MR. TODENHOFER, I'M GOING TO START OFF BY ASKING YOU ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT, WHAT DID YOU AND YOUR PARTY EXPECT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO BE DISCUSSING AT REYKJAVIK? WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND TO BE THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION BEFORE THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT?

We expected what President Reagan and what the American administration had said before. They said that they would meet in Reykjavik to prepare a summit. This wasn't a summit, it was a pre-summit and everybody has been very surprised, I think also the American administration has been very surprised that the Russians came with prepared papers and now we have to live with the result of this summit. We wanted that Gorbachev and Reagan would meet together... We wanted a meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan and I think such a meeting is always useful but from the point of view of diplomatic negotiations it's a really very silly thing to go into such important negotiations without being prepared. President Reagan hasn't been prepared for it, he had a prepared letter in his jacket and he wanted to take this letter and read this letter to Mr. Gorbachev, so Gorbachev said, "Let us discuss now about the zero solution, about the total elimination of the strategic weapons," and Reagan accepted that, but he and his team weren't prepared to have such a discussion, and I don't remember a conference with such important results where one side has been so badly prepared and where the side which wasn't prepared accepted to discuss the problems which hadn't been prepared before.

OK, THANK YOU, NOW WHAT DID THE PEOPLE IN YOUR PARTY SAY WHEN THEY HEARD WHAT HAPPENED IN REYKJAVIK?

We heard a lot of things about Reykjavik, at the beginning we heard that all the strategic weapons would be eliminated in the long run, in a ten years plan, then we heard that only the ballistic strategic missiles would be eliminated so the first rumors were very confusing but we heard also that the Russians proposed a zero solution for long range intermediate range nuclear weapons, for long range INF and this was for Germany the big news, but the funny is that in Germany the opposition, the Social Democrats, said this was a Black Friday because at the end of this pre-summit in Reykjavik, President Reagan said, "Now let us go back in our capitals and let us reflect, if you can go on on the results that we have reached now," and it wasn't a Black Friday for the Socialists and Europe, it was the beginning of a new time of disarming, the problem is that I'm a friend of arms reduction, of disarmament, the problem is that you have really to take the responsibility, that you take the right weapons away not the wrong weapons away and I have the impression that, and that's my the most difficult part for me when I think about Reykjavik that they didn't speak about conventional disarmament and the problem of the West Europeans are the conventional weapons. We don't like the nuclear weapons but we have the nuclear weapons because the Warsaw Pact has a gigantic convention superiority and there we have a certain amount of nuclear weapons because we don't have the money and we don't have the system to build up the same conventional military power as the Warsaw Pact countries have.

WHAT DID YOU YOURSELF DO, I BELIEVE YOU WENT TO WASHINGTON AND COMPLAINED IS THAT CORRECT?

It is correct that I asked a lot of questions several days after Reykjavik and because some of the positions that the Americans took during this summit and some of the positions that President Reagan seems to be ready to sign haven't been consulted. There was no consultation with the allies and I think if the Americans have negotiations with the Russians about Western security, they have to speak with their allies, with their most important allies and they didn't do that.

DID YOU FEEL THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED AT REYKJAVIK PLACED THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN SOME DOUBT?

Of course, but the first thing, I'm not speaking now about the intermediate range of nuclear weapons, Reagan accepted and on this point we have two versions. Reagan accepted to eliminate all the nuclear, this is his version, strategic ballistic missiles in a ten years time... period and this would mean that in ten years wouldn't have strategic missiles any more and we would have no more INFs and this would mean that we would have the huge conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact without this nuclear deterrents we have now and this would change completely the strategy of the Western countries. This is completely unacceptable for us.

WHAT WAS THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT URGING ON THE AMERICANS AFTER REYKJAVIK, WHAT, I WANT YOU TO DESCRIBE FOR US WHAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO BRING ABOUT AFTER REYKJAVIK. WHAT WAS IT URGING THE AMERICANS TO DO? WAS IT URGING THEM TO GO SLOW WITH THE RUSSIANS, WAS IT URGING THEM TO, WHAT WAS IT URGING THEM TO DO?

Here you should ask a member of the German government, I have to control the German government, I'm a member of the Parliament and the Parliament has to control the government but as far as I'm informed, we had certain questions. One question was, "What about the conventional superiority, why haven't you mentioned the conventional superiority, why didn't you find a solution for the conventional threat for Western Europe," and the second question was concerning this complete destruction of all the ballistic missiles, strategic ballistic missiles in ten years, or even of all the strategic weapons, all airplanes and other weapons in ten years, and I think that this was the position of the other allies too and in another point, several governments have been backing the Americans especially as far as the zero solution on the intermediate range nuclear weapons was concerned Here we had a common position, this wasn't my position, but there existed a common position.

CAN I STOP YOU THERE AND ASK YOU ABOUT THE, WHAT IS IN ENGLAND REFERRED TO AS THE "DOUBLE ZERO." IN OTHER WORDS THIS IS WHAT EMERGED WHEN MR. SCHULTZ WENT TO MOSCOW IN MAY 1987 AND ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AND MR. GORBACHEV SAID, "WELL IF YOU ARE WORRIED ABOUT THEM, WE'LL GET RID OF THEM TOO." DID YOU AND YOUR PARTY WANT SHORTER RANGE MISSILES ELIMINATED OR WOULD YOU HAVE PREFERRED TO MATCH THE SOVIET'S CAPACITY IN THAT AREA? WERE YOU UNHAPPY WITH WHAT HAPPENED?

I think this question is not fair because I don't want weapons at all, I would like the Russians to take their convention superiority away and then I would say we don't need nuclear weapons any more.

ON THE SPECIFIC POINT OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SCHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE CAME UP WITH.

You said, we would like perhaps to match and to have weapons, you don't like nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons for us are a necessity against the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, a necessity to guarantee our freedom and our common liberty in Western Europe, but we said of course, the first zero solution the government our government said, the first zero solution OK we are going to accept it. I think all the governments who accept this first big zero solution concerning the long range INF see the big risk they take, because it has a decoupling effect concerning the United States, but to take also the weapons away, the missiles away with the range from 500 kilometers to a thousand kilometers was... a new problem, nobody had asked that before, it was a new problem because it allows the Warsaw Pact to concentrate in a crisis its armies and its troops on certain points and the Western countries would have no possibility to make such conventional concentrations impossible and there was no need to take the... one away or to sign a treatment and to accept a second zero solution and I must say the Western Governments have been backing the Americans concerning the zero solution for long range INF and also my government has been backing this position, but as far as the second zero solution from 500 to 1,000 kilometers was concerned, we didn't back, my party, the biggest party in Germany, the party didn't back this solution because it destroyed something which is very very important in an alliance, the risk sharing in Europe. We were told by English politicians that they were quite happy with the double zero solution because now the World was going to construct a fire wall with a range of 500 kilometers around Germany and we ha-to continue to live in this fire wall and you, you're very happy to live outside this fire wall the Italians are living outside this fire wall, but we Germans, whenever a military crisis could exist or could start in Europe, we would have to have short range or shorter range missiles from zero to 500 kilometers. You will live in the happy positions that no land based missile will after double zero solution, will be able to reach your country, and perhaps you understand the feelings of German politicians but also of the German population, if I tell you that I think that in this case, not only the Americans let us alone, also your government let us alone, also the French let us alone.

LET US DOWN, IS THAT WHAT YOU MEAN? CAN YOU START AGAIN, IN NOT JUST THE AMERICANS.

I wanted to say... In this case or as far as the double zero solution is concerned, not only the American administration didn't back our position, didn't help us, also the British Government, the French Government and all the other Governments we asked for support let us down, and there is a bitter feeling that we see now that you are in a much better position as far as your security is concerned than our country, and there is a bitter feeling to see that our risks in Europe are much higher than the risk of our friends, they are still our friends, of the Americans, they take the weapons far away to the United States and destroy them there but there is also a different risk between us and between the British people, the French people, Italians and I don't think that it's good for the alliance.

NOW ON ONE SPECIFIC POINT, WELL ON MANY POINTS BUT SPECIALLY ON THE POINT OF THE PERSHING IIS, CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD TO GIVE WAY, NOW WHY DO YOU THINK HE GAVE WAY ON THAT, PERHAPS I SHOULD ASK CHANCELLOR KOHL, BUT AS YOU'RE IN THIS ROOM...

I personally think it's the same reason, we got official signs that the Americans would be ready to accept that the Germans would have the right to keep their old Pershing IA, but we had also very clear signs that the Americans and the other allies would never accept that the zero solution would not be successful because the Germans would keep their Pershing IA and these signs were so clear and after these moments where we had the impressions that we were completely alone in Western Europe when the Western countries, when your government showed us that your government was backing the double zero solution, the French showed us that they were backing the double zero solution, I think that Chancellor Kohl said, "It was enough," and he didn't want to get this feeling again and to fight again for a certain amount of security for our country and after several weeks or some months just to see that the British and the French and the Americans would leave us on our own again and I think that's the main reason. I don't know exactly what was working in his heart but I think this is one of the main reasons.

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION] THE FINAL QUESTION HERR TODENHOFER, DO YOU THINK THE AMERICANS HAVE PROPERLY LOOKED AFTER GERMAN INTERESTS? THE AMERICANS PRIVATELY TEND TO SAY THAT THE GERMANS ALWAYS GET SORT OF AXED WHENEVER THEY TALK TO THE RUSSIANS, THE GERMANS ALWAYS GET... NOW DO YOU THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE LOOKED AFTER THE GERMANY'S INTEREST PROPERLY, OR DO YOU THINK THAT THEY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THEIR OWN POSSIBLY RATHER MORE SHORT TERM POLITICAL NEED TO HAVE A QUICK FIX, HAVE A QUICK THING THEY CAN PARADE AT HOME AND THAT THEY'VE NEGLECTED GERMANY'S INTEREST AS A RESULT?

You know I've had, during the last years after the deployment of the Pershing II and the Cruise Missiles, I had to fight these fights during this time. I have police around my house years and years. My children see more policemen than other people, it is because I had to fight for the deployment of the Pershing because everybody said we need this flexibility and this coupling effect to improve our strategy and I don't like missiles, I don't like weapons, but I make no difference between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. I have told... that and we had very close contacts with the Americans, they are still our friends like the British are still our friends, and the French are our friends, that's the reason why I'm so disappointed. I think the Americans, the American administration in Reykjavik and after Reykjavik has accepted certain results which are in the interest of the United States but not in the interests of my country, and I am very clear when I say I know exactly what I am saying when I say, the risk, the military risk, the risk of a war, the risk in war time after the zero solution will be much lower for the Americans, but much higher for the Germans, that's the result. We have lost... and something and I understand partnership and alliance in another way. For me an alliance is I am ready to defend the interests of my friends of my allies, but I expect also that our best allies, the Americans, the British and also the French, should fight for our interest and I don't know, we are now in '87 what will happen in the '90s when other young Germans will have to take decisions. If they will really say our security is really guaranteed by the United States, I say, yes, I say, yes, even if I see all the things that happened during the last ones, but I'm not sure what the next generation will say because I tell you, when you read that everybody's happy about the dismantling of the weapons, that's OK, because people don't like weapons but I think that a lot of people have realized that the Americans didn't care that much about the German interest and I repeat one thing for us, one thing is crucial, the most crucial thing for us is the conventional disarmament and the Americans aren't interested to solve this problem because they cannot be attacked by conventional army. They'll solve their problems when they get an agreement with the Russians to take the missile away or to reduce the number of strategic missiles by 50 percent, they don't have the problem of conventional weapons but we have it and we have it now in a much more dangerous way than we had it before Reykjavik.