Interviewer: SO GENERAL, YOU WENT BACK TO SAC IN 1955 FROM EUROPE.
Interviewer: COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHAT THE COMMAND WAS LIKE AND WHAT THE ATTITUDE TO GENERAL LEMAY WAS AND WHAT YOU THINK OF HIM AS A COMMANDER AT THAT TIME?
Martin: Yes.
Martin: I remember those days very clearly.
Martin: SAC was a vibrant, growing command.
Martin: And it was led uniquely and ably by General LeMay.
Martin: He inspired great loyalty from all who worked for him regardless of level.
Martin: And as I believe I mentioned, although it's not perhaps generally recognized in General LeMay's public reputation he was very much interested in many aspects of the command and the Air Force and the country other than operations.
Martin: He was interested in people.
Martin: And he did a lot for people.
Martin: SAC, in those mid–'50s innovated a number of features in military life in SAC that were beneficial to the people.
Martin: And as a result, even though recruitment was difficult from time to time, SAC was able to maintain a high level of attraction.
Martin: SAC also had a very difficult life.
Martin: And gained a reputation for family separation and long periods of service over seas without the families.
Martin: Many temporary duties.
Martin: Some of them on very short notice.
Martin: So some people were not attracted to SAC as a matter of first choice for those reasons.
Martin: But basically SAC was becoming probably the most effective military command in world history...
Interviewer: THAT'S A BIG CLAIM.
Interviewer: YES, THE MOST EFFECTIVE MILITARY COMMAND IN WORLD HISTORY.
Interviewer: I MEAN, WHY DO YOU SAY THAT?
Martin: Well, I think that based on my personal observation of how the command worked and what the mission was and the attention paid to every feature of operation and support and the results all based on realism and readiness the performance of SAC was unequaled.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE TASK FACING A PILOT OR NAVIGATOR OR BOMBARDIER IN THE EARLY TO MID-'50S? HOW DIFFICULT WAS IT TO ACTUALLY EXECUTE THE THEORETICAL MISSION
Martin: It was a great effort for a number of reasons.
Martin: The maintenance of the equipment was difficult because it had to be performed outdoors in all kinds of weather in many places in the world under a variety of conditions, many of them adverse.
Martin: I'll give you one example maintaining a B-36 in Thule Greenland was demand that was unique.
Martin: But it was met.
Martin: As to the mission itself, the missions were long.
Martin: And every crew member had to perform his...
Martin: function to a higher degree of perfection or near perfection as nearly as he could come to perfection in order for the mission to be carried out successfully.
Martin: And of course the mission was to get the bomb on the target if called upon to do so.
Interviewer: AND THIS AFTER ALL WOULD HAVE BEEN A TARGET THAT YOU'D NEVER SEEN AND OVER A COUNTRY THAT YOU'D NEVER FLOWN OVER.
Interviewer: I MEAN, HOW WOULD YOU HAVE GONE ABOUT FINDING THOSE TARGETS?
Martin: Well, the training was rigorous and the simulation was carried out in great detail.
Martin: I think that perhaps that was another area of innovation and breakthrough.
Martin: The...
Martin: the radar simulation of a target in an unknown or unexamined part of the world for example to use your...
Martin: you same example The...
Martin: the training was the basis for finding the target.
Interviewer: HOW COULD YOU FIND A TARGET YOU'D NEVER SEEN BEFORE?
Martin: By study of all intelligence data.
Martin: By training with the best possible simulation.
Martin: And of course, there was a great reliance on radar and radar simulation was part of the training.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE MOOD OF SAC AT THE TIME? DID YOU BELIEVE THAT A GENERAL WAR WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY?
Martin: Yes.
Martin: We...
Martin: we felt that we had to be prepared for that possibility.
Interviewer: [REPEATS QUESTION]
Martin: I'd say the mood in general was one of constant readiness.
Martin: During the '50s there were several crises in the Middle East for example.
Martin: And on each of those occasions SAC forces were put on some condition of readiness.
Martin: To use the jargon DEFCON of some number.
Martin: The increasing numbers indicated increasing degrees of readiness and more steps taken to achieve those degrees of readiness.
Martin: So the possibility of the outbreak of a war was a condition that you lived with at SAC 24 hours a day.
Martin: I don't say probability.
Martin: But to use your word, possibility.
Martin: And it was real.
Interviewer: AND YOU FELT IT COULD COME VERY FAST IF IT CAME?
Martin: Yes.
Interviewer: HOW FAST?
Martin: Well, depending upon the scenario I think it could be with strategic warning.
Martin: For example, if there were preparations made to attack Western Europe by the...
Martin: Warsaw Pact forces.
Martin: Before or simultaneously with a strategic attack by the Soviets, you could expect perhaps strategic warning because you cannot prepare for an attack of that sort against Western Europe without having certain features of your preparations become known.
Martin: That would be one end of the scale.
Martin: But if you leave out the attack against Western Europe in relation to the strategic attack then you'd have perhaps only strategic warning.
Martin: I should say tactical warning.
Martin: And that could be a matter of just a few hours.
Martin: And now, with the advent of missiles of course, it could be a matter of just minutes.
Interviewer: MOST OF THE SCENARIOS THAT WERE PAINTED FOR THE PUBLIC AT THE TIME, POSITED THAT RETALIATION BY THE UNITED STATES TO A BOMBER ATTACK ON THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT BY THE SOVIET UNION.
Interviewer: THE WAY THAT YOU TALKED OR THOUGHT ABOUT THIS IN SAC AT THE TIME IN REALISTIC MILITARY TERMS, WAS THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO A BOMBER ATTACK OR DID YOU EXPECT TO GET YOUR BLOW IN BEFORE ANY SUCH BOMBER ATTACK ON THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT?
Martin: We regarded that as a matter of Presidential decision.
Martin: The same question exists today with missiles.
Martin: And generally it's...
Martin: it's part of the question of should we or should we not launch on warning.
Martin: I don't think anybody knows if the Soviets attacked us whether we would wait till the first missiles impacted or whether the President would decide to launch on warning.
Martin: The same is true 30 years ago just at the advent of the missile age with bombers.
Martin: But I would judge, in thinking back to answer your question, that with the national military policy which dictated our planning being one of retaliation that we would expect to be struck in some degree first.
Interviewer: THE ACTUAL PLANS AS TO WHAT YOU WOULD STRIKE— COULD YOU TELL ME IF THAT CHANGED OVER THE PERIOD OF 1953 THROUGH 1961.
Interviewer: WHAT THE MAIN TARGETS WERE, WHAT KINDS OF TARGETS THEY WERE, AND IF IT DID CHANGE, WHY IT CHANGED?
Martin: I don't think that I could go into detail on that.
Martin: But your question, I assume, has to do with the difference between counterforce, on the one hand, meaning to strike military forces and targets of the enemy, primarily as a matter of first priority or whether to strike urban targets as a matter of priority.
Martin: The change as I recall came about in the early '60s.
Martin: Before that time counterforce targets were always included as matters of priority.
Martin: And that was regarded as being particularly important because of the contribution of the United States to NATO in the form of strategic forces.
Martin: And in order to contribute to the defense of NATO Europe, enemy forces would have to be struck or neutralized as much as possible.
Martin: So the counterforce concept was present.
Martin: It was real.
Martin: It was a matter of priority.
Interviewer: SO BY THAT YOU MEAN THAT IN THE '50s AND EARLY '60s THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS EITHER DESTROYING THE SOVIET AIR FORCE OR ATTACKING THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE WAR? IS THAT RIGHT?
Martin: And naval forces.
Martin: Their submarine fleet was extensive and impressive and still is.
Interviewer: [REPEATS QUESTION]
Martin: Well, I believe that the importance of attacking enemy forces, land, sea, and air was an important part of the targeting concept not only as a matter of US direct interest.
Martin: For example, knocking out Soviet bombers and supporting activities, but also important to the defense of NATO.
Martin: Now, those things are still important, But I believe in the early '60s there was a change in the targeting concept to elevate the priority of attacks against urban areas.
Martin: And that probably is where the term, a balance of terror, became popular.
Martin: And it was in that period that the terms such as finite deterrence minimum deterrence were born.
Martin: The general argument by those who advocated minimum deterrence ran along these lines...
Interviewer: SURELY IN THE VERY EARLY '50S IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WITH THE KINDS OF SYSTEMS THAT YOU HAD AVAILABLE THEN.
Interviewer: IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HARD TO HIT ANY TARGET OTHER THAN UH...
Interviewer: WITH THE KIND OF INTELLIGENCE THAT YOU HAD, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HARD TO HIT ANYTHING OTHER THAN CITIES, WOULD IT NOT?
Martin: Well, I was going to mention that.
Martin: When there were very few weapons, and they were relatively less accurate than they became steadily and have become the targets had to be selected within the capabilities of those weapons.
Martin: But the idea still was to select those targets that had a military significance as well as industrial significance in supporting military activity on the part of the enemy.
Martin: But there were constraints in terms of numbers of weapons, types of weapons, and numbers of delivery vehicles.
Interviewer: COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE TRANSITION FROM CITIES TO COUNTERFORCE?
Martin: Well, I think that the nature of the weapons dictated to a certain extent the nature of targets selected.
Martin: But with...
Martin: and let's say that the...
Martin: if we had a weapon that was not extremely accurate, as they have since become, the target selection process had to be based on what that weapon could do against that type of target.
Martin: Let's call it an urban industrial area or a military industrial area.
Martin: Within those types of targets there were priorities established for military reasons.
Martin: So I think, what I'm saying in summary is if you...
Martin: if you were constrained by the...
Martin: nature of your weapon to go against certain types of targets then you selected those targets based on doing the maximum amount of damage to the Soviet military capability if they started by attacking you.
Interviewer: SO DESPITE THE FUSS THAT WAS MADE IN THE LATE '70S WHEN PEOPLE SAID THAT THE US HAD SUDDENLY DISCOVERED A WAR FIGHTING PHILOSOPHY, IN FACT, RIGHT THROUGH THE '50s TARGETING WAS BASED ON THE NEED TO WIN A WAR AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IF ONE SHOULD BREAK OUT...
Martin: That's right.
Martin: That's right,
Interviewer: COULD YOU SAY THAT YOURSELF, DO YOU THINK?
Martin: Well, I think that during the '50s there was a debate to some extent perhaps more in Washington in government circles than in public, but it certainly became public from time to time on the question of whether a war started by the Soviet Union would be a short war or a long war.
Martin: And that debate incidentally was carried on within NATO which was formed in the early '50s from a military standpoint.
Martin: And I think probably that debate's still going on.
Martin: And nobody really knows whether a war would be short or long.
Martin: But if you recall, the size of stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, that sort of thing was relatively modest.
Martin: I felt at the time that it was partly due to economic reasons on the part of NATO nations and the belief that a short war was a convenient way of cutting down the expense of maintaining extensive stockpiles.
Martin: But that really is a side issue.
Martin: The basic belief that we had in SAC and I think in the Air Force generally at that time in the early days of the nuclear era was that if the Soviet Union attacked the United States, it would probably be a relatively short war.
Martin: And that contributed again to the need for readiness of force.
Martin: If the forces were not in existence or not ready, they might very well not be useful in a war.
Interviewer: BUT THE OBJECT OF THE TARGETING, OF WHAT SAC WOULD DO IF THE WAR BROKE OUT WAS WHAT? WHAT WAS THE GOAL?
Martin: To limit Soviet military capability to the greatest extent possible.
Interviewer: IN OTHER WORDS TO WIN THE WAR?
Martin: That's right.
Interviewer: COULD YOU SAY THAT...
Martin: Absolutely, the objective was to win the war,
Interviewer: TOWARD THE END OF THE SIXTIES, SAC HAD REALLY PRETTY LARGE NUMBER OF WEAPONS.
Interviewer: AND PRETTY WEAPONS AT THAT.
Interviewer: AND THERE WERE A LOT OF CRITICISMS VOICED BY PARTICULARLY THE NAVY, ARMY, AND THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISERS WHEN THEY GOT A LOOK AT THE SAC WAR PLANS...THAT THIS WAS LUDICROUS OVERKILL.
Interviewer: THAT THE AMOUNT OF WEAPONRY THAT WAS PLANNED TO BE LAID DOWN AND THE MEGATONNAGE WAS JUST FAR GREATER THAN COULD POSSIBLY BE HAVING ANY MILITARY PURPOSE, WHAT WAS SAC'S ANSWER TO THOSE CRITICISMS? AND WHY DID YOU NEED SO MUCH?
Martin: That is probably one of the most complicated questions that you could raise from the standpoint of the technicalities of strategic targeting.
Martin: I think the subject of overkill had several fathers.
Martin: First though, let me just say why so many weapons were judged to be needed to knock out a number of targets.
Martin: And I might add, a great number of targets.
Martin: In the first place, it's a, it's an exercise in mathematics.
Martin: And without computers, I dare say that it would be almost impossible.
Martin: But all of the probabilities have to be taken into account.
Martin: For example, will the airplane or the missile be ready to take off if we have to retaliate? You assign a percentage of likelihood to that, based on maintenance conditions, and other factors that might prevent that weapon from launching.
Martin: Then from the point of launch, right on through the entire mission, the probability of successful completion of that phase of the mission must be assessed, estimated.
Martin: And I might say that all of the many operational exercises are analyzed to arrive at the best possible estimates of those probabilities.
Martin: Because you rarely accomplish a mission in one hundred percent perfect completion.
Martin: Perhaps that's an illustration of Murphy's Law.
Martin: If something can go wrong, it'll go wrong.
Martin: But in any case, the delivery vehicle is just one part of the problem.
Martin: The weapon itself, whether again, whether a warhead on a missile, or a bomb on an aircraft, has the same number of probabilities of successful performance assigned to every phase of it's operation.
Martin: Another factor is weather.
Martin: So when you got all through, you find that you don't have any real confidence in a one on one, that is, one weapon against one target, probability of success in accomplishing what you're trying to do in terms of damage to the enemy.
Martin: Therefore, to use a very simple example, you might find that it takes two or three weapons, against one target.
Martin: Now that's one phase of the targeting problem.
Martin: The other is somewhat in reverse.
Martin: You take a look at the target.
Martin: How accurate is your information on that target: (a) the location; (b) the size; (c) the nature, or, in the jargon, how hard is the target? What kind of a blast effect, or force from a weapon could it stand and survive? These things are all quite questionable, and they must be based on the best intelligence available from all sources.
Martin: So again, the probability of kill to use the targeting language for a moment, the probability of kill, depends on delivery vehicles, weapon characteristics, and target characteristics.
Martin: And when you got all through, looking at the nature and number and types of targets, that should be hit in order to accomplish the mission, a great many more weapons are needed than you would suspect from just looking at the problem on the surface.
Martin: Now, that adds up to a sizable force of strategic forces.
Martin: A sizable investment in defense dollars, in tax payers dollars.
Martin: If the priority of those strategic forces tends to interfere, or reduce the budget of other forces, you can expect objections to that expenditure for strategic forces.
Martin: There are only so many budget dollars, even though there are often a great many.
Martin: There still is a limit.
Martin: So in those parts of the military structure of the United States that do not participate directly in the strategic forces, one could expect objections to great numbers of forces, great numbers of weapons.
Martin: That is one illustration of I think where the term overkill was born.
Interviewer: WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IN OTHER WORDS IS THAT THE ARMY OR THE NAVY WERE BASICALLY OBJECTING TO THE SAC WAR PLANS FOR BUDGETARY REASONS?
Martin: That's one factor, in the generation of the term overkill, yes.
Martin: I think another was the one that I alluded to a minute ago, in terms of the basic strategic concept of finite deterrence, versus a broader spectrum of total strategic deterrence.
Martin: Finite deterrence would require fewer forces, fewer weapons.
Interviewer: OK, ONE LAST QUESTION FOR ME THEN.
Interviewer: THERE WERE A LOT OF ACCUSATIONS MADE AT THE TIME AND MORE HAVE BEEN MADE TO ME SINCE, BY QUITE A WIDE SPECTRUM OF PEOPLE, THAT AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE, WHICH WAS FORECASTING A SUBSTANTIAL MISSILE GAP IN THE '61, '62, '63, AND PARTICULARLY SAC INTELLIGENCE, WAS ITSELF INFLUENCED BY IT'S OWN VESTED INTEREST.
Interviewer: THAT THESE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WHICH AS IT TURNED OUT WERE VERY INFLATED, WERE A REFLECTION OF SAC'S VESTED INTEREST IN FORECASTING A MAJOR THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND THEREFORE GETTING A MAJOR CAPABILITY ITSELF, RATHER THAN ANY REAL, GENUINE ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
Interviewer: WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO THAT ACCUSATION?
Martin: I don't have personal knowledge of the intelligence activity on that point at that time.
Martin: However, I think in looking back, I would say that perhaps we should examine whether or not the intelligence was really very far off.
Martin: It may have been a little premature.
Martin: But I think that based on my later experience with the entire intelligence community, and SAC intelligence activity also, that they attempt to deal in facts, or in the best estimate that they can get.
Martin: I can't confirm or deny vested interest.
Martin: I suppose people are people and to some extent, there may have been vested interest.
Martin: But on the other hand, the, any elaboration of the Soviet offensive capability, you would expect to be used more by the strategic defensive command, now NORAD, to enhance their forces, their defense forces against the threat.
Martin: To a greater extent then SAC would use that information to build offensive forces.
Martin: One example.