...AND YOUR FIRST IMPRESSION OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WAS IT A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION? WAS IT ANY OTHER REVOLUTION?

I think I was lucky to be in Cuba just a year after the Revolution. As a matter of fact, I was the first Soviet citizen on this island... as they later called it, the Island of Freedom. There were very few journalists before (in Cuba). Their visits were really brief. So I went there as the TASS special reporter, to see what the Cuban Revolution looked like. We knew nothing of it before. Thought later we have always been accused of exporting revolution, as they said, "Moscow hand"... we knew next to nothing about the Cuban Revolution (at that time). My task was really to learn something about it, and what I saw there was amazing, indeed. We had heard before, that there was some revolution with some sort of progressive reforms -- here and there we knew something about it. But when I arrived, what I noticed first was a terribly anti-Soviet press. All the owners of old newspapers...All the old newspapers were still circulating in Cuba the way they were during the Batista period (of rule). And...this anti-Sovietism, and anti-Communism really shocked me. I didn't know how to accept this revolution. Little by little, though, I started seeing through (clues of) different reforms. Then, a number of meetings with Cuban leaders took place, with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and others...And they explained to me the nature of Cuban revolution, although there was not a single word mentioning socialism or its build-up. There were talks about "a just Cuban social" (structure), about "Cuba the Independent". At that time... (CUT) I must say... I understood at least, that at least 90 percent (of the population) were for Fidel, were with Fidel, they preached him, idolized him, Fidel was the idol of Cuban people, absolutely, whether of the revolutionary or the bourgeois types. And...what I noticed (was that) every (Cuban) house had graffiti saying: Fidel, this is your home! And...at that very time, the American propaganda the started its attacks on the Cuban revolution. Cuban people could not understand why Batista; the bloody Batista that committed so many misdeeds against Cuban people was never mentioned (as a villain) by the American press, and now...it aims its attacks against the revolutionary government which is so popular among all the people. That was...as far as I'm concerned...I would say that that was the most erroneous move of the American propaganda. And I think...Frankly, I'd been even mischievous.. That all those things... diversions started against Cuba...ah...umm...There was a so-called "Revolutionary Council" established under the Miro Cardona (?) supervision, made of emigrants. The units were formed out of Batista circles (of refugees). I couldn't quite comprehend (the reasons for) that and the Cubans couldn't comprehend it either. Even the friends of the United States of America couldn't quite explain it to themselves, they were confused... At that time, of course, a lot of people were already leaving Cuba. Not because of their pro-Batista sympathies, there were just those (individuals) who felt that they would have to face financial difficulties, etc. Well...Here's...This propaganda played...as I think...well... This propaganda and these actions—already all sorts of counter-revolutionary actions had started -- they all had a reversing effect. I am deeply assured (error in Russian) that they played a big role in sobering the Cuban people, in creating their distrust of the neighbor, in creating the first trends of the pro-Soviet and pro-Socialist atmosphere. The first ones, I say...So far...At the beginning... There were terrible anti-Soviet and anti-Communist attitudes (in Cuba) in the beginning. Even your compatriot Ernest Hemingway, whom I was lucky enough to meet upon his arrival (in Cuba) in 1959,...even he thought that it was the time...that Cuba was...He said that to me personally, as well as in public, that it was the first time, that the honest and non-corrupt government came to power in Cuba. (The government) whose main concern was its people. And...he...I say...True, he admitted: "I am not mixing with politics, I understand nothing of politics, but I can distinguish lie from truth." Therefore...Well. His opinion was in accordance...with mine... because...the actions...of the American government--anyway, this (policy) had played (for the US) a negative role in sobering the Cuban people and in creating pro-Soviet attitudes (in Cuba). Well...You know about acts of sabotage, that had started already... in...mountains counter-revolutionary gangs had been formed; they were supplied (with arms) by planes from the United States. Who sent these arms--(I don't know) but they were sent...all that was known to the Cuban people. There were organized, or at least planned, several terrorist acts against Fidel Castro personally—more than ten (acts). When in the 1970s the Congress investigated the CIA activity—even there, there were admitted more than...eight...terrorist acts. All against, as it was planned, Fidel Castro—and the Cuban people knew all about it! Of course, it did. Well...But the most important, I would like to...[TAPE CUT] I would like to mention three, four or five main actions of the American government, that played a crucial role in creating a gap (between the US and Cuba); in friendly relations with Cuba (and the US) and in...abolishing the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist prejudices in Cuba. They were the following: On March 4, 1960, the French cargo ship "Le Coubre" was blown up and sunk in Havana harbor. This ship carried fraught to the Cubans; it brought ammunition and weapons from Belgium. The explosion of the ship killed about 100...I think, 72 --there were French also aboard—well, about 100 Cubans and French sailors. It was clear to everyone that the timebomb was planted by CIA agents. At least, that was what was explained to the Cubans, and everybody believed it...Well... before, when we had talked with Fidel, there was (the Soviet Politburo member) Mikoyan (?) already with us—we never spoke of selling weapons... they never asked us to sell them arms. Never...Only after this ship..."Le Coubre explosion, did Fidel and his government request Soviet military assistance. It was in April...Because the planes, that were ordered from England were stopped by the English government... Only then, even before the establishment of diplomatic relations,...upon the Cuban request had the Soviet government sold...or, well, delivered some weapons (to Cuba), some little...artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, etc...which was used on Playa Girón. At Playa Girón, they used the arms received from the Soviet Union and other countries, particularly from Czechoslovakia. The second big...well, important action, also not so well-thought-out by the American government, was the American refusal to supply Cuba with oil. Perhaps, in order to force it to kneel...by (depriving Cuba of fuel)...And then,...when the American companies refused to export oil to Cuba, the latter asked us (for oil) and bought our oil. And...paid much less...our prices were much better; then, the companies—there were three factories then in Cuba, the American, and the international ones, well, all those companies refused to process this oil. Next, in response to these actions, the Cuban government took control of all three factories, and started processing the Soviet oil. This action only damaged relations between the US and Cuba. Another act was prepared in order to do terrible damage to Cuba. Cuba (then) was producing and selling to the US its sugar, using the preference status' price list. Then, when the (transport of) sugar was already for delivery, Eisenhower gave instructions to stop the import of 700,000 tons of Cuban sugar. That meant death to the Cuban revolution. At that time, the Soviet Union was not importing sugar; the other countries of the Western market also did not need it...Therefore, the country (Cuba) was really facing a currency deficit disaster. So. Fidel, asked us --he spoke to me personally, —and at that time, we already had our small trade mission in Havana—he asked whether we could buy some of his sugar—at least a symbolic quantity. He was preparing a rally, and wanted to tell the Cubans that there was an alternative. We sent a cable (to Moscow). The answer of the Soviet government was expected to be received in two days—before the rally would have started—and it was received! And the contents were...When I handed this cable to Fidel, it said (and it was signed by Khrushchev)—it said there, that we...the Soviet Union were ready to buy all the sugar, those 700,000 tons rejected by the Americans—and not only that year's consignment, but also all the next year's (Cuban sugar). That was really an event! That very day marked the end of the Cuban anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism once and forever. And...triumphantly...and the anti-imperialist attitude started penetrating the Cuban people's consciousness. Because it became obvious to one side and another... Well, I was at the rally, there were one million people there, I stayed on the tribune at that time, and could see for myself the joy of the Cuban people; they were throwing their berets in the air, they were dancing, and so on... And the last one...It happened July 8 or 9--I don't remember exactly when --1960. And last...and the heaviest blow, that...really crushed the relationship between the Democratic —at that time not yet Socialist—Cuba and the US, was undoubtedly the Playa Jiron operation ...It was, of course, a remarkably...well, I think it was the most... thoughtless action... because, perhaps,...I could never understand, how come the CIA agents were informing (their headquarters) that there was the possibility of an (anti-Castro) revolt (uprising). Every child could see (then) that Cubans followed Castro with full trust. At least 80-90 percent of (the entire population did). And there were no possibilities...At that period Cuba was already organized. It was not yet fully armed, but there was already an armed militia (there)...And... to count on those mercenaries...(those) 1500 men that landed at Playa Girón; (to think that they) could turn history around, was an impossibility. It never happened. And you know what the outcome was. They were captured in 72 hours, and, eventually sent back to the US for... for...er...some sort of ransom...of medicine, etc. That's what actually happened, and the Cuban people realized, where its enemy was, and where... er...so to say...well... who wanted...who didn't want...so to say...for the Cuban people...who never really wanted freedom for them... and who was their true friend. That's it... That's when... just before the troops landed at Playa Girón; on the 15th a few different (Cuban) airfields were bombed, there were several casualties on the Cuban side, and then, that later at (their) funeral-- that was the first time when Fidel Castro declared that...the Cuban people from then on would defend not only their national interests, but also...also the Socialist Cuba. Therefore...it was with Socialist slogans (ideas) in hand that they were defeated...the mercenaries of Playa Girón were defeated. ...

BECAUSE HE SMILES, AND GESTURE... YOU KNOW. AND SO ON...

Well all right, I'll try to...

WE'RE COMING NOW TO THE NUMBER TWO QUESTION, WHICH IS...

Let me finish this Playa Girón (story)... I'm almost done...really...and then, I'll get straight to the missiles.

OKAY, OKAY CHANGE FOCUS, OKAY? ARE YOU READY? DON'T LOOK AT... DON'T!

As for the Playa Girón defeat, there started... the (anti-Cuban) propaganda did not slow down, just the opposite. In retaliation, new different acts (of terror) were prepared. And the only possibility left...I'm not talking about the American government...But to the American hawks it became clear, that only a full-scale invasion could overthrow the Castro government. The number one task, then, became to overthrow by coup, or just murder— whatever you wish--Fidel Castro's government, and to eliminate Fidel Castro (personally). It became clear to everybody. It was clear, that...these were the actions prepared; and only then...the Soviet Union...upon receiving more...close (inside)...information...er... When the Soviet Union embassy was already functioning...I wasn't yet the ambassador, I was only a councilor...at that time... At that very moment the dialogue (between Cuba and the USSR) was taking place, regarding ways of saving the Cuban revolution...er...(the discussion) between our leaders and the Cubans (started). There were already some visits to Moscow of either Fidel...no there weren't yet visits of Fidel...of either Che Guevara and Raul Castro, and of many others...There were some Soviet leaders visiting Cuba (too)... some leaders...well...that's when...in the year of 1962... in 1962...er...I don't know (exactly) when it was conceived, I'm not that informed...well... (that's when) the idea appeared...The two governments started... thinking of ways to save the Cuban revolution. It was clear to everyone that the preparations to invade (Cuba) started...more solid military supplies: planes, let's say...MIGs, er... (Soviet) military advisers...er...some artillery... And... at the end...both governments decided that ... in order to avoid the US (preemptive) attack on Cuba...it was necessary to supply Cuba with missiles. That was a reciprocal agreement. There was, of course a risk which was taken by our government, and of course, by Khrushchev himself, in particular. ...It was a mutual decision...That's how that problem was solved. The missiles had to be brought in secretly, not publicly, because, as you can understand...to...for...In order to let the American government (who had prepared the invasion) understand that they were playing a (dangerous game). Because...as Fidel used to say...the adventurism...The adventurist's (policy) succeeds (prospers) only when unpunished. But if...But if they... the hawks, the adventurers...they would feel that there would be some risk...to pay (for what they had done), that would, probably, avert the Sword of Damocles' which hung over the Cuban revolution. Well... then...the decision to import (bring in) the missiles was made. I...I'd been appointed...the ambassador... I had arrived (in Cuba) just before the Caribbean crisis, in August...There were no missiles yet...but some of them were already there...er...the missiles were brought and, (later) supervised exclusively by Soviet military specialists. Cubans had nothing to do with them. Ahm...er...Except that... they backed up ours...and they knew, that, you know what ... you know, the (delicate) question of the nuclear limitations (agreement) ...Of course, we were responsible for these missiles, and, I would say, our advisers were fully...you know...These missiles were not brought to start a war with the United States. That would have been sheer madness, and nobody ever thought of that. And our leaders had always considered that— at least that is what they said— as a moderating factor, a certain warning factor. We, ourselves, did feel what it meant (to have missiles aimed at you). During that period the American missiles were aimed at us from Turkey, from Italy, from England...So, it was necessary...to let (the Americans) feel what it means to live with rockets aimed at you. That is what...that is what should be understood by the American people, as well as by the American government. That was the only goal: to save the Cuban revolution...There were no other plans. We never planned...to set up any military bases there,...and we don't plan it now...and we'll never plan it, because...we don't need it. Especially today, when the present situation calls for compromises,...when...in the nuclear age...all sorts of rivalry between two nuclear superpowers... it could lead, of course, to tragic results...That's how...there were... There were goals: to save the Cuban revolution with the help of such...of such a ...gesture. And indeed,...it happened exactly as it was (planned)...Well, what should I say...er...the missiles were ready, brought in (in place), they'd been served, so to say,... There were still (more) ships en route. There remained things to be brought in, perhaps. I don't know...Anyway on the 14th...er...or the 15th of October, the (American) President received, on his desk, documents proving that...that...there were forty...forty...forty two, I think, forty two missiles in Cuba; there were forty two points of, probably, of...I am sure that the Americans (had found out) a bit...At least their intelligence should have learned (about the missiles) a bit earlier... somehow...even before the air surveillance was done by planes and satellites. Because the rocket itself is quite a big thing, about 30 meters in length. It was transported across Cuba, it was taxied to the sites (launch sites); obviously, a lot of people saw it, though they did not know what it was...It was transported...(without being recognized) but they didn't know what it was!...Those weird things ...Plus the fact that almost all the work (on silos) was being done by our experts... er...Perhaps, there were many letters being sent to the US..voluntary...voluntarily... those volunteers...who...were sympathizing with the US, were anti-Soviet...were anti-Fidelists...were anti-Communist...they, of course, were writing (letters) that something was going on in Cuba. But I think that the Reagan administration didn't believe (them). I mean, (they thought) how come...it was impossible to deliver missiles in such a brief period of time. But when they (their employed spy) planes, they found out (the Soviet missiles), and within a week, as you know...

LET'S SPEAK ABOUT A DECISION...

I... don't know exactly who had proposed the idea of installing missiles, but I do know, because I saw it myself, that both governments were interested (in it); that both governments were equal... (in their desire) to save the Cuban revolution. The Cuban government (was interested)—from its side--in saving its revolution, and we, as their friends, were also ready to sacrifi...to even take some risk of such a big...of this...risk of a nuclear war, though we knew that would not happen...Therefore, in that case both governments were equal(ly agreed); nobody forced anything on the other, and, therefore, as you know, our missiles were... when we were taking them back, as you know, even...also...Cuban...to speak of enforced decisions...Even...The Cuban government was not very happy; it accepted, without great enthusiasm, our decision to withdraw our missiles. Which proves that our concern was only to save the Cuban revolution. That was, of course, a very hard time for us. For the Soviet representatives there (in Cuba)...Our embassy, councilors...Of course I had with opportunities to meet with our military advisers who supervised the missiles. Although, as you understand, they weren't reporting to me. Well...what helped us cope with these hard times was the following: First, the unity and that sort of enthusiasm of the Cuban people. (They were ready) to withstand ...The unity, absolute unity...No fear of being (blown to smithereens) tomorrow. On the other hand was the cleverness and decisiveness of Fidel Castro who gave us full support. I think that we in Cuba were actually calmer than those, let us say, in Washington or in Moscow, notwithstanding the fact that we were the direct target (of the Americans). That's for sure... Because there (here?) (in Moscow and Washington) was where the future was really discussed. The compromise was reached. True, that both governments...Kennedy in particular, was brave enough to face the facts...er...er ...was realistic enough not to be influenced by those bloodthirsty hawks, and I think that it was much to his credit (to stop the conflict); this is the only way to exist in the modern world. There were no other ways...(to solve the conflict) considering the existence of nuclear parity. And that was the lesson, which I hope, should serve both of our govern¬ments when they work out their future relations. What next?...

As it is known, on October 22nd, President Kennedy had addressed the nation and declared the blockade (of Cuba). He called it a quarantine though. But, as a matter of fact, it was the same thing. That was a military blockade aimed not only at the Soviet ships, but at all the others. That was considered (by the Soviets) as the alarming fact, but nonetheless, the Soviet ships continued (their routes) and even passed through (the blockade). I think, one or two ships had been stopped, but...er...lots of ships had just passed through. Nevertheless, there was some kind of danger. It was, actually, a military act taking place, almost a declared war. But we weren't taking any risks (chances) in order not to deepen this conflict. That is...we were looking for some compromise. A number of our ships had been ordered back...they were turned...changing their routes. But everything was already in Cuba...the rockets were in Cuba. Therefore, it was not...such a...that big a damage to us. Well...Fidel Castro, as well as the whole Cuban people weren't...how should I put it...He was concerned, but at the same time, never felt something like: That's it, his end is coming. One could feel it, their attitude, their preparedness to fight. And then, on the 22nd...no, on the 23rd the exchange of notes between Khrushchev and Kennedy had begun. There were..., I don't remember how many,--letters. All the (copies of) letters were received by...had been sent to the (Soviet embassy (in Havana) in order to keep Fidel Castro informed. All the (copies of the) letters, without exception, from the first one of Khrushchev's to the Kennedy answer; then the other one by Khrushchev, another by Kennedy—... All the letters from the 23rd to the 28th were transferred to Fidel; were discussed with him, he took an active part in...in... working out...well...certain ideas. He... knowing your nation and its leaders far better than we did,...he had helped us...well...he had followed his own line, his absolutely independent line...as an absolutely independent leader of an absolutely independent state. At that time...on the 28th, as you know,...a... decision was made to withdraw the (Soviet) missiles in exchange for the US guarantee of non-aggression against Cuba, and the (US) obligation to restrain its allies (from aggression against Cuba). Well, unfortunately, ...this letter came...this cable was received on the 28th, though the radio news had announced the news agency's (reports) much earlier. Because, you know, the cable was received through the usual channels, it had been ciphered, you know, the procedures. Er... it was reported earlier, that...reported by the news agencies, that the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw its missiles in exchange for the guarantee. That was a bit.... Because the Cubans had not known before about that last letter, they didn't quite understand (what happened); then, eventually, they understood (everything). Fidel had dictated that very day his well-known five points...

HOW FIDEL RESPONDED?

Yes...Yes. That morning, Fidel, even before receiving the last copies of letters, had dictated his known five points, in which to he demanded: an end to the trade blockade; an end to the acts of aggression and sabotage against Cuba; an end to violations of the airspace and territorial waters (of Cuba)--that's another one; and the fifth, the withdrawal of Americans (troops) from the base at Guantanamo. Those were, so to say, his conditions for resolving the crisis. True, not all the conditions had... Not all Fidel's conditions were accepted when the quarantine was stopped on the Oct 28. Not all his conditions were accepted in the final draft. He was the active participant in our negotiations and Mikoyan. Mikoyan arrived in Cuba on Oct 30 and U Thant arrived several days later so Mikoyan had a meeting with him and Fidel on Oct 30. Mikoyan met me and Fidel with me. I supervised the dismantling of the missiles and then U Thant was told it was probably the 31st and we informed him that all the missiles in Cuba would be on the ships or in the harbor. He asked us to write it down in order to help him prepare a speech in the UN and when Mikoyan arrived to start negotiations with Castro, trying to explain him what where the reasons for the decision made between the US and the Soviet Union...Fidel directly didn't take part in this. Therefore he needed certain explanations but well we arrived in his...He (Fidel) arrived Nov 1 and on Nov £ (?) we arrived in his place and we started talking to him. At that very moment they called me from our embassy and informed me that a cable was received saying that Mikoyan's wife had died. The only thing I could do was to ask Fidel Castro's secretary to write some sort of note (to excuse the Soviet Ambassador to receive this cable) and it must be a note of excuse in order to secure the good will atmosphere of the talks (In other words - Alekseev was asked to leave Castro and Mikoyan alone). I went to the embassy and received the cable -the cable said that Mikoyan's wife was dead and Mikoyan was suggested to feel free to make any decision he felt like doing. Which means to leave or stay in Cuba. Mikoyan had his personal plane and so they advised him to take off or to stay depending on his desire. After long thoughts Mikoyan decided that he couldn't help anymore (his wife) so he decided to stay. The things in Cuba were so serious that he decided to stay in Cuba and remain in Cuba for almost one more month until the blockade was stopped. Only his son, Serge flied back to Moscow. He had arrived in Cuba with his father. Well the negotiations were not fully successful and Fidel proved to be if not more farsighted but at least to know better the psychology of our American partners in the negotiations. He didn't believe strongly in guarantees. He thought that a guarantee without it being backed up with some sort of force was not a guarantee. Even in, how do you say in Russian, as I recall, Fidel said, "The way the negotiations will be led is the following in my opinion: First, in order to humiliate Cuba and to humiliate me, the Americans will - which was already clear then - will demand a withdrawal of the IL-SS bombers from Cuba — which were dated anyway. Second, they will probably demand liquidation or in any case...of the torpedo boats Komor, they would demand inspections of their bases or of the harbors anyway. And it could happen (Fidel said) I remember how he said that they (the Americans) could force me to accept into my government the immigrants that then were in the US (Batista sympathizers). Well, all of his predictions came true except for the last one but at that time we didn't believe it. (as we said) It couldn't happen – the agreement was that our American negotiators did demand the withdrawal of our bombers or our planes, the same with torpedo boats. As for the inspections, we could say nothing – we just answered that is was up to the Cuban government to decide. Therefore we found a compromise. Fidel was decisively objecting against both harbor inspections and even against the inspection of Soviet ships. And then the missiles were loaded into the Soviet ships and when they were in the open sea American planes from the air counted them. That's how we stopped the inspection problem. So Fidel played an absolutely independent role in all of these things. We supported all his 5 points well. We considered all his expressed wishes (or desires).

BUT TALK TO ME.

The resolution of the Cuba crisis proved the possibility and necessity of solving arguments by compromising, by...reciprocal discussion of both points of view in order to let common sense rule even the most complicated problems. The common sense...and both sides decisions. The Caribbean Crisis proved that at that time, our leaders proved to be up to the demands of their jobs and, I would say, managed to avoid the most complicated thermonuclear duel in one of the most difficult situations of our history. President Kennedy proved to be a real statesman, a big one, the realistic one. And a politician who understood the importance...the whole seriousness of the situation, that it was necessary to look for the compromise mentioned the compromise that was reached. As a result what actually won was good will and human wisdom and that we have to always remember. No matter who said the press wrote that the Americans won (this conflict) but I think that it is definitely of no importance. What was important that the world was saved. From our point of view the Cuban revolution was saved and I would say these and those were satisfied by the situation that was settled as a result. As time proved later Cuba though it had been attacked by certain...But as an independent country with its own state policy, Cuba continued to exist more or less in peace. It lived more or less peacefully up to a certain period and has built up its happy life. I am happy to have been in Cuban at that time and live all those events through. I have always been a sympathizer of common sense and I have always been glad when...and I can say the same about Fidel too that when the certain complications Occur - when half a year later Fidel arrived in the Soviet Union and had understood how the Caribbean Crisis was really solved he declared the following - I would like to read it. In his speech in Moscow in May 23, 1963 Fidel declared: "Let it shine in all its glory forever this country which for the sake of defense of a small nation, had put at stake in a thermonuclear war the well-being of its own people which was built up by enormous efforts and enormous sacrifices during the 40 years of its creative work. The Soviet country didn't hesitate to take a risk of a hard war for the sake of defense of our small country. It is unprecedented historically." That's how he evaluated (what happened)... That's how I would end... That's how I ended... well, 5 years later my diplomatic activity. Did I tell you any secrets?

DOES HE REMEMBER THE INCIDENT WHEN THE U-2 WAS SHOT DOWN?

Yes I remember but not that well. No I don't remember. I really forgot. That happened in the last days. I can't say anything I don't have the slightest idea. Long after I read something that a corpse was returned. Was it? Am I right?

HOW DID THIS AFFECT KHRUSHCHEV?

I think it didn't affect him at all. We don't consider the Caribbean Crisis as a one man business. It was a collectively made decision. Well, I don't know of course, I'm not sure. But I'm almost sure that the Caribbean Crisis was never incriminated to him.

I don't know exactly what Fidel Castro was thinking, but in any case, he was not... he was concerned and believed that it was necessary to be firm; that his neighbors can only respect strength and absolute firmness and, so to speak, a really firm position with no wavering. This much I can remember, I cannot say anything more. In any case, he was not afraid of anything.

APPARENTLY, VASILY KUZNETSOV SAID THAT “YOU WILL NEVER DO THIS TO US AGAIN”. AND THE QUESTION IS: WHAT DID HE MEAN BY IT? CAN HE [THE INTERVIEWEE] MAKE AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS STATEMENT BY VASILY?

Kuznetsov what?

IN THE END OF IT, VASILY KUZNETSOV SAID “YOU WILL NEVER DO THIS TO US AGAIN”.

What, what? I just do not know. That we will never do anything like this again, right? Well, I just do not know. I do not know. I think that these are lessons that must be learned by you and us all. Nothing more.

TO WHAT EXTENT, UM... BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES.

Yes, ours and America's.

YES.

Well, I do not know. Well, how should I put this, well, we had no data, but I think we knew that, of course, the Americans had more nuclear weapons. I, at any rate, thought so, because I knew that, first of all, bases were in Turkey and in... but, moreover, I did not know how many weapons we have and how many... so it is hard to say. As a layman, I could think this way. I believed that the United States had more.

DOES HE THINK THERE WAS ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE TEST BAN TREATY?

I do not know. I just do not know. Logically, probably yes, but I do not know.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE SIMPLY THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE CUBAN STREETS IN HAVANA DURING THIS TIME? WHAT DID THE PEOPLE TALK ABOUT, HOW DID THEY BEHAVE, AND SO ON. JUST GIVE US A SENSE, A TEXTURE OF THE PLACE.

What they talked about? You know, we were so busy with actual political affairs, with important issues, that... but the Cuban people are very active and energetic; well, they protested, spoke up against the US imperialism I think, that's all. It is hard, it's hard to say. Simply... being the ambassador I was not in contact so much...

THE SAME QUESTION, ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE FEELING, AND THE CONVERSATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS. HOW DID THEY... CAN YOU JUST GIVE US A SENSE OF THE PEOPLE?

Well, of course, everyone knew that this was quite a difficult time, but for some reason, I, for example, and not only I, all... all of us who were there, we worried less. I am sure that we worried less than the people in Moscow and Washington. Because still, we could not imagine that the impossible would happen. We believed that it will work out ... moreover that talks have already begun, a way out will be found. That's what we thought.