THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHAT REASONING LED YOU AND PRESIDENT NIXON TO SEEK AN "ERA OF NEGOTIATION" WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

President Nixon in his inaugural address indicated that he wanted an era of negotiation. Our reasoning was that whatever our ideological differences, whatever our geopolitical differences, we were condemned to coexistence by nuclear weapons. But it was not enough simply to base this on the fear of war because that meant we would be going from explosive situation to explosive situation. It therefore seemed to us essential to have constant regular contact with the Soviets. Especially on a conceptual level, so that they understood what we were after and we understood what they were after. And we therefore inaugurated this as the very beginning. President Nixon had a meeting with Dobrynin in the second or third week in office. I had a long session with Dobrynin in at the Soviet Embassy in which I told him that some rules of coexistence had to be worked out. And that we were prepared to discuss other issues including arms issues. And over the years we -- this was elaborated.

DID ANY OF IT HAVE TO DO WITH THE SITUATION AND THE PRESSING PROBLEMS THAT WE WERE CONFRONTING AT THE TIME -- THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAM?

Huh. The Soviet strategic program -- The decision to enter the "era of negotiations" was only marginally affected by the Soviet strategic program. Partly because the intelligence estimates of the strategic program were always too low and partly because we took that as a given. We assumed that a period of strategic parity was upon or would soon be upon us and was only a question of time. It was important, however, in the midst of the Vietnam War to...not to permit the aspiration to peace to become totally lost as a general objective of American foreign policy. And on the contrary to demonstrate that from that point of view what we had done was an aberration to the main line of American foreign policy. And. ..the initiative towards the Soviets was from this perspective influence by our consciousness that we would over decades to come have to live in the same world on a regulated existence and that it was important for the young people in the United State and for the people with whom I after all have been associated all my life in the academic community, that they could look to that part of our policy as something that they could morally agree with. Whether they agreed with all the practical applications or not.

CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE STRATEGY OF DÉTENTE? HOW DID YOU SEEK TO GAIN EITHER THE UPPER HAND TO THE SOVIETS THROUGH DÉTENTE OR GET SOME LEVERAGE WITH THEM?

One doesn't gain...it is frankly a mistake of amateurs to believe you can gain the upper hand in a diplomatic negotiation. In a diplomatic negotiation, you always meet the same the other side all the time. Even if you should succeed in outsmarting him or in pressuring him, it only sets up a cycle in which he will try to get even. Our problem was different. Our problem was that in the American approach to Soviet affairs policy has oscillated between people who take an essentially psychological approach and people who take an essentially theological approach, and the two really meet. The psychologists try to "understand" the Soviet Union. And try to ease its alleged fears. The theologians say the Soviets are evil. And therefore, it's senseless to talk to them. Both agree that their magic moment will arrive when there is a great transformation of Soviet society and we live thereafter with a consciousness of harmony. The fact of the matter is that the Russian empire under czars and commissars has been hard to deal with for other countries and that there will never be a point at which you can say "Now there has been a great Soviet conversion, and peace has arrived." So, the distinctive approach of President Nixon and myself was to try to assert a continuity of national interest and of geopolitical consideration. And to instill this as a pattern of relations. Now that -- it's not easy in the United States because it means that both liberals and conservatives shoot at you simultaneously. And with the Soviets the Soviets -- for the Soviets it's easier to deal with these problems by slogans and they don't have tough domestic decisions to make. And also the Soviets wanted to see how we were doing in Vietnam, whether we would be toppled by these demonstrations. So for a year or two matters proceeded very unevenly. The real breakthrough came, and in that sense there was leverage, when we opened to China. And when the Soviets suddenly realized that we had a bigger canvas to paint on than they had calculated. And after that, a lot of the negotiations that had been started accelerated. But the first breakthrough in SALT negotiations actually preceded the opening to China by about six weeks.

I JUST WANTED TO ASK A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT THE MATERIALS OF THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE -- SOME OF THE OTHER ELEMENTS LIKE TRADE AND RELATIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS.

Well, in the Nixon administration, we had started something that had not been done before and I don't believe has been done since. We put out for four years an annual report on American foreign policy in which we try to layout the conceptual basis of American foreign policy. We spent a lot of time working on this and if it should be that today, I think it gives a very good clue to what we were about to do. The problem was that the press only read the Vietnam section. It was the only part that was covered...in the public discussion. But it was read in the ministries abroad. And in that, in these foreign policy sections, we laid out our perception of a structure of peace, of why it was necessary to found foreign policy on the balance of power and political self restraint and on the willingness to have restraint also in armaments.

DID YOU BELIEVE THAT A PROLONGED PERIOD OF PEACE WOULD BE MORE DAMAGING TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN TO US?

At a minimum, the United States cannot accept a proposition that a period of peace is to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Because that implies that we have an interest in maintaining tensions that are avoidable. And that sets up an impossible situation. How can you convince a democratic public that you are protecting their aspirations when you are having tensions that are perceived to be unnecessary just because you think you can't stand a period of peace? In fact, I believe that a prolonged period of peace has -- is more -- presents more problems for the Soviets than it does for us. Because after all, they use the fear of foreign dangers as a means of rallying their public opinion and if anyone made a balance sheet of what happened during the period of détente on each side of the dividing line, in my view, there's no doubt that the Soviets had infinitely greater trouble holding their structure together than we did. But of course, any agreement that you make is going to have advantages and disadvantages for both sides. You cannot have an agreement that has advantages only for one side and disadvantages only for the other.

CAN I ASK JUST ONE QUICK QUESTION TO MAYBE MAKE A STATEMENT THAT CORRELATES... OR TALKS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADVENT OF ESSENTIAL NUCLEAR PARITY AND DÉTENTE.

Well... with respect to the relationship between nuclear weapons and the advent of détente, one has to consider two things. One, the nature of nuclear weapons in themselves, and secondly, the advent of nuclear parity. As far as my own intellectual background is concerned, I wrote my first book on international -- contemporary international affairs -- on the problem that nuclear weapons were not useful for the achievement of political objectives. And in the middle '50s, I had written that the point would come, inevitably, at which the relationship between the cause of conflict and political objectives would be lost. So whether there was exact nuclear parity or not, whether one side was marginally ahead or not, never seemed to me to be a...the principal issue. The principal issue seemed to me to be that war had lost its meaning as an... -- if it ever had any meaning -- to realize political objectives. And in that sense, of course, every passing year brought that condition closer which may or may not be technically nuclear parity. It is certainly parity in the sense of the political -- of the equivalent of political objectives. Because in a nuclear war, even if one side were to come out ahead by systems analytical standards, both sides would be so weakened, that it would -- they would be in the position of Europe after the two World Wars. That was our reasoning rather than that we had a magic date in mind at which nuclear parity would descend on us.

EARLY IN 1969 PRESIDENT NIXON ANNOUNCED THAT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN SALT WOULD DEPEND ON PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY THIS IDEA OF LINKAGE?

We believed then, and I believe today, that you -- it is a mistake to isolate arms control from other areas of policy because if the Soviet Union is free to stir up trouble everywhere in the world, and simultaneously conduct arms control negotiations, then there's a great danger that arms control negotiations became a safety valve for an expansionist foreign policy. And it is also almost naive to believe that you can improve the climate in East fears if by manipulating numbers of weapons while at the same time political conflicts spread all over the world. The history of relationship shows that these arms control negotiations are in a way hostage to political relations. This is not an act of American policy. This is reality. Now, the arms control advocates in this country have become so fanatical on their...on that issue, that they fight the concept of linkage as if it were an invention of whatever administration is putting it forward. And I believe that the Nixon administration was right in putting forward the concept even if it was prevented from pursuing it. But of course for those of us who were in government we will always think that what we did was right more or less or we wouldn't have done it.

WHY WAS IT ASSUMED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD THIS KIND OF LEVERAGE WITH THE SOVIETS THAT THEY NEEDED THE TALKS MORE THAN WE DID?

I'm not sure that we thought that they needed the talks more than we did. But if they needed talks and wanted talks we wanted to make sure we would talk about all important problems, and then only the future would tell whether they needed to talk -- who needed to talk more. In the end negotiations take place when both sides for whatever reason need the talks more or less equally.

AND WHAT WAS OUR DESIRE? WHY DID WE WANT TO PARTICIPATE? WHAT DID WE HOPE TO GET OUT OF IT?

Well, first it is important to get clear, and I don't want to create the wrong impression. One -- it would be wrong to believe that any administration, or at any rate our administration, had a master plan and that we knew exactly what we wanted at every step of the way. In my particular case foreign policy happens to be my hobby, my consuming interest. I had spent decades studying it, and so -- and there's a record of what I've written before which can be compared, which can be compared with afterwards. But obviously we were feeling our way -- there was a division of opinion in the administration between those who wanted to rush right into arms control negotiation, and those who wanted to create a larger framework. As always happens in any administration. This is not the most disciplined government in the world. President Nixon would announce one policy, and then people would whisper to the Soviets, "Don't pay any attention to this. We are really moving this thing along on another track." Be that as it may, those issues were substantially resolved by June of 1969, give or take a few weeks. And we indicated to the Soviets that we were prepared to open negotiations. Now the fact is the Soviets did not accept this until well into October, and then even set a date into November or early December. So they must have been going through their own process and maybe they were wanting to see what these demonstrations that were then going on would do to the administration. But this is more or less the process by which we arrived at it. I think that President Nixon and I would probably have wanted to delay the opening of negotiations a little longer if we could have achieved a more disciplined bureaucracy. And it was not because we didn't want to negotiate. It's because we felt that once we had set the stage, things would move faster if we had set the stage properly in the event that is what happened. Although in '69 we did not foresee that the breakthrough to China would happen that rapidly.

WHY DID WE GO FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL? WHY DIDN'T WE JUST PUSH AHEAD WITH OUR PROGRAMS AND TRY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST THE IMAGE OF SOME KIND OF SUPERIORITY?

Well, first of all in the middle of the Vietnam War it was impossible to get any new programs through the Congress. The only new military program that existed at the time in the Nixon administration was the ABM Program. And that passed the Senate if I remember correctly by one vote, the Vice President's. The idea that we could accelerate other programs is...that we hadn't inherited, is absurd and there are many heroes of subsequent debates who were absolutely silent at that time who invented ideas of what we could have done, what we might have done. Now could we -- if we could have done it, would we have done it? I'm not so sure because nobody had come up with a definition of military superiority to which you could attach any operational significance, and we might have there might be some programs that we might have moved a little faster. But the fact of the matter is that the programs we continued were the programs we had inherited from previous administrations and there was nothing in the files then and there was nothing proposed afterwards that would dramatically increase those. So I have never believed that you can segment foreign policy into a period in which you first felt strength. Then there comes a day when the Soviets walk into the room and say, "OK, now you're stronger." I think you must act with purpose. You must do something so that they have an interest in stopping, otherwise they won't negotiate. But you cannot go on an all out superiority kick and then after two or three years of that the Congress cuts you back again. You are much better off having a steady program that we can really believe in.

YOU REFERRED TO THE STRUGGLE IN CONGRESS OVER ABM. WHY DID THE ADMINISTRATION PRESS CONGRESS TO FUND THE SAFEGUARD PROGRAM AT THAT TIME WHEN IT WAS BEING SHOWN BY SCIENTISTS AND CONGRESS THAT IT WAS REALLY NOT COST EFFECTIVE AND IT WASN'T USING THE RIGHT HARDWARE FOR THE HARD-SILO DEFENSE JOB?

Well, I frankly -- with all respect for my scientific friends -- don't take that sort of argument all that seriously. It would be hard to find a weapon since the hydrogen bomb that the scientists have found cost effective. Many of the scientists have believed that their contribution to ending the nuclear race is not to let any new weapons to be developed and they found the argument of cost effectiveness a very persuasive argument. Now the cost effectiveness, the test is what you compare to what. If you compare the cost of the incoming missile against the cost of the defending missile then it's fairly easy to prove that almost no defense is cost effective. If you compare the cost of a city or of a missile battery that you are defending against the cost of the incoming missile then it's cost effective. In other words, these systems analytical numbers can be...depend on the assumptions that underlie them. The view with respect to ABM was that one, it would provide some protection against third country attacks. It would provide some protection against accidental attacks, and it would complicate the calculations of an aggressor, because no matter what the scientists say, the aggressor cannot know how effective the system is. He can -- it makes it a much more difficult problem. And after all, reality has proved this. The Soviets would not talk about offensive weapons at all, until we had a safeguard program. Kosygin rejected any discussion with President Johnson about the defensive program of the Soviets until we had one. After the ABM program, the Safeguard program passed the Congress the Soviets would talk about nothing else. And the first breakthrough in our negotiations with the Soviets occurred when they agreed to link offensive and defensive negotiations in the May, 1971 exchange of letters between Kosygin and Nixon.

WHAT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THEY MADE THAT THE SYSTEM WOULDN'T WORK WITH A HARD-SILO DEFENSE ISSUE?

We'll never know this because the system was never implemented. Or at any rate it was -- it became obsolete as a result of the...of the ABM agreement. There were -- there were divisions of opinion and our view was that even if the first prototypes were not as good as could be expected if you demand perfection before you deploy anything you'll never deploy anything.

WHY WAS IT DECIDED AFTER SALT STARTED OR IN PREPARATION FOR SALT NOT TO PRESS FOR A MIRV BAN OR EVEN TO DELAY TESTING TO SEE IF A VERIFIABLE BAN COULD BE FEASIBLE?

You know there is -- there are all sorts of myths that develop and the concern with the MIRV issue was that MIRV was the only offensive program that was going on in the United States. That... and that it was inherited from the democratic administration. That if we indicated any willingness to give it up before we knew what the Soviets were going to do we would lose MIRV. We would lose therefore our counter to the Soviet ABM, which we at that time did not know could be limited. And it's important to remember that MIRV was developed by Secretary McNamara, and it was well along in the testing phase. Secondly there is no indication whatsoever that the Soviets wanted to discuss a MIRV ban. There is... there were people in our delegation who wanted us to propose a MIRV ban. And that is supposed to be "a missed opportunity." The whole record of Soviet negotiating tactics shows that when they want something they will propose it and propose it through every conceivable organ. The Soviets never indicated the slightest interest in a MIRV ban. It was our view in the White House that if the Soviets wanted a MIRV ban, and if they suggested it we could then explore it without risking the only offensive weapon on which we were working at that time. But if we proposed it, the next step would be a test ban, the next step would be a moratorium, and the next step then would be the end of the -- our counter to the Soviet ABM. We'd lose both the ABM negotiations and our only new weapons program. So we went ahead with SALT I, and as soon as we had the ABM treaty and SALT I the United States took innumerable initiatives to limit deployment, to limit testing to have very low level restrictions. From 1973 on the whole history is of very, of a...whole set of American proposals, every one of which was rejected by the Soviets.

DID YOU FORESEE AT THIS TIME BACK THEN WHEN IT STILL WOULD HAVE BEEN AN OPTION TO JUST HOLD OFF ON THE TESTING A LITTLE BIT TO MAYBE WAIT AND SEE IF NPT COULD BE COMPLETED AND THEN THE MIRV AGREEMENT AND SALT I. DID YOU FORESEE THAT...WHAT WAS YOUR THINKING ABOUT THE --?

Well, first of all when we came in and, that's--I'm not sure about the numbers now. But I think I'm correct about the direction. It is generally believed that 20 tests are necessary to before you can make a weapon operational. My recollection is that before we could even make policy decisions eleven tests had already been made in the previous administration and early in the new administration. And one reason, I'm sure, why the Soviets rejected -- or never picked up on the idea of a MIRV ban, which after all knowing our delegations must have been whispered to them innumerable times by the people who wanted to make the proposal. One reason that the Soviets never picked it up is because they figured we had already done our testing. And even if we stopped at this moment we would be ahead at this testing by this testing program. Fundamentally the history of negotiations is that no moratorium is ever ended by the United States. And if we had put an end to the testing there would have been no way of ever starting it again.

WERE YOU WORRIED WHEN YOU THOUGHT AHEAD TO THE FACT THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS MIRVED THERE WOULD BE THIS THROWAWAY PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE HEAVY...?

No, the throwaway problem had -- we had not focused on the throwaway problem which in any case I think is exaggerated since the Soviets have throwaway and we have accuracy. And the -- once you have reached a certain level of accuracy, the throwaway confers no advantage in a first-strike.

SO IT WASN'T SEEN AT THE TIME THAT IT WAS REALLY IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE THE MIRV THEN. THAT WE MIGHT BE BETTER OFF GOING AHEAD WITH OUR PROGRAM STRATEGICALLY?

In the conditions of that period it was not believed that a MIRV ban would be desirable, especially as we also believed that it was unattainable, and as it would wind up with our not having MIRVs and the Soviets continuing it.

NOW WHAT PROMPTED YOU TO INITIATE A SECRET BACK-CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND HIS DEPUTY, VORONTSOV?

The I suppose you're talking now about the back-channel negotiations that linked the offensive to defensive weapon. I think a word has to be said here how we conducted our affairs. We have created a so-called verification panel which dealt with the analysis of SALT issues. And this verification panel had spent two years analyzing weapon by weapon the capability of verification, what it would require to upset the strategic balance, what kind of measures were available to us. Secondly, the verification panel developed basic positions for the negotiating team. So that when the White House engaged in secret diplomacy it was not doing it off the top of its head. It had that background of the most intensive and systematic work that had been done on arms control. And while the bureaucracy didn't necessarily know what we were doing, we knew what the bureaucracy was thinking. Now the reason we took this into the White House was that a deadlock was developing, in which the Soviets were insisting that the defensive weapons be settled first, and no restraint whatever would be put on offensive weapons. And within our bureaucracy inevitably, those who are charged with negotiations then begin looking for compromises. And one of the compromises that kept getting advanced was, OK, let's agree to link the two. But we finish the defensive negotiations first and then we'll turn to the offensive negotiations. The feeling of President Nixon and myself was that if we once had settled the issue that was of the most concern to the Soviets, in which we were building and we were gaining in technology, the Soviets would have no incentive to limit a program in which they were building 200 missiles a year and we were building none. And since this was an issue that did not seem to be settled at Vienna or Geneva or wherever they were meeting, and since we weren't sure that our delegation would really stick to our instructions of insisting on total linkage we opened up a channel on one limited issue. We did not engage in any technical negotiation. We had one limited issue, the simultaneous negotiation of offensive and defensive weapons. And we made clear to the Soviets that whatever they might hear in other channels, we would manage to block any agreement on defensive weapons until they agreed to a simultaneous solution on offensive weapons and announced that. Now that required a whole set of exchanges between at that time Prime Minister Kosygin and President Nixon which were discussed in great detail between Dobrynin and myself. But the argument that we negotiated on our own on complicated issues was only one issue. The nature of which was clearly understood in which we took a tougher position than the delegation did.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN GERARD SMITH ACTED ANGRY AT THAT?

When he what?

WHEN GERARD SMITH WAS ANGRY THAT YOU WERE DOING THAT TO HIM?

Look Gerard Smith is a great public servant. He conducted difficult negotiations with great dignity. And obviously it is very painful for the chief negotiator if behind his back other negotiations are going on about which he learns only when they are completed. And obviously if the White House achieves something that he had been instructed to do and could not achieve for very understandable reasons, he gets even angrier. On the other hand for those of us charged with the conduct of national policy, it was not -- the objective was not to make everybody feel good, but to achieve a breakthrough. It was painful. I have the highest regard for the... for Gerry Smith which is not always reciprocated, but it had to be done, and it succeeded.

WHEN AGREEMENTS WERE FINALLY SIGNED IN MOSCOW, IT WAS A REMARKABLE HISTORICAL ACHIEVEMENT. AND WE JUST WANTED TO HAVE A SENSE OF HOW YOU FELT THAT EVENING OR AT MIDNIGHT ON MAY 26TH?

Well, actually to us, on the in... on president Nixon's entourage, the big breakthrough didn't come that evening. It came in the morning. We had been hung up on one of these abstruse topics of how to count missiles on G-class submarines which is almost impossible to explain to the layman, and whether they should be counted only if they were modernized or whether they should be in the original count. And at about 11:00 at night, I had told Gromyko that we had reached the end of the line. That this was not going to be salvageable. And it would have to go back to the negotiators on some other occasion. And in fact when I reported this to President Nixon he was a little impatient with me and he thought I should have hung in there a few more hours. But I thought I really thought we had reached the end of the line. Well, be that as it may, at 11:00 the next morning Gromyko asked for a meeting with me, and he said that they would accept all our propositions on this abstruse issue provided only that we settle by that evening, and that the agreement would be signed that evening. Now the agreement was completed except for that one issue and some -- one other abstruse point. But the delegation was sitting in Helsinki, and we were in Moscow and we knew it would never be done unless we sent joint instructions to both the Russian and American delegations. So Gromyko and I -- I'm sure in the only time of East-West relations -- drafted literally identical instructions to the two delegations. We showed each other our instructions and we got them off to Helsinki, and we got it done by that evening. Now that was a really exciting thing. That was a historic thing. Then by the evening of course again...bad feelings developed because the people in Helsinki were very put out that they having negotiated 95 percent of it were caught at the end not getting the credit they deserved. And they really deserved. And then there was a terrible mix-up at the airport, they didn't get taken to the right place. So actually the end of it turned into sort of a mess. Because the first briefing we made wasn't all that impressive, and so I had to give another briefing in a bar in the National Hotel, I think it was, at 2:00 in the morning. And that sort of was exciting because we all felt, this was one of those occasions in which the media and we both felt that we had done something important, and while they asked many questions it was...it was done in a spirit that we could all be -- we all felt we had done something we could be proud of and that they had participated in.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT OF SALT I?

Well, I think first of all, it's important to remember that SALT I has lasted, and that its restrictions have been kept by every succeeding American administration including those administrations that came into office having specialized in castigating the SALT process. The achievement first was that it put a numerical ceiling on the build-up, that of course did not end qualitative improvements, but each side had the same opportunity to make qualitative improvement. It created a frame of reference from which subsequent negotiations could be conducted. It created a platform of coexistence. And I believe that without Watergate we would have had an extraordinary period of success with a strong Nixon and a still vital Brezhnev in power. It would have been done without illusion, without sentimentality, but it lasted -- that spirit lasted for -- that attitude lasted for quite sometime including through the Middle East War, which was a rough period.

NOW AFTER SALT I WAS MADE, YOU FACED SOME TROUBLE OVER THE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT, PEOPLE GRUMBLING ABOUT IT. PEOPLE WERE PARTICULARLY UPSET ABOUT THE HIGHER NUMBER OF SUBS -- OF THE SOVIETS IN ADDITION AND SBLMs, AND IN ADDITION TO THE ICBM IN THIS. NOW HOW DID YOU JUSTIFY THE HIGHER NUMBERS TO THE CRITICS?

Well, first of all, on the submarines, the higher numbers of submarines, that was not a problem. The number -- that...the number of submarines, this was taken literally from the verification panel that had made studies before and when I came to Moscow I gave them those numbers as reflecting the views on our bureaucracy. And it... in the intervening period I believe every student of East-West relations will agree that the submarine limits have been infinitely more constraining on the Soviets than they have in...that they have been on ours, because the Soviets have had to scrap many more submarines than we've had to, and we had no program to build more submarines. Before I went to Moscow for the preliminary negotiations I called in the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I told him we two choices: we can either get a limitation on submarines along the numbers of the verification panel, or we can go into a crash program to build more submarines. They unanimously were against building more submarines because they wanted to go to the Trident Submarine and they were afraid that if we build more we would build the Poseidon submarines. But whatever their motive, this was the military advice that we received. The real dispute was that by freezing the numbers an inequality allegedly was created between the Soviet total number of missiles and the American total number of missiles. That inequality resulted from the fact that airplanes were not counted, and we had many more airplanes than the Soviets did. And one reason airplanes were not counted was because we were developing the B-1 bomber, and that we thought we had a much bigger capacity to step up our airplane production than the Soviets did. And also we were going into an area of multiple warheads, so that the number of launchers did not really matter so much. But there was horrible demagoguery about this alleged inequality of numbers. We then spent two years negotiating an equality of numbers that never has been met by the United States, and as soon as it was authorized, the Pentagon stuck to exactly the program of SALT I so this was the essence of this debate was the following. There is a group of people that for a variety of reasons that I can't even understand believe that the SALT process is dangerous. It creates an illusion of progress in their mind. It is it constrains us more than the Soviets, and they are determined to end the SALT process. So whatever is negotiated they find something that they think the American negotiators have given away. And since you can never get an agreement without making some concession they can always find something that allegedly we "gave away." Especially if you ignore the fact of what the Soviets made in the way of counter-concession. But this debate on the numerical limits of SALT I, I believe will be seen in history as demagoguery, and the fact is we have never exceeded the limits of SALT I, even when we were permitted to do so by subsequent negotiation.

NOW SENATOR JACKSON WHO LED SOME OF THIS FIGHT ABOUT THE NUMBERS, HE APPARENTLY HAD SOME WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT FOR HIS AMENDMENT ON EQUIVALENCE...

AS I WAS SAYING, SENATOR JACKSON APPARENTLY HAD SOME WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT FOR HIS AMENDMENT ON EQUIVALENCE, AND ALSO ON HIS DESIRE TO CAN MOST OF THE SALT NEGOTIATING TEAM AND THE TOP LEVEL OF ACDA (ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY). WHY WAS THAT THE CASE?

Well, on the amendment on equivalence I don't know what some White House -- the idea that he had some White House support for that. I don't know what that means. Because the tactical judgement was made that... who could be against equivalence? And therefore that was something that one would agree to. Letting Jackson pick the arms control team in the second Nixon term, was done in order to placate him and to make him part of the process. It turned out to be a big mistake because the ACDA people ought to be the left of the Joint Chiefs so that the President can balance the Pentagon against other considerations. The people that he recommended turned out to be on the right of the Joint Chiefs so that the -- so that there was no longer any checks and balances in the system anymore. And the White House wound up on the left side of that debate and became itself a player rather than a mediator. And that turned out to be a terrible mistake.

I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU IF THERE WAS A CHANGE IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE SECOND TERM FOR SALT II THAT MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION WAS NO LONGER SUCH A GOOD BASIS FOR THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THAT SHIFT.

Now the Nixon administration from the very beginning was opposed to mutually assured destruction. And from the very beginning attempted to find other options. When I became security advisor, I became familiar with the so-called SIOP war plans, I called in Secretary McNamara and asked him what they were hiding from me, because I couldn't believe that the National policy would foresee such a level of destructiveness. And once he convinced me that there weren't any other plans we ordered the development of new options which took a long time to do but for a variety of reasons. But at any rate, mutually assured destruction was never our policy.

NOW WHEN NIXON WON A LANDSLIDE REELECTION AND YOU WERE APPOINTED SECRETARY OF STATE WHAT WERE YOUR VISIONS OF THE KIND OF LONGTERM CHANGES THAT THE CONTINUED POLICIES OF THAT TIME...

Nixon's landslide victory and my appointment to Secretary of State did not coincide. Nixon achieved a landslide victory in November of 1972. I was appointed Secretary of State in September 1973. I was appointed Secretary of State as a result of Watergate, and I would never have been appointed Secretary of State without Watergate. And so we had one vision, when Nixon was elected, he and I believed that we could have reworded an unprecedentedly strong foreign policy position, almost unique. We were closer to both Moscow and Peking than they were to each other. We had a tremendous popular victory. We had ended the war in Vietnam, and we could have really a period of extraordinary construction. By the time I became Secretary of State the Executive Authority of the President was eroding at an alarming rate. And one of my jobs was to obscure this erosion and to give the impression that we were capable of a purposeful foreign policy, and indeed to conduct a purposeful foreign policy in this miasma of a President who was on the verge of being indicted or impeached. So my -- our vision in September '73 was unfortunately no longer the vision of November '72.

RETURNING PERHAPS TO WATERGATE AND THEN TO THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT COULD YOU DISCUSS WHAT YOU THOUGHT WERE SOME OF THE REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF DÉTENTE IN '72.

First of all let me say that Senator Jackson was a man for whom I had really extraordinary respect, a great patriot. A man about whose view on an -- whose views on the strategy of international relations I generally agreed. Now he had a more literal approach to tactics than I would have had. And he believed more that a confrontational approach to the Soviet Union would be effective than I did, or than was compatible with the view that Nixon and I had about the fact that we were living with the Soviets for a long time and that there wouldn't be any terminal point to that relationship at which you could say, now things have been totally transformed. Now the Jackson-Vanik amendment emerged in I believe it was early '73, in -- the Soviets had put an exit tax on émigrés from the Soviet Union. But the whole problem of Jewish immigration had of course been invented by the Nixon administration. When we came in, there were less than a hundred Jews leaving the Soviet Union a year. We quietly told the Soviets that if they permitted an increase of emigration it would be noticed by us and it would in tangible ways affect our decision. We did not expect it to have the effect that it did but by the end of Nixon's first term, 40,000 people were emigrating. It was at this point that Jackson intervened. He had never been part of the previous process. His first objective was the removal of the exit tax. While we could not agree with a direct confrontation about the emigration policy of a country which is after all in its sovereign decision we did not oppose it very strenuously. We came to a parting of the ways when the Soviets agreed to withdraw the emigration tax and Jackson figured if he could get that much he could get more. And then he created the Jackson amendment demanding... or he pursued the Jackson amendment which he now defined as a minimum emigration of 100,000 and distributed according to the criteria of his staff and possibly including other nationalities in addition to Jews and put me into the impossible position that when I said, "This is impossible, and it will lead to a confrontation," he would say, "Wouldn't it be nice to have a Secretary of State who doesn't take the Soviet point of view." So it was a losing proposition. Then Gromyko and I came to an understanding on 45,000. And as a tacit understanding we then went to Jackson, told him this, he wanted 100,000. He publicized this understanding and then the Soviets called the whole thing off. And from then on relations deteriorated rapidly. It was a sad period.

IS THERE A LESSON YOU GOT FROM THAT?

The lesson is that we shouldn't play domestic politics with sensitive international issues. That and also there's a lesson that we can effect Soviet internal developments up to a certain point, but only if we do not claim that we are doing it. I can give you two or three more minutes, but not much.

OK, I JUST WANTED TO ASK YOU A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT BRAINSTORMING SALT II HERE. WHAT WAS YOUR BIGGEST CONCERN FOR SALT II? WHAT DID YOU WANT TO ACHIEVE THERE?

Well, what I wanted to -- the first thing that we had to achieve in SALT II was numerical equality. That was -- of launchers. This, frankly, given the number of warheads was mostly for American domestic reasons. Secondly, we wanted to bring about a reduction in the number of launchers. Thirdly we wanted to bring about a reduction in the number of warheads, which was the key which was the key issue and we were willing to trade a to trade reductions in warheads for some inequality in numbers of launchers and we were beginning to make some progress on that when Nixon was resigning -- was supposed to resign. Then we went back to simpler formula.

I KNOW AT A DECEMBER 1974 PRESS CONFERENCE YOU INDICATED THAT YOU REGRETTED A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE MIRV DECISION YOU HAD MADE BACK IN '69 OR '70. WHAT WERE YOU REFERRING TO THERE?

I frankly don't remember every press conference I ever held, and I don't know whether I used the word regretted.

I GUESS THE QUESTION WOULD BE THEN, GIVEN THAT MIRVs BECAME A BIG....

No, we never made that decision. This is one of those myths that is...that is being invented. The only decision we made was that a second level guy in the delegation wanted to propose a MIRV ban. We did not let him propose this. We -- never took a decision about what we would have done if the Soviets had proposed it. It was perfectly open to the Soviets to raise the MIRV issue. It was a purely tactical decision that we did not want it proposed by the American delegation. That's the only decision that was ever made.

BUT DID THAT -- DID THE MIRVs END UP MAKING SALT II VERY DIFFICULT?

No, the MIRVs have made a subsequent strategic environment very difficult. They did not make SALT II much more difficult.

AND IN THAT SENSE WAS THERE ANY SENSE OF REGRET THAT THERE WAS NO WAY WE COULD HAVE STOPPED IT?

No, I thought that when we got to SALT III we should go back to single warheads and I've been proposing it ever since.

COULD YOU TALK JUST FOR A MINUTE ABOUT WHY SALT II DIDN'T ACHIEVE THE KIND OF SUCCESSES AS SALT I? WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THAT IN THAT TIME PERIOD?

Well, by that time SALT had become a symbol for the conservative groups in this country of what was wrong with the East-West relations, and it became a symbolism of that if you wanted to destroy détente which they also objected to, you had to destroy the SALT process. So endless issues emerged, numbers, command and control, silos, verification issues, some correct, some incorrect. Then SALT II got involved in the whole miasma of the Carter administration. Also in the loss of the American position in the world. And we had lost the philosophical perceptions of the Nixon administration Carter never squared the circle of on the one hand having this extremely moralistic foreign policy and then why do you negotiate with something, with somebody you disapprove of so morally. I have to go unfortunately.

WELL, THE ONLY THING I WOULD ASK YOU, SIR -- AUSTIN HOYT, WHO YOU MET LAST WEEK, HIS PROGRAM IS ON CARTER AND SALT II, AND HE JUST SENT ALONG TWO QUESTIONS... THE ONE, IT PICKS UP FROM THAT. HE WANTED TO KNOW, HE KNEW THAT YOU WERE HESITANT IN THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TO REALLY ENDORSE SALT II...

Look, if you look at my Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony I had discussed it with -- I showed it to Cutler before -- I had told President Carter that the only way that we could make SALT II go is by increasing the defense program. And I had offered to him that I would cooperate with Sen. Nunn, and if he could develop a defense program that Sen. Nunn and I approved of -- together with Harold Brown I would declare the conditions that I had put forward on behalf of SALT II ratification met. I believe that if you ask those members of the Carter administration who understood what was going on, that I was trying to be helpful.

AND FOR THE PROGRAM ON PROLIFERATION, THEY WANT TO KNOW WAS IT A GREAT CONCERN TO YOU WHEN INDIA TESTED THE NUCLEAR DEVICE IN 1974?

It was a concern, but I don't think that we -- by that time we were involved in the Middle East, and Watergate, and so many other things that it was not the highest priority.