Well, the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963 has direct relevance to the problem of non-proliferation since — well the nuclear weapon, the atomic bomb is a product, an industrial product and as every industrial product, it has to be tested like a car or a pair of shoes. And if you will not have or if you do not have an opportunity to test it, you will not have a final product. You cannot be sure that this product will work. That's surely the direct relevance between the prohibition of testing and the problem of non-proliferation. So it restricts the number of countries which can test nuclear weapons.

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, SOMETHING I HAD A VERY TIME WITH, MULTINATIONAL FORCE. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY?

Well because well, we really did have difficult time with the, with this project because it meant the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because, according to this project, some non-nuclear countries would have access to nuclear weapons. They will have a chance to put their finger on a nuclear trigger. That's, that's easy. Like that.

WERE YOU EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH ALL OF THE COUNTRIES, OR WITH SOME MORE THAN OTHERS?

Naturally we were more concerned with certain countries. First of all, Federal Republic of Germany and you can understand that, I think, easily, because the period, that period was only say, fifteen years after the war and we remember it very well.

IN WHAT WAY DO YOU THINK THERE IS A COMMONALITIVE INTEREST IN THE...NON-PROLIFERATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US?

Unfortunately I think this is the only present. This is the only area of —

IN A FULL SENTENCE.

Well I think, I think the, that this area of non-proliferation is the only area in the field of disarmament where the United States and the Soviet Union stand on common grounds. They are both in favor of, for the strengthening the regime, the international regime of non-proliferation. Who I think on different grounds, but still they are.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN BOTH? IN WHAT WAY?

Well it's a very complicated or, not complicated but it's a problem which has many different aspects, for the American, I mean, position. Where our position is simple because you know from the very beginning we have been in favor of nuclear disarmament and that's it. That explains our approach to the problem of non-proliferation. But I think the American position is different. First, I think the Americans were and still are interested in depriving their main their main, how to say? Mm. Partners in the western world.

CAN YOU START THERE AGAIN?

I think the United States are interested and have been interested in the past in depriving their partners in the western world. First of all, Japan, West Germany and some others of nuclear weapons. Because you know, I think we cannot forget about the rivalries, about the competition in the western world. And this is one of the examples. The second reason from my personal point of view is that having achieved some progress in the development of nuclear energy, in a military sense, the United States certainly had some more advanced stage in the development of peaceful nuclear energy and even in the economic sense. They would like to keep this advanced position in comparison to say, the Japan or some western European countries.

HOW IS THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEREST AND THE SOVIET ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THIS, CONTEXT DIFFERENT?

We are only different you know, market. We're a planned economy and we have some other ways of development, our regulations with our allies say. Because, well actually there are two world economic markets. Though they are certainly connected with each other, but still, we can say about western economic market and the socialist country's economic market. So these are two different economic phenomenas. That's, that's the difference in these two approaches. And to continue with my explanation, the third...reasoning for the American approach to the problem of non-proliferation is that in this situation, the United States have a nuclear umbrella over western Europe. And they in this way, you know, they, all the western allies of the United States, they kind of tied to the policy of the United States. And then the last consideration which I would like to mention is the fact that the United States are not certainly interested in the situation when some of their allies with, unstable, I would say, political regimes might have nuclear weapons. Because in the extreme situation they may resort to it and in this way, the United States may be involved in a nuclear conflict which is not in their interest. That's my explanation.

WHAT KIND OF A NON-PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENT DOES THE SOVIET UNION HAVE WITH ITS OWN ALLIES?

Well our non — we don't have any specific non-proliferation arrangements with our allies because all our allies are members of the NDK. And this is, this is for our relations in the field of the non-proliferation. That's, that's, that's easy. We don't make any exclusions, any exceptions for our allies because, in this sense I mean, in the sense of the non-proliferation. We strictly abide to the system of safeguards of international Atomic Energy Agency which regulate the questions of nuclear experts and some other nuclear assistance and so on and so forth. So, there couldn't be any exceptions in the field of nuclear proliferation.

TO GO BACK IN HISTORY, IN THE EYES OF AMERICA I THINK, THE PROBLEM STARTED WITH A ATOMS FOR PEACE PROGRAM. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW IT WAS THE ATOMS FOR PEACE POLICY WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIET UNION?

Well, I don't think it had much substance in the sense of non-proliferation because the program, "Atoms for Peace," introduced by President Eisenhower was basically re-entered for the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear uses. Though the problem of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is certainly one of the three big bones of the regime of non-proliferation, but still is, it's not...because basic is the non-proliferation itself. That's our approach.

WASN'T THAT SORT OF AN OPENING TO LEADS ON THE BOATS (?) OF TECHNOLOGY AND SOME OF THE MATERIALS AND SO ON?

I don't think that at that time the countries — Well, I'm speaking in general. The countries were really for the, for the serious efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons because at that time, well, there were basically two nuclear countries. And only what of -- one of them -- there was no desire for any serious effort in the part of the non-proliferation. There was a different situation. It was practically a period of, though the end, but still the period of Cold War. You certainly remember that all serious efforts, or serious achievements in the field of disarmament started on the first part of the sixties. But to be more precise, Moscow Test Ban Treaty which we have already mentioned was the first, the first signed, the first concrete tangible result in this (?). And since that we started the fortunate development of events in this area, because after '63 and '68 we have non-proliferation and that's some other serious, very serious agreements, both bilateral and multilateral which seriously restricted the arms race.

I WONDER WHETHER SOMETHING SIMILAR TO ATOMS FOR PEACE OR SUCH A PEACEFUL SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC CORPORATION IN THE NUCLEAR AREA STARTED BY THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE SAME TIME?

Well yes, practically at the same time, because as you know, until the middle of the fifties the nuclear research was in the field of high regarded secrets, military secrets of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and United Kingdom because United Kingdom became nuclear power in 1952. But starting from 1954 an international exchange in the field of nuclear information began to acquire the base, the force, the scope and in the second part of the fifties, we have several international conferences on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in which my country participated very actively and our leading scientists and the leading figures, I would say, in the field of our atomic project, like...— he lectured for example. And London allowing (?) nuclear achievements and then we had several international conferences in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations. And at that time, as you know, in 1957, an International Atomic Energy was created, which certainly is a very serious institution in itself and we attach a very ( ). The whole time we attach great importance to this establishment, international establishment, which plays a very role in two fields. First, in the in the control over the non-proliferation and the second in the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses ( ). These are two are two, I think, basic directions in the work of the National Atomic Energy.

HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION VIEW THE FRENCH DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR — OR EVEN THEN THE DETERRENCE IN TERMS OF PROLIFERATION?

Well, I think the French and the Chinese membership in the nuclear club- I may say so. You know that the French in 1960 and China in 1964 were additional drops of wat... of water which overflew a cup in the sense of a non-proliferation. It was additional stimulus for more active efforts in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And they actually, I think were very important factors which contributed to the, to the working out of a non-proliferation treaty. Though, these two b... these two countries are still not members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Though, on a national basis, they practically observe the non-proliferation. And they actively participate in the work of the International Atomic Energy and it — Atomic Energy Agency, but still they are not members of the NPT (?). And this is, and it's a pity. I'd say it's a pity.

IS CHINA A SPECIAL WORRY TO THE SOVIET UNION? IS INITIAL CHINESE EFFORTS WERE DEVELOPED WITH ASSISTANCE OF SOVIET SCIENTISTS AND CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT?

Well, you know I'm a diplomat. I have been always working on the political side of the problem. I don't know the scientific and technical problems of our cooperation with China so I wouldn't discuss these because I'm not a competent person to discuss these questions. But, I think the China joining the nuclear club is another worry for us because it increases the number of nuclear weapons states and in this way, increases the danger of nuclear, of a nuclear conflict. That's very simple.

WHAT ABOUT INDIA?

Well, from my point of view, India's not, is not a nuclear country. Because, as you know, and India exploded a peaceful nuclear device in May of 1974. And since that time it hasn't detonated any other nuclear devices. And according to say, American experts, I read recently their country needs at least five or six explosions to be sure that its weapon will work. So we cannot, I think, even from this practical point of view —we cannot speak about India as a nuclear country. And beside the India, many times at the, at the highest, its highest level of its leaders officially stated that it is not going to acquire or to produce a nuclear weapon. And you know that the India from the very beginning was one of the leaders in the non-nuclear movement. Because, it is India who introduced, say, the question of test ban on the international agenda. As you remember, the late President Nehru in 1954, he went before my country, introduced to the United Nations, officially introduced the question of the prohibition of test ban. And nucli -- and India, for many years is a champion of the concluding convention of the prohibition of the uses of nuclear weapons. And the last Soviet-Indian declaration on the non-nuclear world is also the proof of its policy. This is, as far as the political side is concerned.

CAN YOU ENVISION A SITUATION IN WHICH INDIA MIGHT CHANGE ITS MIND?

Well I don't know. But we have to — It's hard to (?) Indians to decide but, you have to take into consideration a very serious situation in the southern Asia. Because, Pakistan openly proclaimed its nuclear ambitions. And its neighbor, if it's, it's India has to take this into consideration. But this might just — thinking allowed, I would say. It's certainly up to India to decide that way. Until now we know only the statements of the India leadership, that it has no intention on its own initiative to acquire, to produce nuclear weapons. That's, that's easy like that.

DO YOU WORRY ABOUT OTHER STATES IN THE AREA? DO YOU WORRY ABOUT KOREA OR JAPAN, IN FACT?

Well as far as Korea's concerned, if you mean the whole peninsula.

DO YOU WORRY ABOUT THE —

Which one? Well you know the, you know the, that recent proposal of Korean people — the...Republic, that there's enough part of the peninsula on the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone. On the whole peninsula. I think it f... It gives you an answer. And as far as Japan is concerned, well we know about its three non-nuclear principles. Let's believe they will keep it.

WHAT ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST? WHAT'S THE FEELING IN THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT COUNTRIES LIKE ISRAEL AND IRAQ?

Well [SIGHS], about Israel, I think the two, the two most dangerous from (?) the non-proliferation point of view, countries are Israel and South Africa, because they have nuclear facilities which they operate without any safeguards. And they refuse to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and they refuse to put this nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the Vienna agency. And this in itself is certainly not very good I would say very mildly signs of their nuclear policy. I think these two countries are the most dangerous from a point of view. Non-proliferation. And besides we have always keep in mind that once a country in a certain region becomes a nuclear country, it might cause a nuclear a chain reaction in the nuclear field. That's, that's one of the dangers. And you know, now we have regional groupings of countries, say, in the Middle East or in the south of Africa or some other parts, where, because of a country her neighbors do not join the NPT because they do not want to give up any rights in the event of change of the situation in a certain area, to resort to all... disabilities which they might use in this situation. And this is very dangerous. This is very dangerous. That's why we consider one of the basic problems, basic problems of the NPT is the enlargement on the participation of states in NPT. The problem of turning it, this, I mean, this treaty into a really universal agreement, which participation of all states. And first of all, with the participation of so called near-nuclear countries. Near-nuclear, I mean the countries which have the technical know-how and the financial disabilities (?) to create their own nuclear weapon. We call these countries nuclear near-nuclear countries. And there're about three dozens of them in the world now. Though, most of them are members of the NPT, but still have a lot of countries, well, we have — Well, in we have now one hundred and thirty four I think, members of state parties of the NPT, so it makes about three dozens countries which are not members. And among them a lot of so called near-nuclear. Besides Israel and South Africa and we may speak about Brazil or Argentina, Chile, and they're not members of the Vladivostok (?) Treaty. The treaty which, you know, created not the nuclear free weapons zones in... America.

THE USSR DOESN'T LIKE THIS TREATY. WHY IS THAT?

Which treaty? ...We do like it. We are members of the additional protocol of the Vladivostok. The additional protocol to it requires the guarantees of all nuclear countries to respect the nuclear free statutes of Latin America. And we are members. We're a party to this additional protocol. We do like it. Though, from our point of view, this treaty has these three shortcomings, I would say — shortcomings But despite this, we joined the members, the ot... the other members of the protocol two, or the Vladivostok Treaty.

WHAT ARE THE SHORTCOMINGS?

Well first, it... Actually, actually, or legally I would say, it does not prohibit directly. It does not prohibit directly the peaceful nuclear explosions. And it is a common knowledge that there isn't much difference from a technological point of view. That with this nuclear device and a military. (?) Warhead, a bomb, first. Second, the Vladivostok Treaty does not prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons. And naturally first things which comes to mind is Panama. Panama Canal. And the third, the scope, the territory I would say of the Treaty. It extends to half of the Atlantic and to half of the Pacific which contradicts the international law to the freedom of high seas. Because according to all United Nations or internationally agreed principles of the creation of nuclear weapon free zones, the zones should cover the territory and the territorial waters. And that's it. That's our shortcomings, from our point of view.

WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THE KIND OF ARGUMENTS WHICH I HEARD FROM SOME INDIANS SAYING THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATY (?) AND THE TREATIES RESTRICTING THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS HAVE SLIGHTLY ( ) BUT SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS A...SO THE PEOPLE WHO ALREADY HAS IT, THAT THEY CAN BE MORE RESPONSIBLE IN TERMS OF HANDLING IT THAN THE REST OF US. WE'RE GOING TO GET IT WHEN WE NEED IT? WHAT IS ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT OR IS THERE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST IT?

Well I will give you only one argument. That nuclear weapons kill everyone without any regard to the scheme of color, to the color of skin or to the race or to what nationality or statehood. I think it doesn't make any choice.

BUT THE NOTION THAT IT'S APPROPRIATE FOR YOU TO SERVE THE NATIONAL PURPOSES OF US, USSR AND OTHER WITH THOSE INTENTIONS. AND IT'S INAPPROPRIATE TO SERVE NATIONAL PURPOSES OF IRAQ FOR EXAMPLE. HOW WOULD YOU RESPOND TO THAT?

Well I can repeat that the non-proliferation treaties were not the most important international agreements because -- Well, actually this is the only multilateral international agreements which greatly restrict, restricts the danger of nuclear war and the danger of nuclear war is a common war. It's some not only for whites. It's not only for the rich north and poor south. It's for everyone. It's, it's it's one of the global problems. The problems of human survival. Because in the past, the question was either war and peace. But now it's death or life. That's, unfortunately that's simple now.

BUT IT'S A JUDGMENT WHICH THE NUCLEAR CLUB WANTS TO RESERVE TO ITSELF.

It's not a nuclear club. Some members of nuclear club wants to reserve it for themselves.

WELL, CAN YOU RESPOND TO IT ON A KIND OF A PHILOSOPHICAL LEVEL? WHY IS IT RIGHT FOR MEMBERS THAT HAVE — THAT WAS PART OF THE DISCUSSION DURING THE TREATY, IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR CLUB MADE VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROMISES.

Well I c... I can refer only to one ( ). Article 6 on the NPT. And this article was introduced into the text of the treaty on the insistence, or on the proposal of some non-allied and neutral...Sweden...countries and this Article 6 contains the obligation to disarm, to put in a very simple way. And this is actually the only international agreement in accordance with which one hundred and thirty plus countries have the obligation to conduct disarmament negotiations and our chief (?) disarmament measures, first of all, in the arms of, in the field of nuclear armaments. And we, from our point, or from my point of view, when we in the first decade, afterward decade -- when we could not achieve the radical solution or the, as we call it at that time, problem. Then people started, not only our side (?). India started to search for alternate routes to the solution of the atomic problem. And one of the routes was the non-proliferation. Another was the nuclear weapons free zones, the prohibition of test ban and many others, which in the long run should leave, I would say, should lead to the same final goal of nuclear disarmament. That's our approach.

HOW DOES SOVIET UNION FEEL ABOUT SELF HELP NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES AS THOSE OF ISRAEL AGAINST IRAQ?

You call it self-help policy? I call it aggression. And not only me.

FULL SENTENCE.

Well the nuclear, as you call it "self-help" against the Iraqi atomic installations was officially condemned by the United Nations, overwhelming membership of the United Nations as an aggression. It's...aggression. So we're strongly against such self-help non-proliferation. Well, no, no country in the world can solve the problem on on non-proliferation on a an individual basis, because it's a collective undertaking in itself. It certainly, as a country can refuse the acceptance of a nuclear weapon, you cannot produce your own weapon but still you have to have, say, guarantees against nuclear attack, against the only threat of nuclear weapons, against your country. And you cannot achieve it all alone. So it I think it's it's a, it's a universal problem. That's my approach.

CUT.

Probably didn't mention one thing — the nuclear experts.

EXPORTS OR...? THE TRADING IN REACTORS AND SUCH?

Yeah. If you are interested in that because this is a very important also.

IN YOUR VIEW, HOW DID THE POLICIES OF UNITED STATES DIFFER FROM THE POLICY OF SOVIET UNION?

No difference

NO DIFFERENCE.

United States is even better,

HOW DO THE POLICIES OF EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS AND SUCH COMPARE OR DIFFER BETWEEN THE US AND USSR IN TERMS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME?

Okay?

YEAH.

I think there isn't much difference in basic policies both of the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear export. Though, there some are with allies I think....United States shows more loyalty nuclear loyalty I would say than it is allowed by certain international agreements. And this is not only opinion. This is the opinion, say, of the United Nations, which for many times in recent years asked the United States to refrain from the assistance say, to South Africa in the field of the uncooperation and assistance in the field of nuclear energy. The, to the, s... to South Africa or to Israel. But I can repeat that as a basis. The both countries stand on the same grounds, stand on the same grounds. And this is a very important factor because you know there is a, or might be a contradiction between non-proliferation interests and commercial interests. And we would, were, we would like that the non-proliferation interests prevail over commercial interests — otherwise, there will be no non-proliferation. We do enrich...for example, for many countries. You know, even for France and many other countries. Sweden, for example. But we do it under very strict or in strict accordance with international rules established by — at international conferences, by Vienna Agency and by some other international law acts. And this is probably the only way to observe it very strictly, the established rules. And besides we have so called London Club. That is the conference of the main nuclear exporters, on nuclear equipment and materials exporters. Unfortunately for the last, we'll say, eight or in ten years, this club was not active. And we're trying now to...activity to make it to be an active. Cause it's a very important establishment. Though it's a strictly unofficial. It's, it's actually like a club. But it has very important role.

THERE IS GREAT APPRECIATION I THINK TO THE SOVIET CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FISSIONABLE MATERIALS AND SO ON, BUT YOU KNOW, IT'S SAID THAT THE WEST HAD SEVERAL...IN THIS AREA AND...HAD A VERY IMPORTANT ONE WHICH IS CHINA. HOW WOULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

Well we gave it up to one of your first wishes about our nuclear cooperation with China and I can repeat again, we -- I'm not a specialist in this field, but I don't think we failed in any way, in any way we've our relations with China in the field of nuclear weapons. China is a great country. It has huge economic and scientific resources, And by the way, as you know, a lot of Chinese physicists were educated in the United States, So, but I wouldn't go into details because I just don't know.