Could you tell us a bit...What was life like during the French colonial period? What were the negative aspects? And were there any positive aspects to the French colonial rule?

Under the colonial rule, I was in my province, that is Nam Dinh, you know. It is a very crowded, overpopulated province. And very poor province. In my province we have a lot of people and very few land. So we must migrate outside the province. In my province we have a lot of people who worked in the rubber plantation in South Vietnam, in Cambodia and in New Caledonia.

And from my youth I have seen a lot of poverty, in my province. And so there is a people who are caught for the military service, for the war. For instance, in the Second World War. Or they must leave their home to work outside the province. It is abnormal for Vietnamese to leave the home, the family, and to work outside the province. And we have unemployment in my province. So from the childhood, one of my concern was how to get employment.

And we have half a million people who will die in '45 from starvation. So, you see, in my province it is the province who have the biggest number of people who were political prisoners. And since my childhood I'd only seen these things. Of course between 1937 up to 1939 we have enjoyed some freedom because in France they have Popular Front. So there is some importation of press and so on to my country. So we can see something about the world and so on.

Why don't we just go on to the next point, which was your joining the nationalist movement and just one or two anecdotes about life in prison that you want to share.

I was in jail when I was 18 years old from 1940. So life is very hard for people, of course. But we tried to improve our life. We make ourselves goods and so on and to sell outside the prison. And in jail we have no books, no paper and so on. But we can get it by illegal means.

And we can publish inside the prison some journals, some reviews. And I was the people who draw to illustrate the papers. And, really, in jail it is a school for us. We can teach each other and we can train militarily. So that outside the prison we could be a soldier.

Is there any particular incident that you experienced that dramatizes the nature of the resistance?

Can you recall any specific incident that occurred to you during the resistance? When did it take place and where and what happened?

The hardest time is from '47 to '49...

Excuse me, you've got to repeat the sentence, "The hardest time during the resistance."

During the Resistance War against the French, the hardest time is from '47 to '49. I was commanding the headquarters of General Giap to retreat from...to avoid encirclement of French paratroops, parachute troops, in the fall of '47. And we were twice in the encirclement. But we can break and to be in the same place. But you know it is the headquarters of General Giap.

And during the French Resistance we have very hard time because the supply of food is very difficult. So for one year we have every day only two bowls of rice. The ration now is very little. Even now we have six bowls per day. But at that time we have only two bowls of rice per day. And still, in the jungle to fight against the French.

Some historians have suggested that President Ho Chi Minh would have preferred to avoid violence and negotiate a settlement with the French. Do you agree with that thesis? Do you think...What was President Ho's strategy? Did he want to avoid violence? Was he...Phillippe Devillers suggests he might have been another Gandhi. What is your view on it?

He would like to avoid...President Chi Minh's strategy. You know, he would like to avoid war and violence. It is his policy. But he was forced to go to war. Because, you know, from '45 up to '47 he tried many times to have negotiation, settlement, with France.

But France had a very hard policy. That means by negotiation they would like to reestablish colonial rule on our country. Even during the war in '47 he had tried also to negotiate with France but France have denied the peaceful way for our country to gain independence.

Let's go up to the Geneva Conference of 1961 and 1962 which you attended. There were some observers who said that the model of neutrality for Laos could have been applied to South Vietnam. Could you discuss that?

The settlement of Laos question of the Geneva Conference in '61-'62 really have set a model for the settlement of the South Vietnam question. Because you know the Liberation Front of South Vietnam have many times proposed some kind of Laos peaceful model for the South Vietnam.

And the Americans have rejected it. And Prince Sihanouk also, at that time, have proposed some kind, not only for Laos for Vietnam and Cambodia too. But he was rejected by Americans.

So you think you could have accepted a neutral South Vietnam?

Yes, that's so.

Could you repeat that?

Yes. In that time the Front have proposed some kind like...it looks like the model of Laos. And we supposed the Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

Could you recall a little bit what it was like negotiation with Mr. Harriman, Averill Harriman, and the American delegations? What kind of impression did they make on you at the Geneva Conference?

At that time, in the Geneva Conference of 1961-62 on Laos, through this conference we would like to know what is the position of America on South Vietnam and on Cambodia and on Indochina as a whole. By these context and by these negotiation we realized that America, the United States, would like only to neutralize Laos so that USA could concentrate their forces to destroy the revolution in South Vietnam and to destroy the neutrality of Cambodia.

Could you make a statement saying that the...I don't want to make a statement for you, but the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1962 was that you were in favor of neutrality or something.

Our position in '61-'62 and even up to '63-'64, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are supporting the idea of neutralization of South Vietnam. And we are supporting in that time the policy of the Liberation Front in South Vietnam.

Let us go on to the next...go back for a moment to the 1962 conference. I just wanted if you had a few personal impressions of what it was like to negotiate with Mr. Harriman since it's the first time you negotiated with an American. How was it...how was dealing with him personally?

Personally, we have very little contact with the US delegation because they would like to avoid any contact, any discussion on the matter of concern between the two countries, you know. So our impression is they would like to show very flexible on Laos question but very tough towards Vietnamese.

Why did you decide to enter into secret talks with Kissinger? Why did you decide that Le Duc Tho should enter into secret talks with Kissinger in addition to the negotiations then going on in Paris?

The Vietnamese government have decided to accept the secret talks because we see that the official one in the Kléber Avenue could not lead to the settlement. Because there is the Thieu government there. And we think that the problem of South Vietnam, or Vietnam war, could be settled only between USA and Vietnam.

If I can just add a question to that particular line. What about the PRG delegation? Did they agree to have secret talks too?

Yes. Because...About the secret talks, the PRG and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam we have some common line and we have a common interest. But, you know, the Thieu government they would like to drag on the war and to have American troops in South Vietnam. And the American...the Nixon government would like to withdraw. So there are contradictions. And it could not help the settlement with the presence of the Thieu government.

Could you describe the positions of your government and United States when the secret talks began. What were the two positions of the two sides?

When the secret talks begin, the USA position is to settle only the problem of the military question, and let the political problem settle by Vietnamese themselves. And, on our side, we must link these two problems. The political and military one, first.

Secondly, the USA's position is for mutual withdrawal. And we are for...the foreign troops must be withdrawn. The Vietnamese are on their soil, so they have the right to stay on.

Thirdly, the USA position is the government of Thieu is a legal one. So the political solution in South Vietnam must be the acceptance of Thieu as a legal government and the PRG must dissolved and to be integrated within the Constitution of Thieu government. And our...

The USA position on the matter of political issue is the Thieu government is a legal one. And the PRG must be dissolved and to be integrated within the framework of the Constitution of Thieu government. And our position is to dissolve the Thieu government and to have a coalition government. So there is a big gap between the two sides.

Now, at first you held that the military and political issue had to be linked. But then you changed your position later. Is that correct?

We have not changed completely.

You have to repeat.

At first we have linked the political and military issues all together, and the USA would like to separate the two things. They would like to deal only with the military aspect. And further, and step by step, we stick on principle on the linkage of these matters.

But in the political issue we would like to have the principle, that means some principle and concrete things would be settled by the South Vietnamese parties. So there is no leaving our position.

But you changed your position uh, you changed your demand that the Thieu regime be dissolved. Is that correct?

That's correct. But at the same time we are...

I'm sorry you have to say that...

We...Some people say that we have changed our position. That means we have dropped our demand for the dissolution of the Thieu government. It is not right. Because we have asked also not to dissolve the PRG.

So the existence, the coexistence, of two governments in South Vietnam, not only one. So that means they have changed and we have changed to have common ground. That means to have two governments in South Vietnam.

In the spring of 1969 Nixon proposed a ceasefire in place. And Kissinger says that that represented an abandonment by the United States of its demand for mutual withdrawal. Is that the way you interpreted it, and if so, why didn't you accept the proposal in early 1969?

The proposal of Nixon in 1969 for ceasefire in place is not to drop the mutual withdrawal. It is not right. Because if you read in the memories of Kissinger, The White House Years, you could recognize that all the secret talks afterwards, after '69, from 1970 and up to '73, they always asked for the, the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces.

Although they say that the principle is not the same, but fact that Vietnamese must withdraw their forces from South Vietnam. So the ceasefire '69 proposal of Nixon does not mean they have dropped the mutual withdrawal.

At what point in the negotiations did the ceasefire become possible? What was the breakthrough point at which you began to reach your agreement?

The breakthrough point was in October 1972, from 8 October to 11 October. The ceasefire become possible. On 8 October we have a new proposal. That is the American troops withdraw.

Secondly, in South Vietnam there will be a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord and to have the two parties in South Vietnam to make possible the elections, general elections, and to solve the political question in South Vietnam. And thirdly, the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese parties. And the ceasefire...And the last one is the release of prisoners and to investigate for the MIA, you know.

At what point in the negotiations did the ceasefire become possible? What was the breakthrough? And who made what concessions on both sides?

The breakthrough point for the negotiation and leading to ceasefire, it was in the beginning of October 1972. On October the 8th, '72, Le Duc Tho put a very new proposal. That means we have dropped the demand for the dissolution of the Thieu government and we accepted that both governments in South Vietnam would coexist. In the meanwhile, we proposed the setting up of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord.

The breakthrough point leading to the ceasefire was in October '72. On the 8th October '72 Le Duc Tho have made a proposal. In this proposal we have dropped the demand for dissolution of the Thieu government.

And we proposed that the two governments in South Vietnam coexist, and to set up a National Council for Reconciliation and Concord so that they can help the two parties to settle the political problems in South Vietnam and to bring about general elections. And the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam must be settled between the South Vietnamese themselves.

So this proposal have met the positive attitude from...a positive response from Kissinger. And we have negotiated from 8 October to 11 October and we can come to a conclusion that broadly speaking we have concluded the agreement.

Was it at that stage that Kissinger dropped his demand that the North Vietnamese troops in the South have to be withdrawn?

In this breakthrough point, they have dropped officially. But they still insisted that there is some withdrawal, some symbolic withdrawal it will be very welcome.

Excuse me. Could I ask you to repeat that and say Kissinger dropped the demand...

In this time, that means from 8 to 11 October Kissinger have had dropped the demand for withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam. But he still insisted that some partial withdrawal.

They have given the figure two divisions in the upper north of South Vietnam could be...if they would be withdrawn would be very welcome. But we are very strict in the principle that Vietnamese are masters on the Vietnamese soil and we have right to stay everywhere in Vietnam.

And Kissinger accepted your refusal of that token withdrawal?

Perhaps there is no answer, formal answer, in this matter. But after they have accepted to initial and to sign...

What was Kissinger's reaction to your refusal to withdraw two divisions?

To our refusal to withdraw two divisions of North Vietnamese from South Vietnam, Kissinger of course could not say formally that the USA had dropped its demand, because after the Christmas Bombing they still raise again this question. In our thinking, first why they are stick in this question? Because as long as the Vietnamese forces are still in South Vietnam so there are less probability for the USA to maintain its influence in South Vietnam.

Secondly, if we conceded this principle that means that the principle of unity of Vietnam is no more valuable. And we are strict on the principle that Vietnamese are masters on their soil and we are free to stay anywhere in Vietnam as we like. And thirdly, we think that the USA would like to ask for withdrawal to have Thieu joining the agreement.

Let me ask you why...Could you explain why Le Duc Tho made a new proposal on October 8? Now, one suggestion has been made...Kissinger has made it...that Nixon's trips to China and the Soviet Union were a factor in your decision to make this new concession. Could you comment on that?

I think that if you see that after the trip, Nixon's trip to China, this could not shake our will. And we even launched the Spring Offensive. And we have consolidated our position after the Spring Offensive.

That means the trip of Nixon to Peking could not force us to put concessions. After all the consolidating of our positions militarily and politically, we have put this proposal.

Could you comment on your feeling about Nixon's to Moscow in May of '72?

Yes. There was the trip of Nixon in Moscow. But the trip of Nixon in Moscow is very different from the trip of Nixon to Peking. Because Peking, after the trip of Kissinger to Peking in July 1971, we have realized very clearly that China have betrayed Vietnam, very clearly.

But the trip of Nixon to Moscow, you can see it in the memories of Nixon and other journalists who had reported on this trip that Brezhnev and the Soviet Union have supported very strongly our position. It is quite different from the visit of Nixon to Peking.

Could you be a little more precise about how the Chinese changed their position after Kissinger's trip in July of 1971? Did they stop sending aid or did they put pressure on you to negotiate? Could you go into more detail on that?

On the support of China to our struggle, I must say that we have realized that step by step they have reduced their support. And in '71 we see that it is a turning point. It is not only to reduce aid, but it is a betrayal. From 1958 we have seen that they did not support our armed struggle. They advised us only political struggle, not armed struggle.

And in '64 they have advised us not to receive aid from the Soviet Union and to receive only aid from China. And we see that they would like to monopolize our...to have our struggles on their hands only, you know. And in 1966 we could like to have negotiation and at the same time fighting. And they say that only fighting, not negotiation.

So at that time Taylor was very right to say that the Chinese are determined to fight the USA up to the last Vietnamese. And in '71 they, after the visit of Kissinger, they advised us to accept the position of the USA. So, we see that it was a...how to say...a very, absolutely is betrayal.

Go back to the scenario of the negotiations. Could you explain why you decided to make the draft agreement public on October 25, 1972?

Because in...We have make public the draft agreement on the 25th October 1972 because on the 20th October Kissinger have promised to initial this agreement in Hanoi. But on the 23rd Kissinger have asked the Vietnamese to have another round of negotiation to finalize the agreement.

So you see that it was a kind of device to revise the agreement and to drag on the negotiation after the election. We realized it. So we make it public to inform the opinion the trick of USA in the negotiation. And to put them on...facing many options whether to say it is not agreement, or to say that is agreement and they would like to put some amendments, to reject it or to accept it before the election so it is to have...to force USA to have official attitude towards this agreement.

Why did you make the draft agreement public on October 25th?

We have made public the draft agreement on 25th October because we would like to inform the public, the international opinion, world opinion, that the agreement was agreed upon by the two parties. And now whether they would like tear it or to accept it or to revise it. So now the USA must make their statement, their attitude, whether it is to tear it, to accept it or to revise it.

And in our own thinking, we think that they would like to revise it after the election. They would like to change it substantially, the agreement, after the election. Because in 23rd they have not put some date for meeting again between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger, so we think that they would like to drag on and to put the meeting only after the election.

Just to go back to one point. The meeting between the 8th of October and the 11th of October when Kissinger asked for symbolic withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Do you think that he was looking for some ways to save his own face uh, but that he really basically accepted your position, he accepted the reality of the situation but he was just looking for a face-saving device?

Between the 8th October to 11th October when Kissinger asked for symbolic withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces, and at that time they have not yet dropped and they have not yet accepted our position. But the agreement is there.

But if you follow the step-by-step negotiation after the signature, you will see that this question come again and again to the negotiation. So I think that this is not a question of face-saving, but it is a question to maintain some balance of forces in South Vietnam or not.

Kissinger says that when he made his speech on October 26th, 1972, saying "Peace is at hand," that speech was designed to reassure you that the United States still wanted the agreement despite the opposition of Thieu. How did you interpret this speech?

I think the speech by Kissinger at that time, "Peace is at hand," is first of all for the voters in the United States, to say to them that the Vietnam question is no more, there is no more Vietnam question, so they can elect Nixon as a hero of peace, you know. So I think this is the first.

Secondly, I think it is also to reassure us not to give some trouble for them during the election, perhaps. So I think "peace is at hand," those words only to escape the election because, you know, after the election they have caused many troubles to my country, many, many crimes against my people.

I wonder if we can go on now to the period after the election. Could you describe somewhat briefly what happened between that period and the Christmas Bombing? And why you think Nixon ordered the Christmas Bombing?

I think the Christmas Bombing was very criticized all over the world. And if you see the effectiveness of the Christmas Bombing on the agreement, you could see there is no change, or big change, or substantial change. Only wordings, or some minor changes. This could not be explained by the result of the agreement, first.

Secondly, the bombing could not shake our will. So what is the objective of the bombing? The objective of the bombing, in our opinion, is to destroy Vietnam before the signature. Because destroying Vietnam, it is equivalent, it has the same value as to withdraw the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam. This is potential to maintain a decent interval in South Vietnam.

And secondly, we think this only also to show to Vietnamese that if the agreement would be violated, the USA could intervene as they have done. And perhaps there is another interest in the bombing, is to show to the Thieu government the USA are always with Thieu.

You watched the way Kissinger negotiated. As a diplomat yourself, how would you describe his style of negotiation on a personal basis?

I must say that I appreciate very much his intelligence. About the style of Kissinger in the negotiation, I think we must say that he has great intelligence. But one thing he is not very intelligent because he is believing on trick and lies and Machiavellic means to achieve his aims.

So he has no knowledge about his interlocutors, that is the Vietnamese, because we have experiences. Three times in negotiation with the USA, so we have experiences.

Let me ask you a question which is not on the list of questions.

You have lots of questions.

About the style of Kissinger in the negotiation, I can say that he is very intelligent. At the same time, he is not so intelligent because he is believing on tricks, lies, and Machiavellic means to achieve his aims.

For instance, one story: After the Christmas Bombing the first day that Le Duc Tho and Kissinger met in Paris, after shaking hands, Kissinger told Le Duc Tho that "I am very sorry, I could not prevent the decision of the President bombing of North Vietnam on Christmas day."

So Le Duc Tho said, "I know who are responsible. All you are responsible, and you are criminals." And this, I have...Lastly, I have read the book of Haldeman on "The Ends of Power," it is same lying. Because after the Christmas Bombing in the Washington Post there is news that it is Nixon's decision and Kissinger has divergence on this matter.

And Nixon was very angry and he had asked Haldeman to check that out to see who had briefed this reporter. And the Washington Post said that it was Kissinger. And it was Kissinger who had suggested to Nixon to bomb also. So it is lying, you see. Soit is...he deceive some people some of the time, but not all of the people all of the time.

Let me just add a question not on the list and perhaps you'd like to answer it. From your point of view, as you watched politics in the United States, to what degree do you think the Watergate scandal had an impact on American policy toward Vietnam?

Really, I have not any assessment of this matter. On the impact of Watergate on Vietnam question, we think that certainly there is some impact. But the biggest thing is after the signature of Paris agreement we see that USA has no more interested to intervene again in Vietnam because it is the great...this conflict have great impact inside America and outside America. And I think that Watergate is a byproduct of the American war in Vietnam. And not Watergate has great impact on Vietnam. Perhaps there is some reaction, of course.

Let's go to this last point about...If you look back on the lost occasions. I wonder if you could describe some of those lost occasions when a settlement could have been reached.

If you looked back into the past, I could not say now there are many lost occasions. Because now we can put some hypothetical guessing or some hypothetical assessment only. If we considered the agreement signed in January '73 - the outcome - I think if the Americans could accept this agreement they could have better terms in 1960 or '61, '62. And in 1969 they can have better terms.

Why? Because, you know, in 1960, '61, '62, or '63, the South Vietnam Liberation Front have declared that they would like to have independent South Vietnam, a neutral independent South Vietnam. So it is not the same as theParis agreement. The Paris agreement is the unity, we stressed our unity. But in '60, '61, '62, or '63, we stressed neutralization and independence of South Vietnam.

Of course we had said that our long-term objective is for unity. But independence is there. But in theParis agreement there is no word on independence of South Vietnam, only self-determination, you know. So in '69 and '70, you know, we had proposed a coalition government. And, you know, at that time, after the Tet Offensive, the Phoenix operations have wiped out many of...

In 1969, after the Tet Offensive, the Phoenix operations have done very, very many crimes and many of our bases in South Vietnam were wiped out, and many of our armies must be in the Cambodian frontier. So if they accepted the coalition government, that means we had no force to support it. We were not very strong.

In 1972 we are very strong, so if we had a coalition government it is okay, but we don't need it. We need only the coexistence of two governments. And very loose on the head, it is okay. But if we have a coalition government in 1969 and 1970, you see, we are weak. So it is very bad for us.

But one thing: why the USA has lost this occasion? Because they would like to have a total victory. Total victory. And when the could not realize their total victory, after defeat and defeat, they accepted terms which are not as good as in 1969 and 1970.

Could you go back and tell us a little bit about your father and your own childhood recollections?

My father was a peasant, a very poor peasant. And sometimes they could not pay the tax and the fees to the landlords, you know. So he had lost his land and he had to go to work in the mines, mines for tin, very polluted, not good for health, you know.

And for myself, in my childhood, the biggest worry of myself is unemployment because in my province there is a lot of unemployment. And in my village the people are very poor. We have no brick housing. And bamboo housing and so on only. In all of the village we had only one bicycle. It is admired by the village. My dream all the time was how to get money to have a bicycle because it is very wonderful to ride a bicycle.

And when I was engaged in the revolutionary work, I never thought that my country will be independent. I thought that all my life would be in the jail or that I would be guillotined. And we could not...Perhaps the next generation could have independence. So when we have independence it looks like a dream, you know.

And when I was in New York to speak in the United Nations general assembly, it is like a dream for me because I never thought during my childhood. So some people, some journalists, have asked me: Your country, your people, have endured, have suffered so much sacrifice. And now you would like to force your people to accept more sacrifice. When will you stop forcing them to accept these sacrifice?

I have told them, you don't know. Look at my village, for instance. When I was young they have no brick housing, only bamboo. And now they have all brick housing. And in my village, not only the mayor has a bicycle but all the villagers have bicycles, and not only one, but two or three. And some people they don't know how to ride, but they buy bicycles for their children afterward.

So the life now is much more better than before. So they could accept more sacrifice to defend the acquisition, the victory, the success and the heart that the revolution has given to them now. So if we have only sacrifice, we have nothing to gain. So we could not ask them to sacrifice. So they have more gains than sacrifice.