attacked by stealth operations of that type, in any big city.
Interviewer:
What
do you think the communists were trying to accomplish in the Tet Offensive? What do you
think their objectives were?
Westmoreland:
Well...I felt at the time, and I think subsequent information has
confirmed that they honestly thought that if they put on a big
offensive, and North Vietnamese troops were moved to the South...and
they gained the initiative by surprise attack, that the people of South
Vietnam were going to rise up against the, ah...the ah, Thieu regime the people
of South Vietnam would rise up up against the Saigon regime. And that
didn’t happen.
There wasn’t one single case of a public uprising. And this was, ah,
quite a blow and quite a surprise to the authorities, ah...in, ah, in
Hanoi. Of course, as it turned out...a great visibility was given to
this. The media displayed great gloom and doom for the first several
days, and gave the impression that we were being defeated. Yes, there
were some setbacks, but they were very temporary.
Ah, the force was defeated, and the Viet Cong were virtually depleted. And the...Hanoi troops
were very badly hurt, to the point it took them about two years to
recover. Ah...this, this point was obscured by the initial reaction of
the American public, that ah, it was ah, the Americans and the South
Vietnamese that were being defeated.
Interviewer:
Militarily, how would you evaluate it from Hanoi’s point of view?
Westmoreland:
Well, during the period of 1967 we made
tremendous progress. We had the, the troops to do it, and we were
constantly on the move, opening roads and expanding the area under
government control. The enemy didn’t win a single, ah, battle
of...skirmish of any consequence. Ah, Hanoi decided that they had to do
something spectacular. To train, change, ah, its losing battlefield
fortunes, which is typical of any battle.
Ah, in effect, we saw the Germans do this in, ah, WWII, when von
Rundstedt made the attack, ah, ah,...into the Ardennes. And uh, the allied
troops were tremendously set back. But, uh, the Germans were defeated, and it was downhill the
rest of the way. Uh, it was the same psychology which is typical in any
war, where in ’67 the Vietnamese were losing,
and they launched ah, ah...an attack, they hoped a surprise attack,
which it wasn’t.
Although, we didn’t know everything he was going to attack, ah, we knew
that the attack was coming, and we knew the general time frame of it...
He tacked on a much broader front than I had anticipated, ah; there were
some setbacks, but they were very temporary. But he hoped by this
initiative that he could gain the initiative himself and that, ah his
losing fortunes would be changed.
But the unhappy thing was that by virtue of the impression that the
American public received from the gloom and doom of the early days of
the Tet Offensive...ah,
the enemy was begged to come to the conference table. And there they sat
for four years and decided only one thing, the shape of the conference
table.
They finally came to an agreement that was very one sided. They did not
live up to their agreement. Neither side totally did, to include the
South Vietnamese in some respects, and the agreement totally collapsed,
and so did South Vietnam after we had withdrawn our troops.
Request for more troops in 1968
Interviewer:
It
was widely regarded that you asked for 206,000 additional troops in
’68. Did you? Was that the case?
Westmoreland:
No.
Ah (chuckle). This has been tremendously distorted... At the time of the
Tet Offensive, I
asked for only those troops that, ah, were...were on the way to me
anyway, that, ah had been promised, and had been organized. And, ah, I
asked that they be accelerated. Mr. Johnson then sent a message, “If you need
further reinforcements, please call for them.”
Ah, I, ah, took no steps in that regard, ah, till General Wheeler came over. He was
the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. And Wheeler told me that, ah, it was a good prospect that the
Reserves would be mobilized, that the strategy would be changed.
And if Reserves are mobilized and our strategy was changed, the...an
offensive strategy was changed, the...an offensive strategy that would
break down some of the geographical barriers of Laos and Cambodia, and allow us to take the war to the enemy in a
more effective way through the bombing campaign—what would I want to
bring the war to an end? Um, it was in the context, then, of a
contingency plan based on an assumption of a decision. And it was not a
request per se.
Ah, it was decided that, ah...that we would eventually withdraw, and we
would not escalate uh further...and that request was denied. But, I did
say, in order to facilitate my gaining the initiative on the energy on
the, on the Hanoi Regime, the enemy troops, facilitate my regaining that
initiative...ah, I asked that...ah, I be given moderate
reinforcements.
Interviewer:
We're gonna have to...
Non-pursual of a war-winning strategy
Vietnam. SR #2610. T-885. Gen. Westmoreland. This is Sound Roll #2610.
Vietnam T-885. Roll #620. April 27, 1981. IPS 60 cycles, 24 frames.
Here’s a tone at minus 8. We have Take Ten coming up. Tone.
Interviewer:
General, how did you feel about Secretary Clifford’s refusal to grant all the troops that
you wanted, putting ceiling on the amount of troop build up in '68?
Westmoreland:
Well, let me, let me put this in perspective, ah...General Wheeler came over to see
me. We talked about a war winning strategy of mobilizing the reserves,
and assuming a more aggressive policy...try to take the war to the enemy
and force them to the conference table where we’d be in a position to
negotiate from a position of strength. And ah, my, the so called 206,000
was on the assumption that a new strategy would be adopted. It would be
a war-winning strategy.
Mr. Johnson, after, ah...ah, Wheeler returned from Saigon, turned the matter over to Mr. Clifford, who was the new
Secretary of Defense. And he studied the matter, he didn’t ever talk to
me, ah...Mr. McNamara,
every time I made a troop request to Mr. McNamara, and I discussed it. But I was never
asked to come to Washington, and nobody came to...ah, Saigon—Mr. Clifford or his
representative to discuss it with me following the visit by General
Wheeler. And it was
decided that we would not pursue a war-winning strategy...
uh, and I, of course, accepted that as a, a, a political decision from
the Administration. However, since it was decided that we would not
pursue a war-winning strategy, and uh, the 206,000 was in the context of
such a new strategy...uh, which General Wheeler told me was to be considered. I did ask
for relatively modest reinforcements to facilitate my gaining, ah, more
rapidly...the initiative on the enemy...uh, and that...that, ah, in
essence, is, is, was the result of the...ah Clifford study.
Interviewer:
How
do you feel, in general, about not pursuing a war winning strategy? I
mean, you’re trained to fight, and here you have your hand behind your
back. How do you feel about that—not necessarily in '68...
Westmoreland:
Well, it was a frustrating experience, I think, by all military men,
because they are trained to, ah, to win wars. And when they are
frustrated in that attempt, it’s ah, ah...frustrating matter.
However,...the Vietnam conflict was a most unusual one. We had for the
first time, I guess, in our history in any substantial degree, ah...ah,
a group of dissenters...or a significant portion of our population who
were violently opposed to the war and who were waving the flag of the
enemy...which was a very disconcerting thing to all of us in Vietnam,
that there were young men and women and professors on campuses who were
actually cheering the enemy on and waving the flag of our enemy.
The country became tremendously divided, and in the final analysis,
this is why Mr. Johnson
backed off from, ah, pursuing a war-winning policy. The military, of
course, is subject to the control of the Commander in Chief, and...we
accepted it. However, it was my hope and my feeling that with a new
administration coming into power there would be some reconsideration of
this. Uh, so I hadn’t given up all hope.
Westmoreland's reassignment
Interviewer:
How’d you feel when, when, when you became Chief of Staff, when you
were relieved of the command?
Westmoreland:
Well, uh...I was over in Vietnam four and half years. Uh, I was told in
19 uh 60, 67, when I visited Washington in
the fall, by Gen. Wheeler, that uh, that after four years, uh I would be given
another assignment. Uh, that the decision would be made after they had
decided what would happen to General Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the army after
he had finished his four year tour.
Marker. Tone.
Interviewer:
General, what if you just complete that.
Westmoreland:
Yes.
General Johnson was the
Chief of Staff of the army at the time. Uh, General Wheeler told me in ‘67 that uh a decision would be made on what would
happen to General Jo, Johnson after he finished his four year tour as Chief of Staff
of the army at which time I would be given another assignment which
would mean that I would, would’ve been in Vietnam for four and a half
years.
Now, in anticipation of my being given another assignment, uh based on
what was planned in 1967, General Abrams was sent over to
be my deputy, which he was for well over a year. So, he was well
prepared to move into the command slot and when uh General Johnson uh finished his
four year tour which was inevitable by law and it was decided that he
would uh retire uh President Johnson appointed me to replace uh General Johnson as Chief of Staff
of the army.
But this was, was planned back in ’67 but the
decision as to what would happen to General Johnson was the only missing link. Uh, General
Wheeler asked me
what assignment I wanted and uh, I, I was noncommittal.
Interviewer:
Uh...what was your assessment of the enemy, what kind of people were
you fighting? Did you have respect for ‘em?
Westmoreland:
Very
well disciplined, uh, highly motivated. They spent more time on
political indoctrination than they did on military training. Uh, of
course, uh it was highly autocratic regime and...as they moved down uh
south the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, well uh, if they, if they didn’t behave uh there was
somebody behind ‘em to shoot ‘em in the back.
But there were some desertions... Uh, the manpower problem became
rather acute, er, er and uh this acuteness was evidence during the Tet Offensive where we
would pick up uh soldiers sixteen, seventeen years old. But they were
highly disciplined uh, highly motivated soldiers.
Interviewer:
The
uh, just one follow up question on the Tet Offensive. Essentially, you won the Tet Offensive, didn’t you,
I mean...the, the...
Westmoreland:
Well, uh statistics would suggest that. Uh, I believe...
Interviewer:
But
the NLF was, was it an
affective force after that?
Westmoreland:
Uh,
eh, they were, they were virtually decimated...uh, they were not totally
wiped out uh, but uh, they were crippled to the point that they were a
nuisance thereafter and, and uh not a big nuisance at that.
Interviewer:
Uh...the...we had a vast American uh, uh...build up and a tremendous
power and here were these guys that you were fighting with....you know,
rode down the trail on bicycles in the beginning, anyway. What, uh,
uh...why didn’t this power make a difference?
Westmoreland:
Well, it, it coulda made a difference if uh we had uh stuck with the
plan and we had had a war winning strategy. Uh, the North Vietnamese
troops were far better equipped than you suggest, they weren’t a bunch
of guerrillas, they had Russian weapons, and uh, rather good ones. Eh,
they were well trained, as I said before, highly motivated. They had
infiltrated eh a considerable part of the country where they had
political cadres and guerrilla units uh...political cadres were not
wiped out during the Tet
Offensive but a lot of the guerrillas as I said before, were.
But uh, we had to open roads, we had to build logistics, we had to get
prepared uh not only to uh fight the guerrillas, but to fight the North
Vietnamese forces which virtually came uh down in, in strength uh...uh
course at the time of the Tet Offensive and had infiltrated down
starting in 1964. Also, as we prepared our
troop build up we had to be prepared to cope with Chinese that they came in...and uh Mr. Johnson was somewhat
paranoid about ‘n some of the people in the State Department, that
uh the Chinese uh might
eventually uh come into the fray.
Of
course, as a military commander I had to be cognizant of that. I frankly
didn’t think they would come in, but ‘t the same time a commander in the
field has to be prepared to deal with the worst, worst case... Uh, why
didn’t we succeed?
Uh, well, uh, uh very simply the country became divided to the point
where they uh did not uh choose uh, politicians did not choose to pursue
the war long enough in order to bring the enmy, enemy to the conference
table and uh to negotiate from a position of strength. A war winning
strategy was not adopted, a strategy of withdrawal was adopted.
It
did get the enemy to the conference table in Paris, but we negotiated
from a position of weakness, particularly political weakness as uh Hanoi
observed the domestic scene where the country was divided and young men
were cheering on and waving the enemy flag. And I think a lesson to be
learned is that uh young men should not be sent to the battlefield
unless the country is gonna support them.
Further impressions of specific American divisions
Interviewer:
Can
you describe for us, the, the, some of the com, complex logistical
problems you faced in 1965?
Westmoreland:
Uh,
Vietnam was uh roughly half way around the world...uh, very remote to
the United States, even remote to Hawaii... Uh...Vietnam uh was really an undeveloped country,
they had one deep water port uh, there were three jet, jet capable
airfields. We did not have a logistic organization. My requests started
back after the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution in ’64.
Uh, for the, the, the foundation of a log, logistic organization and
for an engineering brigade were, were turned down and when troops were
deployed we had virtually no logistics. They had, they had to be built
up, and they were built up in a amazingly short time and what I’m, what
am I talking about? Airfields, ports, uh, supply depots, maintenance
facilities, uh communication networks, uh and, and matters of this type.
This is that part of the military iceberg that is below the water, that
very few people are acquainted with and...I, I think quite a spectacular
job was done in preparing those logistics to the point where we could
fight in any part of the country and we could uh have gone into Laos, we could’ve gone into uh, into
Cambodia, we could’ve uh
moved north of the demilitarized
zone if national policy had permitted it.
Interviewer:
But,
't, I wanted us just to have the tapes going so... The uh...give us an
indication of of of, of the kinds of, of things that are behind, be,
below the tip of the iceberg. I mean, do you worry about, bout sewage
systems ‘n repairing...
Westmoreland:
Well...I wouldn’t say sewage systems uh, sewage is a very simple thing
to handle on the battlefield, you just uh dig a hole. But uh, uh we are
talking about certain base areas uh we’re talking about uh commissaries,
we’re uh, we’re uh, in Vietnam we had a very unique uh problem, that uh,
uh Vietnam would’ve been plagued with runaway inflation if we had not
had some post exchanges there for the uh, for the... troops to spend
their dollars.
Uh, if we’d not, had not had an offshore uh recreation program, would
allow troops during one time of their tour go to uh Hong Kong uh or Bangkok , to Manila or in uh, later on even to uh Australia to spend their
dollars offshore.
Uh, if they’d spent their dollars in the local market uh, uh, the
entrepreneurs the Chinese and
Vietna—namese, would’ve profited from it whereas when they spent it in
the post exchange, the soldiers themselves profited, profited because uh
this was run uh as a fund for the benefit of the military and, but it
took the pressure off the local economy, without that eh the uh
inflationary pressures would’ve been intolerable and this would have
added very much of an adverse political effect.
So, all of these factors go in to uh, the development of a military
force but you also have to anticipate ah forces that might be needed in
an emergency such as uh...during the siege of Khe Sanh I felt secure because we had a heavy
drop capability where we could drop supplies by parachute and we did
that and uh we knew it would work because we’d had much experience in
doing ‘at.
Interviewer:
Uh...just wanta take one more minute. Give me a sense of of uh...oh I
was thinking of using you as a voiceovers from the film of the, of the
first troops that came in, that why I was asking you about the the, you
know, the 173rd.
Westmoreland:
Yes.
Interviewer:
A
little indication of what, of what their battle record was, or or how
good they were. I wanta, I wanted to build up a sense of sort of pride
in these outfits...in your parted. But, hundred, hundred and seventy
third, the the hundred and first airborne uh...
Westmoreland:
Uh,
the third marine division?
Interviewer:
Yeah.
Westmoreland:
Yes.
Yes. Well, the troops that were deployed in Vietnam uh during the build
up were well established military units with uh, with uh magnificent
records uh, uh during the Korean
War uh, during uh WWII
and in some cases, during WWI. ‘Eh,
they were, they were manned by top grade officers and non commissioned
officers. They had excellent equipment.
Uh, they were uh uh elite, very competent and very effective troops,
that America could be proud of. And, this situation prevailed, frankly
until uh...I would say thirty, uh '69,
'70 where uh the army ran out non-coms. Uh, they had to lower the
standards for officers because a lot of the officer material was on the
campuses uh where they uh did not have to, to serve, they were uh given
an exemption by going onto the campuses of the country.
Interviewer:
Who
were the Screaming Eagles?
Westmoreland:
The
101st Airborne
Divsion. They distinguished themselves uh during WWII. Uh, the 82nd Airborne, they had a
brigade there, they have a magnificent record. The first safety division
has had a record uh in uh, eh...every war since WWI eh...distinguished record uh during the
course of World War, WWI, WWII. Uh, the uh...3rd Marine
Division, magnificent record during the war in the, in the Pacific,
during uh WWII. The 1st Marine
Division, ah, a magnificent record. The, these were...
Interviewer:
Who
was the big, red one?
Westmoreland:
The
big, red one was the 1st Division. Uh, but the ninth division, likewise,
uh, uh, wonderful record uh, in a World
War...uh II, because ‘am I, I know this personally because
that was my, my division in WWII.
Uh, but the 4th Division uh, was uh 1st Cavalry Division, all of these division had uh
splendid records in other conflicts and uh when they were initially
introduced they were in first class shape with excellent leadership and
excellent equipment, and tremendous morale. High degree of discipline.
But as the war draw, drove...drug on and on...uh...it uh, it...the
leadership...uh...had to be...uh, uh watered down by, by virtue of
particularly the noncoms and the junior officers. By virtue of the
educational deferment policy, by virtue of the uh attrition on the non
commissioned officers, by virtue of the fact that uh, uh uh a
considerable percentage of the army and the Marine Corps were over, overseas and uh not
training at home.
And all these factors uh put tremendous stresses and strains on the
military particularly the army over a long period of time, the longest
war in history. A career lasted three years. Uh, Vietnam uh required
substantial sacrifice by any number of military people over a period of
seven years. Uh...’s uh strain on the families by family separation.
Uh...uh and of course uh a major factor were those that killed and
wounded. Uh...the ranks were attrited on the battlefield.
Interviewer:
I
think we better...
Westmoreland:
Did
you say something to me?
Interviewer:
No,
no.
Oh.
Okay. This is the end of this roll.
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