Colonel Snyder, I'd like to take you back to August, 1965. As we've explained to you, we have done some filming in Vietnam and we've seen some films of the raid of (inaudible), about operations that took place in Cam Ne on August the second. And I wonder if you could think back to then, try to remember why you were going in that day and just start to go through the session that early morning. What happened?

Well, I think it probably should start...

You can stop...(laughter)

(Clears throat)

You were just going to give us the background to...

Yes, I think some background is worthwhile to kind of set the scene, uh, uh our company had been in Vietnam for approximately, oh I guess a month or two months, and uh were assigned defensive missions around the Da Nang air base complex. At that time of the war, ah Marines were restricted from offensive operations in our, so therefore, we were simply there to protect the airfield and the cantonment that was associated with it.

Uh, the, I guess maybe a month before, the airbase had been penetrated by an attack and some significant damage was done to the aircraft. And as a result of that, we were re-deployed from positions adjacent to Hill 327 which is west of the airbase, uh to a position southw...southeast of the air field complex. We were north of the Song Cau Do River and uh we were, we were placed along the access at which that penetration had occurred.

To do uh scouting and patrolling and to establish some information about that area and the people in it. Uh, at the same time, in getting to know the people, we were running a number of medical patrols and dispensing medicines and examining people and helping with the school buildings and that sort of thing: reconstruction. Um, one of the uh...

How had that gone? Had that been very successful after the (inaudible). What are your recollections, was it different from being on the base?

It was considerably different because we were out with the population to some extent and uh, uh there was considerable apprehension on both sides as to what to expect but, uh as things progressed uh, I thought uh we were very well received and uh we got along very well with the people. Uh, we had no uh incidents or problems and uh they were, they seemed to generally receptive of our presence there.

Uh, I guess maybe uh two weeks or so before my uh the operation that I went on, we had send a uh a unit uh from our battalion south of the Cau Do River uh to investigate uh the area because of a mortar attack, on the uh the supply dump near Hill 327. Um it was determined that that was uh the approximate location of the mortars and they wanted to go down and investigate it. And uh, I think it signified an extension of our defensive system uh it was determined that we couldn't defend the airbase by sitting on the end of the runway, that we had to go out and uh try to um uh reduce the possibility of uh indirect fire or mortars uh, rockets that sort of thing on the base itself.

Uh, in the process of conducting an initial sweep there south river the unit that went uh it was understanding that they had sustained several casualties, perhaps in the neighborhood of ten or so. Uh, we were not uh involved in that nor did we have any direct information about it. It was simply reported to us, uh and then it was determined that we should go down there in uh with a larger unit uh with a little more uh, uh coherent plan...and try to go into the Cam Ne complex of villages and uh try to assess the situation there as to whether the, the village was friendly, not friendly, uh a threat to the base or whether it might be reasonable or plausible that a mortar attack would come from that area.

Uh, the operation was a one-day operation uh in which one company was essentially to do the work and uh it involved uh embarking upon amphibian tractors very early in the morning, proceeding along the river, the Cau Do River, to a point adjacent and west of the village.

Could you stop please, because I think we're about to run out. Okay, early, early in the morning you're, you're, you're going out...Can you give, just give me a little description as you're going...you get in your vehicles, you start to go towards the company; what happens?

Ah, we had, we initially embarked upon the Amtracs at the junction of Route One ah, of Vietnam Route One and the Cau Do River...very early in the morning, ah, before daylight and proceeded into the river. Ah, it was quiet, ah...ah, the weather was good, but we had difficulty in the river itself because of mudbanks and several of our amphibian tractors became stuck in the mud. It, ah, delayed our operation and also disrupted it to some degree because we could not ah, ah, debark the people from those tractors; we had no room on the other ones.

Ah, those delays, ah, caused us to arrive at, ah, our intended point of departure from the river, ah, maybe two hours later than we had initially estimated. So, therefore, our progress up the river was, ah, in daylight...as it turned out, the last maybe third of the distance...ah, of a mile or so. We had not intended to be in the river in daylight, um...but ah, so we were within observation of the village, ah, on our approach, and...ah, as we moved the Amtracs out of the river and stopped them in the edge of rice paddies...ah, and debarked the Marines aboard, we were, we were taken under fire...a small arms fire – ah, several automatic weapons; I don't, I don't know whether they were machine guns or automatic rifles.

In any event, we found ourselves in a situation where we were being fired upon, ah, across maybe two hundred to three hundred meters of rice paddy...ah, from, ah, what we could determine to be the fringe of the village, which was ah, ah, a tree-line. Ah, we had to take some action at that point to protect ourselves because there was no cover there, except for the rice paddy dikes. Ah, we thereupon attempted to establish some kind of fire superiority, as we call it, by simply returning small arms fire, ah, with the hope of causing whoever's firing at us to duck or leave so that we can maneuver and get out of the open area.

Ah, it was fairly successful, ah, I think after, ah, an exchange of fire of maybe ten or fifteen minutes, we were able then to begin to, to maneuver, ah, toward the tree-line...just in, ah, ah, just simply by running and hitting the dirt and getting up and running again in typical infantry fashion. Ah, we sustained, ah, a casualty in that process, ah...and, ah, we had to evacuate him, but we did reach the tree-line with, ah, minimal casualties to ourselves.

Ah, we did not use...ah, supporting arms – artillery or mortars – at that point to, ah, assist our efforts. Ah, my judgment was that the sporadic small arms was something that we could handle and there was no need to call on additional support. Ah, with the exception of the one casualty, we had no great problems getting across the rice paddy.

Ah, we had, however, been firing into the tree-line...and not knowing what was behind it because we couldn't see behind it. Ah, as it turned out there were, ah, huts, ah, and outbuildings associated with the village...ah, inside the tree-line, which were not observable when we first arrived. Ah, and by that time, ah, the, the village population, or the people that we ah encountered, were, of course, terrified of what was going on and, and what might happen to them, and were, and had been subjected to some, ah, small arms fire. Ah, we did not find any casualties among them initially, but they were certainly terrified, as well they might be.

(Inaudible)...you're doing very well.

Ray, you were telling me that you had gone in early in the morning and that, ah, you'd come under fire...from, ah, a tree-line – you fired into it...you, you're approaching the village and you see that there are, there are houses there – I wonder if you can pick up the story from there and tell me what happened?

Ah, yes, as we initially approached the tree-line and worked out way through it, ah, we had cons, some considerable difficulty just because the nature of the, ah, of the bamboo and the bamboo fencework that's, ah, associated with those kinds of villages, and the perimeters of them. Um, also there is no, no set pattern within the complex of ah, houses; it's not laid out in streets or that sort of thing as we understand it. Um, it tended to disrupt our tactical formations, making control very difficult, and, ah, ah, it also made it very difficult to proceed, ah, in an orderly fashion through the village.

Ah, so we found ourselves operating in small teams, checking...ah huts as we would come to them, and trying to, ah, ah, move the villagers out of the huts or out of at least any potential line of fire that we might run into, ah, bring them to a central point, ah, or, or any open area where a ah Vietnamese soldier might talk to them. Ah, our mission, ah, was essentially to, ah, move in, go into the village and try to develop some, ah, form of intelligence, ah, military intelligence, ah, information about the area, the, the people. Ah, any information we could find about the infrastructure of the Viet Cong there.

And, ah, so we were just in a process of, ah...talking to the villagers as we came upon them and searching the area as we went to try to determine if there were any military supplies. Um...

How did you use your interpreters? Or were they all with the army or what? How did you go actually about questioning them and asking them what was going on?

Ah, they would stay behind the platoon, ah, in ah groups of two or three, and as, ah, as our men came upon a group of villagers, normally in groups of three or four or five, ah...a family sometimes...ah, they would be escorted down the path to, ah essentially, the platoon command post, where I was, and, ah, where we had some interpreters, and...ah, they would talk to them there.

Ah, we didn't have a great deal of difficulty in doing that, ah, ah, except for the language barrier...ah, in, in terms of moving the people, or collecting them up. Uh, they were ah frightened...ah many of them women, of course, were crying and the children. Ah, we saw no young men in the village, ah, there were simply old men, women, and children. Ah, but they were escorted to these points, ah, where we could, ah, talk to them or a Vietnamese, ah, soldier could talk to them.

And...(clears throat) in the process of doing that we were eh continuing to encounter, ah, sporadic small arms fire or sniper fire. So, ah...we were faced with the problem of how to, to move our way through the village ah, and defend, and at the same time protect ourselves from...the, ah, sniper fire. Ah...our intent was, and our instructions were, to avoid, ah, any civilian damage or casualties to the extent possible; that was a general ground rule that we had been operating in...ah, this particular village was, ah, something of a departure from what we had encountered in the past, however. Um...we ah we'd found a number of ah, punji pits, ah, booby traps...um...

Can you tell me what a punji trap is? Because I...

A punji pit, ah, is a, ah...small, square pit dug in the ground about two feet deep and two feet square and it has bamboo spikes buried in the bottom sticking up, so that...and then it's uh, the top of covered over with a layer of grass or ah, some camouflage, and, ah, therefore, if you step into it, the bamboo ah, ah spikes will penetrate either, ah, your foot or your, ah, calf, or something like...cause ah, lower leg wounds...ah, we had encountered them before; we knew what they were, and, and they did not cause us a serious um problem – it ju, it si, simply delayed our movement.

Ah, the, the, ah...booby trapped gates and that sort of thing caused a little more of a delay because you have clear area and move the civilians back and then...disarm the booby trap or, ah, blow it in place with some kind of d-, ah, explosives.

So are these, these mined booby traps, or were they...?

Ah, they were, ah, like hand grenades...ah, ah, a rudimentary form of hand grenade, ah...

Yes, I wonder if you can just sort of – so that I can use it without my question – could you just explain to me more about the booby traps?

Ah, booby traps, ah, in use at that time, ah, or in that area, were homemade...ah, a small amount of explosives, ah, either, ah, black gun powder or, if they could get plastique of some kind, it would be used – uh, packed into, ah, perhaps, bamboo or a tin can or a, a bottle or whatever they could compress it in, ah, filled with some kind of, ah, material that would constitute a form of shrapnel – it could be nails, pieces of tin, wire, whatever – and, and, ah...occasionally you would find a, a standard military hand grenade that had been, been, ah, captured some places along the line – and used for that purpose.

It was hooked up to a trip wire across a trail, or attached to a gate; as the gate swings open or as the trip wire is, ah, tripped, uh, it pulls the pin from the grenade or ah and allows the ah, ah firing pin or the detonator of the device to go home and explode ah the device. Ah, causes localized casualties, ah...oftentimes not lethal – but occasionally it is, depending on the size of the explosive – but certainly enough to ah potentially kill someone, and, ah, would in any event, ah...ah, wound them seriously enough to cause their evacuation.

Was there a significant number of these booby traps; were there more than usual; had you come across them in villages like this before, or what was the significance of them?

Well, I, I think that ah, in relevant terms there were, there were more...ah, substantially more than we had encountered, but that's not to say that there was a large number of them. In, in our sector, we, we would – I guess maybe we found, ah, five or six...ah, but we had found none of that type in the villages we had been in before, we had found punji pits...um, but no explosive devices that were s- at least still...armed and, and functioning.

Ah, so the scene was, ah...ah, a fairly substantial departure from what we'd encountered ah in the past month or so. Ah...ah, having been fired upon, ah, initially...there was small arms fire – and then encountering, ah, the booby traps and other defensive systems that were organized in the village – it was much different than those that were more adjacent ah mor, closer to the airfield itself. Ah, but we had an expectation that it was not going to be a walk in the sun there...ah, we had reason to believe that um...because of previous casualties, that it would not be um...a, a friendly reception. But we didn't know just to what extent, ah, ah, the difficulties would arise and we also did not know whether it was a transitory thing.

We, we didn't know whether the Viet Cong simply moved ah about through the areas and if you encountered them, you would have a problem, and if not the villagers would be in a peaceful, you know, living peacefully. Um, the delays that we were encountering in searching the ah, houses and talking to the villagers were slowing down the operation significantly, and, ah, the, ah, way the village had developed, ah, in n-, in a random pattern, so to speak, was making it very difficult to maintain any kind of contact with the, eh, other ah units...that were involved, the other two platoons...on ea, one on each side.

Ah, so there was a, ah, a difference in pace in the development of the search and it caused our formations to get out of contact with one another and just created a number of command and control problems. Um...the, ah, the reception that we received in the village, ah, I think, ah, was about what I had expected – ah, simply, ah, a high degree of, ah, ah fright and apprehension about what was going on and ah, ah...it was very difficult to determine, ah, whether any of these particular villagers that we talked to had been involved in the firing at all. Ah, in fact, there was little evidence to support that they had...ah, they were simply caught in the middle of it.

And ah we were attempting to move them, ah, out of the way so that they wouldn't be caught in any kind of, ah, crossfire. And in the process, give the Vietnamese soldiers a chance to talk to them at some length about the village itself.

Ah, as we moved into the further into the village, ah, we did encounter a problem, which ah which was ultimately to become, ah, a very difficult situation...in that we had not gotten a report from one of my squads that they had been fired from behind. Ah, it meant either that our search was not, ah, ah, sufficiently, ah, adequate, or that we were facing some other kind of a problem; um that perhaps they had come from some other area of the village and come in behind us or whatever.

Um, it was my deter, determination at that point that, ah, we needed to first research some of the, the houses that we had ah gone by, and ah try to determine why, ah, we had missed these people, and, in the process of doing that, we began to ah, uncover, ah, bunkers – just simply ce, ah, cellars – ah dug in the, in the ground, ah, beneath the floor of, of the dwellings, which might well have been simply for protection of the, the family itself – somewhere to go if something happened.

Ah, there did appear to be some, ah, ah, further digging ah, of smaller exits or, or perhaps adjacent tunnels or something from some of those ah, pits. Ah, then it began to be-, uh become apparent to me that we were facing a problem in which a, a sniper, or a, a Viet Cong soldier, ah, could fire at us from one building, one hut, ah, and disappear down these tunnels and then come up in another one and fire from a completely different direction, which ca- ah posed substantial problems for us. Um, there was...

(Inaudible) sorry...(inaudible)...you're doing very (noise on tape)...I'm pleased to say.

You're really explaining to me that you were having...difficulty, ah, going through; the operation was being slowed up, and that you then got a report of someone being fired on from behind, and so you ordered a further search of some of the buildings that you'd come across. Ah, and you were talking about the tunnels – and I wonder if you could just give me a little bit more...um, about the tunnels; you said they could either have been places for shelter or they could have been places to run from one house to the other.

Could you describe the, the extent of the tunnel network or what it actually was and then what you did about it?

Um, as I was saying, we, we, we had begun to discover, ah, on a more detailed search, the existence of, ah, protective shelters or bunkers and, ah, trenches, ah beneath the floors of the buildings and, and ah, some, ah, branches or, or tunnels leading away from them. Ah, we had not encountered this before, and, ah, so I couldn't determine, in my own mind, whether it was simply a, ah, a protection against, ah, th-, an, war fighting that had been, had occurred in that area in many years before and that, ah, they simply existed, or were they storage shelters or cellars for food and that sort of thing.

Ah, we'd, ah, we did not make an attempt to, ah, to do an extensive search of those pits and tunnels. Um, we had a limited number of men available and we were, we had more than wh- than we could handle in just simple looking through the, the houses as best we could.

Ah, so it was very difficult, at that point, to develop any sense of ah, whether there was a pattern to these tunnels or not, or whether, in fact, ah, they, they just simply represented additional digging for more protection on the part of population. Um, we checked them as best we could; we did not have the means to, to, ah, to destroy them, ah, except that we did have some en-, some engineer demolitions, ah, that we used to plug up some of them. Ah, but we, we had ah far...ah, a much inadequate ah, amount of engineer equipment to do that sort of thing – we had not anticipated encountering it. Ah, the engineer equipment we had was primarily to dispose of booby traps and that sort of thing if we found them.

And ah...in any event, I found myself in a, in a difficult operational dilemma because, ah, ah we, we knew that there were ah, ah enemy soldiers in the village – we, we were continuing to take some sporadic fire – but finding them and ah getting them out and, and in the process, trying to avoid ah any damage to the civilians themselves, ah, was a difficult process indeed. Ah, when faced with th- the possibility that ah these tunnels ah could be connecting one house to another or an outbuilding or a haystack – ah, we did find some, something like ah spider traps that were used in the Viet-, an in the Japanese war, where very small foxhole...ah, that ah, with a, a portable top on it so the man can hide in it, raise up, fire, and then drop back down.

Ah, so ah...and, and we also understood that ah it was in no way to our advantage to cause any ah unnecessary damage to the people because, I think our training had been fairly extensive in that area in counter-guerrilla operations and I, I have ah great confidence that the platoon understood that the people were not the enemy ah they were simply caught up in it. And, ah, although it was difficult, you, you had to find some way to determine who the enemy was without doing any undue damage to the to the civilian population. And, thus, drive them to support ah, ah the Viet Cong movement.

But, ah, when you find yourself between a rock and hard place ah occasionally in something like that, and ah then I had a responsibility to, to the men that were, that were with me as well. Ah, that some reasonable precaution should be taken to protect them and ah on balance I determined that ah and my guidance to my squad leaders was that if ah they are fired upon from a house, they more, they may attack it in a more ah standard military fashion rather than just simply ah being forced to approach it. Ah, that standard process ah for combat in a built-up area or in fortified positions is to ah to fire at any openings in the house ah, ah if necessary use a flame thrower to shoot into the aperture or the window or whatever and throw a hand grenade or an explosive device in, in front of you and then enter the building.

And, that's what we began to do, to do on for those houses that had ah that we received fire from. Ah, that caused a considerable amount of damage ah in the houses. Ah, they or the small huts that we had to deal with ah and the flame throwers ah, of course, the houses being constructured of wood and straw matting were ah very inflammable and ah those houses that were approached on that basis were burned. Ah, and to, obviously, to the consternation of the people and I fully understand, stood that. I just couldn't in my own mind find another way to do what I had to do, ah, and still provide some reasonable protection for the Marines who were with me. Ah...

Was the criteria for the burning of the houses then that there should have been fire from them or was there ever a situation in which got so out of hand that a considerable number of houses had to be destroyed? I wonder if you could explain that.

Ah, one establishing ah, you know, coming to that decision and ah trying to determine in my own mind what should be the, the restrictions ah on the level of damage that was going to ah accrue from all of this, ah, I tried, I told the squad leaders to approach it on simply a case by case basis and use their own judgment ahm that ah we were not getting a ah a heavy volume of fire, that they should be able to ah pinpoint at least to some extent the source of the, of the fire, the firing, and ah therefore they could then take appropriate action.

Ah, the subject did not come up of, of large scale destruction of the say four or five houses in a complex or anything like that ah nor was it approached that way. It was simply as they searched the houses, if they encountered difficulties, ah, they had permission to use more military force than we really wanted to use in order to do it. Ah, since I saw our mission as having to search the village whether it was ah, ah a peaceful search or a military search.

How, was the population regarding what was actually happening to the people who were taken away? Were your own men staying with them or were they totally with ARVN people, was there any interrogation going on. Precisely, what was the pattern for actually dealing with the civilians that you'd gone after in the houses?

Well, as we ah were moving through the village and trying to remove the civilian population from these houses ah they would be returned to ah virtually any place that a ah, ah, Vietnamese soldier was available so that they could talk to them. Ah (clears throat), the largest group were brought to my platoon command post ah that at least that seemed to me to be the largest group. Ah, Vietnamese soldiers would travel along behind the squads and ah they would talk to people as they came out of their houses and if they saw some reason to do more than simply identify the people and look at their identification cards ah they would send them back to the platoon CP where ah a noncommissioned officer from the Vietnamese ah interrogators was there and he would talk more at length.

Ah, we had no holding compound or anything like that ah established. It was simply an effort to, to speak or in some cases interrogate the villagers ah as the Vietnamese soldiers saw fit. Ah, these conversations as I observed them would last ah maybe five minutes, ah, and were conducted in, in my view a very innocuous manner, although I think the Vietnamese soldiers in general tended to handle the civilians a little more roughly than the Marines would in general. Certainly at that point in terms of, of shouting at them, directing them to go to some place or grabbing them by their arm and escorting them to wherever they wanted them.

I did not in my ah in my whole time in the village there observe any of the Vietnamese troops ah nor my own ah...doing a thing that I would have considered to be an assault of some kind like ah hitting someone or kicking someone or shoving them roughly to the ground or that sort of thing. Ah, that part of it was fairly consistent with, with how we had done previous ah, ah operations ah of a similar nature. The Vietnamese would travel along with us and as we would provide some security while they talked to the villagers ah and tried to establish who they were and what they were doing there and ah find out any information they could about any Viet Cong efforts in the area. Ah...

The, the intelligence gathering, the interrogations and so on, was that entirely in the hands of the Vietnamese or did you have any intelligence officers with them or were your own men standing around with them? Was, was the operation straight in other words or was it mixed?

Ah, it was mixed. We, when our men would bring them back to the area they would normally wait there for a few minutes and see if they wanted to return them to their house or there was something else to be done and we had a few men there providing just local security for this ah while the discussions were going on. So, it was, and it was conducted in an open area. Ah, within the village there were a number of, of paths maybe three or four feet wide that intersected and, and ah, ah using the intersection of the paths with the adjacent front yard of a house or something, we had plenty of room to talk to them. Ah, so, ah it was done out in the open and ah in a fairly straightforward manner, you know in my recollection.

I wonder if you could move forward a little bit more. You've done the searching and you've ordered the...Sorry.

Now, you were telling me about what you had to do in the village and and you said that you had had, you'd given orders which allowed men to use standard military practice if they came under fire from, from a building and so on. I'd like to move you on a bit toward the end of the day. Ah, what was the sum total of the ah of the operation? If you could give me some idea of the number of houses that you had to bound and what arrangements were there, if any, for the civilians who were in the village, and what was to happen before you withdrew and what happened as you withdrew?

Well, as the afternoon progressed, we ah found ourselves being more and more bogged down as the number of houses were uncovering and ah more ah tunneling and evidence of tunneling and that sort of thing was developing. It was causing, taking much longer to do the search than we had anticipated. Ah, there was a certain amount of ah, ah chaotic activity in the sense that ah, ah we were continuing to have to, to ah protect ourselves from sniper fire. It was just enough to keep everybody down and ah struggling along in more of a military fashion than, than simply a walk through the village and talking to the people.

Ah, there was firing ah on ah from us ah from our men and explosives going off and I don't want to paint a sort of benign picture of, of the day. It ah I'm sure was ah difficult on the people. There was no doubt about that, and I'm sure that ah because of their apprehensions and their ah not knowing what we were there for, what our intent was, ah, I'm sure it was a very terrifying experience.

Ah, the additional requirement ah as I saw it to ah to destroy some of the structures, the necessity of destroying those structures in the village just ah created ah or exacerbated that situation. (Clears throat) But, it became fairly clear ah by ah about 1:00 in the afternoon, I guess, that we were not going to achieve anything like the objectives that we had set forth in terms of distance and actually getting well into the village or through it. Ah, nor were the other platoons doing any better.

Ah, so then it became an issue of ah did they, did the battalion or the, the higher headquarters want to, want us to stay in the village over night and continue in the morning. And, ah, apparently the decision was made that we would not stay overnight, that we would begin to prepare to withdraw from the villages ah and that perhaps that would ah following operation would come back with a much larger force that would be sufficient to handle the co...the village complex, ah, say it turned out to be far larger than what we had expected.

Ah, so, I guess about 2:00 or 2:15, 2:30, somewhere there in the afternoon, we were, we received instructions to prepare to withdraw back to the amphibian tractors ah from the village. Ah, there was ah no instructions given about the civilians themselves. Ah, we did not have any ah serious injuries on the part of the civilians in my platoon sector so there was no medical problems to be dealt with. It was just simply a matter of leaving ah and trying to protect ourselves as we did so. Ah, and, upon receiving the orders to leave ah, ah we were prepared to do that.

We, we had withdrawn back to the edge of the village. I would estimate that we, my platoon only got maybe oh, a hundred and fifty, or two hundred yards into the village in this whole time and covered perhaps thirty or forty huts in my platoon sector. Ah, the damage that was done. We destroyed several ah gates, ahm filled in a number of punji pits. Ah, houses? Ah, it's difficult for me to estimate. I, in my platoon sector, I would think perhaps ah ten to fifteen houses ah that had been burned in the process. But, because of the way the village was laid out and the fact that I was doing a number of things, I didn't have a chance to go around myself, and, and nor had any inclination to do so, ah to count the particular number of houses. Ahm.

Were you the only platoon in the particular village which I believe is called Cam Ne Four your platoon was concerned solely with this village or were there other platoons actually at the same village. Actually dealing with Cam Ne Four?

Well, it, it's difficult for me to say exactly ah what village I was in, ah, nor is it ah, ah am I able to say what village the other platoons were in. Our maps simply had a designation ah on it that this was Cam Ne and there some islands of habitation in there. Ah, and I can't be certain at all that ah, ah that I was working in one village and somebody else was in, the other platoons were in another village or we were all part, working in parts of a larger village complex. Very difficult to determine that.

But, you weren't actually in contact, immediate contact with other Marines other than by radio. I mean there weren't, there was no platoon going along immediately by the side of you that you were in contact...

Ah, that had been the intent but that was not the case, ah, as it turned out. Because of the way the village complex was laid out, the platoons did get separated to some extent. Ah, it was possible to, to move from ah flank of my platoon to, to go far enough over to, you know, a hundred yards or so and find another platoon. Some men there. But, ah, essentially we were, we were working as an independent platoon. Ah, you know, there was no direct contact on both sides of us, although there was supposed to be.

Did the withdraw go satisfactorily? Were you happy with the way...did your men get out okay?

Ah, the withdrawal process was fairly straightforward, although we continued to re, receive fire in the process of doing it, and so we had to, to move back from the tree line and back out the village about the way we went into it. We would leave a base of fire ah and a section, the right flank of the platoon, might withdraw. And, then, they would take up firing positions and cover the left flanks for withdrawal. So, we just worked our way back to the river and to the Amtracs and ah continued to be fired upon ah until we got the Amtracs down to the river.

I wonder if you could go through your mind. You told us about one casualty that you suffered. I wonder if you could tell me what you, what the estimate was of the total casualties that you received and whether you actually, whether you actually killed any of, any of the enemy or, or the extent to which you came in contact with the enemy? Could you give us some figures?

Ah, an assessment of our casualties and, and those of the enemy, ah the enemy side is certainly sketchy. Ah, our, for, for my part, I think we, we took ah a total of perhaps three or four casualties. Ah, one, one man was shot ah in the stomach as we were approaching a rice paddy and then one man was shot later ah, ah in the buttocks area. Ah, but, very light casualties given the amount of firing going on and it was never a heavy volume of fire. It would just kind of constant and sporadic, but certainly not well-aimed and, and not enough to disrupt what we were trying to do.

Ah, so far as identifying Vietnamese ah or not Vietnamese but Viet Cong, ah actual people with rifles and weapons, very difficult to do. Ah, I, I personally never saw any but I was in the rear of the platoons, ah, ah, but I did not, I did not encounter a, ah, ah, a Viet Cong face to face or anything approaching like that. Ah, and, it was only our initial entry into the village and withdrawal from the village that I myself was under any fire at all.

Ah, I don't think that we did ah any particular damage at all to the Viet Cong infrastructure there or, or even to, to very many Viet Cong ah soldiers. Ah, we found several, you know, three or four, I guess, as I recall, that ah, ah were deemed to be Viet Cong because of circumstances that we found them and, and ah how, how our troops had come upon them. (Clears throat) But, ah, as we were to find later, it was very difficult to identify ah the, the Viet Cong because they could fire at you and then hide the weapon and then just simply melt into the crowd. Ah...

Did you find any weapons caches or anything? You were talking about mortar fire that you received. Did you actually, was there any weapons, significant weapon finds, or any weapon finds at all and in the village...?

Ah, besides the ah the people ah the Viet Cong forces...

I wonder if you can tell me what, if anything, you found in the way of weapons, or stores or firm, firm identification of which, of which you could yes this was ah a Viet Cong village or the Viet Cong operating. What did you come across?

Yes. I, ah, I don't think that we found any firm evidence that ah this was a major Viet Cong operating area except for the reception that we received which was vastly different than, than the other areas. Ah, but, tangible evidence ah such as ah mortar tubes or mortar ammunition, demolitions, ah, ah, small arms, that sort of thing, we did not find any. But, as I say, we, we probably only got into about three to five percent of the village complex, so to me, it was not surprising that we found very little on the fringes of the village and that's about all we got into.

Ah, whether there was any there or not, I have no idea. Ah, whether it was legitimate that ah the assumption that that's where the mortar fire came from, I don't think that was established by our operation at all. Ah, but, ah, it was, the village itself ah on a more subjective, on a more subjective judgment was vastly different than the bulk of those that we'd encountered in the past. It was ah, ah much more ah heavily fortified...

One of the things which people were complaining about was it the actual way, the initial way of being driven out of the villages. They lobbed with smoke or with artillery and they were being forced out of their houses in that way and it wasn't a question of people coming in and saying get out. I wonder if you could ah look again at that whole business of actually getting people from ah from the village. Have you anything to add there or any thoughts on that?

Ahm, Yes. We ah there was no use of artillery or mortar fire ah to deliver ah standard smoke ordinance. Ah...

Could you, we were just starting to go again on the actual way in which you went into the village. If you could tell me again why it should happen that you'd fire an artillery or mortars or grenades or...?

Yes. Ah, we, we did not use artillery or mortar fire ah while we were approaching the village or in the village. Ah, we simply didn't see that there was any necessity to do that. Ah, so far as smoke ah the only source of smoke other than the fire from a hut or something would be our signaling power techniques. Smoke grenades they're called, but they're really colored smoke; red, green, or yellow that's used for signaling purposes and the platoon issue of something like that would be perhaps three or four or five. Ah, not a large issue of smoke. Ah, I don't think sufficient even if we were to set them all off the time that it would cause a great deal of consternation. Ah, it does irritate the eyes to some degree, but ah that's about all it would do, and we used them routinely around our own troops.

And, we had no ah tear gas or anything like that at that point in time or the military equivalent, CS. It was, it had not been introduced there. Ah, so, I, I don't know ah what, what smoke ah mi...where it might have come from.

One of the, two of the people that we interviewed, two of the women who live in Cam Ne now, do say they were there and indeed one of them we've matched up with a photograph on the film, they...one woman in particular claims that she was taken away, as I mentioned to her, she was taken away and she was subjected to multiple rape ah and assault and I wonder whether you were aware of any possibility of anything like this going on. There was also another woman who claims that her twelve or thirteen-year-old daughter ah was both raped and murdered. She went back and buried her two days later. Were there any incidents like this brought to your attention.

No, nor was aware that those allegations had been made. Ah...ah...

I wonder if you could, I was given...specifically mention the topic, and nobody made any allegations to you.

Yes. Insofar as actual assaults upon the persons ah in the village ah in terms of physical assault or abuse or ah, or rape, ah, or murder, or anything like that, ah, I was unaware of any allegations of that sort. Nor was I apprised of any complaints ah of that nature while we were in the village. While I sus – suppose anything is possible, I, my personal opinion is that ah it's ah extremely ah unlikely that that sort of thing went on because ah, we had cer...we had been in the country for several months and I'd had no problems of any sort of that sort of thing with any of my troops. No complaints at all about how they dealt with people and ah we were very busy.

Ah, it was not ah peaceful venture and ah it was, everybody was occupied at searching houses and ah protecting themselves. Ah, I find it unlikely that ah, ah that there would be an opportunity even for anything like that in something like the six or seven hours that we were there. Ah. The people that were interrogated by and large were brought back to the Platoon CP. And, ah, the, the, filming that went on during that time was done probably fifteen or twenty feet from me, and ah, the Vietnamese interpreters ah were in that area also. They traveled with the platoon CP.

Ah, I saw no indication at all that the people were being treated unne...in a manner that might be harmful to them given the circumstances that we were having to evacuate them from their buildings, houses, and they were afraid and didn't want to come out sometimes. Ah, but, no undue force at all so far as I could see and, and the ah as I left I thought that the only significant damage that we had done was to some of the houses that were involved.

Did you actually, just back to many casualties, I believe you said there were just a few civilian casualties as far as, there were no, there was no basic sort of large-scale loss of life on, on either side, as far as you were concerned about this operation, really the operation of the – How big does it stick in your mind as an operation?

Well, I ah, my sense of the operation at the time ah was that it was ah, ah extremely insignificant. Ah, it was certainly unsuccessful in that we did not ah achieve our aims or, or develop any useful intelligence except to know that the village was going to be a problem and that it was ah was defended. Ah, I saw it, I saw it to be of very little consequence from a military standpoint and ah the, the extremely light casualties on both sides would not have led me to believe that it was going to be of any consequence to anyone at any time, and ah the limited depth that we achieved in the village I couldn't believe that we had actually done a significant amount of damage to the village as well. Ah...

The last comment you made I think is quite significant: One of the, two or three of the people, they talk in terms of not of ten or fifteen houses but they talk in terms of about a hundred houses being burned. Do you think that is possible or is that an exaggeration or...?

Well, I don't ah I think it's, it's possible if all of the, the platoons involved were, were operating on about the same level I was. You could get to a number of forty or fifty or so. And, I think the after-action report states that it was fifty or thereabouts. A hundred houses? Certainly there was nothing like that level of burning done on my platoon sector. No.

Just to reiterate. The allegation from the villagers that we have on film is that the village of Cam Ne was basically decimated, that more than a hundred houses were ah were burned down. Ah. Do you think it was possible that your men could have, could have caused that number of burnings or houses gone? What are your thoughts when you hear a charge like that?

Well, I think it's ah, ah, you know I patently reject the idea that ah that my platoon might have burned down a hundred houses. I don't think we searched a hundred houses. Ah, however, I did not go back and make any conscious attempt to count specifically the number of houses so you know I'm using an estimate just ba...based upon what I've seen. Ah, and, I, I did not see anything like that level of damage going on in the village nor do I know whether ah as is maintained that the entire village was decimated because it was my understanding, although I never went back to Cam Ne that the village was much, much larger than what we had encountered. It was a very extensive village extending hundreds and hundreds of meters. So, ah, my ah, my assessment of it is that ah that's unlikely.

Is there any possibility, do you think, that the mood of the men when going into this village was different than that mood in other villages. I mean, would there have been a possibility that it would be mortar fire from there; even heard suggestions that two or three weeks previous to that some Marines got injured nearby. Do you think there could have been a mood of, of anger of the men as they went to the village that hadn't been in evidence before?

Well I don't, I don't think that there was any serious undercurrent of that nature. I certainly never observed any or encountered any. Ahm. They, they may well have talked to some ah...

Could you please tell me the mood of your men maybe, that's...?

Yeah. Uh, I think the mood of the pe...of the ah Marines that were going down there was that they, was a serious one. They ah and they were probably a little bit apprehensive because they knew that the village ah, ah other Marines had encountered problems there. They didn't know how much or, or what kind of a threat they might expect, but they did anticipate that ah it was, there was going to be problems ah and probably exchange of fire. Ah, so, I would, I would, I would just say they were serious, ahh, about it. They knew it wasn't going to be ah just a walk in the sun as I said, and, ah apprehensive.

But, I don't think ah, nor did I observe in continuing to operate with them that there was any animosity on the part of the men toward the people. Ah, and we, we routinely helped school kids and, and you know ran medical patrols, as I mentioned. Ah, dispensed food ah supplies, ah, ah, assisted them with their rice harvesting and that sort of thing. Ah, I thought ah the men in the platoon had a pretty good feeling for the people that we'd encountered.

Okay. That's fine. Finished completely. Thank you very much. Gone very well.

Well I hope it's of some use.