PROFESSOR TROFIMENKO, WHAT IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT?

You know, come to think of it, I guess you know, simply, there is no conflict, generally speaking, if one tries to think about the philosophical meaning of the word, you know. But I guess the confrontation that we experienced at the end of the Second World War was because we were sort of a, an obstacle to the United States in establishing "pax Americana" and United States were trying to overwhelm us, to push, so to say, to push back, you see, or to push aside in their quest for world supremacy, and I understand world supremacy, you see, in a quite flexible sense, you see. And, and that's, the Soviet Union answered back an that's how we were, sort of clinched in the mutual relationship over, of confrontational nature.

BEFORE YOU GO INTO THE HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION, COULD YOU IN CONTEMPORARY TERMS, TODAY'S TERMS, TO ANALYZE WHAT IS THE CONFLICT ABOUT NOW?

The conflict about now, you see, I guess, you see, in philosophical terms, it's a conflict about our systems, about our values, you see, about our ways of development. But it's a conflict that existed since 1917, you see. But this conflict cannot be solved by the military means. This is a conflict of, simply of different models of development, you see, you have American way of life, you have Soviet way of life, and these ways of life compete in a way, you know. And actually, the military competition blurs or distorts the nature of the, of the social competition. The less the military competition, the better will be the conditions for social competition. So this is the philosophical, I would say, conflict. Otherwise, I don't think we have any conflict with the United States in the sense that we are really require something of the United States. But the United States, you see, one, another conflict of the, or another aspect of conflict is that the United States still--up till now, did not relinquish its perennial idea to be number one in the world, and so the two dictate to other states. In order to dictate, it has to be number one militarily. Since we don't want to allow the United States to be in such a position to dictate to us, we have to catch up with the United States and so, this mechanical, so to say, development, on, of posing challenges by the United States and answering on our part makes it sort of a kind of a conflict in which we are gradually drifting to a nuclear collision, and that's what we want to avoid, of all the things. And we say we don't have really differences with the United States, on many things, and we want to cooperate with the United States for the sake of averting nuclear war, nuclear holocaust, but in order to cooperate, one principle ought to be ruling our relations. That's a principle of equality and not anyone of the sides striving for superiority.

CAN YOU NOW GO BACK AND IDENTIFY THE EVENTS THAT, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, HAVE BECOME FOCAL IN TERMS OF MOVING THE CONFLICT FORWARD, OR DEVELOPING, OR ACCELERATING, OR MAKING IT MORE?

You see, I guess the development was the end of the Second World War. When the Soviet Union, though it suffered greatly, economically, during the war, because the European, great part of the European, parts of my country was occupied by the Nazis, nevertheless emerged as a second most-powerful state in the world, after the United States; United States were unscathed by the war, we have been scathed by the war, but we were relatively in the, in the same position, you see. And one can construe this kind of interrelationship, when United States, United States took the emergence of new socialist countries in eastern Europe and later on, the switch of China to socialist mode of development, as a sort of threat to itself. Threat to itself, to its way of life, especially the emergence of the strong communist parties in western Europe, and so pictured, so to say, the Soviet "menace" and started to arm itself still more. The Soviet Union looking at the United States saw that this is an American threat to our developments, to our position. And so, each country was thinking; I'm, you know, I'm allowing to be very objective, while the United States as well; it's the best, so to say, most objective interpretation that you can make. Each country was thinking that it is defending itself, you know, against the other and, while arming, it scared the other side still more, so the other side have to reply and so on, so forth. But you see, in this, I could say this is, was an almost equal picture on both sides. Each country was defending itself, scaring the other; the other country was defending itself by scaring the other. But the situation was not that equal, if one sort of a little bit abstracts itself, because United States have been monopolists by the atomic weapons, on absolute weaponry, in--first of all. And second thing, there is, there emerged an ideology of pax Americana, that the United States have to sort of to be the super-arbiter in the world. Soviet Union was in the way, so we have to pressure the Soviet Union, and of course, this was an additional element, why we were so scared, and since we are inferior--at that time we didn't have atomic weapon--we have to do some preparation in order not to be pushed around. And that's how the whole thing started, and after that, you see, I consider some of the moves in this continuous increasing of stakes, of new steps in the arms race where, sometimes even not thought out or simply mechanical, you see. Challenge and response, challenge and response, and we came to the situation where like how we see about 30,000 nuclear weapons on both sides, you see, and security is less than it has been 40 years ago.

TELL ME JUST COMING HERE THIS TIME, I SEE A SUDDEN RECOGNITION THAT POSSIBLY IS A PERIOD OF STALIN RULE MIGHT HAVE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH WESTERN AND AMERICAN POPULAR WARS. WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT?

Well, you see, I would not agree entirely with your statement, you see, because Stalin was exactly the man or the leader who cooperated very well with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, with other western leaders. Stalin, in a way, was instrumental in dissolving Comintern after the Second World War in order to show that the Soviet Union doesn't manipulate communist parties, doesn't strive for world domination, this kind of thing. So, I guess there are many aspects of, negative aspects of Stalin, but I guess, from the point of view of cooperation, I don't think that Stalin really scared the western leaders because one thing they knew that Stalin, once he promises something, he delivers, you see. Stalin really played by the, by the international rules that have been established during the Second World War, so in this way, I don't think that Stalin had to do with sort of scaring United States into the, into the some sort of a excessive military preparations.

THINGS LIKE POLAND, THE CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE AND SUCH, IF YOU WERE TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE WEST, WOULD YOU GRANT IT SOME REASON FOR WORRY?

I've already described, you see, that the west was worried because new states emerged on the eastern borders of the Soviet Union and some of them or some of the western leaders were not exactly seeing that their emergence was sort of a, legitimate, as they current--the very well known border that has been...often used as the--was not legitimate, or something, a sort of illegitimate, that the Soviet Union helped to establish those states and so on, so forth. I understand that this was the element of the...but nevertheless, you see, during the Potsdam Conference, during the previous Yalta Conference somehow the post-war division, you know, of Europe have been agreed upon, post-war, the sort of division of the distribution of forces or the balance of forces in Europe has been agreed upon. And that nothing changes, you see, because in 1975, thirty-five nations underwrite, underwrote the same situation that occurred after the Second World War. But the problem is that while banking on the Soviet wonderful military machine, as western leaders, I think it's a Churchill phrase, in smashing Hitler and then, banking on the Soviet assistance in smashing Japanese militarism, the western powers didn't want to give, so to say, due to the people's who've done that, you see. They wanted, after the Soviet Union helped liberate, you see, wester--the whole of Europe, they wanted to throw the Soviet Union of Socialism, to be exact, back into its pre-war borders, and that was the reason of this whole turmoil during the past thirty-odd years, because--- and after the western powers, headed by the United States, came to recognize that they couldn't overturn the results of the Second World War by the power-push pressure, by some sort of even not only psychological pressure, but sometimes, you see, the actions are bordering on military, you see. Then they came to agree to actually what have been agreed in 1945, they have came to agree in 1975. That was the constant idea of, to push the Soviet Union back to its borders, to the, its pre-war borders. And we have the right position. All right, you see, those states emerge, see, maybe you like them, you don't like them, but actually, they also didn't like very much Cordon Sanitaire that has been a pre-war situation and all the countries bordering on the Soviet Union are hostile to the Soviet Union and which were breeding grounds for the forward bases for attack on the Soviet Union.

WHEN DO YOU THINK THIS PERIOD OF KIND OF AN ACTIVE CONFRONTATION HAS EVOLVED, HAS CHANGED INTO SOMETHING ELSE?

You see, it took a long time, it took a long time for a change. I say, as a pronounced watershed, I would say 1955, when there was a four-power meeting summit meeting, in Geneva, you see. By that time, United States sort of recognized that the trend is not favorable to the United States, not to the extent that it's very unfavorable, but not the historical trend, you see. And that was the first attempt at serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. The American idea was very simple, you see: we still have a lot of power, we still have a lot of pressure to make, so we could not push the Soviet Union in a rude way. Maybe we could negotiate the Soviet Union, such a condition that the Soviet Union would agree to an inferior position and, but, through the agreement, through sort of a, sort of a deal, you see, deal, in which the Soviet Union would yield much more that it would gain, you see. And that was the basic the basis for going out for Mr. Eisenhower, for going out to Geneva and since this was the idea behind this whole conference, the so-called "Spirit of Geneva" didn't last much, because the first encounter with negotiations when, on the German questions and other issues, when the Soviet Union was confronted, actually, with ultimatums, the Soviet Union said, we couldn't accept those conditions. But nevertheless, this was the first sign of recognition that one could talk with Soviet leaders, not just to summon them, to under, undersign some sort of documents developed in the halls of Westminster, or in someone in the White House, but to negotiate. But to negotiate from unequal positions and that was in itself it was a, it was a good omen, you know, but it didn't materialize because, behind that was some sort of a rather I don't know what the word would be, rather unseemly design, you see. And, but that period, because United States felt that they have to deal with the Soviet Union, the period dragged on and on, you see, then there was, you know, the visit by Premier Khrushchev to the United States and was you know supposedly President Eisenhower had to come back to the Soviet Union. But there was U-2 affair, you see, where there was intrusion into the Soviet airspace and the whole thing collapsed, you see. And then, everything started anew. But at least the period, you see, of interrelationship not only of absurdly confrontational nature. Before that, the only, actually we only spoke to each other with signs of forced demonstration, of power demonstration. Diplomacy was pushed aside, you see, those, at the, at the background, on the back burner. You don't do anything diplomatically. But since 1945, diplomacy started to say its word, you see, and more and more, you see, as force sort of yielded a little bit to the back, you see diplomacy come more and more to the ground. That was the first stage.

CAN YOU SAY THIS AGAIN-- YOU SAID '45 INSTEAD OF '55. SAY THE SAME SENTENCE BUT...

So, so actually, you see, we've started the whole process started in 1955, you see, that was the watershed I mean, that was when we started to--diplomacy started to enter into the picture. Before that, we only spoke with each other starting from 1945 to 1955 with sort of a, with power of gesture, you see. We--United States remonstrated with force demonstrations; we answered back with this, in kind, so to say, but starting from 1955, from the summitry meeting in Geneva, diplomacy started to have more of a say in dealing with be--with the problems that existed between the two countries. Actually, that, when the we've started to move in a situation with not only military confrontation but also some sort of a dialogue, or some sort of cooperation started to emerge, which actually developed more and more in the '60s.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS A SIGNIFICANT NEXT STEP?

Significant next step, of course there were sort of intermediate steps, you know, but I guess a significant next step was a, was the Cuban missile crisis, which was now, you know, there was again some sort of around, how to say, figure of the twenty-five years, yes, of the missile crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis. They weren't, you see, and then there were a lot more memoirs and these memoirs, more and more you see truth emerge, you see. Even five years ago, when there was a twentieth anniversary, there was still not so much material that have emerged, but actually, you see, that was when the United States was by show of force, you know, to make the Soviet Union yield without actually equitable--you, the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis are very well known, but my point is that the solution of this Cuban Missile Crisis was really instrumental in improving relations between the two countries and improving the atmosphere in the world. After that, we had this famous, you see, speech by Kennedy at the American University that you see, that we don't want you see, two Carthages being demolished but we want, you see, the world that would be really living as a, as a whole. This kind of thing. But actually the American side recognition, the fact that recognition on the necessity of peaceful coexistence, that was the, that was the second stage in our countries moving to better relations. The third stage came after the United States suffered a fiasco in the in the, in Vietnam, in Vietnam and while working out the strategy of somehow of ending the Vietnam War, and understanding that it is not possible to win in Vietnam, Nixon government devised the strategy of relaxation of tensions between United States and China, between United States and the Soviet Union, in order to help Mr. Nixon to extricate the country from the Vietnam War and to help him to be elected to the second term in office. And in his very well-known formula, you know, what's a partnership strength in negotiations, he actually, for the first time on the part of the United States president, granted an equal status to negotiations with so-called adversaries. And that was the very important stage and that stage, you see, somehow burst out of the narrow limits that were designed for it by Nixon and Kissinger, because the, it appeared that the American people were so sick and tired of the war--and not only of the Vietnam War; but that's my appreciation, you understand, you are talking to a Soviet scholar and not to some sort of objective person from Mars, you know. So, the American people are so sick and tired, not only of Viet-- Vietnam War, but the general, this confrontational politics that the moment, you see, Nixon so stretched his hand to the Soviet leadership, it was so widely applauded and so widely supported that Nixon and Kissinger had to go far further than they initially intended in improving relations with the Soviet Union. And this drastic improvement of relationship and signing of some basic agreements, you see, that in a way limited the arms race--not closed it down, but limited--was a very important stage and very important lessons for, lesson for the people of both countries.

WHAT'S THE NEXT STEP...?

The next the next step was the step of the, of the Cold War, regretfully you see, United States, what we, I am thinking, you see, I am talking to you about the stages in improving relations, but each time, each stage, but they no-- note you, mind you, the stage of improvement becomes longer and longer and stage of worsening relations becomes shorter, you see, that's somehow also shows you some sort of a trend. So, then we, after Mr. Nixon was forced out of office there came Mr. Carter, you see, who was trying to continue the discourse, but at the same time, he has a conflicting advice you see, and so vacillated between the policy of détente and the policy of power pressure. But that's not the main thing; the main thing is that when Mr. Reagan came to power, he represented those forces that were not satisfied that the United States accepted the situation of equality with the Soviet Union by those agreements that were signed during Mr. Nixon's time. That, that is absolutely unacceptable, that was the message of Mr. Reagan and all those people who actually came to power in the United States in 1981. And United States made a dash to reasserts it--to reassert its preponderant position, through acceleration of the arms race. And it raced with the Soviet Union for the first half of 1980s. But as a result of this thing, you see, United States over, you see, also over-stretched itself, you see. It somehow dawned on the United State, the United States leadership, even the conservative one of Mr. Reagan, you see, that just to raise is not the way that United States would really become more secure, that you, one has to also to talk with the Soviet Union. But first, it was a pro forma talk, you see. To talk just to, sort of to put dust into the eyes of the American public opinion and west European public opinion. The administration was forced, by the actual signs of the dissatisfaction, you see, of the American public with the situation of Soviet-American relations was for to talk with the Soviet Union, but they didn't want to talk, to talk seriously; they just want to talk, to talk and to talk and while talking, you see, to build up the arms the arms, to accelerate and but it appeared-- and in this way, you see, there was a strategy devised, you see, it was not the first time it was devised, but somehow each American president coming to power, thinks that he, so to say, he invents bicycle, you see, he tries the same course that failed previously, but because a lot of your public figures didn't have, you see, in the context with European public figures, experience in foreign affairs be-- when they come to Washington, they start anew, you see. They see some, something as a sort of a revelation: oh, we would economically exhaust the Soviet Union if we push and push and push, so that was a sort of a strategy adopted by the United States. But at the end of the, say the second half of the 1980s, it became evident you see, that maybe Soviet Union would be exhausted in the final analysis, but United States doubled its national debt, during the course of the five years, you see. Actually it added one trillion dollars to one trillion dollars that have been accumulated in the, during the previous 200 years of American history. And now, by the way, President Reagan recently signed into law the bill that is actually raising the ceiling of American national debt to $2.5 trillion. It actually says that while, during the first 200 years, one trillion dollars was added to national debt, during two terms of President Reagan, two more trillion dollars will be added, and it's not for nothing. It's for too much, to, too much efforts at arms race. So one has to talk sober, to talk sober, to talk seriously and that, what started in Geneva, in Geneva in the November of 1985, when both leaders met and somehow that was a good hand-shake, there was not much substance behind it, but the visit was a desire on both sides, but we considered first of all desire on the part of the United States, because we were open, all the time we were open for cooperative engagement, to start some sort of a serious dialogue, and in the process of this dialogue, in two years, we came to quite an important agreements that have been signed. And first of all, this agreement on INF and shorter INF, that actually bans two classes of missiles from so wipes them out, and that is most important achievement during the whole history of Soviet-American postwar relationship. So you see, the trend is, the, as we see, the historical trend, you see, we, you Soviets are Marxists and we sometimes want to see in the broader and the historical trend is for our country to cooperate, not to quarrel, you see, and somehow, despite the subjective desires and tensions, attempts, obstacles put by this or that leader, or by this or that grouping, this historic trend pushes through, you see, and makes both countries to come to cooperation and not to confrontation.

IF YOU WANT TO PROJECT TO THE FUTURE: WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DO IF THE NEXT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IS AGAIN CONFRONTATIONAL?

The Soviet government should, somehow, educate, in the way, in the good sense, the next American administration if it is confrontational, which I don't believe, you see, that it will be confrontational. It will, it might be not really cooperative, you, so and so, but confrontational-it is impossible, you know. It is impossible not because, you see, of us, but because even of the American situation. One has to--because, if we would be confronting for, you see, twenty or more years, you see, we would become irrelevant to the world scene, generally speaking you know. We would exhaust ourselves and other powers and other forces would emerge in the world, you see. So we really have a very, almost last chance, you know, last chance to contribute to peaceful development of the world. And if it would be still going along the road that we have been going along for the past forty years, I don't think it-it-really, we could do much for the world and for the humanity, except just to bring it closer to the atomic precipice.

SO WHAT KIND OF A POLICY WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE FOLLOWED? WHAT KIND OF A POLICY DO YOU THINK THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE OPEN TO?

You see, I think the Soviet Union would be open to constructive policy, to the continuation of the process of really drastic normalization, not just superficial normalization, not just some sort of a brushing-up, but drastic normalization of Soviet-American relations and international relations as a whole, you see. And we could wait, you see. We could wait for a new down in Soviet-American relations, if that would be desire of some of the White House spokesmen, or those White House statesmen, because I don't think that my, that it would be desire of American public at large. But all right, we could out wait it, but our strategy is to put forward the agenda for peaceful world, for de-cl--denuclearized world, for the world in which there is much more interrelationship between the states--economic, political, other interrelationships and we should just stick with this message, you see and don't make rash moves, you see. If the United States wants to add one more missile that we would immediately have to make two more, you see. We, we've already passed this, passed this system of imitation or mirror-imaging of the United States; whatever United States does, you see, we have to do the same. I think we could wait. We are powerful enough, you see. 100 or even oh, 500 missiles on this or that side don't change a picture. So, but the problem is that I guess we have to present this message, present this message to the American leadership, present this message to American public, to present this message of peaceful intentions and peaceful programs for the future, and just enact upon it.

WHAT ARE SOME WAYS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CAN PROJECT A PEACEFUL IMAGE TO THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC? THAT YOU THINK THAT IN THE PAST, MIGHT HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD?

See, one of, one of the things is just to achieve the settlement in Afghanistan and to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and we are on the record that we want to withdraw them and we now told the period within which we want to withdraw, twelve months, you see, so. But we are asking that during this withdrawal, United States shouldn't should, in a way give some sort of understanding and be constructive in the peaceful settlement of Afghanistan and not to do, to act in such a way that, you see, that withdrawal would lead to some sort of a bloodbath in Afghanistan and so and so forth. But I guess, you see, the normalization of situation in Afghanistan would be very constructive, more on the part of our country, to show our desire, really, to liquidate all contacts, all contacts in the world peacefully. Second thing, you see, we have to develop better relation, relationship not only with the United States but with some other countries, including western Europe. I understand, you see, there is a tendency in western Europe now, especially when they, the agreement on medium-range missiles have been signed, to picture the Soviet Union, you see, as a, as a threat in a sort of a conventional weaponry looming over the, over western Europe. We are ready to discuss this, we are ready to correct any imbalance that exists and that Comrade Gorbachev stressed many times. But the fact is that we have to show to western Europe, and I think western Europe knows this much better than the United States, that we don't have any aggressive designs against western Europe, but constructive policies, not only just on general statements, but constructive policies like the initiatives need to do something to improve the situation in northern Europe, you see, to make some cooperative agreements on--

So, to make a lot of steps, you see, that would show our intention to live in peace with Europe, you see, we always wanted to live in peace, but this build-up on both sides, on one side on NATO and Warsaw Pact, of course we understand it frightened western Europe and, to a certain extent, it frightened us, as well, you know. So we have to de-frighten, so to say, the western part of Europe, and it seems that complete steps might be really appropriate and the, including the increase or better relationship between the European Economic Community and COMECON. So, this is another thing. Third thing, if you are trying to join some international economic bodies, like general agreement of tariff and trade, you see, and the other bodies, you see, to show that we want to cooperate on the basis of international division of labor. And of course, very important from the point of view of reassuring the western public about our long-term peaceful policy would be making perestroika in the Soviet Union work, to show that we are really very deep involved in our own business, you see, that we first and foremost, mind our own business and we want peaceful environment for the, for the betterment of our own society, to show, finally, that our model is not, is not, is--as much good as the American model, you know, of social development. And, and much better than the American model. But, from, for that we need peaceful environment as well as any country needs that. And so, in this way, in doing constructive work within our country, it's also would be one very solid proof on our part that we are serious about restructuring international relations on the basis of really peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

THE PROBLEM ABOUT THE MX AND I WANTED TO ASK YOU SEVERAL QUESTIONS WHICH SORT OF DEAL WITH STRATEGY OF MX AND COMPARABLE SOVIET WEAPONS.

I am not an expert on these technical thing, but all right, you go ahead, I'll answer your question, if I can't, I say I can't, you know.

LET'S TRY IT AND IF NOT WE'LL MOVE TO SOMETHING ELSE. HOW IS MX PERCEIVED IN THE SOVIET UNION BY SOVIET MILITARY?

You see I would say generally how it's perceived, you see, I am not a military man and I'm not a spokesman for the military. MX was perceived as a one more step in the United States attempt to gain the upper hand over the Soviet Union, in its perennial striving to be number one, you see, to hold the absolute security from positions of which it would dictate to all others and that was one of the manifestations of President Reagan dissatisfaction or non-acceptance of the equal status, military status, of the Soviet Union and the United States, and decide to break away from the past agreement, from past understanding that no side would seek superiority and to create superiority by MX, by Trident, by SDI and many new departures in the United States military build-up.

HOW, WHAT IS THE ROLE, DO YOU THINK, OF THE SS-19?

You see, it is a problem that could never be decided, you see, because we could say one thing, American would say the other again...from our point of view, role of SS-19 as any other weapon in our army, is purely defensive, is to show that under any circumstances, we could strike back at the United States and cause it unacceptable damage, you see, and in this way, you see, we have the set of weaponry, or the, yes, the set of weapons, of nuclear weapons, that we are satisfied is enough for making this purpose. We came-- it is not possible just to answer in a short sentence, why SS-19 and not something else; it's a different tech--technical policy of the state, you see, it's different approaches to some technical solutions and so on, so forth. We build bigger missiles, you build smaller missiles. It was your conscious choice, because sometimes when I am asked, or see some writings of the American experts who are writing, really, a lot of nonsense, I came to the conclusion, you see, that some sort of a, you see, I don't know, some sort traitor sat in the Pentagon and devised all these American missilery in such a way that to consciously be inferior to the Soviet Union. When you read a lot of stuff that is published, you see that our missile is small and Soviet Union's is big, you could have built, you could have--United Stats could have built big missiles at your leisure, at your pleasure, you see, when there was no agreements and so on, so forth, so why all this fuss, you see? Why all this fuss? Because, you see, United States--it's also one of the stupid, but nevertheless persistent desire on the part of certain strategists in the United States--during the negotiations to make the Soviet Union do exactly that, like the United States did, you see. To, to build the same kind of missiles, you see. If the United States want to switch to underwater, Soviet Union have to switch underwater; if the United States wants more bombers Soviet Union have to have more bombers. And why not the other way around, let the United States imitate the Soviet Union. If we don't have many bombers, United States will drop bombers and so on... but it's, it would be futile discussion, because each country develops its weapons system according to its own need, according to its own strategical understanding and so on, so forth, and the idea is not to rush ahead with all these thing, you see, and leave each country with what it has, you see, and to decrease it. So the problem is what is SS-19 and how it is related, you see, to MX and how MX is related to something else. It's a, it's a, it's a futile discussion. I don't believe in this notion of, especially nuclear weapons, you see. In, in conventional weapons one might come to some certain conclusion about the, you see, more defensive weapon, more offensive weapon. In, in nuclear armory, there is no such thing as stabilizing it and destabilizing. Everything that is stabilizing for our side is destabilizing for the United States. Everything that is stabilizing for the United States is destabilizing for us. So the problem is how to decrease all this stabilizing and destabilizing weaponry, so there would be real stabilization and not a constant approach to such a situation when each country in a nervous, you see, fit or some nervousness could push the button and then, after that historians, if they are left you see, would discuss all these theoretical problems.

WHAT ABOUT THE NOTION OF BOTH SIDES MOVING FROM A LARGE MIRV MISSILES TO A SINGLE-WARHEAD MOBILE MISSILES, WHICH ARE PRESUMED TO BE STABILIZING?

Maybe they are more, maybe they're more stabilizing, maybe one could negotiate, you see, one could agree--

START FROM... MAKE IT A SENTENCE...

I want to say that, you see, there are some schemes of setting the military choice of nuclear weapons on each side which would be sort of really more stabilizing, but the only condition for this thing to really work is to make it contractual. You both sides, through negotiations, would come to an agreement that some sort of weaponry should be excluded or more drastically reduced than the other, and they both, I mean, not one side would push another but both come to the conclusion that there would be some, somewhat more beneficial situation and less threatening, less you see, less trigger-happy, so to say, situation, if this or that weaponry would replace this or that might be done, you see. And generally speaking, you see United States, in discussion with United States specialists and the United States on here, you see, United States representatives were building for a long time, you see. The midget-man, you see, single warhead, you see, not very powerful missiles, mobile missiles and the equivalent on the Soviet side would be better for stabilization. And we were almost persuaded, you see, on those kind of... and the moment we were persuaded, United States started to say, no we won't build Midgetman, you see, it's, it's not in our interest, you see. So, sometimes it's, you, one can't understand is whether it's serious talk or whether it's simply a formal strategy of deception. But I would agree with you, I would grant that both sides could contractually make some sort of an agreement that would sort of push both countries to make stress, at least so far as their building up is going on, even on the lower levels, some sorts modernization, to go in certain directions that would be less threatening each side, would be can be seen as less threatening, you see. It might happen, as now we've done, you see; we've, we've done away with two classes of weapons. For us, it's good bargain because the American missiles that could reach Moscow or the vicinity of Moscow in eight to ten minutes, are gone, you see. For you, it's a good bargain because many more Soviet warheads are destroyed, you see and the situation, from the point of your Soviet threat to western Europe is different, and this kind of thing. So, one might agree to this, but one can't say that someone in the Pentagon could think of something that is really beneficial to him and try to sell this idea to the Soviet Union as most beneficial and the Soviet Union will absolutely have to accept it, otherwise everything would collapse. That won't work, and didn't work in the past, and won't work in the future. But contractually, both sides--and that's why have talking, you see, we are so far didn't make this proposal to the United States on, regarding nuclear weaponry, although some discussions are going on. But in, to NATO we have said, quite openly, let's discuss our military doctrines, let's discuss, so to say, the rationale, the basic idea, the basic ideas that are behind our military bu--build-up. And finally, if we discuss, we probably could come to some certain ideas of more defensive defense, you see, but by agreement and that would be a good thing, you see. So we are not averse to this kind of a discussion, granted that it's seen as discussion and both sides are striving for a compromise, and not for imposition of its own particular mode of build-up or certain particular modes of technical policies, you see, onto another side.

YOU TOLD ME BEFORE WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF REAGAN'S POLICY VERSUS THE SOVIET UNION. CAN YOU REPEAT IT, FROM THE COMING TO REAGAN TO POWER?

You see probably there was not a single understanding and I will tell you my personal understanding. The personal understanding is such that during the end of, or the second half of '70s, United States suffered some sort of a defeat, and even humiliation, especially in the Iran hostage crisis. That was a big humiliation for the United States, you see. And many others, even the withdrawal from Vietnam was considered by one part of American society as a defeat, and also as a humiliation. And graduate--gradually built up, it built up unconsciously, you see. Nobody reasoned that it's the fault of the United States they had done us in this way, it's the fault of the United States that they allowed, you see Tehran to take hostages, you see, and didn't have the means, you see, to release them quickly, except some stupid idea, you see, as if you are a, an international brigand, you see, to say a few helicopters, and even that failed, you see, with all this kind of a, of a preparations. By the way, parenthetically, I would say, you see, sometimes one reads, you see, scenarios of atomic war. How, about the surgical strikes, you see, counter-strikes, you see, you're playing like on the keyboard of a piano, you see, that, to that much efficiency. And then comes, you see, it's five or six helicopters flying to release, you see American hostages in a, in a crazy operation, really unworthy of such a big state. And nevertheless, there is a mess-up, and one thing is, if you can't handle these six helicopters, how could you handle atomic war? Why are you saying all this bloody stuff, you see, to your public and so on? But that's, I say, parenthetically. The main thing is that United, there was a sort of sort of a conservative way growing out, growing in the American body politics, you see. I think it was not only, you see, a superficial only phenomenon at the top, you see. Reagan and a few... No, there was a very big conservative wave, you see, connected with the dissatisfaction of the previous years, connected with some economic dissatisfaction, and also connected, by the way, which was also a very great boost to the United States with this kind, various kinds of revolutions, you see, including sexual revolution. Sexual revolution, narcotics revolution and so on. And the American public, which is normal public, and American citizen's a good, conscientious, you know, good-feeling, I would say, citizen, you see, who revolted against this whole thing, when seeing his son or a daughter, you see, going along all these revolutions and this kind of thing, and that was taken up by the fundamentalist church in the United States, on the one hand, and by the politicians of the conservative type, Republicans, on the other side, which combined their forces in the way into moral-political appeal, and that's, the, Mr. Reagan's phenomenon, you see. What, with Mr. Reagan, or somebody else, but it would have to be a conservative spokesman who would promise to restore, you know, the decency of American life and who would promise to restore the image of American positions abroad. That was Mr. Reagan, and the in-in-internal leverage was Reaganomics and external leverage, or external method was just a military build-up, especially build-up of nuclear missilery and other stuff, you see, big American navy for intervention and this kind of stuff. So that was the situation in the beginning await us, and that was the Mr. Reagan's phenomenon, and he was very popular and as his second election underscored. But, I would say, within two years and especially more after four years in office, Mr. Reagan very well understood that whatever his mandate was, for reasserting America again, you see, nobody gave him the mandate to be belligerent and bellicose towards the Soviet Union. Nobody gave him the mandate to spoil the relationship with the Soviet Union, and it was not just I am a, as a sort of a Russian scholar stating this. It was quite a concrete sign, you see, in failure of arch-conservatives, so much conservatives to gain seats in 1982 election, and especially in 1984 election. In 1984, Mr. Reagan outsmarted Mondale on the Left, so to say, in discussing on TV the policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, because he's a brilliant man in sensing the American mood, your president. He's--feels it very accurately and he sensed that this is not the right course, this, that, the American public all right, for reassertion, for grand American, and so on, but not for America that is drifting towards a nuclear conflict within it. And he changed, he changed the tune, so to say, he changed the gears and, at the end of 1984, we had the meeting between Gromyko and your the secretary of state and then this famous formal about new negotiations and so on so forth. And that's how, you see, the Reagan phenomenon developed.

BEFORE YOU GO THAT FAR, THE STAR WAR PROPOSAL AND STAR WAR SPEECH. HOW DID YOU THINK?

The Star Wars, the Star War proposal was, again you see a, along the lines of this American striving for regaining superiority, was step in this direction. Why United States decided, or President Reagan and some of his surrounding advisers decided to go to Star Wars. Generally speaking United States had some experiments, you see, in ABM defense going on, though they discarded the, actually the one ABM site that was allowed by the treaty. But in the Pentagon, the specialists came to the conclusion-- that's my belief; I am talking you my personal opinion--that under the state-of-the-art, whatever it is being written, it is impossible for the United States to gain the upper hand over the Soviet Union strategically by going in a qualitative and quantitative development of existing weapons, of existing offensive nuclear weapons, that whatever United States have done in offense would be, would be negated by the Soviet Union very easily. So then, in President Reagan very explicitly said that in his speech about the SDI; he said, you see, that we have to rely on the, on the American technological capabilities, he actually threw a gauntlet to the Soviet Union, actually having done nothing. You see, Star Wars is a twenty-first century phenomenon, if it ever happens, you see, which I think, I doubt this, but nevertheless twenty-first century. But already, as if already in 1950, in mid-1980s, he already possessed the Star Wars! Oh, we have challenged you techno-that's perennial American trick, you see. You don't have any, anything in your pockets, so to say, or in your hand, but already threaten the other side with some American edge, the, though this edge might make it realized in twenty years hence, you know, but now let us understand their approach. So, we threaten you, we challenge you on this space defense business, and of course this idea and I could deliberate for the length, for the end of the program, was very easy to sell, to President Reagan, particularly, you see, because he's an emotional man, you see, and he was told, you see, why is it such, you see, that both sides--

You know, your president is emotional...

RATHER THAN DO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN SCENE, TRY TO DO THE INTERPRETATION OF HOW IT WAS SEEN.

As I said, you see, your president is a very emotional man. And he was, he saw this thing, why should we stabilize the situation by threat of killing persons on both sides? We have to stabilize the situation by denying killing. And he very, he accepted this thing though in this thing, you see, offense and defense are interlinked, are interlinked. If you, and that was the actually, the philosophy behind the ABM treaty. If you cut ABM to zero or to one site, or to one complex, then you would not to spend very much money on defense and so on. So in our country, this idea of SDI, especially being presented as a challenge, as a military change...challenge to the Soviet Union. And such a challenge that actually the Soviet Union would be, would be sort of impossible to match the United States. Was seen as a challenge, the new round of arms race, as a quite exclusive standing, or expression of Americans striving for absolute superiority which actually spoiled their relationship. And which made to do us soul searching, what to do, you see. To immediately rush into this SDI business to match the United States. Or to, wait and try to reason with the United States government and say you see, what are you doing. You have to persuade not so much the government, but more wide circle. That it is not the way. Because you see, alright, whatever one might say with the Soviet, could match, or couldn't match you see. The specialists are understanding absolute perfect, absolutely perfect understanding. That the whole idea would boil down to the fact that the United States will be five to seven years ahead of the Soviet Union. For a five to seven years, it would be ahead. After five years and maybe shorter... if you go to some asymmetrical reply. This gap would be closed. But is it necessary for this five years gap, sometimes in the beginning of the 21st century, to invest, I don't know how many, $500, $1 trillion in this whole thing in order at the end of it, actually to see that it's not working. Or it's had so little effect that it's absolutely not cost effective, militarily, that's what we are trying to say to Mr. Reagan, to his advisers, and so on. And gradually understand even the American technical and specialized opinion comes to see that the idea is what is SDI, you see are not really the ideas that could be materialized in this way. Could be effective, you see. And we, while after any initial so called challenge would become more quieter. If you want to, you see to invest this kind of money, you do, you see. We will find the very easy methods of to engage this whole thing. Because the whole thing would revolve in stationary orbits you see. Which are very easily to. ..to take out of orbit. Some very small investment of money. But in the process we would ruin for a long period all the idea of reduction of nuclear weaponry. All that year of going along the disarmament course and so on. Because if you have this kind of thing in space, then, the other side needs every chunk of iron that could put into space you see. Just old cars see, if they could be lifted and blown up, that would be good defense against so called strategic defense. Because the more chance of iron you have in the space, the more complicated is the prolonged distinction. There's the situation. So we are gradually understanding. The United States, bulk of the United States informed opinion, are coming to the same thing. But of course, United States continues to go with SDI. Though I don't know what the end product would be. My personal understanding of SDI is it's a very big gimmick on the part of the Reagan administration. And I'll explain why. According to Mr. Reagan's philosophy, you see, he's very much against peace government. He's against, you see, this bloody democratic, financial support of American economic institutions, capitalistic, work as a capitalism you see. Result in government, support and so and so. That's his philosophy. But now tell us, he wants to use some technical support to American concerns and American firms, you see. But he can't because of this philosophy. He can't do it. So he invented this kind of SDI. And now he is giving a lot of money. Much more than any democratic president gave to American big business. In order they would perfect, you see, the technology. Maybe for competition of the Japanese. And more than that, they made another trick you see. They involved some advanced firms of Western Europe, of Japan, and to this business. And they bound them with obligations that they are working for security, you know, problem. And they couldn't get untied you see. They couldn't go away from this business. Alright they give them some small money, you see, for this kind of thing. But these actually firms are already obliged not to compete in the United, with the United States on this age of technological development. Or if they do something, it automatically belongs to the United States. Because within the SDI. So that was the great fraud I guess, you see. It's a big investment in technological industry, in the advanced technological industry of the United States. Under the guise of the necessity for military preparation, that's the repetition of the same thing. Which you done a while before, after Soviets, Sputnik was launched. When the drastic improvement in the American education system was done on the ground of some education for defense build-up was passed through Congress. For education, Congress couldn't give money. But for education for defense, it gave money. You see for just simply to donate some billions of money to big American corporations. Reagan and his aides, they couldn't because they pledge you see that said, almost on the Bible, that no money would be given, you see. Or no taxpayer's money would be given free of charge to boost the big business. Now he's boosting big business under the aegis of SDI. And that's... that's, there you go. That's very big part of this whole scheme.

TELL ME, WHAT KIND OF FUTURE YOU ENVISION? WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SOVIETS ARE THINKING ABOUT WHAT THEN COULD HAPPEN. WHAT'S GOING TO BE THE FUTURE OF SDI?

You see, I guess we now, we now sort of are now working on the fifty percent reduction on the next stage. On the [three count], on the fifty percent reductions of offensive missiles. Of course it could be done only with some sort of an understanding that United States will stay within the bounds of the ABM treaty. With a strict interpretation. And the only possible interpretation because so called wide interpretation was also the invention of some, I don't know, cunning lawyers you see who are trying to run ahead and say oh we are more smart than the others you see. There is no to interpret. There are single interpretations that all these things are forbidden. If you have some sort of a laboratory experiments and so on, then we are even eager to grant United States even more leeway. We say alright, let's even agree to some sort of experiments allowable in space. But define them, what would be the parameters, the technical parameters of these experiments. So they would stay as experiments and not as a really weapons development. And my feeling is, you see my feeling is that it will actually peter out, this whole thing. The research would go on, the research would go on, but my understanding is that the present technological capacities and present state of the art makes this kind of space-based defense very inefficient, and not cost effective. Probably at certain times, you see, if you would go along the arms race competition, when a country could raise in the, at the seconds, you see in the second into the air, onto the space, the end of... that is produced now for a whole, say month, in the world. That could raise it in one second. Then probably some sort of a space difference would be efficient. But not before. But so that would peter out, though some laboratory experiments would go on. But the problem is if it would, the problem is now when would this happen? It would happen in three years time when the United States come to realize that would be bad because then no reduction in offensive missiles will be possible. If the United States would tacitly so to say, not necessary to advertise, but tacitly, would come to understand that it's better to go along the road that is suggested by the Soviet Union to drastically cut offensive missiles. Just and leaving ABM treaty as it is you see and not infringing on it, then we would feel quite a different situation you see in about ten or twelve year time. Enough of that, it would be quite a different environment for the American leadership to think whether to go along with this kind of thing, or go along the road that was mapped out in the end of 1987 with the signing of this very important treaty. And go along this route. And this would be better for security of the United States, of the Soviet Union, and the whole world, then attempt for another dash for superiority through space. But then you see, one might say, you see, so you keep it hypothetically. When we, you started talking, you say hypothetically, what would be even further? Alright, for instance, the Soviet Union, the United States would deploy this SDI. Let's consider this situation. The Soviet Union would answer back. The Soviet Union would negate SDI. Will the thing stop? No. You have to say, to invent something super-SDI. Or something else. Or... or to reach back to offensive ones in order, again, because we are switching from offensive to defensive. Each United States thinking that this is the exhausted. This technology is switched on. And there's the perennial arms race. But perennial arms race in holding the resources you see, reach out amounting to the budget of several big states clamped together. And that's not the end of it. And if we survive, for instance, during this round, SDI encounter, the next round we would not survive. Even if there would be no war, you see, we would simply exhaust our planet ecologically. We would spoil the whole thing to such an extent that it would be impossible, you see, to normally live on earth. That's the, actually the perspective that if you logically put through it's the perspective of the, of the that United States is offering to humans. And we offer the alternative. Or even imagine this thing, you see. For instance, SDI encounter, SDI you see, are built-up and then somebody shoots you see. And all this, all these systems are absolutely effective, you see. They overtake this missile. The crash down and so on. And so we see, 10,000 warheads fall on earth you see as a radioactive waste, you know on earth. They... not atomic explosives, simply radioactive, you see. And you, I read now in the newspapers that three American bombs that have been broken at Palomares over Spain. There are still patches of land, with all those things that the American military take and build. The... the fallout allow it and so it's still rather high radioactivity in certain place. Out of the three bombs. And imagine you see, 20,000 warheads you see being effectively destroyed in space by both system and just falling on earth as debris. What would be, what would, on the background of Chernobyl? What would be the situation? So this is a way to nowhere what the United States is offering. And that's...that's our appreciation: no SDI. And not because we are too much afraid of that.

FROM YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET SOCIETY, FROM THE WORKMEN SOVIET INSTITUTION, DID ANYBODY ANTICIPATE THAT THE SS-20 WILL BE COUNTER-EXTENSION?

I guess you see initially, no. No because I think it was the belief here that what we are simply doing that we are modernizing missiles that have been staying in the positions for the past twenty years: SS-4 and SS-5. We didn't have time you see to do this thing. Because NATO during that time, it modernized three times its nuclear carriers. You see I don't speak war carriers, but you have your own, alright. United has its own set of nuclear and missile launch. We have our own. NATO modernized three times, we didn't modernize. So let us modernize, you see after we sort of somehow leveled up with the United States and strategic missilery. We'll do something to improve our technical thing you see. And that's I think how the thing was perceived and how the military, our military here thought about it. And that was normal thing. And probably you know, probably if we, in advance we would tell about this thing. We would tell, see we have this missile about 600 or something you see. Old missiles. We want to modernize them, and we would be modernizing them and we would replace them with new missiles if NATO would not do this, and that. But we didn't tell this and I think that was in a way mistake. If we told them, probably we would come to some solution before. But we've done it in the normal way and all of a sudden it became political issue. Because you see NATO understood... wanted qualitative change you see. And then Helmut Schmidt came with an idea that since there was a stabilization, in strategic arms, you see, let's stabilize on European continent which the idea which we... are totally acceptable to us. By the way, it was, the Schmidt's idea was absolutely acceptable to us. And the Schmidt said, you see, but in order to make the Soviet Union, we should frighten them with a possibility of introducing American missiles and so on and so forth. And the whole thing you see collapsed because somehow a lot of events happened. SALT II was not '85 so this thing might be taken up at SALT III. It didn't, you see. Then there was a split big split between the United States and the Soviet Union. There was other developments. And somehow everything went under I don't know how to say. Under the drain. You know the whole idea that we could have stopped at that time. And after that when we were sort of on not very good speaking terms, we build up. United States started count... build up. And they came to the situation when we have to destroy now already made weaponry when we could have agreed on when the both sides were with this weaponry on paper.

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH REAGAN'S ZERO PROPOSAL WHEN IT WAS MADE IN '81?

You see the... I personally don't consider there was something wrong about that except that it was done --

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PRESENT IT...

I, you ask me why, what was wrong with the zero proposal. I think you see there was nothing wrong except that it was absolutely propagandistic. It was not a real proposal. It was simply the proposal that United States themselves did consider, you see, that they're making some proposal to the Soviet Union would never accept. And that's why they made it. And now it's considered explicitly. Written in every paper you see in the west. Now, when the treaty is really formally signed enough to be ratified, everybody said that was a mistake on the part of, or anybody of the conservative persuasion. That was bad, what Mr. Reagan wanted. So it was just simply a propaganda ploy. And probably he understood that the mentality of our then leadership in the way, in that case happened. We considered it a propaganda ploy and we didn't take it that seriously and we moved our own counterproposal. Let's do away with all the nuclear weapon in Europe, you see. But there was no real negotiations. There was simply, you see, maneuvering you see for not only the part of the United States to drag time in order to deploy. That's all.

WHY DO YOU THINK THE WESTERN, WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT WERE GOING ALONG?

At that time I guess you see west European governments still very much rely on the United States protection. They don't want to spend a lot of money on their own. And this was a supposedly new American protection for them that was the, how say, the confirmation of American guarantee, or coming to defense of western Europe and all this you see, blah things, you know. Though actually the United States were decoupling its strategic arsenal from European theater. Actually United States, by deploying those weapons, said it is it is a situation when the nuclear war on European continent can be waged without affecting the United States. And somehow decide our American reasoning which of course not really much explicit. It's not stated out loud you see. Out loud it's said, oh we are connecting more American strategic missiles. But generally speaking, United States we are distancing itself from Europe. And the best minds in Europe understood this. But nevertheless, from the point of view of not desiring to do a business themselves, you see they, some conservativist with European governments. And there were a lot of conservative governments at the time. By the time the realization started to be implemented they relied on this American deployment as a substitute for their own efforts. Either military efforts or their own drastic weapons on their own, and improving drastic situations in Europe and negotiations with the Soviet Union. They did what neither a good negotiation. They didn't want neither efforts of their own. So United States, Uncle Sam will provide.

WHAT MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE DEPLOYMENT TO COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATIONS?

Well we negotiated all the time you see. And after the beginning, you see, we'll make maybe some technical mistakes about this, you see.

WHICH ONES?

Oh I guess probably we should we should strongly protest against the, against the deployment and really break up negotiations. That we should continue with a START negotiations. We should have gone on so on. But nevertheless we don't have other way. We have to negotiate. But you should understand that in the process you see, Soviet leadership should drastically change. We now have quite a new leadership. We should use the situation differently which is has much mere wider understanding of a general trend in the world which has much more better philosophical background for the mapping out long-term Soviet strategy. It... it this leadership understands. You have to start somewhere. And even if during this START you have to give somewhat more weapons than the Americans given. It would be a good start you see for moving the world from the path that it followed up till now. From forty years you see. The path of incessant arms race, even sometimes interrupted by common agreement about the rules of the arms race. And to drastically versatile that.. .that so it's a combination of many factors including one very important, the change of the coming to the leadership of the Soviet Union Comrade Gorbachev and his colleagues.

CAN YOU ELABORATE ON IT, SORT OF THE SHIFT IN THE THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS BETWEEN THE BREZHNEV, ANDROPOV, CHERNENKO AND...

And also I'm not, would not be going into that detail. But as you know, you see, when the first notion that you see are not really going along the right road was made by Mr. Comrade Brezhnev in his speech in Tula in 1977 when he talked about the necessity to stop arms race. That he talked about the peril of human civilization. I don't remember the exact phrase and the result of the war. And he talked about the sufficiency of weaponry. That you don't have to add on, and on, and on. But at that time, you see, probably this occasion was such that besides this kind of a general understanding, there was not enough you see of political will, and maybe not enough of a vigor in the, in that leadership to implement this. Then you know that we have a very short terms for Commander Andropov, and commander Chernenko That time it was devoted, attention was devoted more to the internal matters than to external policies. Neither of these persons could really develop long-term policy though I understand Commander Andropov had a very strong ideas about drastic change in the direction, or world politics so to say. But finally, it came to the fate of Commander Gorbachev and his colleagues really to think out systematically in the scientific fashion. With really a very big discussion. Not only within the top leadership of a government, but with the moment of military and scientific circles, to map out the plan for drastically changing the chosen path so to say. Not just to serve gears on this road that we are taking, but simply try to walk off this road and try to suggest a new road. The road to denuclearize the world. The road in which as Commander Gorbachev, remembering Lenin says, you see that the some interests of humanity are more important then the class interests and this very drastic departure from the mature practice, or the previous practice of our foreign policy practice of our state. That there are common values. That there should not be, you see, international relations should not be ideal choice you see. They should be carried out on the basis of national interest. And on the recognition of mutually important national interests by the various states on the equality which would encompass not only the super-power, but all the states. So we have the whole philosophy for which you see one could devote a couple of programs you see. We would spell that out on the table. But the main thing is we initiated perestroika, or restructuring Soviet economy inside our country. And we are appealing for the same perestroika in the international relations to going to, it's not immediately everything should be absolutely new. We had some good premises. We had Soviet-American agreement on the basic rules of behavior you see which spelled out that there could not be, you see, war in the nuclear age. The relationship should be based on the basis of peaceful coexistence. But peaceful coexistence itself is a, as a notion of Soviet policies, reinterpreted you see. It's not in anyway a breathing spell or whatever. It's a conscious policy of living in a world with multiple different states with different philosophers, different economic systems, and so on. And to live in this world we have to do whatever is possible to make it peaceful world. And world that would be really coping with its great ecological and social and other problems. And not spending, you see, a lot of money. Especially for both our country, for the United States. We are excessive spender. We spend more than anybody else on military preparations. Why should we put ourselves in such a situation and allow all the other world, you see, to overtake us and to leave us behind. That's a very normal and very practical, and pragmatic philosophy. Let's do something for the people you see instead of doing something for killing them.