British troops arrive in Saigon

VIETNAM—TVP002
SR 8F
Brigadier Doidge Estcourt Taunton (D.E., (Ted) Taunton)
We're shooting 16 mm, 60 cycles, 24 frames per second, 7 1/2 CCRR

Interviewer:

We should attempt to make a complete statement rather than answer a question.

Running.

Slate one, take one.

Interviewer:

Brigadier Taunton, would you tell us your full name and the correct spelling please?

Taunton:

Well, my full name is Brigadier Doidge Estcourt Taunton.

Interviewer:

Would you spell it please?

Taunton:

Spell it?

Interviewer:

Please.

Taunton:

D-o-i-d-g-e, it's a Cornish name, Christian name, Estcourt, E-s-t-c-o-u-r-t, Taunton, the same as the capital of Somerset.

Interviewer:

D.E. Taunton.

Taunton:

D.E. Taunton.

Interviewer:

Right. And your nickname is...

Taunton:

Ted.

Interviewer:

Ted. Brigadier, would you describe for us what your orders were when you first arrived in Saigon in September 1945?

Taunton:

When I first arrived, um, I had no real specific orders. Uh, I arrived only with a small advance party, and less than a company of troops, and I knew that I had A, to deal first with the Japanese, and uh, secondly with any Annamites that might be in power.

Interviewer:

Were there orders issued to you or the commanding, the senior commanding officer, General Gracey, in the period of September '45?

Taunton:

Oh, yes. Um, he as the control...

Interviewer:

Please start with a complete sentence.

Taunton:

Oh, I'm sorry, heh heh heh... Um, there were occasions when General Gracey as the control commissioner, or when in charge as the control commission, had to ask me to carry out certain things as a brigade commander. And so from time to time I received instructions from General Gracey. Otherwise, I was sort of, um, looked after my brigade myself.

Interviewer:

Were you privy to General Gracey's deliberations about how to deal with the Annamites and, uh, the Japanese and the French? What were the circumstances of the orders from higher up?

Taunton:

Uh, I was not present when the, uh, instructions were given for, by the control commission to the Annamites. I think that’s all I can say to that one.

Interviewer:

Do you recall any of the general orders, that uh, you or General Gracey were issued?

Taunton:

Uh, I do remember, that it was a very difficult period for me at that time. The Japanese were in control and were armed. The French were imprisoned by the Japanese and my job was to release them and the Annamites appeared to be in control of government buildings and so on and so forth. So, I went through a very difficult period of, trying to re-arm the French, trying to disarm the Annamites, and uh, not bothering very much about the Japanese, who were well behaved, and left them, I left them with their small arms for a while.

Interviewer:

What was the official position as relayed to you from Allied command, toward the Annamites, the French and the others?

Taunton:

(Sigh) Don’t know that one.

Interviewer:

While you were acting commander what guidelines did you use? Did you use your own common sense? Did you ah, deal with the situation as it arose? What were the problems you faced and what were the terms of of your decision making?

Taunton:

Uh, I found... that in Saigon, I had to balance three things: Uh, the Japanese, who were in charge of sort of the key points; the French who, having been released, were getting a little bit out of control; and uh, the Annamites, who were sitting on the government buildings. And, it was about then, that I received orders, through the control commission, to effect a complete switchover. I... tried to get the French in charge, get the Vietnam out, the Annamites out, and then, uh, let the Japanese, uh, concentrate themselves as surrendered personnel.

Interviewer:

Could, uh, could we go over that once more please, just to try to get as little, a little better, he's a bit of an interruption. But I think what you said was, was really crucial. Can we just go over that again? When you arrived in Saigon, just starting just as you did...

Taunton:

Right, right at the beginning?

Interviewer:

No, just this last answer.

Taunton:

Oh, when I arrived in Saigon, uh, I... cut for a minute. You, you're not talking about now, that I had no specific orders, this that and the other. No. What I found about the Japanese, the French, being released and rather happy that, and it all leading up to, uh, I was suddenly realized that somebody’s got to be in charge, and I was told...

Interviewer:

Yes.

Taunton:

...to effect the French being armed, that the sort of story you want. Right. Uh...

Interviewer:

As much detail as you remember.

Taunton:

Yes. Um, when I arrived in Saigon, having found my feet, a bit, I realized that the Japanese were in charge, and were armed, the French, whom we were releasing, as um, to their freedom, were a little bit trigger happy, and that the Annamites were in charge, and that state was a very difficult one to balance what to do. And it led up to the orders finally given me, to disarm the French, remove the Vietnamese, the Annamites, and, the Japanese eventually to be concentrated and disarmed.

Interviewer:

What were those orders, do you recall?

Taunton:

Yes, broadly speaking.

Interviewer:

In a statement.

Taunton:

Ya, Oh, uh, yes yes. Um, the orders as I remember them, were, on the 23rd, the French under Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel Rivière, would take over certain key points, quickly, quietly, from the Annamites. Assisted by my troops when necessary. My troops would also take over the bank and the post office and all this would be achieved quietly in the night. It went perfectly quietly and all right, there were no casualties on either side, but it broke down as the day went on, the following day, that the French, as I said earlier, became over excited and all sorts of shooting and noise was going on.

The decision to re-arm the Japanese

Interviewer:

If we can go back, just a moment, Brigadier, uh, to before that, the events of the 23rd, what, uh, led to the decision by the British forces, to uh, let's stop. Can we put him in the house, Bill?

Taunton:

Yah, put him in, will you?

Interviewer:

Are we running?

We're running.

Slate two, take one. (clapsticks)

Interviewer:

Brigadier, going back again, to the beginning, what were your instructions when you arrived as acting commander of your brigade? In going into Saigon?

Taunton:

When I went into Saigon, uh, my instructions were not really very clear except that I was there to, protect uh, the control commission, and also to effect the surrender and the disarmament of the Japanese, and uh, after the freeing of the French, uh, to help the French reassume control of the country. In broad terms that was my task. And of course, uh, to ensure that law and order existed.

Interviewer:

Did you have any instructions toward the Annamites?

Taunton:

No specific instructions were given to me with regards the Annamites, but it developed as, uh, it developed as I was there that um, I was dealing with Japanese, who were armed, Annamites who had assumed power, and French who had been released and becoming a little, uh, over excitable. So it was rather a complicated and unusual or unique situation.

Interviewer:

Would you describe what was going on in Saigon at the time that led to the decision to rearm the Japanese? And what were your own personal feelings about it?

Taunton:

I remember, that, there was sort of, um, a spirit of tension in Saigon, and um... over the Vietnamese being in control, and the Japanese still being armed, and um, I felt that this would go on for a long time and I'm sure my superiors must have realized that, because it led to the decision to rearm the French, evict the Annamites, and eventually um, disarm and concentrate the Japanese.

Uh, I would say though, that the policy that I was told to effect was that, that I would deal with French, and, I beg your pardon, I would deal with the Japanese, and the Japanese would deal with the Viet, the Annamites. Rather than me.

Interviewer:

Good, we're going to cut here.

Taunton:

Yah.

Interviewer:

Excellent. Excellent. Just right.

Taunton:

Was it?

VIETNAM—TVP002
SR 9F
Brigadier Doidge Estcourt Taunton (D.E. (Ted) Taunton)
Slate three, take one. (clapsticks)

Interviewer:

Brigadier, why did General Gracey issue proclamation number one, and what were the key points of that proclamation?

Taunton:

General Gracey was worried about the... uncertainty that was going on in Saigon. We were there to disarm the Japanese, release, and repat—and uh, the French from their prisons, prisoner of war camps, and to insure that law and order existed. And uh, he therefore issued his proclamation number one as a reiteration of our instructions. And he added that um, he was unhappy about all the press reports, he closed the newspapers, and he ordered a curfew to be imposed. About all I can remember of that one.

Interviewer:

What was the situation in Saigon at the time? And, uh, what led to the decision to rearm the Japanese? And what did you think about it?

Taunton:

I think that uh, Saigon had reached a stage where, restlessness was existing. The Annamites believed that they were in control. The Japanese had been disarmed and the French re-armed. And everything got a bit out of hand. And the only logical thing to do, was to rearm the Japanese, who were highly trained, they had surrendered, and they were, at that time, reliable. It was a bit odd to do it, I admit that, but it worked.

Interviewer:

Did you approve? Did you approve...?

Taunton:

I personally thought it was the right thing to do. Because I had been dealing with the Japanese quite a lot, uh, answering their problems about the surrender, so on and so forth, and I thought it was far better and I felt happier to have rearmed Japanese in control of the key points, rather than rather trigger happy and untrained Frenchmen, and some of them were, running about, and offering themselves as targets to the Annamites, and the Annamites taking full advantage of it.

Interviewer:

Could you briefly describe for us, Brigadier, how your men behaved, what their actions were at this time? They'd been engaged, uh, in looking after the P.O.W.'s who were, who were released, um, and in taking back the strong points around the city, um, from the Japanese. Or the Annamites, as the case might be. And then handing them over to the French. Uh, how, how, what were the actions of your men, what, what was their job to do?

Taunton:

The um, reaction to all this of my own troops, which were fairly specialized and highly trained Gurkhas, an Indian army, were perfectly natural and normal. They knew all about internal security duties. They had left the war behind them and, I suppose in many ways they were a bit ah, confused, like I was, but it became natural and instinctive to them to perform internal security duties properly. There was no question of going in and trying to push people back or control a crowd. If wrong was being done then shots were fired. And it was perfectly simple.

Interviewer:

Were these operations part of a lead up to um, the coup d'etat on September 23rd? Were the actions of your troops a run up to, to this, or was it just part of arranging the surrender of the Japanese? And what did the Annamites, how did they they react to what you were doing?

Taunton:

The rearming of the Japanese... to effect some sort of control, was in a minor way, I suppose, leading up to the coup d'etat. But, um, I didn't sense any strong reaction to, from the Annamites. And um, it seemed to me, in retrospect, that it was the only sensible thing to do. Because we knew that we could depend on the Japanese to do the job properly.

Removing the Vietnamese from positions of contol

Interviewer:

Did you have a sense at that time that you were preparing to hand over to the French again, rather than to the Annamites?

Taunton:

I never lost uh, the impression that in due course, the French would have to take over control and responsibility when they were in a position and strong enough to do so. I never entered my head that I was going to hand back control to Annamites. And uh, it seemed to me a perfectly logical step that having re-armed Frenchmen who were there, that they should be the first link towards resuming control, until such time as Leclerc and his um, troops, who were waiting to come out, should take over from me and the other Indian brigades who were there to disarm the Japanese and send them back. To Japan.

Interviewer:

Did you have any contact with the Annamites or were you instructed not to have contact?

Taunton:

As far as I was concerned, I don't think I had any contact with the Annamites at all, uh, that is personally. And uh, I was certainly never given any orders to deal direct with Annamites.

Interviewer:

Or not deal with them.

Taunton:

Or not deal with them. Yes, I said to deal or not deal with them.

Interviewer:

Whose idea was the coup d'etat? Did you, uh, take part in any of the planning sessions?

Taunton:

I remember vaguely, too, that um... the coup d'etat was heavily recommended by... Decile. Uh, what's it...

Director:

Colonel Cédile.

Taunton:

Cédile. By...

Interviewer:

Let's start again please.

Taunton:

Yah, yah. Uh, with regard, my impressions with regard to the coup d'etat, was that Colonel Cédile was very very much in favor of it. And uh, that uh, General Gracey, who was heartily sick of the Viet Minh, the Annamites causing all this unrest and disturbance in Saigon...

Interviewer:

I'm sorry, I'm going to interrupt for just a second.

Taunton:

Yah, I'm going off net.

Interviewer:

Let's start this...

Director:

Would it help when the mention of Cédile is made, Cédile was then the governor, the governor of Cochinchina.

Interviewer:

The French governor.

Director:

The French governor of Cochinchina. Cédile was then the French governor...

Taunton:

That was right, yes.

Interviewer:

Let's start again.

Taunton:

Right.

Interviewer:

Whose idea was the coup d'etat?

Taunton:

Yah. Um...

Interviewer:

Did you take part in any of the meetings?

Taunton:

When I think back about the coup de, the coup d'etat, I think it must have been the brainchild of Cédile, who was the governor of French Indochina at the time. At...

Director:

Hold it... I'm sorry...

Taunton:

Have I missed it again?

Director:

You missed it again.

Taunton:

Blast it!

Director:

Cochinchina is just the south..

Taunton:

Huh?

Director:

Cochinchina. Just Cochinchina.

Taunton:

Oh, Cochinchina.

Director:

Yes, that was, in other words Saigon. Included Saigon.

Taunton:

I didn't know that.

Director:

French Indochina being the whole...

Interviewer:

Just, let's just refer to him as the French Governor.

Taunton:

All right. It was the impression of Decile...

Interviewer:

Let’s start...

Taunton:

...who was the French governor...

Interviewer:

From the top.... Whose idea was the coup d'etat and did you take part in any of the meetings or discussions about it?

Taunton:

Uh, I'm trying to remember too, who idea was the ah, coup d'etat. I didn't take part in any of the discussions about it although I knew of them, afterwards. But I think it was Decile, who was the French governor of Cochinchina. Enough?

Interviewer:

Please carry on. I want to hear more about it.

Taunton:

Um, in a, broadly, the coup d'etat, which I can remember, in some detail, because I had to issue the operation order, from Asia brigade to effect it, was that on the night of the 22nd, the French would take over about twelve key points in Saigon. About four a.m. in the morning, quite quietly, from the Annamites. My troops were there to help if necessary, but we did take over two other key points, which were more important to us, and all this happened without a hitch.

There were a few shots fired and as far as I remember there were no casualties by the, on the French side, although the Annamites lost one or two killed. The next day, the French populace were so excited at seeing the tricolore flying on the key points taken over, that everybody got a bit wild and happy and uh, there was a lot of unnecessary shooting, joie de vivre being shown throughout Saigon.

Interviewer:

Very good. We'll just change rolls again.

Taunton:

I'm making a bit of a waltz of this.

Interviewer:

Not at all.

Taunton:

What?

Slate four. Take one. (clapsticks)

Interviewer:

Brigadier, whose idea was the coup d'etat, and uh, what were your orders in achieving it?

Taunton:

The... call had went out, when I think back about the coup d'etat, I think it came from the Frenchmen, ah, this Cédile, who was, I think, uh, governor of Cochinchina, at the time. It was um, supported by Gracey, that I'm certain of, because the control commission were very upset about the unnecessary disturbances going on.

And the situation where you had the Japanese in charge of certain key points, the Viet Minh sitting in certain government offices, and so on and so forth, and the French were being release, ah, and, slowly being re-armed, ah, as the third party. Therefore, the decision was made that the French under Lieutenant Colonel Rivière would, on the night of the 22nd, quietly take over key points being held by the Annamites. Disarm the Annamites and at the same time, my brigade, would take over the barracks.

Interviewer:

What were the unnecessary disturbances?

Taunton:

It was the question of the unnecessary disturbances which forced, which led to the coup d'etat being arranged, were, that um, you had Annamites, Frenchmen, at loggerheads with each other, in the streets of Saigon and Cho Lon, and uh, nobody quite knew who was responsible for what.

Interviewer:

Is coup d'etat the right word or were your troops in conjunction with the Japanese and the French, seizing power instead of the Annamites?

Taunton:

When I think about this coup d'etat, it was no question of, the control commission or my troops taking command or control of Saigon. It was all part of the ultimate intention restore control to the French, rather than the Annamites, and to be able, ultimately, to disarm and intern the Japanese ready for their return to Japan.

Post coup violence

Interviewer:

Tell us about the events of the night of the coup d'etat. What happened in the streets? How did your troops behave, uh, was there any violence, did it go according to plan, uh, how did the Annamites react?

Taunton:

The actual coup d'etat, when it was put into effect, happened perfectly quietly, perfectly naturally, and exactly as planned. And it was not until the next day, when the tricolore was seen to be flying in place of, well, for the first time, that excitement broke out, and the French, being an excitable nation, started to become trigger happy, and it was then, that uh, it was necessary to put control back in the hands of the Japanese. And to re, disarm rather, the the French, for a while.

Interviewer:

What were they doing? What were the French doing?

Taunton:

The French were, just sort of, rampaging, may I put that word, the French were rampaging down the streets and letting off shots quite unnecessarily, and um...

Interviewer:

Well, were they terrorizing the Annamites? There have been some reports of brutality.

Taunton:

I, thinking back again, about the disturbances that went on after the coup d'etat, I don't think that there was deliberately any, uh, retaliation by the French against the Annamites. I don't think they were trying to take it out on the Annamites, but there was this feeling that the Annamites, given a chance, would have a crack at the French, and the French had no hesitation in replying back. Uh, it was just a question, to my mind, that everybody, except the Japanese, were trigger-happy.

Interviewer:

Do you have any personal recollection of the event two nights later when the French civilians were massacred?

Taunton:

I can not remember the, the, matter of French being massacred. I know it happened but I have no knowledge of where or when.

The death of Peter Dewey

Interviewer:

Finally, Lt. Colonel Dewey, the American OSS officer, how did you find out about his death? Uh, what do you know about the whole process, the efforts to recover his body, the failure of those efforts, and uh, General Gracey's reaction to the, to the, to the um, to the killing.

Taunton:

The question of um, Colonel Dewey's death...

Interviewer:

Let's cut it.

Taunton:

Yah, I've got the wrong thing haven't I?

Interviewer:

No... It’s the airplane.

Front board five. Take one. (clapsticks)

Interviewer:

Brigadier, what did you about, what did you know at the time, about Colonel Dewey's death? And how did uh, Gracey react?

Taunton:

Colonel Dewey, of the OSS, was a law to himself. He had arrived, uh, and attached himself to the control commission, I think a little to ah, Cédile's surprise, as well as Gracey's surprise, and he was a man who acted always on his own. And um, it was great surprise to me when I found that he had been killed, I didn't know, and one of the company commanders of the third first Gurkhas, Blascheck, very nearly succeeded in, uh, recovering the body, but there again, it was never found. Whether or not it was done by Annamites or French, I wouldn't like to say. That's a bit...

Interviewer:

That's excellent.

Taunton:

That all right?

Interviewer:

Thank you very much.

Taunton:

But I forgot about the, bringing in the other issue. You wanted me to bring it in but I forgot about it.

Interviewer:

Oh, the flags.

Taunton:

The flag, yah.

Interviewer:

The rule about the flag.

Taunton:

Yah. Shall I try it now?

Interviewer:

Yes.

Taunton:

Um, at that time, I can remember, that Dewey always flew ah, an American flag, and the orders were that nobody, uh, should fly a flag above the rank of a one star general.

Interviewer:

Below.

Taunton:

Below the rank of a one star general. So, uh, it may be that because he flew this flag, was a cause for somebody taking a pot shot at him. That's all I can surmise.

Interviewer:

Thank you, Brigadier, very much.

Taunton:

I got that wrong, too. Right.

Interviewer:

Shall we go over it once more?

Taunton:

Yup.

Interviewer:

Ok. The rule about the flag. Would you tell us about that? We'll do it once more.

Taunton:

Once more.

Interviewer:

Yes.

Taunton:

The rule about the... Stop, will you.

The rule about the flag was that Gracey said, if I remember right, that nobody below the rank of a one star general could fly a flag. And if I remember right, Dewey was a Lt. Colonel, and he flew a flag, and I think I'm right that he flew the USA flag. That's right. So you want that little bit again, that he might be an instrumental... right. When you're ready.

Interviewer:

Go.

Taunton:

The rule that um, General Gracey issued about flags being flown on cars, was that nobody below that rank of a one star general should fly a flag. Dewey, of course, was flying a United States flag, which might well have been the cause of somebody taking a pot shot at him. I wouldn't know, but it seems possible.

Interviewer:

Very good. Excellent. Thank you. Good.

This is exterior post track.