DR. SUBRAMANYAM, I'D LIKE TO START BY ASKING YOU WHAT INDIA'S EARLIEST RESERVATIONS WERE WITH THE IAEA?

The IAEA was established following Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan. At that stage, there were two rival philosophies underlying IAEA. One was what India wanted, namely the IAEA should be the agency...

IN THE SCRIPT WE WILL EXPLAIN WHAT IAEA WAS AND EVERYTHING SO IF YOU COULD JUST GIVE ME THE INDIAN POINT OF VIEW. WHY YOU HAD RESERVATIONS. THAT WOULD BE GREAT.

Yes... our reservations were that we felt that the IAEA would be used as a regulatory agency. And that... discriminatory manner against the development of a peaceful applications of nuclear energy the... our reservations...

WHAT WERE INDIA'S EARLIEST RESERVATIONS WITH IAEA?

We feared that it would be used as a regulatory agency which would hamper the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the developing countries.

YOU MENTIONED A QUOTE BY HOMI BHABHA...IF YOU COULD REPEAT THAT.

Yes, Homi Bhabha said about the pursuit clause of the IAEA that it is like not only enslaving us but enslaving our grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF INDIA'S DEFEAT IN THE 1962 HIMALAYAN CLASHES WITH CHINA AND WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INDIAN MILITARY PROGRAM?

Well, the Indian military program was doubled. The budget was almost doubled overnight, and India raced to attain new mountain divisions and then we went in for purchase of equipment all over the world in order to give ourselves adequate capability for defense against another such kind of attack. And at the same time, of course, it had a very shattering effect on India's morale especially vis-a-vis China. And therefore, when less than two years later, when the Chinese explosion... nuclear explosion came, well, it aggravated all the fears we had about China.

WHAT WAS YOUR OWN REACTION TO THAT NEWS OF THE TEST?

Well, my reaction to that test was that India should go nuclear.

AND CAN YOU JUST EXPAND ON THAT?

Well, at that time, I argued for India exercising nuclear option and I argued it was well within India's nuclear, technological capability and it was also well within our economic means. And roughly these were arguments which were also, at that time, put forward by Dr. Bhabha.

WHAT PROMPTED YOU TO MAKE THOSE ARGUMENTS?

Well, I was working in the Ministry of Defense and I was dealing with the equipment at that time.

IF YOU CAN...I SAID SHORT BUT YOU CAN EXPAND IT A LOT MORE THAN...THAN YOU'RE DOING.

Well, I was working in the Ministry of Defense and I was dealing with the equipment and I was also dealing with the intelligence at that stage and even then, I was one of the few exponents in the Military of Defense about geo-strategic approach to India's security problems. And therefore I felt that India would be at a terrific disadvantage vis-a-vis nuclear China and therefore that India should exercise its nuclear option.

THEN TO REPEAT THIS A LITTLE BIT, YOU KNOW HOW THIS IS, WE EDIT AND WE GO OVER THINGS. AND TRY NOT TO SAY, "AS YOU SAID BEFORE." I JUST WANT TO REPEAT IT. WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE IN THE 1964-68 DOMESTIC DEBATE CONCERNING INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, AND WHAT WERE YOUR ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR?

Well, in fact, in about 1968, I did not take part in the public debate because up until 1966, October, I was a civil servant within the Ministry of Defense and then I went to the London School of Economics as a fellow in strategic studies. And the paper I'd wrote was only in 1968 and that was a paper called Credible Strategy to Face a Nuclear Adversary. And in that paper I had advocated that India will have toward exercising nuclear option but probably we would not be able to do it in the '70s—we may have to do it in the '80s. But we should move in various directions so that we would have a balanced capability in the '80s.

WHAT WERE THE FACTORS THAT PROMPTED YOU TO COME TO THAT CONCLUSION?

First is I always felt that India should stand up to nuclear China. And secondly, I found The Non-Proliferation Treaty made nuclear weapons a legitimate currency of power in international relations. And India as a large country in the world, should also have that legitimate currency of power and especially when so many nations of the world had acceded to that treaty and had made it a legitimate currency of even though we did not approve of it. And thirdly, I felt that that was the only way in which India would be able to preserve its non-alignment and face up to the great pressures of the great powers in the world.

WHAT WERE THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF AN INDIAN BOMB OR AN INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM? WHAT DID YOU FEEL WERE THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR?

Well, firstly, as I said, it is... it's a... it was made a legitimate currency of power by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If it was good enough for five nations of the world it should be good enough for India. And secondly is India is a country which had about one-sixth of global population living within its borders, and if India is to hold together it must have necessary cohesion, and in that cohesion a national power, and a major national power, is an essential ingredient. And because the nuclear weapons have become international currency of power India needed that ingredient.

HOW COULD INDIA A TRADITIONAL ADVOCATE OF DISARMAMENT, CONSIDER ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT THIS STAGE?

The two are not mutually contradictory the question is not what we want, but we have to take into account the belief systems of other nations of the world. And if other nations in the world believe in nuclear deterrence we have to operate on that belief system irrespective of our own preferences. Our own preference was for nuclear disarmament. While we should work for nuclear disarmament, at the same time, we have to also, if we want to influence others, have to operate on their belief system. And so long as the other powers in the world and especially the industrialized nations believed in nuclear deterrence, we have got to, first of all, acquire it, and thereafter, with that in our possession we should have worked for nuclear disarmament.

WHAT WAS YOUR RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM? I'M TALKING ABOUT IN THE LATE '60s.

Most of those arguments were sentimental. They were not logical... Yes most of those people who put forward those arguments, argued on the basis nuclear weapons are evil we should not, therefore, have it. It is too costly, we cannot afford it. We are advocating disarmament and, therefore, it would contradict our stand on that. Those are the kinds of arguments which are put forward, which I do not think, if you really analyze it, had much substance then.

LET ME JUST FOR THE FINAL TIME ASK YOU TO SUMMARIZE WHAT THE ARGUMENTS WERE AND WHY YOU WERE IN SUPPORT? AND YOU WERE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AT THE TIME YOU SAID. SO...IF YOU COULD START BY SAYING, "I WAS IN THE MILITARY OF DEFENSE AND I FELT FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE SHOULD GO NUCLEAR," OR WHATEVER.

I was in the Ministry of Defense, though, I don't think I had much say in this matter because my position was at, low-middle level. But I did argue this with the people who are my superiors and try to impress these considerations on them. I felt that given a nuclear China to the north, a nuclear China with which we had a border problem, and a nuclear China which was trying to intervene in India's internal affairs, at that time, that we had no option but to go nuclear. Secondly as a, as other countries of the world had made nuclear weapons a legitimate currency of power, India must also have them.

IN 1965, FOLLOWING THE KASHMIR WAR, PAKISTAN'S PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO, AT THE TIME SAID, "IF INDIA BUILDS A BOMB PAKISTAN WOULD EAT GRASS IN ORDER TO GET ONE OF ITS OWN." HOW SERIOUSLY DID YOU TAKE PAKISTAN'S THREAT AT THAT TIME?

Well, to be very frank, we didn't take it very seriously at that time.

CAN YOU EXPAND ON THAT?

Well at that stage we didn't think that the Pakistanis had the necessary capability to go nuclear for many, many years to come. And therefore, I would say that we did not take Pakistan very seriously in the '60s.

HOW MUCH FURTHER ALONG WAS INDIA IN HER NUCLEAR PROGRAM AT THIS TIME?

At that time, I didn't know that, I only knew it later—that Bhabha had started what is called Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project which was a project for testing a nuclear explosive device underground. But in 1966 Dr. Bhabha died and Dr. Vikram Sarabhai took over and I used to have arguments with Dr. Sarabhai because he was opposed to India exercising nuclear option. And I presume that until Dr. Sarabhai died while the various experimental physicists did pursue the research, there was no commitment to India going in for nuclear explosion or a nuclear device.

DID YOU AGREE WITH THE, THE GENERAL GALLOIS SCHOOL OF THEORY, AT THIS TIME, THAT THE MORE COUNTRIES THAT HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE SAFER THE WORLD WOULD BE?

Yes, in fact, I did subscribe to Gallois' thesis and, in fact, I do subscribe to it even today. But if he didn't say "more" without any reservations or limitations. If his view was—there were about 15 countries in the world it would result in a better balance--then I would agree with him. I don't think Gallois' thesis meant proliferation or a hundred nations or anything of that sort.

HOW DID INDIA PARTICIPATE IN THE DRAFTING OF THE NPT?

We did not, we participated in all the initial...

...IN THE DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING THE DRAFT.

The... the we had...

HOW WAS INDIA PARTICIPATING AT THIS STAGE?

India participated very vigorously in the debate leading up to the NPT. Mr. V.C. Trivedi was very articulate exponent of India's view. Uh, he argued that non-proliferation meant that those who were proliferating should stop proliferation and those who have not started proliferating should not begin it. But once India found that this view was not being accepted by the proliferating powers, then India would have nothing to do with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

WHY DID INDIA DECIDE NOT TO SIGN THE TREATY?

I think essentially it was a feeling that India was being discriminated against and the treaty was a treaty to the position of nuclear weapons in the hands of the few. And to prevent the developing nations especially from having an equal status. It was hegemonic in nature.

HOW DID MRS. GANDHI'S VIEWS DIFFER ON THE NUCLEAR SUBJECT FROM HER PREDECESSORS?

Well I don't know whether there was very major differences. Because Jawaharlal Nehru kept the option open even though he was against nuclear weapons but he did not close India's options. And I understand that there is a letter which he had written at one time to Dr. Bhabha. And Dr. Bhabha proposed and he renounced the nuclear option. Jawaharlal Nehru had said that we should be very careful about this. In the case of Mr. Shastri, Mr. Shastri sanctioned this up to the nuclear explosive project. Therefore I don't think that there was any major differences of view in regard to approach to the nuclear weapons. Where— between Jawaharlal Nehru, and Indira Gandhi. All of them didn't want it but at the same time they felt if the compulsions of the international situation and the international conduct would compel them then they would exercise the option if necessary.

WHAT WERE THE BENEFITS OF RETAINING THE OPTION?

I think the benefit immediately pursuing the wars that it would give India bargaining leverage and inference in negotiating disarmament. Secondly, it... it would enable India to exercise the option if India found over a period of time that it is... it was becoming more and more acceptable currency international relations.

HOW DID INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS CHANGE DURING THE PERIOD THAT MRS. GANDHI WAS IN OFFICE THE FIRST TIME, '66-'77?

Well it, the first major security crisis in 1971 when the Pakistani military action in Bengal exploded in such terrific violence and there were ten million refugees on... pushed into, onto our soil. And we had to face that situation. But the Pakistan's supported tacitly by the United States administration and China. And that was a very difficult period. And that was the period in which in order to countervail that inference India had turned to a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union which was a countervailing measure at that stage. But at the same time it drove home to India the point that India was in a very difficult position facing a combination of powers like the United States, China and Pakistan at that stage. Therefore we came through that crisis even though... I would say successfully. But it did leave India with the considerable concern about its security for the future.

WHY DID INDIA SIGN A FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT DID SHE HAVE TO GAIN FROM IT?

Well it was meant to be a countervailing inference against the United States going too far in its support to Pakistan. And it was proved in 1971 December, if you read Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, he himself says the US administration asked China to move against India and the Chinese asked the question, "What happens if the Soviet Union moved against China?" Even though in, the United States did give some guarantees to China about that contingency China did not move. And therefore it was quite obvious that the Indian action of entering into the friendship treaty with the Soviet did succeed in restraining China from acting in spite of all the goading from the United States.

HOW DID YOU INTERPRET NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL?

Well it was one of the instances of what is known as demonstration of use of force without war, or diplomacy. And it didn't succeed. But it didn't succeed partly because for the fact the Enterprise came around two days late.

IN YOUR WRITING YOU'VE ALSO REFERRED TO IT AS THE ATOMIC GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY. WOULD YOU REMIND REPEATING THAT?

Yes. Actually when you send your task force with the...

HOW DID YOU INTERPRET NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL DURING THE '71 WAR?

It was a piece of class of diplomacy, when your... vessel which is known to contain nuclear weapons was sent into the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to exercise intimidation on India.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL AND WAS INDIA ALSO CONCERNED CHINA WOULD INTERVENE AT THAT POINT?

We were not very worried about China intervening at that point because the passes were covered with snow.

[REPEATS QUESTION]

It was a threat because the Enterprise had come in close enough to the shores of Bangladesh. Then they could have started flying in the aircraft over Dhaka in which case it could have faced India with a problem whether the Indian air force should fire on the US aircraft.

WHAT EFFECT DID THIS HAVE ON FOREIGN POLICY?

Well it would have stagnated completely the liberation of Bangladesh.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS THAT INDIA HAD SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN 1974?

My reaction was "At last... The people have done it. They've acted sensibly." It is interpreted as atomic gunboat diplomacy. And...

SAY IT ONE MORE TIME.

It was interpreted as atomic gunboat diplomacy because...

LOOK AT ME.

It was interpreted as atomic gunboat diplomacy because it was very well known that Enterprise had nuclear weapons on board.

ABOUT THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE TIMING OF THE TEST?

There was nothing... extraordinary about the timing of the test, though... a lot of stories had been written about it. It all depends upon when the decision was taken to make the test. That I understand was some time in October, 1972. At that time Indira Gandhi did not face any crisis. She was at the height of her popularity when she took that decision. And once that decision was taken the test came eighteen months later which was the... in the normal period for development of the explosive device.

CAN YOU GIVE ME AN IDEA OF THE FACTORS YOU THINK WHICH INFLUENCED HER TO MAKE THE DECISION IN '72?

Well that's a very difficult question to answer because I, I understand Mrs. Gandhi had not prepared any papers on the subject. Nor are there any other papers prepared by any of her advisers on it. But I have a feeling Mrs. Gandhi perhaps wanted to do it before the first NPT review conference. And perhaps she wanted to do it in order to show that India should no longer be treated as... as a non-nuclear weapon power for all time to come. And also that she at that time... there was considerable speculation about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the United States and Soviet Union had conducted a number of tests. And therefore she thought that this would be the appropriate time to go along with the exploitation of their technology.

WHAT DO YOU THINK INDIA GAINED FROM THAT TEST?

India gained the reputation of having the necessary technology to assemble a nuclear explosive device at short notice.

IF YOU COULD MAKE YOUR ANSWERS JUST A LITTLE LONGER. WHAT DO YOU THINK INDIA GAINED FROM THAT EXPLOSION?

India gained the reputation of we are a power which is in the position to go nuclear... at short notice. Secondly of course it was a technological feat for a developing country. And thirdly, I think it did put up India's reputation among the developing countries of the world.

ONE MORE TIME. COULD YOU SUMMARIZE WHAT INDIA GAINED FROM THE PNE?

First is the reputation that India had achieved a particular stage in the nuclear energy development. Secondly that India was in a position to transform peaceful nuclear application to military application at a very short notice. And thirdly that the enhancement in international reputation.

AFTER THE PNE, PAKISTAN PROPOSED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE FOR SOUTH ASIA. WHY WAS THIS SO UNACCEPTABLE TO INDIA?

Because we do not believe just as it is not possible for somebody to spray... your field in the middle of a whole lot of fields, only one field with your spray. If you want to get rid of pesti... pests you'll have to spray the whole area with the pesticide. Therefore we believed that these kinds of regional nuclear weapon free zones are placebos and they do not really lead to denuclearization of the world. We can only have one nuclear weapon free zone in the world. That is the nuclear ...free zone for the whole globe.

THIS IS BECAUSE OF CHINA, RIGHT?

It is not only because of China but it is also a question of legitimizing nuclear weapons. By saying that you want a particular area free of them and asking the nuclear weapon powers to give you guarantees legitimizing the nuclear weapons.

BUT EARLIER INDIA HAD SUPPORTED THE TREATY TO AND ALSO AFRICAN...

Yes. Those were things in which we said that so long as some people wanted to have some local arrangement and all of them were ... agreeable on that. Well we don't have to object to that.

HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THE SURGE OF INTEREST IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES IN AMERICA FOR THIS NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE?

The non-proliferation issue was raised in America in order to fight the ongoing arms race. It was an attempt at diverting attention. Both the countries, the United States and the Soviet Union were galloping with the proliferation. Since they were going ahead with the proliferation, the non-proliferation was kept at the front of the people in order to fight the ugly fact of galloping proliferation of weapons.

WAS INDIA A PARTICULAR TARGET IN THIS SENSE?

I don't think India by itself is a target. But I think on the whole the... It was an attempt at diverting attention at the proliferation which followed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

HOW DID YOU VIEW PRESIDENT CARTER'S NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS?

I don't think he was very serious about it.

DID YOU AGREE WITH HIS VIEWS THAT A COUNTRY COULD BE PREVENTED FROM BUILDING A BOMB BY DENYING IT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE?

Well... He had been proved wrong.

IN WHICH CASE?

Well, I don't think that the Pakistanis went ahead and built their bomb without technical assistance from somebody else. I mean, they might have taken it away but nobody gave it to them willingly. India did it. China did it. This is like the old story of you know the gods felt that if they hid fire away from humanity the human beings would not get it. Prometheus had to steal the fire. The same old idiotic attitude...continues.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS IN THE LATE SEVENTIES THAT PAKISTAN WAS EMBARKING ON AN ENRICHMENT PROGRAM? DID YOU TAKE IT VERY SERIOUSLY?

Well I did take it very seriously because at that time I was the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee which produced the report on Pakistani nuclear weapons.

AND WHAT DID YOU FIND OUT?

Well we found that they had, they were going on a very ... passive effort to go in for enrichment to reach nuclear capability. And in that respect they were following partly the Israeli model and partly the Chinese model.

WHAT KIND OF CONTRIBUTION DO YOU THINK DR. A.Q. KHAN HAS MADE?

Very significant contribution I would say. His contribution perhaps is the most important contribution.

CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THAT?

At that time we knew that uh, Dr. A.Q. Khan had come from Holland and had set up the project 706. And he had brought with him the centrifuge technology and he had set up the centrifuges under project 706 in Kahuda. And therefore it was quite obvious that Dr. A.Q. Khan was the most important contributor to Pakistani nuclear capability.

AND WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACT THAT THEY ACQUIRED THIS CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY?

Well it, it meant a lot of confidence on the part of Pakistanis that they would be able to manage such sophisticated technology. And secondly of course it was a surprise to the rest of the world that people felt that centrifuge was such a sophisticated technology and no developing nation would attempt it. So with the result when in the original... trigger list the centrifuge technology did not even fit here. And with the result...even cleared one of the companies to put in all the piping and plumbing for the plant in Pakistan.

HOW DID YOU THINK INDIA SHOULD RESPOND TO THIS?

Well my view is that s...

AT THE TIME...

At that time I felt that India should keep a careful watch on Pakistani developments and if Pakistan was close to... going nuclear India also should exercise its weapon option.

WHAT EVIDENCE WAS THERE FOR AN ISLAMIC BOMB?

I don't think there was any evidence for an Islamic bomb. That was only a name given to it by Mr. Bhutto. And it was a catchy thing. And possibly Mr. Bhutto with a very fertile imagination felt that is one way of getting money from various Islamic countries.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO RENEW AID TO PAKISTAN FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN DESPITE THIS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN WAS EMBARKING ON A PROGRAM?

Well we always felt that the anti-Sovietism in American policy in fact was more fervent than Pakistan's... than, than the US loyalty...

START AGAIN.

It only confirmed us in our view that the anti-Sovietism in the US policy was more fervent than their non-proliferation objectives.

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU'D LIKE TO ADD?

Well if, we felt that in any case the United States has turned a blind eye to Israel in reaching its nuclear capability and I, that perhaps they would do the same thing in regard to Pakistan.

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MADE NON-PROLIFERATION A KEY ISSUE IN HIS CAMPAIGN. FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HE RENEWED AID TO PAKISTAN IN SPITE OF THE GROWING EVIDENCE. WHAT DOES THIS SAY ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW?

I don't think that in India we took the US non-proliferation policy very seriously. It is to use one of Mr. V.C. Trivedi's comparisons earlier, "It was like the drunken emperor who decreed prohibition for all his subjects." Here is the United States with, sitting on 25,000 warheads and continuing with producing more warheads. And continuing with more and more producing more and more weapons. And not willing in... to enter into serious negotiations on Test Ban Treaty or in any way cutting off the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and introducing nuclear weapons into the oceans of the world, all over the world including in the Indian Ocean. We didn't take that United States was serious about its non-proliferation objectives. It was one of those things which you say during election times.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE 1981 ATTACK ON THE OSIRAK REACTOR?

That was almost like snatching something from a child's hands. The Osirak could not have produced any weapon for Israel, for Iraqis for another fifteen years. And this is again one of those things which showed that the United States was prepared to condone any action on the part of Israel.

CAN WE DO THAT AGAIN? THERE WAS SOME TRAFFIC NOISE. HOW DID YOU INTERPRET THE OSIRAK INCIDENT?

The Osirak incident was almost like a case of taking away a toy from the hands of a child. I don't think there was any real danger of Israelis... Iraqis producing a bomb for next fifteen years. And it was more or less on the p... on the part of Israelis wanting all Arab countries and if they, anybody started... anything in nuclear realm they would hit. And of course it was endorsed by all the supporters in the West.

WHAT ARE INDIA'S CURRENT SECURITY CONCERNS?

Our security concerns are to shield our country's decision making process, our nation's state-building process, nation consolidation process from the turbulence we have around India, and prevent others from intervening in these nation building and nation consolidation process. And also to ensure that we are not subjected to coercive diplomacy by the major powers of the world.

WHAT IS THAT TURBULENCE THAT YOU... COLLABORATE ON.

There is turbulence all over the developing world just as there was in the three centuries preceding the Second World War. In the, in that part of the world which constituted industrialized states. And these turbulences are inevitable outcome of the nation state building process. And that turbulence we have all around us. And we have it inside India too. But at the same time if we are to pursue our nation state building process, we have to shield ourselves from the turbulence around us.

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK INDIA'S CURRENT NUCLEAR AND SPACE CAPABILITIES PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST CHINA AND PAKISTAN?

At the present moment they don't provide any deterrent capability. They are only a potential deterrent value because at the present moment there are still technology pursuits. They are not yet weapons.

DO YOU THINK THE POTENTIALITY IS ENOUGH?

Well up to a point you can say that vis-a-vis Pakistan but you can't say that vis-a-vis China which has got already weapons.

HOW DO YOU THINK AN INDIAN BOMB COULD ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT?

Well it could act as a deterrent in a situation of asymmetry where the other side has got the bomb and it can always threaten to use that bomb. And therefore it acts as a deterrent against threat of use of the bomb.

DO YOU THINK INDIA WILL SIGN NPT IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

I can't think of India... I can't think of India signing NPT unless we have got a change in political leadership which is totally not in tune with the Indian thinking.

WHAT DO YOU THINK INDIA'S RESPONSE WOULD BE IF THE PAKISTANIS DO GO AHEAD WITH A NUCLEAR TEST?

I don't think they would. I think they would adopt the policy like the Israelis of developing an arsenal without testing it.

YOU MEAN PAKISTAN WOULD DO THAT...

Yes.

ABOUT THE SPACE PROGRAM, TO WHAT EXTENT IS IT DEFENSE RELATED?

No, it is not very much defense related because our space scientists have tried to keep it peaceful. We have a separate missile program under Defense Ministry.

HOW EFFECTIVE HAS THE US BEEN IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION DO YOU THINK?

That's a laugh. I don't think the US has ever done anything to control proliferation. They only contributed to proliferation all around the world, whether it is Israeli or Pakistan or in their own proliferation of their own weapons?

ANYTHING YOU'D LIKE TO ADD TO THAT?

Well, all that I would say is that I don't think that the United States has, has ever had a policy against proliferation. They always had a policy which consisted of license to proliferate for themselves and their allies and trying to impose hegemony in stopping the proliferation of the rest of the world. That is basically an unrealistic and unrealizable policy.

COMMENT SPECIFICALLY ON ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THAT SENSE. IN WHAT WAY DO YOU THINK THE US CONTRIBUTED IN THE ISRAELI AND SOUTH AFRICAN EXAMPLE?

The case of Israel...

KEEP YOUR EYES ON ME.

Yes. In the case of Israel according to the evidence given by a former deputy director of CIA for technology called uh, the Americans were aware of Israel having diverted weapon grade fissile material from facility Apollo, Pennsylvania as early as 1968, even before the treaty was signed.

WE'LL GET TO THAT LATER. HOW DO YOU ENVISION THE NEXT TEN YEARS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE?

The next ten years I envisage... There can be two totally diametrically opposing developments. One is the number of nuclear weapon nations can increase but not rapidly. It could include Pakistan, India, possibly Argentina, and Brazil. That's about all. The other development could be that there could be reduction in nuclear weapons and we could move towards elimination of nuclear weapons as has been envisaged by people who believe nuclear weapons can be eliminated. If we move on that part, then there is a possibility that you'd be able to also proliferation. But the greatest impediment of that is the government of the United States because they believe that there is no way of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world. And once they accepted there is no way of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world, then it follows it is inevitable that more countries will have that. And finally it'll fall into the hands of the terrorists.

HOW ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION?

The Soviet Union at least on their accord, whether they really believe in it or not we don't know. But it is on their accord that they want to eliminate nuclear weapons. As the other day in a conference in Moscow an American scientist said, "Let us not test nuclear weapons. Let us test Mikael Gorbachev." Well, they're very serious about this. Therefore that is what one should do. But that is not what the United States is doing.

WHAT DO YOU THINK MOTIVATES A COUNTRY TO WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

I think every country has gone for nuclear weapons mainly for ensuring its security. Excepting perhaps France and a lesser extent Britain where it was done for purposes of prestige, I felt that India could not face China unless this asymmetry a nuclear China and a non-nuclear India was regressed. Secondly the nuclear weapons were becoming a legitimate currency of power under the... Non-Proliferation Treaty. And therefore, India, representing one-sixth of mankind should also have this currency of power if it is to... if it is to exercise its due influence in international relations.

ONE MORE TIME. IF YOU COULD EXPLAIN WHY YOU ADVOCATED AN INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN THE SIXTIES.

I felt that with China having gone nuclear India would not be able to face up to China unless this asymmetry between Chinese capability and the Indian capability was redressed. Secondly, since the nuclear weapons were becoming legitimate currency of power under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, India with one-sixth of the... global population within its bodice should also have that currency power if it were to exercise its due influence in international relations.

HOW DID PEOPLE RESPOND TO YOUR VIEWS?

Well if I may say so most of the people were, did not tune in to these arguments. For them it is a question of; China has gone nuclear, we should go nuclear. Pakistan has gone nuclear, India should go nuclear. They were not thinking in terms of the sophistication of international relations and the role of power in international relations and role of force in international relations.

ONE LAST TIME. WHEN THE USS. ENTERPRISE WAS SENT INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL HOW DID YOU VIEW IT?

We viewed it as an attempt at coercive diplomacy, an old-fashioned type of gunboat diplomacy, this time atomic gunboat diplomacy because the Enterprise is rep... was reported to have nuclear weapons on board.

ON THE PRO-BOMB, EARLIER PERIOD. HOW DID YOUR VIEWS IN THE SIXTIES AS YOU'VE DESCRIBED THEM, HOW WERE THEY CONSISTENT WITH THE TRADITIONAL INDIANS VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT?

Mahatma Gandhi himself has explained why, while he had solved the problem of use of non-violence in an offensive mode, he had not solved the problem of non-violence in defensive mode. Now, in this particular case working for nuclear disarmament required a credibility of somebody having the nuclear weapons to disarm. The words of countries which did not have the nuclear weapons did not count in the international forum of disarmament. It's only when you have something to disarm you were heard in the forum. And it is therefore necessary if you are really wanting to pursue the goal of disarmament you'll have to show something to disarm.

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE WHAT YOUR VIEWS ARE TODAY ON THE SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION?

On, on the, on the issue of nuclear proli...

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

Yes. I, I think that it could take one of the two alternative parts. The one is that there could be further proliferation but it will not be as rapid as many people predict. It may be Pakistan, India, Argentina and Brazil may join the present six nuclear weapon nations or seven nuclear weapon nations and that'll be about eleven. The other possibility is that uh, the world can move towards reduction in nuclear arsenals, reduction in nuclear stockpiles, more and more of control over new armaments including putting weapons in space and with the declared objected of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. If you do that that there is a possibility you can slow down the nuclear proliferation and uh, this may not come about.

WHICH COUNTRIES DO YOU CONSIDER TODAY HAVE THE BOMB?

The five declared nuclear weapon powers: Israel and Pakistan.

YOU MEAN ACTUALLY HAVE THE BOMB?

Yes.

YOU CONSIDER PAKISTAN HAS THE BOMB.

Yes. I consider Pakistan has the bomb.

COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT?

Well, I, I'm one of those people who have a lot of respect for the Pakistani scientists. I do not think they are now for ten years. And I do not think that they have been able to get the fissile materials from 1982, '83 onwards. And still that they're not assemble the bomb so far. The fact that they have tested the triggering device a year ago would show that they are very close to it. Whether they are only two screwdriver turns away or they have already turned those screwdrivers, I think that's purely academic.

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OF A PAKISTANI BOMB FOR THE SOUTH ASIA?

Well.. it may bring about a stable deterrent, mutually deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan as it has happened in Central Europe, as it has happened between China and Soviet Union. Um, I think that is more likely than its contributing to increase tension because both sides would now fear of uh, taking any action which would contribute to escalation.