Secretary of Defense for International Affairs under LBJ, Paul C. Warnke recalls the bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese. He states that one of the misjudgments that the United States made was that victory was more important to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese than to the Americans. Warnke recalls that even though the bombing was not working, there were no other solutions, so there was a reluctance in the administration to halt the bombing. He states that the turning point came when McNamara realized that the North Vietnamese wanted unification and saw the US as aliens. Warnke talks about his changing views regarding the war and that the US was in a tough situation since they were the ones invading a country, not trying to drive out invaders.
The limits of force in Vietnam
Turning. Marker. Take one.
Using Vietnam as a defense against the Chinese threat
This is a head of SR 2717 to pick up with Camera Roll 724 for WGBH, Vietnam Americanization, TVP 007 on this August 25, 1982. Continuing interview with Paul Warnke.
Marker. Take three. Claps.
Continuation of bombing in the absence of alternative ideas
The impossibility of battling nationalism instead of communism
The schism within the Defense Department over Vietnam strategy
Johnson's inner conflict over Vietnam strategy