I entered the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam in 1967. And I feel that it was very deserving for me to serve all those years in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam to defend my free country.

In 1972 you were in the Quang Tri area. Tell me how you first heard about the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese. What were happening with the North Vietnamese?

In March 1972 I served as an aide in the Military Security Office and was given the special duty of counterintelligence. And we were able to gather information on the 321 A Division, known as the Yellow Star Division. I am sorry, it was the Red Banner Division. At the same time we were able to follow the activities of the 711 Division, known as the Yellow Star Division. They were moving troops into the Quang Tri area.

At the same time, we were also informed that there were more than 250 T-54 tanks belonging to the Communists poised on the other side of the Ai Tu military base. And at that time in Quang Tri the unit which was based there comprised the Third Military Division which had just been formed and which had not held the ceremony for going out to battle yet, a paratrooper regiment and a marine regiment. This was our entire observation in relation to the concentration of Communist troops against the provincial town of Quang Tri.

It was also in March 1972 that the Communist forces opened up large attacks into the city of Quang Tri. And we had very little time to prepare a counterattack. For this reason, the Third Infantry Division, which had just been formed, had to beat a retreat and it seemed that we lost the provincial town of Quang Tri too prematurely. The entire military unit based in Quang Tri had to withdraw to the southern bank of the My Chanh River. At that time, the entire military unit which withdrew to the southern bank of the My Chanh River decided to stop there and form a defense parameter for the ancient capitol city of Hue.

After that, there was a change in the commanding structure of the First Corps. This is to say that General Hoang Xuan Lam was recalled to High Command and Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong arrived to become commander of the First Corps. After Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong assumed his post, we had the plan to reoccupy Quang Tri.

In this plan to reoccupy Quang Tri I knew of this because I was working in the security branch of the military involved three phases. The first phase was to rebuild troop morale, causing the soldiers to have stronger confidence in a new battle. After that, we had fake targets to draw the Communist forces to concentrate into a certain area so that we could attack them in other areas. To be more exact, in this plan Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong tried his best to create a pincer movement involving the paratroop division west of Highway One and a division of marines east of Highway One. At the same time, support units such as the First Infantry Division was composed of the 51st Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Infantry Regiment and the First Infantry Regiment. They provided the rear support for the two large paratroop and marine units.

It was around June 1972 when we – the large units of paratroopers, marines and the First Infantry Division - charged across the My Chanh River. And we were really very surprised that during the first 48 hours, our counterattack was able to move a very long way. This is to say we were able to retake the Hai Lang section of the Highway. After that it seemed that we met with much stronger resistance on the part of the Communist forces. Therefore, our troop advance during the next 48 hours was slower.

The thing I want to say here is that, in term of relative troop strength and weapon between the Vietnamese Communists and the Armed Forces of the Republic or Vietnam, on our side — on the ARVN side — we had the paratroop division, the marine division and the First Infantry Division. But the First Infantry Division, besides its task of providing support to the paratroop division and the marine division in their effort to retake Quang Tri also had to protect the whole area southwest of Hue.

Therefore, it seemed that at that time everyone was very busy and was being confronted with all kinds of dangers. This was because we had already had to put up with extremely heavy artillery from the enemy forces. On the average, we had to put up with something like 5,000 shells and 122mm rockets a day. But the really lucky thing for us was that at that time we were given extremely artillery support from the Seventh Fleet belonging to the United States, which was at that time in the South China Sea.

And the plan was to retake Quang Tri after three months. But it seemed that it took us only two months to retake the ancient citadel of Quang Tri. And the various military units, after the reoccupation of the ancient citadel of Quang Tri, were in very high spirit. And we were ready to cross the Thach Han River to reoccupy Ai Tu and even to advance even further.

But by that time the Paris Agreement had just been signed. Therefore, we were stopped at the place that we had just occupied which was south of the Thach Han River. In general, the development in the summer of 1972 when the Communist forces threw 3 divisions and over 250 tanks into the battle for Quang Tri in March of 1972 was that we were able to become the master of the situation again by July 1972.

And, of course, in a large battle like that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam had to receive certain casualties. But the damages to the enemy forces were not small. It can be said that they received three times more casualties than us. This was because the Communist troops had to contend with American B-52 bombings and, at the same time, artillery barrages from the American Seventh Fleet. After this battle when we became the master of the situation again, the morale of the soldiers at all levels was seemingly very high. And it seemed that we were totally confident in the fighting ability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and of our own.

We thought that if we were to receive continued American support and to receive continued support from peoples who adored freedom in the world, we would have been able to defend the freedom of South Vietnam ourselves. But this did not happen because other pressures arising from the Paris Agreement began to mount. This can be considered a brief summary of the situation in the summer of 1972. Do you have any other questions?

What was it like on the return to Quang Tri? What was the intensity? How much fighting was there? What did you see?

When we finally set foot in Quang Tri again, the city was nearly completely destroyed. Almost all of the buildings in the city of Quang Tri had been destroyed. Perhaps, according to some statistics which I happened to know, the city of Quang Tri had to put up with over 10,000 artillery shells per square meter on the average during the entire period of our counterattack.

What did you think about the Army in Saigon? Were they giving you enough help to recapture Quang Tri? Did you have enough equipment?

We thought that we had enough equipment and weapons during the entire period of the counterattack on Quang Tri.

And what about the general feeling? Did you think that the attack on Quang Tri would be enough? Why did they have the attack? Why do you think they attacked Quang Tri?

I think that the Communist forces did their best to occupy Quang Tri for political rather than military reasons. They wanted to occupy Quang Tri in order to create a capitol for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. And it was precisely because of military and political reasons that we tried our best to recapture Quang Tri. As far as I was concerned, I was very proud when I set my foot in Quang Tri again after a long period in the hands of the Communist forces.

What about General Van Tien Dung? You said you knew where General Van Tien Dung was. Can you explain about that?

According to our intelligence information, General Van Tien Dung of the Viet Cong, of the North Vietnamese, had moved his command headquarters to the Ai Tu base camp. This meant that he was very close to the battle.

Tell us the story of Van Tien Dung. Tell that story to me.

Throughout the period that the Communist forces occupied Quang Tri, we used our intelligence networks and radio surveillance system to collect all telegraphic communiqués and official dispatches which Van Tien Dung which the Command Headquarters of Van Tien Dung sent out to his units on the battlefront. As a result, we found out the location of the Command Headquarters of General Van Tien Dung, which was in Ai Tu.

And after we recaptured the ancient citadel of Quang Tri, this meant that Van Tien Dung's command post was very close to the battlefront. And so the Communist forces there had to retreat very hurriedly. This was especially the case with Van Tien Dung's military command post. All the forward units such as the marines were ready to cross the Thach Han River and advance even further to recapture all the areas which had been lost. This included all the territory south of the Ben Hai River, south of the 17th parallel.

If we... I think that if we did that, if the paratroop and marine units had done that, then that was the time when we could have taught Van Tien Dung a telling lesson. This was because after we recaptured the ancient citadel we seemed to create a tremendous surprise to the Communist forces. This was because the Communist forces had employed a very new weapon. This was the first time the Communists used an extremely large tank force. This was the first time that the Communist employed heat seeking AT 3 rockets, which was the most up to date, and also SR 7 and SR 9 heat seeking rockets in the defense against tanks and airplanes. Therefore, with such concentration of air defense capabilities and firepower the Communist had the right to think that it was difficult... Or, in other words, the Communist forces thought that we could never recapture Quang Tri.

But when we soldiers did set foot in the city of Quang Tri, it seemed that we could hear on our radio monitors panicked directives and extremely frightened messages from the Communist leaders at all levels to their own units to beat an urgent retreat in order to defend its Command Headquarters. The one very regrettable thing was that we did not have enough time left in order to cross the Ben Hai River... I am sorry, the Thach Han River.

This was because the Paris Agreement had just been signed and it stopped our advance right inside the ancient citadel of Quang Tri. Therefore, the fact that we did not have enough time to chase down Van Tien Dung's Command was a really regrettable thing. However, when we read the urgent directives, the frightened official messages, by Van Tien Dung to all related units, we felt that it was a real honor for us. We had created total confusion to the command structure of the Communists on the battlefront.

You worked for the Green Berets. Tell me what your work was like. And do you personally think that the Americans understood what they were doing? And what did you feel about the Americans pulling out? Did you think that was a betrayal? Or did you think that was going to happen, or whatever?

I worked for the American Green Berets for a period of two years. This was at the C 1 Command Headquarters of the Green Berets which was based in Non Nuoc, Da Nang province. This was the first time I worked for the American Special Forces. They included the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders.

My work was to organize the civilian inter defense groups (CIDG). This CIDG unit was trained for a short time. The training included jungle combat, basic combat techniques, sky diving and transport by helicopters. After that, we sent them to coordinate their activities with the American Green Berets in order to create border control forts such as the border defense base of Anh Son in Khe Sanh and other border defense posts such as the ones in Tao Tac and Deo Gio. These border defense posts were located near the Vietnamese Laotian border. And the border defense base of Kon Thien was situated next to the 17th parallel.

During the two years of fighting with the American Special Forces, I developed tremendous respect for the American Green Berets. This was because their endurance was beyond our imagination. Although often an American soldier fighting in a strange battleground, especially a battleground in the tropical area where there was more rain than sunshine and where the jungle and the terrain were extremely treacherous, met with certain difficulties which would reduce his combat effectiveness.

I will cite but one example. In the morning an American soldier must have breakfast which has to include coffee and cigarettes. But when we parachuted down into the jungles in small groups, drinking coffee and smoking cigarettes were extremely dangerous things to do. This was because we would have caused the Communist forces to be able to smell us out.

These groups of parachutists were usually very small. Each group usually included seven Americans, one Australian, and about seven Vietnamese. In general, we observed that the American Green Beret units were able to bring about very significant achievements in that they were able to create border defense bases along the Vietnamese-Laotian border. And these bases did create tremendous hindrances to the Communist forces which were infiltrating into the South from North Vietnam through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Let me cite but one example. The Anh Son border defense base was located in Khe Sanh.

So, what do you personally think of the Americans you worked with? What do you think about them? And what about when they were being withdrawn? Did you think that was going to be a big problem?

About the American presence in South Vietnam, I think that this created a situation in which we could have higher firepower. At the same time, the American forces helped us patrol a larger territory, thereby reducing the responsibilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. But on the political level, this exposed us to the Communist propaganda to the international community. The Communists had concocted... had gotten it into the heads of the Vietnamese people the false notion that they were "fighting the Americans to save the country."

This was because the Communists maintained that... propagandized the population that the presence of the Americans was the proof of American aggression. Therefore the American presence in South Vietnam at that time was beneficial militarily but was disastrous politically. Whether we liked it or not, we the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam were extremely grateful to the American military for having fought to defend our freedom until 1975. We are sincerely ... we are respectfully grateful to the American soldiers who had fallen on the battlegrounds in Vietnam for the sake of our people.

With regard to the withdrawal of the American troops from South Vietnam after the signing of the Paris Agreement, we had expected that this was going to come about. This was because at that time in the United States certain relatively unstable political phenomena such as Watergate occurred. At the same time, the American antiwar movements could not understand the full meaning of the struggle to defend freedom of South Vietnam.

At that time the majority of the American people believed more in the argument of an antiwar activist rather than the argument of a fighter who was helping other races of people defend their freedom. For this reason, the American antiwar movement grew larger. The majority of the American people at that time felt that it was illogical for their brothers and sons, for the American soldiers, to be in the Vietnam battleground and to become daily casualties.

We followed the American TV broadcasts at the time and saw that daily they would begin their programs by saying how many days it had been since the American armed forces first engaged in the Vietnam war and what the total number of American casualties had been. They never told you what victories had been reaped. Therefore, this created a less than desirable impression about the presence of the American forces in South Vietnam. For this reason, we thought that one day the American government would have to come to the decision to withdraw all their troops from South Vietnam and to turn over the burdens of that war to us.

We were not surprised by this. But the one thing that affected our morale was the question as to whether after the Americans had withdrawn their troops they would continue to supply us with adequate materials to carry on the fighting. This was the important thing. And we found out that, hand in hand with the withdrawal of the American troops, it was difficult for the American government to get the American Congress to maintain its aid to South Vietnam. This is to say that aid was decreased after that. This affected our morale greatly.

And the second impact was that, as far as Quang Tri was concerned, when the Americans withdrew they left behind extremely large military bases. These extremely large military bases were not appropriate for the defense capacity of the Armed Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam which only had small military units.

Could you just explain, Mr. Cuong, the personal life you had with your family and where they lived and how much money you made and how they survived.

Throughout the war years, I was seldom with my family. I was able to go home once a year. But this was not true every year. Sometimes I could go home only once every two years. And the living condition of my family was relatively hard because my salary was small. It was not even enough to pay for my personal expenses.

The same thing was true for my family. We had to live in a situation where we had to fight at the same time we were producing food. However, you could still find peace and sufficiency in our lives. And... during the many times I went home to see my family I felt quite comfortable... I felt as if I had left the burden behind me.

However, as far as the social conditions were concerned, we soldiers seemed never to be bothered by them. The thing we paid much attention to was how to fight and survive and to defend our defense parameters successfully. This is to say that we paid more attention to the battlefront than to the things which were happening in the rear areas. We paid more attention to the survival of our units than the social and political developments behind our backs.

I would like to mention particularly that the majority of the political developments in Saigon did not please us at all. An example of this political development was the demonstrations by antiwar groups and by the Third Force which swept others along with them and which created political turmoil. This political turmoil did not affect the battlefront, but they affected our fighting morale a little bit.

But this perhaps had a lot of impact on international issues. This was because the foreigners did not understand the psychology of the soldiers of the Republic of Vietnam who were carrying guns and fighting the war. Our feeling was that we had to fight. We were enduring all kinds of hardship and were spilling our blood because we felt that there was no other choice, that there was no other peace than that which could be obtained by pushing the Communist forces back to the northern side of the 17th parallel, that there was no other peace than the one which could be obtained by defending all the territory of South Vietnam and by not letting the Communist take over any part of this territory.

Therefore, we were fighting with the mentality that there was actually no choice at all. We had to fight for freedom. We had to fight for my own survival, for the survival of my family and the survival of all those people who were in the rear areas.

For this reason, the political developments in the rear areas did not affect the fighting very much. However, we thought that they did affect the international scene. When the foreigners looked at Vietnam, they did not understand the psychology of the soldiers on the front. Rather, they only paid attention to all the bad things which were happening in the rear areas.

Now, let's go through all the questions of the Paris Agreement. What were your reactions after the signature of the Paris Agreement? Did you think this was the end of the war or... what were your feelings?

Beginning in 1968, after the Tet Offensive, the Paris Conference was convened. It seemed that nearly a year was lost over the size and shape of the table alone. This caused us to think that this was not going to be a fruitful conference and that it was not going to be a conference that will really bring peace to our Vietnam. This was because, more than anyone else, us Vietnamese people knew what Communism meant and what Communist propaganda meant. For this reason, we were not hopeful at all about the agreement... We were not very hopeful about the Paris Peace Talks at all.

In 1973 the Agreement was signed. Frankly speaking, we were absolutely furious about this Agreement. It was an injustice. It was more of a death certificate for us than a peace agreement. This was because the stipulations of this agreement were extremely illogical. We had never seen anything more illogical than the Paris Agreement which was signed on March 27, 1973.

The illogical things which we pointed out was that, in the Agreement, it only mentioned the withdrawal of the American troops and never the withdrawal of other foreign troops such as those of the Vietnamese Communists. This was because South Vietnam and North Vietnam had already become two separate nations after the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Therefore, the presence of foreign troops in South Vietnam was not just a matter of American troops alone but also that of North Vietnamese forces.

About a million North Vietnamese troops were staying in place there and yet there is no mention of the withdrawal of this force. The second problem was the one-to-one replacement of weapons. This only applied to South Vietnam and the United States and never to North Vietnam. The proof is that you just can not find any clause in the Paris Agreement which mentions the inspection of supplies to North Vietnam. And the supply route was the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

What about Nixon's resignation? Did you think that was a big problem?

Yes. I thought that was a big problem. We thought that was an agreement which tied our hands and feet and imprisoned us in the narrow spaces in which we could not fight at all. I thought that was really a problem.

What about the final Phuoc Binh attack? Did you think this was a different attack in January 1975?

We did not think the Communist attack and occupation of Phuoc Binh and Phuoc Long in 1975 was a big problem. This was because we regarded this was an effort during the high point of the battle and that we would be able to recapture them relatively easily.

And then later when Ban Me Thuot fell, did you think this is the start of a new offensive like in ‘72 or...?

We did not think so. When Ban Me Thuot fell we did not think that this would lead to total collapse. We thought that this was also a high point. And we were very surprised when retreats were made in Phuoc Long, Phuoc Binh, Ban Me Thuot and finally Hue. This was extremely illogical.

Orders for the retreats were sent from nowhere, from the Central Command. But my own unit never received these orders. It was only the administrative headquarters such as the provincial offices and regional military command posts which received the orders for retreat. The command posts of the divisions never received such an order.

Let us cite an example which occurred in the city of Hue. Throughout March 1975, from February to March 1975 the situation was quite calm in Hue. All military units belonging to the I Corps were still manning the nut and bolt defense parameter southwest of Hue. And not only did we not lose, but we won!

The administrative offices - like the court, the police, the governor - received the order to withdraw. The orders caused turmoil because our units had not realized there was any danger or pressure caused by the Communist troops. Finally, we had to withdraw due to the order which we did not get or possibly the commander got. Therefore, we felt it was so unreasonable in 1975. It was different from 1972. In 1972, we lost, then fought and won to recapture the places. It was different in 1975. In 1975, we knew nothing except the order to withdraw.

What about your family? What happened in March '75 with your family?

In March 1975, I went with the troops to Hue, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang. Personally, I had no information about my family. In late 1975 when the Communists took Saigon I found my father. I lost my family I still have no contact with them.

Did you see in Saigon, what was your feeling in Saigon when you were trying to work in the tower, trying to help things? Did you think there is still a hope that Congress or that other people would help Vietnam, or did you think that this is finished?

We had complicated feelings caused by what was happening. We never believed it was true. When we saw the stupid Communist army entering Saigon, even the communists did not think that one day they could set foot in this city. I think that the Republic of Vietnam soldiers are still fighting.

What were you saying at the very end there about Saigon?

Uh, that Saigon, talking about so surprise for every people when they first see the North Vietnam Army that come in. They look like the... I can say look like the monkey, you know. They know nothing. In a big city like this...

They were puzzled, curious.

Yeah. Impossible for them. They don't believe they are going to Saigon. Yeah. With us, also. They don't, we don't believe it. We don't have...

Like a dream or something.

Look like a dream, a terrible dream.

A nightmare.

Yeah.