I'D LIKE TO START BY ASKING YOU ABOUT THE PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE AMBASSADOR IN -- I'M SORRY, LET'S STOP A MINUTE... OKAY, I'D LIKE TO START, MR. C.S. JHA, BY ASKING YOU WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN, IN PARTICULAR THE MOOD OF THE COUNTRY FOLLOWING ON THE AWFUL ATOMIC BOMBINGS? DO YOU REMEMBER ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JAPANESE PEOPLE ABOUT THEM?

Well, I was in Japan in 1957 and '58; that was only a few years after the end of the occupation. We had already concluded a peace treaty with Japan; and Japan was beginning to build itself up. So there was a tremendous enthusiasm on that ground. There was equally a great abhorrence to anything... smelling of nuclear weapons, or the use of nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes. And on that point the whole nation was united. The government and the people. And they had good reason to be to feel like that, because of what the past threw, in... Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Of course we, this was the common talk, with intellectuals and all that, and well, I found a very fierce desire for Japan not to get involved, or not to be a privy or party to anything that went into the making of nuclear weapons, or the use of nuclear weapons. I also had the unique opportunity of visiting Hiroshima. I had also the unique opportunity of visiting Hiroshima along with Prime Minister Nehru, when the prime minister paid a state visit to Japan, in October, 1957, and they were, he was terribly moved by the demonstration -- at that time Hiroshima was not rebuilt; it was a mass of rubble, except for one tower, which was standing... more or less intact. And then we visited the hospital where there were hundreds of patients suffering from radiation, with the most pathetic smiles on their faces. They knew they were going to die, they just didn't know when. Then we visited the museum, which was a ghastly experience. Until that time Hiroshima was not open to visitors from outside; Prime Minister Nehru was the first foreign dignitary who visited that place. Also, during the prime minister's visit, the Japanese government and our government, the Indian government, agreed to enter into very close cooperation at the United Nations, for getting a resolution passed on the suspension of nuclear tests. The treaty was a matter of... great urgency, and instructions were issued to both the permanent groups and representatives. I myself joined the United Nations a few months later I should say about a year later, and was able to... work in close collaboration... with Ambassador Matsudara, who was the permanent representative of Japan, and we were successful in getting for the first time, in 1959, a resolution passed by the General Assembly recommending the suspension of nuclear tests.

DO YOU THINK THAT VISIT BY NEHRU TO HIROSHIMA CONTRIBUTED TO HIS FEELINGS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Well, I certainly think... it did. It would be more accurate to say that it confirmed all his abhorrence, because even before that, he had become a crusader --

IF I COULD JUST STOP YOU THERE, SAY "EVEN BEFORE HIS VISIT..."

Even before his visit... he had become a passionate exponent of--

SORRY... HOW DID MR. NEHRU'S VISIT TO HIROSHIMA INFLUENCE HIS OPINION? YOU WERE THERE, DO YOU REMEMBER HOW HE FELT?

Well, he felt very bad, he was deeply touched, and it only confirmed his passionate abhorrence of nuclear weapons and the... use of these weapons for this kind of diabolical destruction.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS IN PARTICULAR?

No, I can't recall any conversations with him on this matter, but, I noticed a couple of tears falling down his eyes, you see, when he was in the museum, and saw relics of that devastation.

HOW DID INDIA CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE LATE '50S? WHAT WAS YOUR PARTICULAR ROLE?

You see, the United Nations charter has an article in which disarmament... is recommended. The words it used is "regulation of armaments." This is rather weak, and in the beginning there was a small commission that was created with I think United States, Britain, France, Soviet Union, and China. The, the five big powers -- less Canada. But nothing very much came out of this, and in the latter part of the 1950s, most members in the Assembly started feeling that this was really no monopoly of six powers we should be, that the Assembly should be involved much more in this whole question of disarmament. And I remember in 1959, we worked hard, and got a disarmament commission appointed... constituting of the entire membership of the of the General Assembly. But I might tell you that the powers, really, which had the capability of making it effective, the big powers, they were not really interested, at that time. They paid lip service to disarmament, but nobody wished to get down to the brass tacks.

WHY DID INDIA DECIDE TO SIGN THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY?

Well India signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, was in consonance with all her previous declarations and her policies. And she was driven by that Prime Minister Nehru was the first world... statesman, who spoke so openly and strongly against these nuclear tests, which were at that time be- being done on, in the air, polluting the atmosphere, nuclear fallout in Japan, and parts of it shared even in India, and this was a very dangerous situation. So our, it was India which... got this item inserted, on the agenda of the General Assembly. From 1954, every year we used to present it, and as I told you, for a few years no resolution was passed, until 1959; because the big powers were kind enough to abstain, the resolution was adopted. But a resolution in the General Assembly is merely recommendatory. The Partial Test Ban treaty came about when the nuclear powers agreed. Of course, France and China were not in the, not in that agreement, but the big three, that is the United States, Soviet Union, and united Kingdom, they agreed, and then the Partial Test Ban Treaty was formulated, and agreed to, and India signed it, just a... natural corollary to her, to her previous policies.

CAN YOU REMEMBER MR. NEHRU'S SPEECHES AT THE U.N., AND HOW PEOPLE RESPONDED TO THEM?

Mr. Nehru didn't himself speak on this subject to the U.N. The prime minister was not at, in the U.N. session. But he made a speech, his first appearance was in Paris in 1948, in which he certainly spoke on disarmament, on the danger of nuclear weapons, and I think one of the, one of the themes that he put forward was that the greatest enemy of nations, mankind and nations, is fear. And that fear, we should try to eliminate, using some international relations, mutual fear. His second appearance was at the summit session of the General Assembly, in 1960, when about 40, or 45, heads of government and states came to the General Assembly, and that was the session which was remembered in many countries as the session in which there was shoe-raising and the President of the General Assembly broke his gavel. But at that session also he delivered a very important speech, in which he touched on disarmament, and, including nuclear disarmament. But aside from that I mean, he didn't make many appearances at the U.N. Sometimes he used to go as a guest speaker, when he was visiting the United States. But he was always consistent on his theme, and on his passionate plea for disarmament.

WHAT WERE HIS VIEWS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INDIA?

You see, the nuclear question, on nuclear weapons for India did not come about in his time...

WHAT WERE NEHRU'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INDIA?

Well, this question was not a live question for India... in his lifetime. The question of security for, against nuclear weapons, became a somewhat live issue after the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. And China's proclaiming that it was going to have nuclear weapons. And Mr. Nehru died in May, 1964, so it was not really a live question in his time.

WHAT WERE HIS VIEWS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR INDIA, AND HOW CLOSE WAS HE TO DR. BHABHA?

Yes, well, he was certainly a tremendous believer in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, medicine and science, and technology and production of power, et cetera, et cetera. And he is the one who inspired the whole atomic program of the government. And Bhabha did help him in that, but he was a man of vision himself -- so was Bhabha -- and I remember Bhabha speaking to us in the Ministry of External Affairs. I was then a relatively junior officer, a joint secretary of the ministry. He spoke to us in 1954 or early 1955, soon after the Department of Atomic Energy was created, in 1954, and he spoke with tremendous imagination and vision, and he was most eloquent on the question, and the possibility of nuclear power being harnessed, for the development of India, which he emphasized was an energy starved country; India didn't have enough resources of oil; it had enough resources of coal, they were not very high-grade, and most of the coal was situated for very far away from areas which needed, which were short of energy, and there was the question of transport of oil and various things of that kind. And he drew a very a rosy picture, of the possibility of using nuclear energy for our own development and peaceful purposes. And this was in 1955, and he became the head of the Atomic Energy Department, and secretary to government. So well, I mean, I would say that this whole program... was the brainchild of Nehru and Bhabha. If I may expand a little further, this was again not, nothing sudden, because... India had already a base for it, we had some very fine scientific institutions: the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research was established in 1945... the... so we had the we had an infrastructure of scientists and mathematicians. In the '30s and '40s, large numbers of Indians went abroad and came back with very high scientific, mechanical qualifications. Bhabha was one of them. He was a brilliant product of Cambridge and so we had that base. And then of course we had these institutes of re-, institutions of research, and fundamental science, and what Bhabha did was to add to them a large corps of geologists, engineers and the whole infrastructure he started building up even in 1954, and he was going to put in thousands, he told us, and some of us thought it was most extravagant. But he was a man of vision; he was thinking of the future, and in retrospect, that proved very useful for the country, because today India has a very fine infrastructure of engineers, fundamental scientists geologists and others, and they've found uranium in various places; they've found thorium they've used, thorium deposits; so I think that a great deal of credit for our nuclear program must go to Bhabha, who was a man of tremendous imagination, scientific talent, and administrative ability. He combined all these in a very abundant measure.

DID MR. NEHRU SHARE DR. BHABHA'S VISION FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN INDIA?

Nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, yes, he did.

COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO MEN...

Well, Nehru was a man who was not quick to give confidences, but if he gave you a confidence, he trusted you abundantly and wholly, without reservations. And I have no doubt that he had tremendous faith in the ability and capacity of Bhabha to deliver the goods.

WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THE TARAPUR AND THE CIRUS... ANY OF THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN EFFORTS?

No, I was not involved in those negotiations, but the, I happened to be High Commissioner in Ottawa when we had this deal with the Canadian government on this heavy water, for our reactors. And of course the question of safeguards was also raised at that time; this was in 1962, '63. I didn't have a direct hand, but I knew about this, I was kept informed... of the, of the negotiation. Bhabha visited several times Canada in that connection.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THE SPIRIT OF THE COOPERATION WAS BETWEEN CANADA AND INDIA AT THAT EARLY POINT?

Well, Canada we had very good relations with Canada; we still have, but those days I think they were even closer than... they are now. Partly because of the very fine rapport between the prime ministers, Prime Minister Nehru, the prime minister of Canada. And Canada had full confidence in India, and we had confidence in them, so the negotiations were not so difficult -- of course, Canadians are very keen on preventing the misuse of the heavy water or the products which went into the making were, which was used by a, for any of, by the use of which were which products which came out of use of heavy water -- they were very particular about that, but actually it was a relation of mutual confidence. The mutual confidence had not been there, that agreement wouldn't have been agreed to.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE CHINESE EXPLOSION OF 1964?

Well, that was a kind of watershed, because before the Chinese explosion, India's whole approach was to the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons, the manufacture of nuclear weapons the undertaking of tests the proliferation, vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. But after the Chinese explosion... people in India started thinking about the security aspect. Because in 1962 China had invaded India. Our relations couldn't be worse, even after the... after '62. It was a period of great tension and a lot of propaganda against us... and China was in a very belligerent mood. So the 1964 explosion brought home, to the people of India, and to the, to those who were in the policy-making field, the realization that one of our neighbors which is very hostile to us, possessed these weapons, and might conceivably use them against us. So the security aspect started dawning on the Indians as a result of the nuclear explosion by China.

WHAT DO YOU THINK MOTIVATED THE CHINESE TO EMBARK ON A PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TEST IN '64?

First, there was the question of Chinese pride. They wanted to be on terms of equality with the other four big powers. Second, it may have been their fear of the Soviet Union, because their relations with the Soviet Union had already worsened; there had been incidents on the border in the north, and they may have felt, rightly or wrongly, that if they had also nuclear weapons and the delivery systems after that would have some deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. Third, China was passing through a rather belligerent mood at that time, excuse me.

WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO SUMMARIZE....

Third, it also wanted to acquire nuclear-weapons capability... and flaunt its power, and its position in its own eyes, as the premier country in Asia.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO GO OVER THAT AGAIN? ... WHAT DO YOU THINK MOTIVATED THE CHINESE TO GO AHEAD WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM?

Pride, Chinese pride, because they wanted to be on terms of equality with other, big four big powers. Their desire to establish supremacy in Asia, as the only Asian country possessing nuclear capability. Their desire perhaps to find an antidote to their security fear from the Soviet Union. I think these were, the, these must have been the motivations -- but of course it's not easy to judge Chinese motivations.

FOLLOWING THE CHINESE TESTS... PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI MADE VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE SECURITY GUARANTEES, SINCE INDIA WAS A NON-ALIGNED NATION. COULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

I do not think it is correct to say that he made many attempts. Naturally, this question of security against China was the on his mind. He made one statement when in London for the prime ministers' conference, the statement to the press, I think, that India would like to have some sort of a nuclear guarantee -- a statement which was regretted by many people at home, because once you get a nuclear guarantee from a big power, you are in danger....

DID SHASTRI MAKE ANY EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SECURITY GUARANTEES FOLLOWING ON THE CHINESE EXPLOSION?

Well it's not correct to say that he made attempts to obtain security guarantees. What he did was that when he was in London for the prime minister's conference, in 1964, he made a statement to the press that, where India... would like to have some security guarantee because of the situation that had been created, after the Chinese nuclear-weapons program. But that statement was regretted by many people at home, because once you get a nuclear guarantee from a big power... you are really in danger of losing your non-aligned status. And when Shastri came back many of us, including myself, pointed out that was... a statement which might put us into difficulties. And he realized that; he was very new to the job of prime minister at that time, had been only three, four months in power. And he authorized us to say that this was not really any considered expression of policy, but an off-, off-the-cuff statement.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE DILEMMA THAT INDIA WAS IN AT THIS POINT?

On the nuclear question, India has been beset with dilemmas. It has always advocated nuclear disarmament, the abolishing of nuclear weapons. At the same time... after '62, it has started having grave concern about its own security... and third, I've I would also add --

I WAS TRYING TO GET AT THE POINT THAT INDIA WAS A NON-ALIGNED NATION, YET HERE WAS A SITUATION WHERE YOUR SECURITY WAS THREATENED AFTER THE CHINESE EXPLOSION...

You see, there has been a certain strain of what you might call moral thinking, in India's whole approach to this nuclear question. And the origins of that go very deep, but in recent times I would say Mahatma Gandhi's whole approach towards violence, or rather his sponsorship of nonviolence, and the fact that the generation of statesmen who came after him, and took charge of Indian affairs, they were all groomed by Gandhi. And that also, there were two or three different aspects, which posed a great dilemma to India, you see; and I think the Indian dilemma should be understood.

CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN THAT DILEMMA AGAIN?

You see, for example, if nuclear weapons... are immoral, then one has nothing to do with this; abolish your all your establishments which might even remotely be used, or be considered to be used as capable of producing nuclear weapons. But at the same time, a government has to run the country, its first responsibility is to secure it against possible attack, with either conventional or by nuclear weapons. And the question arises whether, in that case... deterrent nuclear weapons are not the answer. Well we won't going to that at this stage, because there are two views: one view is deterrence is no answer, and the other, yes, it's an answer. But anyhow, these conflicting considerations came into the picture. That is where the dilemma came in.

WHILE YOU WERE FOREIGN SECRETARY, THERE WAS A DEBATE GOING ON, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IN INDIA, A DOMESTIC DEBATE, ABOUT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. WHERE DID YOU FIT IN THAT?

You see, this is a free country, and people talk very freely. They can write what they like, even in Parliament. They'll --

CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT THE ARGUMENTS WERE AGAINST THE BOMB, FOR INDIA, AT THIS STAGE?

The arguments against the bomb were summarized very well by Mrs. Gandhi, in a statement she made before Parliament, in 1978. And the date is 24th November, or something like that... in which she very cogently said that the experience of the last 20 years shows that just having nuclear weapons doesn't provide you security. She also mentioned that in a country like India, if we divert the resources that we have for the making of these weapons -- and you cannot stop at merely making one bomb or two bombs, you have to go for missiles, you have to go for delivery systems, et cetera -- then we shall be impeding our process of development, and which will give rise to social turbulence, and unrest, and that kind of thing, and therefore it will not be good for our country, for the, for the internal welfare of our country. And she said one sentence, which I remember -- she said that if... we undertake this kind of weapons program, then nobody will be more pleased than our adversaries. So that is a very definitive statement of the reasons stated by none other than the head of the Indian government, and I think that, for those who are not in favor of this, those are very, very important reasons.

HOW WAS SHASTRI INFLUENCED BY THESE PEOPLE WHO ARGUED FOR A NUCLEAR... HOW WAS HE INFLUENCED?

You mean by Bhabha and others?

NO, THESE PRO-BOMB PEOPLE, THESE HAWKS.

In 1966, '67... to the best of my recollection, and, I, of the speeches in Parliament, of what appeared in the press, there were not too many hawks in the country. A few people said "yes, we must also have the bomb." But in the Parliament, were some parties, one of the parties, [Jana Sangh], said "yes, we should have the nuclear bomb." But views were divided, and in Parliament, you know, they talk very freely, and you have contrary opinions, but what matters is the opinion of the government. The government has never made a statement that they would go for a nuclear weapons program. And what they have said is... that we have a nuclear capability, or we are going to have nuclear capability in a short time, but we do not propose to make nuclear weapons. What Shastri said was... that this is our decision, but I cannot say this is an immutable decision, because situations change, and if situations change, and we feel that some other course is necessary, then we'll have to tell ourselves all right, go ahead. This is what he said, you know? And this has been the view, in a nutshell, of all Indian governments. We, I don't think we have said that for all time we renounce this. No Indian government has said that. But they have all said that we do not want to make nuclear weapons, and the proof of this is that... for, I think 13 years after our peaceful nuclear explosion, India has not gone for a nuclear weapons program.

HOW WAS INDIA'S SECURITY INFLUENCED BY THE KASHMIR QUESTION?

Well, this came in the '70s. Because -- Bhutto, yes, Bhutto has written in, in his testament, you know, that he started on this program, I think, I forget the exact date, but it's, I think, late '60s, he had his confabulations with China, and I think some sort of a nuclear cooperation program was decided between them, and he is reported to have said that, well, "We'll eat grass, but we'll make the Islamic bomb." Now I don't think at that time people took Pakistan very seriously, but in the '80s, it's a very serious threat, and this is exercising the minds of Indian policy makers. It's a threat... which is all the more because of the indirect assistance, encouragement, that Pakistan has received from the United States. United States also, I'm sure, would be very disturbed, or is very disturbed, about the possibility, or the probability, of Pakistan making a nuclear, but for reasons of high policy they want they seem to be ignoring it. That's the feeling in India. And, and in certain ways, even encouraging Pakistan to make that. And this is rather unfortunate; you see, the attitude of big powers, particularly the United States. They have been very indulgent to South Africa making a bomb. Nobody hears about criticism from the United States on this account. They have been very indulgent about Israel making a bomb, which many people say she has. They kept almost quiet, you see, when China exploded a nuclear explo- nuclear weapon nuclear explosion. But... where India is concerned... India had a peaceful nuclear explosion 13 years ago. India made it clear even at that time, and even earlier, that we had to intention of going in for nuclear weapons, and that policy stands, but it's still very, such a hullabaloo about this in the United States of America. We really can't understand it.

HOW MUCH -- WELL, LET'S STOP A SECOND...

Bhabha has been accused, by many people, many of the people with whom he had contacts in the West, Sir John Cockroft, Maddox and others, of having been a hawk, and a man dedicated to making nuclear weapons. That is not my reading of Bhabha's attitude, from the talks that I've had with him. It must be remembered that Bhabha was not a policy maker. He was in charge of the Department of Atomic Energy, which is a technical department. He was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, but he was not the policy maker. The policy making on this subject was the function of the cabinet, with the advice of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of External Affairs. These are the ministries most importantly involved. Of course, on the technical side, the Department of Atomic Energy also came in. There was only one speech by Bhabha, and that was soon after the Chinese nuclear explosion, in which I think he went too far. He even said that it seems that this is the only, we have also to have our deterrence, or something like that. But my own reading is that was after the excitement of the Chinese nuclear explosion. But in his many talks with me... he said that what he wanted for India is not to lag behind in technological knowledge, about unraveling the power of the atom, unleashing the power of the atom. He wanted to be equal to other countries in that respect. And that is, that was not purely Bhabha's feeling; there's a very strong pride among the Indians, that intellectually, scientifically, they are not, and they should not be inferior to any other people anywhere. And you might call it very ambitious, but, there it is. Because this is indeed a country for learning and research, in other fields, perhaps, spiritual fields, philosophical fields, but there is no dearth of intellectual, of brain power in this country. Even today we are the third largest reservoir of scientific power, scientific manpower. So... he wanted to be equal to other countries. He never accepted, and the Indian government never accepted, and I can tell you that, right from 1954, we wanted to be equal to any other nation, in our knowledge about the atom. I don't remember his telling me we must have the atom bomb. All that he used to say is that this is the technical side, we want to have the knowledge -- of course, it's a matter for government to decide. If they want nuclear weapons, this could be produced. We have the capability. And that is not saying that he was a hawk. I don't remember him being hawkish at any time, in his talks with me.

THERE WAS A VERY HEATED DEBATE IN THE U.N., I BELIEVE IT WAS AMBASSADOR TRIVEDI WHO WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED, ON THIS QUESTION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. WHAT DO YOU REMEMBER ABOUT THOSE DEBATES?

Oh, yes, I do have because I was involved at headquarters what where they spoke, represented the views of the government. A non-proliferation treaty debate came about, the draft, I mean, well, not the correct one. Because in 1960 -- now what was the date, I think... the re-, the, I remember the number of the resolution -- 2028, of the 20th session of the General Assembly. That would be some time in '66 or something like that. The United Nations General Assembly directed that the ENDC, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee prepare a treaty based on four or five principles they set down. One of them was that there should be acceptable --

WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE NPT, THE EARLY DAYS? AND WHAT, HOW DID YOU VIEW THE EARLY DRAFTS?

Well, my involvement was in the first place, with ENDC, where our representative committee was handling this matter. And that was in 1965. In 1966, late 1966.

WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFTS OF NPT?

I didn't see any original drafts. I saw only one draft as it was presented to us by the United States, Soviet Union, and Britain. It was a combined draft by then.

WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THE KIND OF TREATY THAT WAS BEING WORKED?

The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was directed by the General Assembly to prepare a draft treaty, or based on certain principles. One of the important principles there, that was, that there should be acceptable, mutual responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear powers in regard to proliferation. Now the draft that came to us, there was no balance of responsibility at all. All the responsibility there on the, on the, on the country which was signing their own proliferation treaty. There was no commitment by the nuclear weapon powers to reduce the proliferation, the vertical proliferation on nuclear weapons. The other thing was that it was a very unequal treaty. The treaty, through all the responsibilities, on the non-nuclear power, non-nuclear countries, and that hardly any on the nuclear weapon powers. There was a vague clause saying that they would endeavor, the nuclear powers endeavor to promote disarmament, which really means nothing. And that so far as peaceful uses of nuclear energy were concerned, the nuclear weapon powers, nuclear powers shall we say, very graciously said, these, the benefits of these, of the experiments made by them, we were not to touch this thing, would be made available at concessional rates, concessional prices to those who signed the treaty. And they seemed to us that this was a new kind of colonialism, nuclear colonialism. The world was being divided into two halves. The have nuclear weapon countries. The non-nuclear weapon countries. And the one was privileged to go on mounting armaments, mounting nuclear weapons. The other one not to touch not merely, nuclear, not willing to make nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. And this was completely unacceptable. Also, they, none of the points that they really made, very eloquently in that 1965, and '66 in the ENDC, were really incorporated there. It was really a take it or leave it draft. And the manner in which this draft was prepared was very unfortunate. Its contents were even more unfortunate.

YOU'VE VISITED A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, THE ENDC COUNTRIES, I BELIEVE. DO YOU REMEMBER PEOPLE'S REACTIONS TO WHAT YOU WERE SAYING? YOU SAID ALL THESE THINGS, YOU CRITICIZED THE TREATY. WHAT DID THE COUNTRY SAY? WERE THEY SYMPATHETIC TO INDIA'S VIEWPOINT?

The general feeling was that, there were some, they accepted the validity of our arguments. But some said you know, we personally agree with our government has decided, or that would that it would be good first step. This was the kind of thing many of them said. One of them agreed with us entirely and did not sign the treaty. But for other reasons, that's Egypt for example. Because they have their problem with Israel which are supposed to be making nuclear weapons. So they didn't sign it, but they agreed with us entirely. Yugoslavia, they also agreed with us, but I think they had taken the decision that it would be a good fist step. So we didn't cut much ice, but our position was made clear to various countries and nobody could have any doubt about our motivation. And the only thing that we also did not wish to become a nuclear weapons power.

IF THE SUPER POWERS HAD BEEN WILLING TO DISARM, GENERAL DISARMAMENT, DO YOU THINK THAT WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE?

Well it is a hypothetical question, but I should think that if there was a very substantial diminution in the level of nuclear armaments, if there was suspen--, prohibition, on all nuclear tests, then it might be possible with some further amendments to have a new nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I might mention yet also that the question of security of non-nuclear weapon states against an attack by nuclear weapon countries, is also a very important aspect. What the treaty lacks, although I would say this was not the main consideration, why we did not, but it was a consideration. I must admit that, but it was not the main motivation. Even if there would have been some security safeguard because of the unequal character of this treaty, we wouldn't have signed it.

THE DECISION, WHEN IT WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN, THE DECISION NOT TO SIGN, MRS. GANDHI, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HAD THE MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE. WAS IT A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR HER TO TAKE?

You see the cabinet committee or cabinet doesn't take a staccato decision suddenly. The ministers talk among themselves. They have informal contacts. They talk with the officials, and there is a certain evolution of policy. So I had been in touch with the foreign ministers, naturally, on these matters. They also met the Prime Minister. And we had the secretaries committee in which the secretaries involved, under the cabinet secretary's chairmanship. [I, myself understood that] because it was a multi-disciplinary thing, you see, in which several ministers were involved. And in all these we had discussions there was an evolution toward this consensus. I wouldn't say it was a very difficult meeting. Before the meeting in May, 1967, which I attended as foreign secretary. That was not, that was not controversial at all. But I would say this, that the ministers also, they viewed it in slightly different ways. For example, the defense ministry has a certain outlook. The finance ministry had an outlook which had a bias toward development, and towards, you know the possible stoppage of funds for development from outside. The various, there were differences and no answers. But nobody thought this was a treaty we should sign.

WHAT WERE MRS. GANDHI'S VIEWS? DO YOU RECALL ANY EXACT CONVERSATIONS?

There have been some writing, writings in the press and in some books that Mrs. Gandhi favored signing this treaty, but Mr. Morarji Desai didn't. No it's not my experience. There were no differences of opinions between them. As I said there might have been differences and no answers, but Mrs. Gandhi was as opposed to this as Morarji Desai.

IF I COULD JUST ASK YOU TO SAY THAT THE DECISION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT WAS UNANIMOUS AND MRS. GANDHI WAS...

At the emergency cabinet meeting that I decided it was unanimous consensus decision. I believe there was, I know when the draft came, was formally presented in '68, at that time I was not foreign secretary so I can not speak from any first hand knowledge. I believe that there was another meeting of the cabinet for taking a formal decision. And that the different, they counseled that. I can not say that either they are right or wrong. I have no personal knowledge. But the result of the cabinet meeting that they adhered to the decision that they had taken in 1967.

THE INDIAN PUBLIC OF COURSE WERE SUPPORTIVE. BUT THERE WAS SOME OPINION POLLS AT THAT TIME IN WHICH IT SEEMED LIKE THE INDIAN PUBLIC WERE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING INDIAN BOMBS. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

Well you see the Indian public opinion polls were taken in certain cities. And their leaders were very in favor of having nuclear weapons. Bombay, only 45% voted in favor of that. Calcutta, there was a majority, but the majority was smaller. Madras was still smaller. But when you talk of Indian public, you can't talk merely of people in the cities. It's a vast country. And for the 750, or 800 million people in this country, I don't think they're bothered about that. They are bothered more about their two meals, and about shelter and clothing and all that, you see. So you can see that certain cross-section of public opinion, which was very small compared to the size of the country, and was mainly confined to urban people, indeed at one time said yes, let's make the bomb. But I think, I'm sure that many of them who said, yes make the bomb, probably said it out of enthusiasm, not realizing its full implications.

NOW I REALIZE YOU THEN WENT TO FRANCE AND YOU RETIRED, IN 1968. I JUST HAVE SOME QUESTIONS IN THE LATER PERIOD THAT I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU. FOR INSTANCE, 1971, HOW DID THE EVENTS OF 1971 ALTER INDIA'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS?

Well, 1971, you mean after the Bangladesh War, well I was not in harness then. I had retired already, but 1971 was not a hegemonistic war, as it had been represented by the people. We were really forced into it. I mean you have this genocide going across your frontier, millions of refuges coming. And really no country can remain quiet. You've got to go to the root of this matter. And I remember security counsel at the meeting which was held in 1971 in New York. Asking the question, gentlemen, if you had ten million Mexicans coming across your border, what would you do? Wouldn't you try to stop it and chase them out and go to the roots of it? Because it really, it was a kind of invasion. Peaceful invasion, but invasion nevertheless. And it created all kinds of problems. So India was forced to, it was not a hegemonistic war, but there's no doubt that 1971 marked a very signal with people in the Indian armed forces. Showed their superiority, and settling the morale and the security position of India improved after that. But I don't think it made any difference to the government's perception about nuclear weapons, why they were not having a nuclear weapons program.

I JUST WONDERED ABOUT THE ANXIETY THAT'S BEEN MENTIONED ABOUT THE AXIS, THE U.S.-CHINA AXIS, CERTAINLY AFTER THE ENTERPRISE WAS SENT IN. WAS THAT A VERY REAL FEELING?

The U.S.-China axis that started in 1979, or even earlier, but became pronounced... 1969. '69, yeah '69, but became more pronounced when Deng Xiaoping came into power, went to the United States and invited the U.S. to form the common front together against the Soviet Union. I think that was in '79 or '80. Well that... we really, I am speaking purely personally, I think it was a, it was a change in the whole power equation. And from that point of view, it had a portent of causing difficulties in this part of the world. But I didn't take it really aimed against India. What is causing us a great concern is the Pakistan-U.S. axis and the almost certainty now that they are on the threshold of making a nuclear weapons, or have already made nuclear weapons. That is the thing that is very prominent in the minds of those who are concerned with the security of India.

DO YOU THINK THE U.S. IS DOING ENOUGH TO IMPEDE THAT PROGRESS?

I don't think they are. I don't think they are. On the other hand, a lot of things they are doing, they are, they are sort of closing their eyes to certain patent facts.

CAN YOU JUST START BY SAYING THE UNITED STATES, AND THEN WE'LL KNOW WHO YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT.

Yes, the United States has not done enough to restrain Pakistan from becoming a nuclear weapons power. Which is their professed policy and that the President goes on certifying every year that they have no nuclear weapons. Although all the agencies, most of the agencies within the U.S. government think that Pakistan has either already got nuclear weapons or can make it very quickly. There have been reports, I needn't go into all the details, this has come out in Congressional hearings, the report of the CIA and all kinds of things. And also this close cooperation between China and Pakistan. Now the continued flow of massive arms supplied to Pakistan. Even then it's strongly suspected of becoming a nuclear weapons power. It's something we do not understand. And something which can only encourage Pakistan. There has been an exception made in favor of Pakistan from the Symington amendment, and from the non-proliferation act of the United States government. Now these are things which appear very strange to people in India, to say the least. And the security problem is very important now. Very much in the minds of policy makers. In the context of the development in Pakistan is the nuclear treaty. And I believe that the government confirmed this intention, continues to confirm not to use nuclear weapons, I mean nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes. But if India finds itself sandwiched between hostile China a nuclear weapons power, and a hostile Pakistan under the nuclear weapons power, then the tide of public opinion in this country may become irresistible for India to become nuclear.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS THAT INDIA HAD GONE AHEAD WITH THE PNE?

I happened to be in New York at that time. I was 1974, and to be frank with you I never thought that we were going to be a nuclear weapons power, but I was glad that we had been able to achieve something which the more sophisticated nations with great scientific knowledge had done. So there was a sense of pride. The other idea never came into my mind. I mean I never thought that this meant that we were going to be a nuclear weapons power.

WHY DO YOU THINK THAT THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN WHEN IT WAS?

You see here, there seems to be a lot of misunderstanding in international circles. I don't think you can pinpoint a moment in time when this decision was taken. It was a natural evolution of Indian policy from the '50s. You find numerous statements by Nehru, Shastri, by Bhabha and others, that we wanted to use this tremendous source of energy for peaceful purposes. Our whole nuclear weapons program was geared to that purpose. And the time came when this culminated in the peaceful nuclear explosion. It is true that somebody in authority, or a group of scientists must have taken orders from some political personality, the prime minister or whoever, to whether we should have it at some such time, or some such place. But exactly when that was done, I can't tell you. I don't think perhaps anybody can tell you. It was a natural evolution of the policy. It just happened. Because even in the, even in the fifties, if our scientific knowledge and technology advance, then this would be the natural corollary. How do you, unless you can produce this controlled, nuclear power, and control means you have first capacities to explode it. How do you, how do you use it for peaceful purposes. In, Bhabha in 1954, when we met '54, '55, when we met the officers of the external affairs ministry, spoke to us most eloquently of nuclear energy being used, for making canals, for flattening mountain tops, and for roads for.. .for exploiting the geothermal energy and all that, you see. So how do you do all that unless you are going to explode? So it was a natural evolution. I think that who gave the order then is not a serious question. And really you can not pinpoint that. That is my own view. But beyond that I couldn't say because I was not involved in this kind of decision.

WHAT DO YOU THINK MOTIVATES A COUNTRY TO WANT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

I think motivations are different because of different countries. The motivation of the Soviet, the motivation for the Soviet Union was to be equal to the United States and not be in a position of being dominated or threatened by the United States. I doubt if they thought very much about using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes at that time. China motivation was undoubtedly to be, to proceed to equality with a power that's the Soviet Union who we consider to be an adversary at that time. France's becoming nuclear was a question of French pride, la grandeur de la France. The, and also the General de Gaulle felt that he had not been well treated and we suspect because the Americans gave the know-how, and the secrets of nuclear technology to the British, but refused to give it to the French. And he wanted for France to play a very important role in Europe. And therefore, he decided to have his own nuclear force de frappe, striking force. So the motivations are different. In the case of India, we've done it, a nuclear explosion, but the motivation for that was really peaceful as evident by the fact that India has not embarked a nuclear weapons program. For very good reasons but I should, I should admit that there is also an element of security safety in that. One can't eliminate it altogether. We should know this. If the worst comes to the worst, in fact any time, the whole world situation changes. And our geopolitical situation changes. No government can commit to success for all time.

TO WHAT EXTENT TO YOU THINK INDIA'S CURRENT NUCLEAR AND SPACE CAPABILITIES AS WELL, PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST CHINA AND PAKISTAN AT THE MOMENT?

They do not provide a deterrent because our we are not a nuclear weapons, and so those delivery vehicles, although we have them now in a small way, they can not be used for that purpose. So I would say they are not, they are not likely to provide any deterrent. I think if Pakistan is foolish enough to embark on a war with India, it will do so at the time when it thinks rightly or wrongly, that it has an edge over India in the matter of conventional weapons, or if it's already become a nuclear weapons power. It thinks it has got two or three bombs which it's going to drop over India.

WHY IS IT IN INDIA'S INTEREST TO KEEP HER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION OPEN TODAY?

Well as I said the, you can't for all time assume the situation you are in, you are at the present time. Situations change...

JUST TO SAY AGAIN, IF YOU CAN NOT REFER BACK... WHY IS IT IN INDIA'S INTEREST TO KEEP HER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION OPEN?

Situations change. The equation between nations change. And why should India foreclose it's options for the future in case a situation arises where it thinks that the only way in which it can protect itself is to having a nuclear arsenal of its own. It's as simple as that. India doesn't think at present in terms of a nuclear arsenal. The government, the prime ministers have made it absolutely clear. Down to Rajiv Gandhi only a few days ago. At the same time, I think the government is right in saying you cannot foreclose this option for all times. Because one government can not bind it's successor government for the future. And one government can not insure that situations will not change.

DO YOU THINK WE'RE FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE TRYING TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GENERAL?

If.. .if the nuclear weapon powers do not show more seriousness about disarmament. If they go on adding to their stock piles, if nuclear disarmaments is only, becomes a cliché only, then I don't see how, I'm not talking of India only, how many other countries will not, will not feel, that they have also to become a nuclear weapon's power, to live in this mad world, and provide a deterrent to others, the attacks by others, because those countries have hostile neighbors and things like that. So provide a deterrent to an attack by nuclear weapons by hostile neighbor. The real, the real key to this problem lies with the big powers, but I'm afraid that they do not show any sincerity. There is a lot of double talk. Nations, big nations talk of peace, but all the time they are preparing for war, and increasing their stockpiles. They pay lip service to disarmament, but they go re-arming themselves. And I think they hold the key to the whole situation. It's not the people who have no nuclear weapons. They have successfully diverted attention to countries like India which has really no nuclear weapons programs. No desire, no financial capacity, and is wise enough not to embark on this useless and extravagant endeavor. But they have diverted attention successfully. They're the culprits in my opinion. If there's a nuclear holocaust, they will be responsible. I'm sorry I was speaking strongly on this, but this is the view of millions of people throughout the world. There is a five continent, six nation, declaration to which India has subscribed. Our prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi has taken a very active part in that. That gives you the view of nine-tenths of mankind. I'm including China also in that, but China, I think, basically feels that it doesn't want to use nuclear weapons first, and they have been forced to have a nuclear weapons program.

IN 1947, MAHATMA GANDHI SAID THE WEST IS DESPAIRING OF THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE ATOM BOMB. BECAUSE ATOM BOMBS MEAN UTTER DESTRUCTION, NOT REALLY OF THE WEST, BUT OF THE WHOLE WORLD. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT? WHERE HAVE WE COME SINCE THEN?

Yes I would. Well I think we have we're are going in the wrong direction. The direction is doom. The nuclear, the mounting nuclear stockpiles. Mounting violence, stockpiles represent concentrated violence. And who knows that a small component of the computer will fail to function, and start a nuclear holocaust by accident. So the whole thing is utterly incomprehensible. It fills and should fill every right thinking person with despair and gloom. But the pity of it is that this has become, in many countries a status symbol, a kind of political weapon, to fight their rivals within the country, or whatever. And an instrument for domination, and causing fear to others. I think it's a very situation full of despair, but let's so there have been some signs lately which give some cause for hope. I think is being realized in the United States itself, I understand. Among the public there is a rising feeling against this astronomical expenditures on nuclear weapons, SDIs, or whatever. On the other side, the other super power has come out with very firm proposals for suspending nuclear tests, abolishing nuclear tests. We're abolishing all nuclear weapons by 2080. Now the very fact that these proposals are being made, even though they may not secure adequate response at the present time, is a good sign. Let us hope that the strength of public opinion grow in the United States, in the more important countries of the world. In Japan, in India, in China itself, and in the Soviet Union, and that the governments will be forced to heed to the public cry in this matter.

THANK YOU, THAT WAS GREAT. DURING THE PERIOD WHEN SHASTRI WAS IN OFFICE, THERE WAS THIS DOMESTIC DEBATE OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. COULD YOU PUT THIS IN CONTEXT AT THE TIME.

This debate was I think in 1965, or '66. '65, I think, '65, because Shastri died in '66. See at that time there was a scare caused by the Chinese nuclear explosion and China's declaration is going to have, how to make weapons. And there was a debate but I don't think it was a very intensive debate. Some views are expressed because the Parliament always likes to discuss matters of immediate importance where the public are interested. It was more, I must say like an armchair debate. And some views were expressed in favor of not having nuclear weapons. Others in favor of having nuclear weapons. But I don't think that this had any great impact on the government's policy one way or the other.

WHAT EFFORTS WERE MADE DURING THE NPT DEBATE. WHAT EFFORTS WERE MADE BY THE NPT SPONSORING COUNTRIES TO TRY AND ILLICIT INDIAN SUPPORT? HOW WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THAT? DO YOU REMEMBER?

Yes the, of course the debate was going on in the ENDC at Geneva. And Ambassador Trivedi was always sending us the information and asking for instructions. He did most of the work there. In 1966... yes, towards the end of 1966, I had a very distinguished but rather unusual visitor, Mr. Duncan Sandys who had just given up the post of Commonwealth secretary in the British government. He came as a private citizen. He was staying at Rashtrapati Bhavan. He sought a meeting with me, so there to have. But he brought with him a draft of a paper which I had never seen, draft of a treaty, non-proliferation treaty which I had never seen before. And I found it embarrassing to comment on. Anyhow we went through the terms of the in and out that, and I gave my comments. And I didn't agree with his views that this was a very wonderful thing. For well known reasons, which I won't beat here, and he rather left in a huff because he was not able to convince me. And then, of course we had visits by the ambassadors of the USA, Mr. Chester Bowles. At that time I think we had a chargé d'affaires from the Soviet Union. And the British High Commissioner, Mr. John Freeman. And this is part of their normal work trying to persuade us to go along with this treaty and all that. We, I raised the objections on the ground which was being unequal, and on other grounds. Then I had a visit from an American professor. His name was either Hockstead, Hocksteadat, or Wohlstetter. He was a learned man --

PERHAPS WE'LL MOVE A LITTLE BIT... THE CARTER EFFORTS TO STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS HE CALLED IT, NON-PROLIFERATION. HOW DID YOU VIEW HIS EFFORTS AT THE TIME?

Well he was -- he came and saw me, and I must say he was a very intelligent man.

JUST SAY "PRESIDENT CARTER CAME TO SEE ME..." -- THE CARTER LEGISLATION, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT, HOW DID YOU VIEW HIS EFFORTS? DID YOU FEEL THAT THEY WERE PRODUCTIVE?

Well we saw it naturally from our own point of view. And our position was that there had been a treaty, an agreement of the United States in 1963. It was the Tarapur reactor. India had accepted some safeguards, not international, but United States themselves could inspect what was done with the processed fuel and that kind of thing. They were to supply fuel and military agreement. And suddenly the Carter administration, for reasons which appeal to them, did a lot of things which went against the United States capacity to implement that treaty. The Atomic Energy Commission in the United States was abolished, and was replaced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Which had a very elaborate procedure. We started finding difficulty in getting the nuclear fuel in time. For many months, Tarapur had to be closed because the fuel is not forthcoming from the United States. Then the non-proliferation act was passed. Then Carter, fought by all these means to be able to persuade India into accepting full scale international safeguards, not only on Tarapur but on all its nuclear activities. India refused to oblige. And India took up the position that you had a treaty with us in which the United States undertook certain obligations. By unilaterally enacting legislation in their own legislative body, they could not undermine the provisions of a treaty. And therefore it was their obligation to supply it to us. India also took up the position that if they reneged on the treaty, then India would be free to process this venture then in any manner they liked. And also it was well known that India was in the process of perfecting the fast breeder reactor. So there was this deadlock. And for a time, they feared a lot of difficulty in the relations of the United States and India. Eventually the matter was resolved by the United States substituting itself by France as a supplier of nuclear fuel.