LORD CHALFONT, WHAT WAS THE REACTION IN BRITAIN TO EISENHOWER'S ATOMS FOR PEACE SPEECH AT THE U.N.?

Well...it depends...when you say "the reaction in Britain," I mean in fact the public reaction, the general reaction, was not great at all. But amongst those who were involved in these things, obviously it had a... it had a very considerable impact. When you think of the way in which the whole argument about nuclear weapons and nuclear technology has developed over the years, this was obviously a very significant speech; it was taken very seriously by decision makers and policy makers in this country. But if you ask what kind of an impact it had in general terms, it was zero.

BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT, THE FRENCH ATOMIC ENERGY OFFICIAL, TALKS ABOUT IT BEING A PERIOD OF NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE.

Yes. I don't think it was as definitive as—

I THINK IT WAS PROBABLY AFTER THE MCMAHON ACT AND THE POLICY OF DENIAL...

No, quite honestly my recollection of it is that it didn't really have a tremendous impact on the thinking about nuclear technology and nuclear weapons in this country at all.

DID ATOMS FOR PEACE APPEAR TO HAVE ANY POLITICAL GOALS?

Yes, I think... it's a long way to look back now at that, but I would have thought that the political goal that one saw in it was a desire, even at that stage, to anticipate and perhaps prevent what has in fact happened, which is the growth of enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons born out of the suspicion of one bloc, one side in this confrontation for the other.

WHAT WAS THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE SETTING UP OF THE IAEA? WAS IT A POSITIVE REACTION?

Yes. I think the IAEA has always been taken very seriously by British people who've been involved in the decision making process. I have to say here again, because I always... make this reservation, that if you were to ask the average British citizen that question, you would say, "What is the IAEA?" the International Atomic Energy Authority is not a well-known body. It isn't, for example a familiar term like United Nations or NATO — very few people would know what it is, but in the decision-making establishment, the IAEA has always been taken very seriously, and of course became an extremely important factor when..., we came to discuss such things as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the whole argument about test-ban treaties, the Partial Test-Ban treaty of 1963 and then subsequently the arguments that have gone on ever since, about a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the kind of role that the International Atomic Energy Authority could play in the in the monitoring and verification of that kind of international agreement.

DID BOTH ATOMS FOR PEACE AND THE IAEA APPEAR TO BE A BREAKTHROUGH?

No, I don't think so. I mean, I said this in the context of Atoms for Peace and I think the same in the in the Vienna agency. No. I don't think anybody thought there was a breakthrough; in fact, I think it's true to say that those people who have been involved in the whole of the... business of nuclear strategy, atomic weapons, arms control in this country, have never seen any breakthrough, either in the past or, nor do they expect one in the future. Breakthrough is not a, is not a term that comes easily to the minds of British people dealing with the nuclear weapons problem.

DO YOU REMEMBER FEELING AT THE TIME THAT AMERICA MIGHT HAVE BEEN OVERLY GENEROUS WITH ITS PROGRAM?

No. There were people who thought that sometimes the United States was being a little relaxed in the way that it handled its nuclear technology. But I think those people who were close to the close to the business in this country have always recognized that the United States has had to draw a very, very fine line between the business of making nuclear technology widely available on the one hand, and maintaining for military purposes some kind, if not a monopoly, then some kind of control over its own nuclear weapons technology. I certainly have never thought that the United States has either been overly generous except... perhaps with the British and even then I wouldn't say overly generous; I think they've been generous, but I wouldn't have said that they have been overly generous certainly with the world... at large. I think... to be... quite honest, I think they've handled it with very great skill.

WHAT WAS THE INITIAL IMPETUS FOR NPT?

Oh, well theoretically, of course, the impetus was that the more nuclear weapons there were in the world, and the more centers of decision making there were in the world, the greater danger there was of nuclear war by accident or by miscalculation, or by the decision of some madman who might happen to get his hands on nuclear technology — that was the theory. I guess really that the that the real impetus was that the five nuclear powers, the five members of the permanent members of the Security Council who were the nuclear powers wanted to maintain their monopoly. Certainly that is, for example, what people like the Swedes and the Indians were saying throughout the whole of the non-proliferation process. I think there was a combination of both, actually; certainly in the at the time at which I was in-, involved in the... Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations, we were really seriously concerned that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of nuclear war. But of course in order to persuade those who haven't got nuclear weapons that this was a serious concern, we had to try to demonstrate to them that if the non-nuclear powers, and the near-nuclear powers, who were then... beginning to be quite clearly identified, if they agreed not... to acquire nuclear weapons or the technology of nuclear weapons or the transfer of nuclear weapons from anybody else, that the nuclear powers themselves had to begin seriously to engage in the process of nuclear disarmament and arms control. That hasn't happened, of course and although this may be leaping ahead of the argument a bit, I think that is why the non-proliferation strategy has failed.

CAN YOU TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH?

Well, no, I think it's not quite—

'62-'64...

Yeah... well, there wasn't very much going on between '62 and '64, except in the terms of the preparation of position papers and so on in the Foreign Office.

CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE IRISH RESOLUTION?

Yes. That was really, I suppose, an early example of interest in it, but nothing really happened in the negotiating field, from the British point of view, until the Wilson government...came into power in 1964. Now what I discovered when I got into the Foreign Office, as minister of state with special responsibility for these things, was that the Foreign Office had been doing a great deal of work on non-proliferation, and it was immediately seized upon by the government coming in 1964, as the obvious way, the obvious field, in which the British government could take an initiative. It looked like, a possible field for a serious arms-control agreement, a lot of serious intellectual and scientific work had been done on it and it looked-- and I think turned out to be -- an area in which almost uniquely the British government could take some kind of real initiative. The Soviet Union and the United States were not yet...in agreement, either on the need for a non-proliferation treaty or on the possible means of achieving it. And we... saw... in 1964 the possibility that this might provide an opportunity for a British initiative, so, from that point of view, it was partly political and it was a way of getting ourselves into the real business of arms control negotiations which, at that time were beginning to become increasingly bipolar -- there was a general feeling that it was only, that the only people in the business were the United States and the Soviet Union. And you may recall the general argument about nuclear weapons giving people a seat at the top table... I think that was a remark made by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Lord Home of the Hirsel, and in order to justify that kind of claim, which I think has a certain validity it was obviously necessary that we should have a contribution to make to the deliberations of what was then the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and of course the first political committee in the United Nations.

CAN YOU TELL ME SOMETHING ABOUT THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY? TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THAT A NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURE?

I've never regarded the partial test ban treaty as a non-proliferation measure, because it was principally an undertaking by the nuclear powers, not to test in any environment except underground and...no, the answer is, I don't think that was a non-proliferation measure at all -- I think that was an early attempt to put some kind of cap on nuclear arms competition, and I think I'm remembering rightly when I say that even at that time, I would not have regarded it as a non-proliferation measure, and I certainly don't now.

IN 1963, PRESIDENT KENNEDY PREDICTED THAT BY THE '70S UP TO 25 NATIONS MAY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DID YOU SHARE HIS CONCERN THEN, AND WHICH NATIONS WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT?

I would not have agreed with President Kennedy, even in 1963 that 25 was a sensible number to quote. I thought in those days, that the number of nuclear powers, by the end of the century, nuclear weapons powers by the end of the century, may well be 10 or 12. And the kind of countries that I had in mind... even in those days were of course Japan, Israel, South Africa, Australia, Argentina, then, of course in a completely different context, you had countries like Western Germany, which, for all kinds of other reasons was not regarded as a near-nuclear power but quite obviously had the industrial base and the technological know-how to become nuclear weapons powers. And I think... although this is looking back now over... 20 years I see no reason to change that judgment; I think these are still the near-nuclear powers and I would say that if we are asking ourselves the question, How many nuclear powers would there be by the end of... this century, I think the real question is, How many nuclear powers are there now? And certainly more than five.

YOU MENTIONED JAPAN. I WONDERED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT JAPAN IN THE '60's?

The general view of Japan in those days was that the Japanese certainly had the technological expertise, even if it was only then in a laboratory, to construct a nuclear weapon, and of all the near-nuclear countries, Japan was... recognized scientifically and industrially as being the most likely to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Of course, what was standing in the way was the question of testing that weapon, and the question of delivering it. In those days, the Japanese had no were inhibited in any case from testing it for all kinds of reasons, and certainly had no effective method of delivering. But I think you could say that about quite a number of countries, but the Japanese have always been, at least in my mind, from the point of view of their... technical ability and their industrial base, the most...likely sixth member of the official nuclear weapons club.

DID THEY HAVE THE POLITICAL INCENTIVE?

We're talking back now in the 1960s? You see, I think that...countries always have, if they have the capability, always have the political incentive. It may not be in the open; it may not be a part of a government's policy, either stated, or even... unstated, but there are always scientists who are working on these things, and technicians in laboratories. And I don't think that one can place too much emphasis on the political will or the political incentive to achieve a nuclear capability; I think the way that one has to look at it is that in a country like Japan--and I don't single out Japan; there are other countries with the, with equivalent levels of scientific and technological knowledge... and other countries with similar industrial bases. But when you have that scientific level of expertise, and that industrial base, there will always be people who will be researching and experimenting in this field. So that when a country comes to have the political will, the technology and the ability is there, and I think that's the way to look at the proliferation problem.

IN 1964, THE CHINESE BOMB EXPLOSION: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT NEWS?

Well, that was a very considerable shock, I think, you know, one can use that phrase, I think, that term, I think, quite honestly in this, in this context; the knowledge that the Chinese had this capability, and the certainty that within a limited, fairly limited period they would achieve a delivery capability as well very considerably changed the whole picture --this was the moment when to an extent, to a very large extent, the nuclear picture ceased to be bipolar and that was of course a very important moment in the whole, analysis of nuclear strategy.

CAN YOU TELL ME ANY ANECDOTES ABOUT THE AMERICAN REACTION, OR...?

No, I think the main the main reaction to this was one of surprise that the Chinese has achieved this capability so soon, a realization, of course, that they could not have done it without help from the Russians and so the... arguments at the time... varied from those deployed by people who feared a Moscow-Peking axis, nuclear axis, and those who believed that it was in the interests of Western foreign policy to try to detach the Chinese from the Communist world and perhaps even get them on the other side. Now, I know there are a lot of people who said at the time -- and I was one of them -- that it would be an extremely dangerous strategy indeed to adopt, but I say that simply to indicate that the Chinese bomb changed the whole dimension of the strategic argument virtually overnight.

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS IT KNOWN AT THE TIME THAT THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN A FAIR AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE PROGRAM?

Oh, that was fully known. That was fully known.

CAN YOU GIVE ME ANY ANECDOTES, OR AN FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE?

No I can't, I'm afraid; I mean, all I can say is that it was part of the general knowledge of those of us who were involved that there had been a considerable amount of cooperation between the Russians and the Chinese, which came to an end, I think it was about 1967; but that's, that's a very—

WAS IT EVER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MADE A MISTAKE AT THE TIME?

That the Russians had made a mistake? Yes, I mean, I don't have any evidence on that, no.

DO YOU RECALL, AFTER THE CHINESE BOMB, WHEN BHABHA GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE, AND ANNOUNCED THAT INDIAN SCIENTISTS COULD ALSO PRODUCE A NUCLEAR BOMB IN 18 MONTHS?

Yeah, mmm-hmmm. Yes. I remember... I remember that incident well, and it didn't come as any surprise; you see, the Indian...

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE WHOLE EVENT?

Well, it was a speech, I can't remember where... Homi Bhabha's speech was made, but he certainly said that the Indians were capable of producing a nuclear weapon within 18 months — 18 months, incidentally, is a sort of cliché time; whenever anybody talks about near-nuclear powers, they refer to people who could in 18 months produce and test nuclear weapons, so that wasn't you know, there wasn't anything very significant in that time factor. And there wasn't anything, I think, of any great surprise to us. The Indians, had, after all, been playing a very, very important part in all this; they were one of the key players in the whole of the non-proliferation... strategy, in the non-proliferation negotiation. And I think it was generally known that generally accepted that their... influence in this lay in the fact that they were a potential nuclear power themselves.

HOW DID WEST GERMANY FIGURE IN THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS?

Well. West Germany, of course, was in a very special position in that it had undertaken not... separately, quite apart from any non-proliferation treaty not to become a nuclear power, not to acquire nuclear technology or nuclear weapons; the importance of West Germany's position was that there was almost a universal desire that West Germany should not become a nuclear power. The Soviet Union and its allies were clearly very interested in this, and extremely anxious, from the point of view of their own security, and the especially the security of Europe, that West Germany should not become a nuclear power; there was a great cliché at the time of the German finger on the trigger. This was indeed a wish shared by the Western powers, because the Western powers also knew that the one thing that would... upset the very delicate balance of stability in Europe, between the Soviet Union and the West, would be if the Germans gained a nuclear capability, in any way at all, either by making nuclear weapons for themselves, or acquiring them, or the technology, from somebody else, or even becoming involved in some kind of multilateral nuclear force, in which they had a voice in the decision, so... West Germany was a very key figure; it was the sort of you know, it was the ghost at the banquet, always. They were not involved, of course, in the negotiations, but it was, I think, I would go as far as to say that, for the Soviet Union, the main interest in the Non-Proliferation Treaty was West Germany.

I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU HOW MUCH OF A CONCERN WAS IT, WHETHER IT TOOK PRIORITY OVER THEIR CONCERNS FOR PROLIFERATION, IN THE SOVIET CASE, THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT MLF AND WEST GERMANY. DO YOU THINK THAT'S TRUE OF THE SOVIET UNION?

Yes. I think that's, it's true to say that the only reason or the principal reason, anyway, why we got the German the principal reason why we got the Russians to come along with us eventually in the non-proliferation agreement, in the non-proliferation treaty, was their fear of the spread of some kind of nuclear technology or control to Western Germany. The West had other preoccupations, other fears, but that was the basic motivation of the Soviet Union.

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE U.S.'S MAIN INTEREST WAS IN NPT? WAS IT CONSISTENT WITH THE BRITISH VIEW?

I got the impression at the time that it was, yes; I was obviously very close to the American negotiating team at the time. And I got the impression that we were indeed very close in our view of the motivation and the... justification, the rationalization for the NPT, that... the spread of nuclear weapons, the spread of nuclear weapon decision centers, would make the world a less stable place; you know, it was really a straightforward argument, that the more centers of nuclear decision making there were, the bigger the chance was that sooner or later somebody would either go crazy or miscalculate, or... become involved in a regional conflict. And, of course, regional instability was a tremendous factor in the whole non-proliferation argument. Nobody, I think, felt that any of the near-nuclear powers, if they became nuclear would threaten the United States or the Soviet Union; what was feared was that if, for example, in an Indian-Pakistan confrontation, or an Israel-Arab confrontation or some major confrontation in Latin America, that if one of the parties had a nuclear capability that they might use it, and that therefore, the major nuclear powers would be sucked into the whole thing, on the basis that you can never keep a nuclear war limited.

WHAT WAS THE BRITISH VIEW ON THE MLF?

No. I think most people who took –

I SHOULD QUALIFY THIS BECAUSE I REALIZE THAT WHEN HAROLD WILSON AND YOURSELF WERE IN THE GOVERNMENT... IT'S ALL CHANGED, I'M COMING TO THAT.

No, I think it's true to say that in general terms, most people in this country although the idea was played with analytically, it was played with by academic strategy, strategists, and sometimes by official analysts as well, the MLF was never a really serious proposition. I think it was a kind of political toy that people were playing with at the time, to try to the ma... one of the main factors, of course, in the whole MLF idea, was to bring the Germans, the West Germans, into the nuclear decision making process, without giving them that nuclear capability which we, and the Russians, were so afraid of. It was a, it was a device which was designed almost entirely for that purpose. I, personally, certainly never took it seriously at all on... one simple basis, quite apart from all the other arguments which were... as you know, enormously various and complicated, but on the single basis that you cannot take decisions to use nuclear weapons multilaterally; you can't take decisions by committee. The decision to use a nuclear weapon is the decision of a sovereign government, and it can never be the decision of an alliance or of a committee of people, so I never took the MLF seriously for that reason.

WHAT WERE YOUR FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF YOUR FELLOW NEGOTIATORS, AND THE INITIAL METHODS OF NEGOTIATION AT THE ENDC IN GENEVA?

Well, to take the question of the methods of negotiation first; I thought that they were hopelessly over-formalized and over-bureaucratized. They were, there was really very little in the way of negotiation in the sense that I understood it, as an exchange of positions, a readiness to make concessions on one hand and to demand conditions on the other; negotiation in that sense didn't really happen. And that was really because, to a large extent, of the character, not of the people taking part, but of the countries taking part. Now the Soviet Union, for example, had a number of quite pleasant, intelligent... negotiators, the heads of their departments, the heads of their negotiating teams at that time were basically a man named called Tsarapkin and another one called Roschin who followed him, who were extremely pleasant, intelligent, flexible men. But they had absolutely no kind of authority to make decisions. No authority to make concessions, and so what happened was that there would be... an exchange of views, an exchange of positions, and then there would be a kind of moratorium or silence while the Soviet Union went back to Moscow and got authority to make the next move or to deliver the answer. The United States was much more flexible; they had the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as the head of the delegation, and he had a certain broad authority to make certain decisions, and to make certain concessions. So had I, because I was the first minister to, first political figure to lead that delegation... it had always been an official before. Then, there were a number of other key players in the game: there was the Swedish delegation, which was run by a very formidable lady called Alva Myrdal who was a tremendous, who had a tremendous intellectual input into the whole thing; the Indians, who were at the time that I joined their delegation was run by a man called Vishnu Trivedi and the Poles had a very interesting role to play too, although we recognized that they were very largely a kind of second Moscow voice. They had a very considerable intellectual input. I would give, I would say as my general, impression of the ENDC when I arrived there was that first of all it was hopelessly bureaucratized; the meetings were formal: at each meeting people just simply read prepared papers; there was no... virtually no exchange of views -- there was sometimes... there was sometimes an exchange of insults between East and West, but there was not very much exchange of views or ideas. All the ideas... took place behind the scenes; they took place in the bureaucracy; and although over a period you could make progress it certainly wasn't due either to the personality or the ability of any of the negotiators; it was all very, very much a process commanded from the capitals concerned. With, as I've said, the slight reservation that the United States delegation clearly had more authority to negotiate and to make concessions than the Soviet... had. But the Soviet delegation was really the key to the whole thing; they were the people who, in the end, by the very nature of their bureaucracy, determined the whole pace of the thing, because as I say, as soon as anybody produced a new idea of any kind, the whole process had to stop while the Russians checked back to Moscow to see what they could, what they had to say about it.

NEVERTHELESS, DID IT FEEL LIKE SOMETHING OF A FIRST, EVEN IN ITS POSSIBILITIES?

Oh, yes. Yes, certainly it had it had a very considerable intellectual challenge about it, because it was an area in which the problems of arms control, still very much in their infancy then it was a place in which these problems were being considered intellectually and... into which a great deal of intellectual effort was going. I know that " people outside and to a very large extent, the media and the press especially did not take it terribly seriously. I remember some one journalist saying to me at a press conference in Geneva that it was a place in which people, arrived at agreements to--

DID IT FEEL LIKE A FIRST?

Yes. I think it was a breakthrough in the sense that for the first time, one got a sense of a very considerable intellectual effort going in to... a search for serious arms control agreements. Really serious arms control agreements. Of course, as you know, the original name for arms control was "partial measures of disarmament," and that arose because people had just begun to realize that the idea of general and complete disarmament under international control, which was the kind of buzz phrase that lay behind the ENDC... people had realized, I think, that it was, although perhaps a very laudable aim, a totally unattainable one. And arms control, or partial measures of disarmament, as it was then called, became the really serious issue. Not everybody took the ENDC seriously, or the... search for arms control seriously. I remember one journalist saying to me at a press conference in Geneva that what we were doing there was arriving at agreements by people not to do things which either they were incapable of doing, or they had no intention of doing anyway. And that really was somewhat dismissive way of dealing with the whole N, ENDC. But when you come to things like, for example, the famous Seabed Treaty, when an agreement was made not to station nuclear weapons on the seabed, the simple answer to that was that nobody had any intention of doing so anyway. So it wasn't a particularly significant arms-control agreement, nor do I think that the Antarctic Treaty, when people agreed not to station weapons; of mass destruction in Antarctica was very significant. But other things were significant: the search for a comprehensive test ban treaty; the search for the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and then subsequently for a treaty on chemical and microbiological weapons -- I think all those were quite serious things. But, I think the answer to your question is yes, it did seem to be a serious forum at the time, because there were people in it who were investing a great deal of political and intellectual effort into the search for serious arms-control agreements.

THE SAME DAY THE CHINESE BOMB EXPLODED THERE WAS A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP IN BRITAIN. HOW DID THE INCOMING LABOUR GOVERNMENT OF HAROLD WILSON VIEW THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION?

The problem of proliferation then, I think, had for the British government the basic, factor that proliferation was dangerous, just simply, like that the more nuclear weapons there were in the world, the more chance was that sooner or later one would go off, and drag everybody else in. But, also the British government saw this as one area in which it could in fact influence and take an important part in the arms-control negotiations. I think it's perhaps important to remember that when the Labour government came into power in 1964 it had promised, as part of its election campaign, to appoint a Minister for Disarmament, who was going to be the very first person in the world appointed as a political figure to take part in, on behalf of the United Kingdom, in international arms-control agreements; that was the post to which I was appointed. And I think, although I don't want to make this sound flippant or trivial in any way, because it wasn't it was quite clear that having appointed a minister for disarmament the British government had to find something for him to do. And the non-proliferation strategy seemed, from the research work that we'd done into the thing, the most obvious and the most, likely most potentially successful field in which to work.

THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 16TH SAW THREE EVENTS: THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV, THE CHINESE BOMB, AND THE INCOMING LABOUR GOVERNMENT. HOW DID THE THREE EVENTS INTERACT AND AFFECT THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS?

I think it would be too glib, quite honestly, to say that they interacted or had any specific effect on the negotiations. They changed the climate very considerably, of course; I mean... especially the fall of Khrushchev which seemed to a great number of people to signal the end of a kind of era... Khrushchev, of course, had been specifically famous in the West for his denunciation of Stalin, and when he fell, there was a feeling that perhaps an era of accommodation and negotiation had gone, but I mean, I would have to say that none of these things really affected the negotiations at the ENDC, for the simple reason -- and again, I don't want to sound too flip about this -- but nothing could affect... the temper of negotiations at the ENDC — they went on as though they were going on in a vacuum, really; there was a kind of ritualistic tempo about them. This is not to, in any way to diminish them, but I think it would almost have taken a nuclear war to change the climate of negotiations in Geneva.

TELL ME ABOUT YOUR VISIT TO THE STATES TO SEE LBJ?

Well, this was at the time of the multilateral force discussions and it was an attempt to make some kind of sense out of this thing; there was, as you know, a very heavy lobby in the United States at that time in favor of the multilateral force...

HOW WAS BRITAIN INSTRUMENTAL IN TURNING AROUND THE U.S. DECISION ON MLF?

Oh, I think it was very decisive in turning around the American position on MLF. The ANF, as you remember, was the... alternative... it was then called, to the MLF. In fact, it was a quite deliberate policy on the part of the British government to destroy the MLF. And I think to that extent the British government's support for the ANF concept was one which was designed, I think someone has used this phrase before, just to torpedo the MLF, which it... succeeded in doing.

SO WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT TRIP?

It would be difficult for me to say what it achieved, really. I'm, I mean, I was then simply a minister of state, a junior minister in the government. What effect it had on the overall thinking of the government I think would be it would be at this, certainly at this distance in time... too difficult for me to answer. All I can say is that at that time, there was a, quite well formulated policy in the British government, that the multilateral force idea had to be... had to be removed from the, from the sort of field of practical politics, because it was dangerous we felt, in terms of the East-West confrontation, because of the well-known fear of the Soviet Union that any part played by Western Germany in nuclear decision making would be intolerably provocative. But also because we saw that it wouldn't work. There was no way in which such a concept could be made a credible...form of deterrence. A credible form of nuclear deterrence. But as to the impact it had on the future...flow of history and international events, I wouldn't like to say; I mean, all I know is that we eventually did succeed in torpedoing the MLF.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NPT DEBATE, SEVERAL NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, LIKE INDIA AND BRAZIL, WHO HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE TREATY, RAISED OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED DRAFTS. WHAT WERE THEIR OBJECTIONS?

The principal objection of the countries like Brazil and India and Sweden, incidentally was that the treaty was discriminatory: that was the phrase that was constantly used, it was brought up in practically every speech and practically every debate. What they said was this. What you are asking us to do is to give up our right to, and our possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons technology. You are not proposing to give up anything yourselves. I remember Alva Myrdal using in a speech in Geneva, the phrase that it was like a compulsive alcoholic persuading other people to give up drink. And this is, this was their feeling, that it was totally discriminatory against the non-nuclear powers, and that it was an attempt to preserve the monopoly of the elitist nuclear club. That was their --as far as I can remember, and I think my memory of these days is fairly vivid -- that was their only argument; there was really no other motivation at all behind their objection to the various drafts. And it was indeed...perhaps I could interject here, it was as a result of that that an article was, inserted into the treaty which required the nuclear powers to engage in effective measures of nuclear disarmament -- that was their way of redressing the, what they saw as the discriminatory nature of the treaty.

I KNOW THAT YOU WERE INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH THE PAKISTANIS, WHO WANTED THEIR OWN CONFERENCE.

Yes, yes. I felt that the real place to... arrive at these decisions was in Geneva, and I thought and still think now even at this distance in time, that the idea of having regional nuclear-free zones and regional pacts on the basis of the Rapatsky Plan and things like that were just simply not practical.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY OF THE INDIAN SPEECHES?

Oh, yes -- very vividly. As I say, Vishnu Trivedi was the head of the of the Indian delegation when I was there. And the Indian speeches were always very hostile to the idea of the superpower confrontation their...point hammered home over and over again was that the world was not just simply a matter of the confrontation between the superpowers and their allies: there were other people out there, you know, like the Indians and the Swedes and the Brazilians whose interests had to be taken into account; and, although a number of people made that point, people like Alva Myrdal for Sweden, and Garcia Robles from Latin America it was, the leader of that faction, really, the sort of, "a plague on both your houses" faction was the Indian delegation.

WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THE IDEA OF PROMOTING PNEs, OPERATION PLOWSHARES?

Yes I mean, I thought that was the purest fantasy and I remember making at the Geneva Conference the point that if you can achieve a device which will move a million tons of earth in the middle of a desert, it can do the same in the middle of a city, and that therefore, the... idea of peaceful nuclear explosions was so much fantasy.

IN OCTOBER 1966, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS, YOU VISITED DELHI TO SOUND OUT THE GANDHI GOVERNMENT ON NPT. WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT VISIT, AND WHAT DID YOU FIND OUT?

Well, the purpose of the visit was to try to get to the heart of the Indian attitude towards arms control as a whole towards the NPT in particular; but, specifically, to try to find out a little bit about this concept of positive neutrality, which was very much the vogue at the time, and it wasn't just neutrality, it was positive neutrality -- in other words, it was a kind of policy or philosophy which was to provide a positive alternative to superpower politics. And I wanted to find out from Mrs. Gandhi just what philosophical thinking lay behind that, and also, to find out to what extent they were really in—

START AGAIN. (REPEATS QUESTION)

Yeah, the purpose of the trip was to try to establish what lay behind—

(INTERRUPTION)

The purpose of the visit was to try to establish what lay behind the apparent Indian negotiating position at Geneva to find out... what the Indian government's basic views were towards arms control towards the superpower confrontation, and towards the idea, which was then very fashionable, of positive neutrality, as an alternative to the superpower confrontation.

WHAT DID YOU FIND OUT?

I discovered that Mrs. Gandhi was very sincere it seemed to me, in her neutrality. There were some suspicions at the time that perhaps she was a little too close to the Soviet position: my impression was that she was not. What has happened to India since then is another matter, but I got the impression that Mrs. Gandhi had a genuine interest in positive neutrality that she had a very strong interest in, arms control; but that she clearly regarded the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it was at present conceived, in those days, as discriminatory, and she felt that it discriminated against, for example, countries like India, which had a regional confrontation with Pakistan. And it was, therefore she gave the impression a considerable sacrifice or concession on the part of India to throw away forever its ability to make a nuclear weapon if the Indian government should ever wish to do so.

WHAT WAS THE STATUS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM AT THAT TIME? DID IT FEEL AT THE TIME THAT INDIA WAS ABOUT TO FORGE AHEAD?

Oh yes one of basic assumptions at the time was that the reason why India was such an important player in this game was that the progress that they were making in nuclear technology as a whole although they were insistent that all their technology was entirely for peaceful purposes. It was clear to us that their advances in nuclear technology was such that they were very well advanced. They were in a position where in that famous eighteen month cliché probably in a position to make and test a nuclear weapon.

WAS IT COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE IN LIKE K. SUBRAHMANYAM, AND I THINK SUBRAMANIAM SWAMY, AND OTHERS. THERE WERE HAWKS, IF YOU LIKE, WHO WERE TRYING TO PUSH FOR WEAPONS OPTION AT THAT TIME. WAS THAT COMMON KNOWLEDGE?

Oh yes, Yes. It, it was common knowledge that there were people who, especially in the scientific community in India, who knew what the ending capability was or potential was and thought that at least the Indian government ought to retain the option to translate this into a nuclear weapons capability.

THAT'S...THAT WAS HOMI BHABHA?

...Homi Bhabha specifically, yes. That's right.

BY AUGUST OF '67, THE U.S. AND SOVIET DRAFT TREATIES HAD BEEN AGREED UPON IN PRINCIPLE, WITHOUT THE SAFEGUARDS CLAUSE AGREED UPON...

Yes, yes.

WHAT WAS THE BRITISH POSITION-- THIS IS JUST BRIEFLY -- WHAT WAS THE BRITISH POSITION ON THE EURATOM/IAEA CONFLICT?

We were not very much in favor of the Euratom idea at all. Our view was that the Vienna agency... the IAEA should be the proper the proper center for the verification of any treaty of this kind, And I remember having some quite abrasive confrontations with Euratom because they wanted of course to have a big say in the whole of this monitoring of any non-proliferation treaty...the safeguards of a non-proliferation treaty, and our view was quite unequivocal that the place for that was Vienna.

WERE THERE PARTICULAR PEOPLE...WHO WERE THE PEOPLE WHO WERE...

...Who's the man who's subsequently been... oh dear, the man who subsequently been Prime Minister of France...Raymond Barre.

OH, OKAY. WERE YOU AWARE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH A NUMBER OF THE U.S.- SOVIET DIFFERENCES WERE RESOLVED AWAY FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WE'VE HEARD ABOUT HIKING AND BOATING TRIPS. AS A BRITISH PARTICIPANT DID YOU...DID YOU WHILE SOME OF THIS WAS GOING ON...?

Yes. Not only knew that it was going on but I played a very considerable part in it. I mean, I go back again to the, bureaucratic nature of the actual negotiations in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. And repeat that very, very little happened in the ENDC. What happened happened outside the ENDC. It happened in bilateral talks between the Russians and the Americans. It happened in trilateral talks in which the British took a part. And the interesting thing was that there were also bilateral discussions between the British delegation and the Russian and the British and the American. So it was, although we never fooled ourselves that we held any key to anything. We think that we made a considerable input into the thinking of both sides, and I think it's true to say that there were several occasions when we were able to bring them together and resolve a difference on some...on the wording of some clause or other in a draft. But it is certainly true to say though whatever progress was made was made outside the negotiating chamber. The negotiating chamber was simply a place for the presentation of prepared papers. The press were always present, you see, so that these things were quite open negotiations. And the real, the real stuff went on outside the debating...the negotiating chamber.

YOU'LL JUST HAVE TO AMPLIFY THAT. WHAT KIND OF EVENTS... DID YOU GET INVOLVED IN ANY OF THE BOATING TRIPS AND THE HIKING. WHERE WAS THE PROGRESS?

What happened was that the heads of the delegations had a whole series of smaller meetings. For example, the Russian leader either Roschin or Tsarapkin -- The Russian delegation leader, Tsarapkin or Roschin, would have perhaps a quiet dinner with the head of the American delegation, or with me. I would very often on many occasions meet for lunch or for dinner with the American delegation alone to exchange views, and it was on those occasions that the real progress was made. Of course it all had to be ratified and formalized in the negotiating chamber and with the change of drafts. But the real progress went on behind the scenes in private meetings at the Soviet delegation, at the American delegation, in restaurants. There's a famous restaurant called La Perle Du Lac in Geneva. I reckon that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was really negotiated in La Perle Du Lac.

IN WHAT WAY DID BRITAIN PLAY THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR?

Well, mediator may be a rather strong word, and I guess the other people who were there would slight resent that. But I think we were, if I could use the word, catalysts. And I suppose the best example of that was clause six of the treaty which was in the end the key to the success of the whole negotiating process. It was the clause which required the nuclear powers in effect to negotiate in good faith on the reduction of their own nuclear stockpiles. It doesn't actually say that but that's what its effect was. And that was the way in which we overcame the arguments about discrimination. We were able then to say to the Indians, and to the Swedes, and to the Latin Americans, "Look, in exchange for you giving up the right for nuclear to have nuclear weapons we will reduce our stockpiles." Now that was not an idea that appealed enormously to the Americans and the Russians as you can imagine. They were not in the business in those days of giving anything away. We did realize...I think the British realized that you were not going to get this treaty through the non-aligned bloc unless some concession of this kind was made. And so I recall at that time having a succession of bilateral meetings not only with the Russians and the Americans but with the Indians and the Swedes, and the Mexicans and everybody else who was involved in this to try to achieve some kind of sensible draft. If you look at clause six now it all looks very simple but in fact practically every word and every comma in clause six was achieved in blood and also a great deal of vodka and a certain amount of scotch.

CAN YOU THINK OF ANY OTHER AMUSING ANECDOTES LIKE THAT?

They come to mind as one talks.

CAN YOU THINK OF ANY OTHER INCIDENTS THAT YOU RECALL WHICH WOULD HAVE ANY RELEVANCE?

It is... it's a long way back now I mean the major... no, I don't think I can think of any specific anecdotes. The... interesting thing was that the only time when one could not have a straightforward bilateral discussion was with the Russians. I could go out to dinner or for drinks with the head of the American delegation, or the Indian delegation, or even the Polish delegation. But if ever I had a meeting with the head of the Russian delegation, there were always a number of minders around. There was no possibility that you were ever going to say anything to the Russian -- head of the Russian delegation or hear anything from him that wasn't being listened to very carefully.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IT WAS THAT MADE NPT POSSIBLE?

The desire for some kind of arms control agreement. I think it's as simple as that. We had reached a stage at which, the partial test ban treaty had really taken us as far as we could go on nuclear testing. Although, of course, at the time and even since then people have said that the barrier in the way of a comprehensive test ban is verification. It isn't and it never has been. The barrier in the way of a comprehensive test ban is that people want to go on testing, and they will go on testing as long as nuclear weapons are the basis of deterrence. So we'd reached as far as we could go no nuclear testing and there was a great desire at that stage for some kind of arms control agreement. And this did seem to be not only an area in which a certain degree of success could be foreseen if not guaranteed. But it was also an area in which we genuinely believed that we would begin to contain the nature of the problem. If we could stop nuclear weapon spreading then, the theory went, we might then get down seriously to the business of reducing the existing stockpiles. And that, of course, was what clause six of the NPT said. The fact that the nuclear powers have never taken the slightest notice of clause six is to my mind the main key to the failure of the non-proliferation strategy. Had the nuclear powers been able to pursue negotiations in good faith quickly under clause six ...they couldn't for all kinds of political reasons. I'm not suggesting that it was an easy chance missed or anything like that. It wasn't. But had they been able to do so then I think that the non-proliferation strategy would've succeeded in the event, of course, it hasn't.

JUST BEFORE THAT, DO YOU THINK THAT NPT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION?

Yes, yes. I think it was...that was about the most significant thing about it that it demonstrated and formalized a commonality of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States.

UNTIL THE '70S, NON-PROLIFERATION WAS VIEWED BY MANY EUROPEANS PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH AND WEST GERMANS AS A SUPER POWER BUSINESS WHICH ONE SHOULD EITHER OPPOSE OR SUBMIT TO. WAS THIS A VIEW SHARED BY THE BRITISH?

No. No, the British view was that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a really serious piece of arms control. But of course the reason why we engaged in it so wholeheartedly was that I think we had probably invested more intellectual effort in it than most people. We had really for some years examined the problem of non-proliferation and the possible ways of achieving it, and so we were very much right from the beginning a part of the whole thing. We were very much on the side of those who wanted a non-proliferation treaty. We had no doubts about it. We did not regard it as a super power ploy, and we were very much I was almost going to say one of the leaders of the NPT strategy. But certainly we were very, very much in the front line with the Russians and the Americans.

PEOPLE SAY IT WAS VERY MUCH A JOINT COOPERATIVE EFFORT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S., DO YOU THINK THAT'S OVERSIMPLIFYING IT?

Slightly oversimplifying, yes. I mean it was an area in which for once in these negotiations Soviet and American interests coincided but it wasn't anything like a set up or a put up job. It took a great deal of negotiating because, of course, the Russians perhaps to a very much greater extent than the United States were in the business of placating the non-allying countries. And so they were looking after not only their own interests but to a very great extent the interest of the non-aligned as well. So it was by no means a set up between the Soviet Union and the United States. It took a great deal of negotiating.

WHEN THE NPT WAS ACTUALLY SIGNED, DID THE ACTUAL TREATY REPRESENT EVERYTHING THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PARTICULARLY WANTED AND WAS EVERYTHING ACCOMPLISHED IN THAT TREATY?

Yes, in that treaty. I mean, there are a lot of other things that we wanted in the field of arms control but we got what we wanted in non-proliferation.

IN 1967 THE TREATY AT TLATELOLCO WAS SIGNED. DID BRITAIN REGARD THIS TREATY AS AN EFFECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURE. PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY DID YOU...?

No, I never regarded the treaty of Tlatelolco with any high degree of interest and importance. It always seemed to me to be in the area of those things which one went along with because it was clearly the desire of the Latin American countries to establish a nuclear free zone in their own area...a regional nuclear free zone and we were prepared to go along with that. But I must say that...in hindsight and I think at the time, but certainly in hindsight, I would not regard the treaty of Tlatelolco as a very important or far reaching agreement.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION SIX YEARS AFTER THE TREATY WAS SIGNED TO THE INDIAN TEST?

No great surprise and a feeling then when the Indians carried out their test that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had failed because as soon as one country demonstrated a nuclear weapons capability, which the Indian test did whatever they like to say about it really meant that the, that the strategy had failed... that the treaty was not being observed by the rest of the world. And we had, of course, a number of countries which had not signed or ratified the treaty but what we believed at the time was that even if the treaty was not universally adhered to or universally signed or universally ratified that the strategy would work. And so what the Indian test did was to demonstrate to me anyway that the strategy had failed.

WERE YOU SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE PEACEFUL PURPOSE...MOTIVES THAT THE...THAT THE TIME THE...MADE A STATEMENT THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE...WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION ON WHAT IT SET OUT...

Well to say that I'm skeptical about peaceful background to a nuclear explosion would be the understatement of the century. If somebody explodes a nuclear device they have a nuclear bomb. It's as simple as that. What they use if for is a political matter but the technical fact is that once you have exploded a nuclear device you are a nuclear weapons power.

FOLLOWING THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY MADE A NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR DEALS. LOOKING BACK AND AS A MEMBER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HOW DID YOU VIEW THESE DEALS?

Well, I've...I've always thought that the transfer of nuclear technology, especially if it's done without Vienna safeguards is highly dangerous and it was, of course, one of the things that we went into the non-proliferation strategy to prevent. And the Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically prevents the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes. And unless you have the strictest safeguards, it seems to me that the indiscriminate transfer of nuclear technology for whatever purpose is bound to be dangerous and indeed has proved to be.

CAN YOU GIVE ME AN EXAMPLE WHICH YOU PARTICULARLY OBJECT TO BECAUSE MOST OF THOSE WERE UNDER SAFEGUARDS. WHAT COMES TO MIND?

Well there was an occasion on which the Canadian government made a transfer of nuclear technology without submitting it to the Vienna safeguards, and I think that was unfortunate.

THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP MEETINGS...YOU WEREN'T A PARTICIPANT IN THAT...

No, no.

THE U.S. GOT VERY WORKED UP IN THE CARTER YEARS ABOUT THE PLUTONIUM INDUSTRY. I WONDERED HOW BRITAIN VIEWED THE U.S. ANTI-PLUTONIUM FERVOR. IS THAT SOMETHING YOU...?

I don't think there was a great deal of reaction to it. There was at one time a suggestion that large amounts of plutonium had actually gone missing... that nobody could account for.

DO YOU THINK THAT MOST BRITISH PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT THE SAFEGUARDS...WERE INVOLVED IN THIS PROLIFERATION STORY...FELT THAT THE SAFEGUARDS WEREN'T STRINGENT ENOUGH, BY THE WAY... THIS IS AFTER THE INDIAN EXPLOSION.

Oh I see. Perhaps I could go back to the treaty itself where we thought, in fact, that the safeguards were strictly enough drawn. We argued at the time, as you know, that there was no point in applying safeguards between nuclear powers that the safeguards were only needed when you were dealing with a nuclear power on the one hand and a non-nuclear power on the other. And I thought that was the right approach, and I got the right result. I think I would have felt that view fairly consistently. What worried me was that people were not were not adequately observing the safeguards agreements that there were...there was a great deal of transfer of nuclear technology going on without adequate safeguard. I don't think that you could blame this on the safeguards clause in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I think it was the way in which the importance of safeguards was regarded by sovereign governments. It gave, and still gives, cause for some considerable concern.

DID YOU THINK THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT ACHIEVED MUCH TO HELP THE SITUATION?

No, I don't think it had much effect. It was, I think a sort of brave attempt to put inhibitions on this process but I don't think it was really very effective.

I HAVE A FEW GENERAL QUESTIONS JUST REFLECTING ON A FEW EVENTS. IN '81 WHEN ISRAEL ATTACKED THE OSIRAK REACTOR IN IRAQ, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE ATTACK?

My own reaction now? Because I was not in government then, as you know, or even connected with the government.

...NO...RIGHT. AS A MEMBER OF NPT WHO HAS GONE THROUGH THOSE NEGOTIATIONS HOW DID YOU REACT TO THAT NEWS?

I reacted quite positively, actually, I have to tell you because it seemed to me if I could put it rather flippantly that the Israelis were applying a non-proliferation treaty of their own. I think it would've been very dangerous if Iraq had been able to achieve a nuclear capability. I think it would still be dangerous for either Iraq or Iran to achieve a nuclear capability. And I think the Israelis had clearly come to the conclusion that the Iraqis with help from certain other countries were getting very close to a nuclear weapons capability. And although I am never entirely in favor of people going and bombing other people's countries I can see exactly what the Israelis had in mind then, and I can understand why they came to that decision.

IT'S STRANGE WHEN YOU LOOK AT IT, THE EARLY DAYS AND BERTRAND RUSSELL WAS TALKING ABOUT PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AND SOVIET...AND IT IS LIKE WE'VE GONE FULL CIRCLE... IS THERE ANYTHING YOU'D LIKE TO COMMENT ON IN TERMS OF THE PROLIFERATION STORY BEING A CYCLICAL ONE. EVEN TODAY PEOPLE TALK ABOUT MAYBE IF PAKISTAN GOES ANY FURTHER, INDIA'S GOING TO TAKE... ANY GENERAL COMMENTS?

I think my own general comment would be that the time has long gone when you could expect the international community or any of the major powers to inhibit proliferation by direct military action. The Israelis, of course, are a law entirely unto themselves. They do what they do for Israeli interest. They don't really give a great deal of attention to world opinion provided they are convinced that they're acting in the interests of Israeli security. But I think I would not consider at the moment that any of the major nuclear powers would contemplate using force or the threat of force to prevent proliferation. I think they will stop always stop short of that, and I very much hope they would.

THE...WITH ISRAEL...THE RECENT PRESS REPORTS IN BRITAIN ABOUT THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM...THE SPECULATING ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE STOCKPILE AND THE TEN TIMES PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. THE U.S. HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF APPLYING DOUBLE STANDARDS WHEN IT COMES TO THE ISRAELI PROGRAM, AND I WONDERED WHAT YOUR OPINION WAS ON THAT?

No, I don't think the U.S. has applied doubled standards. We have always known that the Israelis were in the front rank of the near nuclear powers...that they had the money, the industrial base, the scientific knowledge, and the technological...technologically advanced research to do this. I don't think that anybody has applied double standards. If only because, as I said a moment ago, there is very little anybody could do about it anyway. If the Israelis decide to do something, they go right ahead and do it.

ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT MORE COUNTRIES WILL TEST NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ACHIEVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES IN THE FUTURE?

I'd like to divide your question into two answers really. First of all, do I think this will happen, and second does it worry me. The first is I think it will certainly happen. I believe now that the non-proliferation strategy has failed... that there will be a number of nuclear powers in the 21st century, maybe as I have always thought anything up to a dozen. The second...

THE QUESTION I ASKED YOU WAS ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT MORE COUNTRIES WILL TEST…

Yes, do you want me to start that answer again?

YES, IF YOU WOULDN'T MIND.

There are two ways I'd answer that question. The first is do I think that there will be a number of other nuclear powers soon, and the other question is does it worry me. I think there will be...Oh God...

I THINK THE WAY YOU STARTED OFF BY SAYING IS UNFORTUNATELY THE TREATY HADN'T FAILED AND HE FELT THAT...

...He wanted to bring that back...right...okay...yeah, sure...yeah...right. I think that what has happened since the Non-Proliferation Treaty is that the strategy upon which it is based has clearly failed. There is now at least one other power with the ability to use a nuclear weapon. And I think there will be many more...

OH, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT INDIA. LET'S START THAT AGAIN.

You don't want...

WELL, I THINK YOU BETTER SAY IT'S JUST A LITTLE AMBIGUOUS...TALKING ABOUT IRAQ AND...TALKING ABOUT ISRAEL. JUST IF YOU COULD SPELL IT OUT.

Spell it out...okay, cause I mean it is only speculation.

A...FINE, THAT'S FINE...ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT MORE COUNTRIES WILL TEST IN THE FUTURE?

Yes, I am concerned. I think there are two answers to your question. One is will there be a great spread of nuclear weapons powers and secondly, is it worrying? The spread has already begun because India has tested a nuclear device and that, whatever name you'd like to give it, is a, is a nuclear weapons capability. I think that the number of countries will grow. The non-proliferation strategy has failed, and I would expect that by the early years of the next century there may be ten or a dozen nuclear powers...nuclear weapons powers within the meaning of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Does it worry me? Yes it does because I go right back to the motivation behind the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The one aspect that always worried me most, whatever other perceptions might have been, was the possibility of a regional conflict turning into a nuclear exchange and drawing in the nuclear super powers. I think that danger still exists. It's now of course, been overtaken or not overtaken perhaps but reinforced by another danger which is the possibility of nuclear proliferation spreading into the world of international terrorism. So I think that the spread, which I believe to be inevitable, does worry me for exactly the same reasons that it worried me in the early 1960s reinforced by certain other dangers that have emerged since then.

IS THERE ANY PARTICULAR AREA OR ANY PARTICULAR REGIONAL...THAT YOU HAVE IN MIND...

Yes, I have two regional conflicts in mind. One in the Middle East -- well both in the Middle East I suppose in the sense that the Iran-Iraq war is a clearly...a regional flash point of very considerable importance and the basic confrontation between the Israelis and certain Arab countries. I think the introduction of nuclear weapons into that kind of regional conflict is a very dangerous possibility. And then of course there is the long running confrontation between India and Pakistan. And it seems to me that is one perhaps above all others where nuclear weapons or the threat of nuclear weapons might in the not too distant future become involved.

...ATOMIC ENERGY OFFICIAL, BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT, SAID IF YOU WANT TO BE SOMEBODY IN THIS WORLD, YOU HAD TO HAVE A BOMB. WHAT IS YOUR COMMENT ON THAT?

That's the great cry of the non-nuclear powers always. But I'm not surprised at it because after all it was a British prime minister who said that you need the bomb in order to get to the top table ...everybody wants to be at the top table, and that of course was the great argument of all the nonnuclear powers throughout the Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations. If they used to say to me, if you think that it is so ridiculous that we should want a nuclear weapon why do you have one? And this has always been the argument that if you want to be anybody you've got to have a bomb. The the, you, know the cry used to be before the nuclear weapon came into people's calculations...if you wanted to be anybody you had to have an international airline. Well, now it's a bomb.

IN AMERICA THE PROLIFERATION STORY IS A BIT OF A BACK BURNER ISSUE. IS THIS GOING TO CHANGE DO YOU THINK? IS THIS SOMETHING PECULIARLY AMERICAN THERE ARE NO POLITICAL POINTS IN NON-PROLIFERATION AT THE MOMENT...?

No, I think of course different countries have different perceptions depending, to some extent, on their geographical, geopolitical situation. Things that bother the Americans don't bother the West Germans and vice versa. I think all that it would need to make non-proliferation or proliferation a live issue in the United States would be for Mexico to get a bomb.

ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON PAKISTAN? WE'VE SORT OF LEFT IT OUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH. I JUST WONDERED IF THERE WERE ANY IN TERMS OF IT BEING PERHAPS A LOOPHOLE EXAMPLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE WERE SO ANXIOUS TO TRY AND AVOID AT THE TIME OF THE DEBATE. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON...?

Not quite sure what you mean by...

OH, ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE...

Yeah, out I'm not quite sure how you connect it with a loophole in the...

OH, IN A SENSE THAT THE STORY OF THE ISLAMIC BOMB...THE PURCHASING OF THE TECHNOLOGY AROUND THE WORLD FOR THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM.

Well...you see, I don't think that's a loophole in the treaty. I think that goes back to something I said earlier. It is an extent to which...it is the extent to which a treaty...the strategy has failed. I don't think it was necessarily a loophole in the drafting in the treaty. It's just that the non...I don't think it's necessarily a loophole in the drafting of the treaty. The treaty after all was only an articulation of a strategy...of a general strategy which the nuclear powers were trying to impose on the rest of the world. The strategy has failed, I think, not because of loopholes in the treaty but because there was always a conflict. There was always an intellectual conflict in the treaty. We were trying to persuade...the nuclear powers were trying to persuade the nonnuclear powers not to do something that we thought it was perfectly okay to do. And I think they've, if I could put it this way, they've seen through it at last.