FROM '47 RIGHT THROUGH TO '50?

From the first day, from... from the first day of the commission, which would have been, late in September or October, 1946 until I left in April or May, 1949, on leave, extended leave — I wanted to go and see Europe, my wife and I drove around Europe — and I came back in January of 1950. I had really not expected to come back. I thought that I had been there long enough, but Lewis Strauss urged, nearly entreated me, to come back, and it, only later did it become evident to me why he was so eager to have me come back, I think — and I did come back, then in January of 1950, and stayed until March of 1950 and I may be off by...those are right, I could look those up if they're important, but--

THIS IS TAPE 2, PROGRAM 2, 15TH OF APRIL, AN INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM GOLDEN, AT WALL STREET, NEW YORK. WILLIAM T. GOLDEN. WHAT WAS ADMIRAL STRAUSS' ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD?

Admiral Strauss had a fundamental and inherent distrust of the Russians. He felt that the Russians were out to achieve world domination; he did not trust what they said, and he felt that, let's just say, that their intentions were what I have just stated. That was a fundamental and inherent belief, and that influenced his I would say, his conduct, throughout, as indeed it should; if one believes that then one ought to conduct himself in a manner consistent with it. And he felt that quite deeply as an article of judgment and faith. He was a very keenly intellectual man, but he was also a man of emotional perception, so that his convictions, when arrived at, were firmly held.

HOW DID THOSE INTENTIONS COMPARE WITH AMERICAN INTENTIONS? HOW DID HE ASSESS AMERICAN INTENTIONS COMPARED TO SOVIET INTENTIONS?

Well, Admiral Strauss was a very patriotic man, and he felt that, the American spirit was virtuous and benign and that the Russians were, one would say the opposite polarity. At least the Russian government — he was not talking, necessarily, about the Russian people, but the Soviet government he regarded with complete distrust, and the American the United States had been a blessed country for him, his grandparents had come here from Europe, and even as others of us whose grandparents or parents had come from the, or ourselves, had come from Europe, this is a wonderful country, and so he was very patriotic. And he wanted to defend it. He wanted it to be safe, if you will, for democracy and progress, and

CAN YOU RESTATE THE SOVIET INTENTIONS AGAIN? DO YOU REMEMBER ANY PARTICULAR EXAMPLES, ANY CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH YOU?

Well, I don't Let me say, his view of the Soviets was that they were not to be trusted. Now he felt that they were intent upon world domination, and upon world domination politically and militarily let us say in a political sense, and that they were believers in achieving world communism. He was opposed to communism; he felt it was not good for people, and so there would, may be said to be two elements: one is, he did not believe in Communism as a system being good for society, and second — I'm not sure what the order should be — he regarded the S- Russians as expansionists, and aggressors, and untrustworthy, and people who would say what they thought would be effective to the end they were seeking to achieve. One example, perhaps it would illustrate some foundation for this deeply held belief on his part, and I can't tell you where that belief originated, other than that his background was in Wall Street as an investment banker, as you know, and have probably brought out -- the it's hard to give an example I should say there were the negotiations beginning of, probably in 1946, right after, and maybe even earlier, right after the American the end of World War II, immediately after which was terminated by the two atomic bombs fired over Japan. Talks were initiated with the Russians looking to some kind of agreement for non-use, let's say, for control of nuclear materials, in a peaceful way, and for agreements for non-use. And there was something called the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Uh which later became the foundation for the Baruch plan, Bernard Baruch, who... represented the United States in talks with the Russians. And these had to do I won't try to summarize the program, but essentially it was a plan which would have limited severely restricted the use of nuclear ma-, would have eliminated, ideally, the use of nuclear power for military purposes. Now these talks were entered into, he believed, and I firmly believe, with the best of honorable intentions on the part of the United States, which had created this weapon, which recognized its hazard, which also recognized, in the background, that sooner or later the Russians would have the weapon, and other countries too — and efforts were made to establish a basis for control. The ... got nowhere. These talks went on for years, with Fabian tactics by the Soviets to keep talking and not to say absolutely no; all the while, they were developing their own weapon. And you might say that this was not a matter of good faith, to be carrying on the talks without any reference to that. Well, he regarded this as characteristic, and I think there's very good basis for that. Now, from the Soviet point of view, it was very sensible, let's say, to carry on talks, and maintain an atmosphere of non-aggression, while developing your own weapon to catch up with the other side. And they did that very successfully. Well, he would feel and this was a matter of duplicity in the way they were talking, even as, if you go back to... Pearl Harbor, the duplicity of the Japanese in carrying on talks, while indeed at the very time, when they were preparing, and then did make the strike at Pearl Harbor. Now, if you were a Japanese you would think this was a very clever and successful tactic, and indeed... it was, the attack on Pearl Harbor was brilliant, and but that's another matter.

TELL ME SOME OF YOUR MEMORIES OF THE EARLY AEC AND ABOUT ITS OBJECTIVES.

The AEC first met, after its appoint-, appointment of the five commissioners to which perhaps I should make some reference, no?

WE CAN COVER THAT. BUT SOME OF YOUR MEMORIES OF THE PERSONALITIES AND THE ISSUES...?

Well, there were f-, the five commissioners, shall I describe briefly, uh?

SURE...

The first meeting consisted of David Lilienthal, who had been appointed as chairman by President Truman and he was a Democrat, had been active in TVA, and was a very bright man; a man named William Waymac, who was a newspaper editor from the Middle West — Iowa, maybe — but in the Middle West; was not a scientist in any way, but I presume, chosen as kind of a representative aware of the public sensitivity, and a public-spirited man; man named Sumner T. Pike, who had served in various federal-government roles, and was a bright extroverted man — he, among the roles he had been a commissioner of the Security and Exchange Commission, varied... roles, also public-spirited; a physicist named Robert F. Bacher, who was had been involved in the Manhattan District, which was the organization, as you know, that created the atomic bomb, under General Groves; a physicist from Cal Tech, California Institute of Technology, who was a very thoughtful man; and Lewis Strauss, whose background had been in investment banking with much international experience, who had spent the entire war — World War II — in the Navy, having started there long before Pearl Harbor, perhaps in either the very beginning of 1941 or perhaps late in 1940, he had been a reserve officer from World War I period — when he had been assistant to Herbert Hoover, who headed the European relief efforts, food and the like — he had met Herbert Hoover, who became a hero to him, as a very young man. I don't know that you want me to go into this background....

IF I CAN ASK YOU TO SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY WHAT THE OBJECTIVES WERE OF THE AEC?

Yes. The AEC was set up by law, with quite well-defined objectives and responsibilities and limitations; it was set up under what was known as the McMahon Act, which had been intensely debated in the Congress versus something called the May-Johnson Bill; the May-Johnson Bill would have given much more authority to the military, and the McMahon Act gave authority to a civilian body...The purpose of the AEC were to create — were to look after the military and non-military uses of atomic energy, and atomic, nuclear reactions, and the great emphasis was on weaponry; the war had just come to an end; the McMahon Act was... passed in the summer, as I recall it, of 1946, and the emphasis was on transferring control of nuclear-energy projects from the military, where they had been developed in the Manhattan District of the Army Corps of Engineers under General Groves and Robert Oppenheimer, to transfer all the authority and responsibility and the properties to a civilian agency, the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. And its purposes, I've said repeating, was to create weapons, to develop new ones, to, but more broadly, to develop uses for atomic energy having very much in mind the development of peaceful uses many of which were... at least anticipated or understood, such as uses in medicine, and industrial uses, and uses for power even then were visualized, in principle. That give it a...?

HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE ADMIRAL STRAUSS'S VIEWS ON CIVILIAN VERSUS MILITARY CUSTODY?

Well I don't recall what were Admiral Strauss's views were on the May-Johnson versus the McMahon bills at the time…

DO YOU RECALL LATER...?

I realize, I just want to keep that as background... Lewis Strauss had felt comfortable with the military. David Lilienthal felt uncomfortable with the military, to put it in rather simplistic terms. Uh, Lewis Strauss had come up as a reserve officer, through the military was respected and trusted by the military people, as well as by the Secretariat of the military, such as Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. Lewis Strauss was very well-respected and accepted, and rose remarkably in the military starting as a reserve lieutenant-commander, as I said about the beginning of 1946 --uh excuse me, about the beginning of 1941 — he rose to the rank of rear admiral at the end of the war, which is an extraordinary achievement, almost, but not quite, unique for a reserve officer to achieve what's called "flag rank" in the Navy. And... he went through the ranks and was a commodore for a while, which was a rather quaint title, rarely used, and then he was made a rear admiral, along with several other reserve officers at the time, right near the end of the war. Now that says something remarkable about him, and he was very highly regarded by the military in, for example, the Bureau of Ordnance, where he was stationed; ordnance has to do with the creation of weapons and both offensive and defensive, arms armaments and ammunition, was what they were called; and he became a very close adviser to the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, in fact, to the several chiefs... who rotated through in the time. So he felt comfortable with the military, and the military felt comfortable with him, as a person who, understood, let's say, the spirit. He was not, however, a militarist, and he was not a professional military officer. David Lilienthal, on the other hand, had never, had never had any military experience. And he served his country during World War II, but not in a military capacity. And so then, he wasn't as ... perhaps as comfortable with what is known, and uncomfortable with what is not known. Further, more broadly, David Lilienthal was what would be called a very liberal-minded person, and Lewis Strauss was what would be called, in excessively simplistic terms, a very conservative kind of person. This is... too simplistic to be fair to either, because each of them had both keen intellects and warm hearts. Ah, but Lewis Strauss would be more skeptical, and David Lilienthal more hopeful, I would say, about the virtuous conduct of human beings, to put it that way.

WHEN IT GOT TO THE TIME OF THE CZECH CRISIS, AND THE BERLIN BLOCKADE, DO YOU THINK STRAUSS WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE SEEN THE MILITARY TAKE OVER CUSTODY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS?

Oh no, I do not think so; I have no... I think that was, that was res judica, as it's called — the act had been passed, the McMahon Bill was perfectly clear, and I have no recollection of any effort, or even expression, of trying to change that, nor, as a matter of fact, do I think nor do I think that Lewis Strauss really would have wanted the military to be in control... though he had great confidence in them but I don't think he would have wanted custody and control to go back to the military. But I don't know that as a fact.... I don't recall ever any, I mean, any such discussions with him. That's... my reading... and I got to know him very well; we had offices immediately adjacent — it was like this room, a little room in between, such as that, and then his room; I was in an office of perhaps this size, and there was a small secretarial office with his secretary and mine in it, and then there was his office, which was very much bigger, on the corner of the of the of the building that became the AEC building, that had been the US Public Health Service Building...Constitution Avenue. So the — he and I knew each other very well; he was a man not easy to get to know well. Do you want any of this? ...in the sense that he was not a trustful man; he was a very kept close to himself, kind of person; and he would be very genial, and indeed in his manners was courtly, so courtly that some people found it excessively courtly on occasion; but he was a very private man, and he would not speak at length about his feelings, except about specific subjects...I got to know him very much better; I'd met him in the Navy -- I had not known him in Wall Street at all, but I met him in the Navy, and did some work with him, for him, really; he was much older, as temporary additional duty, as it was called. And so that was how, when he was asked to go on the Atomic Energy Commission in the summer of 1946, knowing that I wanted to spend part of my time, a large part of my time, on non-remunerative but interesting and useful activities; when I got out of the Navy I thought I didn't want to get back into the old ruts but wanted to get doing things that I'd had in mind to do that would be interesting, he turned to me and he called me and I recall I was at the, actually at the Grand Canyon when he got me, and asked whether if he accepted the position on the AEC -- and this is an example of his courtliness in manner --uh, would I, "Would you, Bill, come and help me get it organized; maybe come for three months?" Well, I think he would have accepted the job without my advice, and certainly without my assistance, but nothing would have interested me more being interested in science and in military affairs, and in international affairs by reason of World War II service, than to be there in this most thrilling and exciting new enterprise, the world of, the world of the atom.

They're referring to the sandstone test of 1948 in the area of Enewetak Atoll in Central Pacific. Certainly the bulk of the American should I say the bulk of the American specialists in the use of the testing of weapons, of nuclear weapons, were at that test at one time or another and some of them were there throughout the test because there were several bombs tested, so that in being asked about whether that was the only American atomic bomb team, I'm not sure that was the term used, I really d—didn't think about it in those terms and I would not doubt that by going to Los Alamos and elsewhere, if in some way the Marshall Islands had been isolated, that a team could have been gotten together, that could have assembled and used weapons, but it would have been very much a second or third team. Certainly the leaders were out there, although some of them went back and forth.

CAN YOU GIVE ME THE ANECDOTES ABOUT THE SANDSTONE TEST, ANY PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS REALLY OF WHAT IT WAS LIKE TO BE OUT THERE AND WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE?

Well, the atmosphere was--was expectant and while the--for arranging for the tests took quite a while, quite a number of days, in fact went into weeks. Some of us who were there had a leisure time, and I will—I picture that being in--in the atoll at Enewetak swimming. And we'd go around to some of the some of the little islands or eyelets and there were palm trees on them and one fellow in our group named Jack Clark, a scientists and engineer from California, climbed up a palm tree and cut out a heart of palm. And that was the first heart of palm, I've ever eaten, and it was taken under somewhat dramatic circumstances. But many of us would have leisure time--be out swimming, things of the sort, while we were not back on ship board making more specific plans and activities. So the atmosphere if not leisurely was at any rate not tense. This was not wartime, every effort was made to be sure that nothing went wrong. And so we would inspect the sight where the tower was to be on which a bomb was to be detonated and things of the sort. General atmosphere was one of intense as you'd expect—of intense interest and devotion to an objective, uh--uh, interest in how the tests would come out including the efficiency of the tests, 'cause it wasn't just a question whether the bomb goes off or not, it's also a question of what the yield is and what the effect is on structures. There were tests made on the ground, various kinds of structures were set up at various distances from where the bomb would be detonated, uh--the power to see what the effects were. So there was-an intense interest and esprit de corps and that's about what I would call it.

AND YOU WERE REPRESENTING THE AEC, RIGHT?

I was representing the AEC, one of the representatives and I was also representing the Bureau of Ordinance of the United States Navy in which I was still a reserve officer. Uh, have been a reserve officer and on active duty throughout World War II, and when I was going to the sandstone test, it seemed to the Bureau of Ordinance, which is the—was then the part of the Navy that was concerned with the development and distribution of weapons and... to have me go out there and report for them. And I was very glad to do that, if getting in a little active--little active duty as a reserve officer.

DO YOU RECALL ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE MILITARY OUT THERE--OUR SCIENTISTS OR?

Well, yes, but we were all one of a group the scientists and the military, I mean there weren't--really didn't distinguish particularly and in the mess, on shore or th—it was very little distinction. I don't think of it in those terms any way I do both and we were a team.

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION]

I was um--I was asked by the atomic energy commission to go to the sandstone tests, and let's say I was delighted to be asked. I--uh, I don't think I had to ask to be asked but it was quite evident--the AEC was a rather small group--a very high quality strongly motivated people at the time and it was quite evident that I would have liked to go to see a bomb test. And at any rate I was asked to go to represent the commission and to observe the point of view that I had as someone who attended virtually all meetings of the commission in my role as assistant to Lewis Strauss The commission meetings accept for a very few that were called executive sessions were attended by very few people other than the commissioners and the general council and the general manager—general council is Herbert Moss, the general manager was Carroll Wilson and there would be some other sometimes called in for specific issues on the agenda. My role was one of being assistant to Lewis Strauss, reading all the papers, sitting behind him, not at the table, occasionally passing him a note and being alert and being a very intrigued with the whole operation—..., in 1946 I was 36 or 37 years old and it was then--I'd been interested in science all my life and this was the highest and newest level so it was not unnatural that I should be one of those who would go for the AEC to the test. Many others went from different divisions such as the engineering division the weapons design division and the like.

... CAN YOU REMEMBER—DID YOU OBSERVE THE ACTUAL EXPLOSIONS, CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT—

Oh, yes, indeed. Uh, we were on ship board we were told to face away from where the explosion would be, we were provided with the blackest of black glasses which I still have to wear, kind of rubber--really covered all our eyes not just this sort of thing but out eyes weren't closed— very black and we were to face the opposite direction. And then, of course, the countdown came and when that went off it was the thought came to my mind and others have used to expression—must be independently, "It's a greater light than a thousand suns." Through closed eyelids these black glasses are facing the other way. The illumination was just dramatic, that as you see by my manner now, it remains with me almost 40 years later, others will have described, I think in rather similar terms. But the idea brighter than a 1,000 suns occurred to me and I know that's the title of a book, and it must just independently have occurred to other people. It was a quite an experience.

...ANY CONVERSATIONS YOU CAN REMEMBER WITH SCIENTISTS, OF ANY OTHER STORIES YOU COULD TELL US ABOUT SANDSTONE...

Well, I--you know, if I've stopped to think about it I might have some come to mind, I hadn't thought in those terms

THIS WAS THE FIRST LARGE TEST AFTER—AFTER THE ONE—THE '46 ONE.

Yes, it was--uh, well no--no interesting vignettes really come to mind. Uh, we're all pleased with what happened and I—I went back before all the tests were completed, partly to report because the communications channels weren't trusted on such matters as a yield and ....

...DECISION TO DEPLOY AIRCRAFT TO DETECT EVIDENCE OF SOVIET—SOVIET ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS THE DECISION BY ADMIRAL STRAUSS TO GO AHEAD CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE BACKGROUND AND EXPLAIN HIS ENTHUSIASM? ... ENTHUSIASM AND THE WAY IN WHICH HE SORT OF PUSHED THIS--THIS POLICY—FINALLY IN?

Yes I can--uh, Admiral Strauss was a remarkable man as a number of these people were as certainly Robert Oppenheimer was and certainly David Lilienthal was in a very different way. Admiral Strauss was very alert and creative. Uh, he was also having come through the Navy and seen how the torpedoes that the Navy had built up stocks of prior to Pearl Harbor failed to work after they first put it to use immediately after Pearl Harbor, they failed to work because they hadn't been adequately tested during the pre-war time and they hadn't been adequately tested because of shortage of funds. And these were expensive devices and the Navy wanted to--had limited funds, everybody had limited funds and instead of testing the weapons, they took them apart and put them together and assumed that they would work. Now, this was of course a very—this was a very serious problem at the time and many submariners had the harrowing experience of firing the torpedoes having them go a—at the appropriately hit the target and not detonate, or go under the target and not detonate as they were supposed to. Strauss was very conscious of this throughout World War II and advocated strongly testing and he was a skeptic, and he felt that—that don't just rely on reports they ought to work. That's a bit of background and I think it may have some bearing. When the atomic energy commission was started very shortly there after he wondered about what arrangements the Manhattan district had made for monitoring the atmosphere and seismically to detect whether and when another country which could only have been the Soviet Union successfully tested a weapon. And he inquired and found that there were no such provisions and he persisted in this--this was the kind of thing that would interest him intensely, partly because of a military background and he was the leader—he--he got the idea, there was no opposition in the atomic energy commission—they're looking into it. And he found that indeed there was no program for monitoring to determine. He thought it was very important and the commission agreed with him, very important that the United States know when the Soviets had a success with the weapon. There was very little interest in the subject partly because the general belief was, it was going to take the Russians a long time. General Groves, especially felt that the American achievement under his leadership was so great that it--Russians wouldn't duplicate it for 10 years was the number I heard him use at that time, if at all, some people said. And Strauss did not nave any such illusions. He felt it was very important that we have an alerting system and he pressed this, he went through certain of the military departments, went to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and found Forrestal incredulous but then checked and found indeed there was no monitoring system. He pressed that one should be established. It was still uh-- there was—there was no opposition to this, but there was no great enthusiasm for it. The military would have had to carry out the program primarily with aircraft, for monitoring the atmosphere with absorbing devices which would pick up radioactive material in minute amounts and could record it. Uh, the military wanted to use its money for other purposes, they're always short of money, doesn't matter how much they have. They want more. It—it—the not just—uh, not just the military—people in general who believe in their causes feel that they need more money than they get and more supplies. However that may be there was very little interest in the military areas and they had to be stimulated and pushed somewhat which they were from the higher levels. And straws pushed this and—and a committee was set up of representatives of the appropriate military departments and as I recall it the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, after the very beginning I was the representative of the AEC on that committee to push ahead, if you will to stimulate the creation of a monitoring system which was conceived primarily as being a system of having aircraft constantly flying and with absorbing devices. A man by the name of Ellis Johnson, Dr. Ellis Johnson with no T. in the Johnson, who was at the Carnegie Institution of Washington, a scientist of somewhat long hair variety uh— a very patriotic and a very capable man had worked throughout the--in the--with the Navy in World War II on mines and wrote a classified book called Mines Against Japan. Ellis Johnson was called on to head this monitoring program as—the Scientific hand under the military direction. And Straws pushed this little committee of which I was member—pushed and it took probably two years ju--just about because the monitoring system was put into effect not very long before the Soviet weapon was detonated in August 1949. Now, you'll, I say this, I say who knows whether they detonated one earlier that had not been detected. But the general presumption is that they hadn't. At any rate the monitoring system did detect the radiation which was definitely determined could be no other source than the Soviet Union and no other source than a nuclear uh— uh—uh, efficient device and as a consequence of that the whole effort here in the United States was stimulated and we got to the question of a super bomb or the hydrogen bomb as it's now called. Have I said enough about long-range detection?

THAT'S FINE.

It was a very--I think history will show that it was a very important contribution by Lewis Strauss which would not have come into being until some indeterminately later time had it not been for his vision, initiative, and persistence and the respect in which he was held by both the civilian secretaries and by the military. Um—I--because not to have known that the Russians had detonated a bomb could have led to very serious adverse consequences for the United States, one of which could have been the Soviets getting a hydrogen bomb before we did. And that in my opinion and the opinion of many people, though not everybody would have been, could have been disastrous because it would have permitted the Soviets to threaten the United States in a manner which we would have—had to knuckle under to. And to say that we had more atomic weapons which is not a very large number at that time anyway is not an adequate answer to a weapon that has a thousand fold or could be more fold the potency.

...WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF LEWIS STRAUSS TO THAT AND WHAT WAS YOUR OWN REACTION..?

To the Soviet—...device--device of the .... Well I was in Florence, Italy this was on my—with my wife, we were traveling around Europe to see Europe, I had left the AEC in April or May and 1940 9. Uh, and I had a vivid recollection one day in Florence, there was a communist parade a big communist parade. We were--my wife and I were impressed with the fervor of the people in this parade. And it was not only in favor of communism it was against the United States and it was for the Soviet Union it was quite interesting in retrospect and I've looked over my wife's travel notes on that at the time. And I remember going to see, was so impressed with this, I went to see the US Information Agency the head in Florence at the time, you know what about this. I didn't get a very meaningful or satisfactory response, but the person there was a not a very high level one. At any rate the day after this very impressive communist parade I saw a big headline, this big, you know, in the Italian papers which I don't speak Italian but you don't have to. "Truman announces Russians Explode an Atomic bomb." ... And that was what I referred to or uh--earlier as stimulating me to intense feelings and I stayed up that night. My wife slept in our hotel room there, on the square in Florence and I was just so stirred by this and I really should go back and say that before I had left—I should go back now I'm sorry to do this in this form. Before I left in April or May of 1949 they had been--repeated talks about developing a super. The question of the Super with a capitol "S" as it was called, was on the Los Alamos program every year. Los Alamos, the—the laboratory at Los Alamos, the weapons lab would produce an annual program for the year ahead. And this would be approved or modified by the Atomic Energy Commission. On that program many items appeared. A question of developing a Super was always honored but at a very low priority. And there was no pressure to make it a higher priority as with everything else, not only funds but manpower, scientific manpower was limited, that seemed to be no great rush. Now, that's the background. And that's the way it was when I left in 1949. Low, low key continue work but at a low level. When I read that the Russians had exploded a weapon so long ahead of what was expected I would have thought instantly we must proceed with the highest intensity of effort to develop the super weapon if it can be developed. If it can't be it would be much...

WHAT ROLE DID ADMIRAL LEWIS STRAUSS PLAY IN THE DECISION TO DEVELOP THE SUPER, AND TO UNDERTAKE A CRASH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM?

Well, he played a very leading role...

IF YOU COULD START BY SAYING LEWIS...

Lewis Strauss....

WAIT A SECOND...

Lewis Strauss, who had been very conscious of... Lewis Strauss was interested in new scientific and technological developments as a matter of a general turn of mind, and so he was more mindful of the, of the possibility of creating a super-weapon. He was by no means certain that it could be, but he was interested, and his turn of mind was such, that if something could be invented, he would be interested in encouraging its invention even a matter so horrible as a thousand-time, more or less more potent weapon — his concern there would be, that if we don't get it, the Russians will get it, and so, he would be interested in that, even if he was interested in better torpedoes and the like. And it was not that he was militaristic or had any idea of invading and taking over the Soviet Union, but rather that he had the feeling that the Soviet Union was, as a matter of policy, trying to win the world away from the democrat-, from the western world, from the democratic world. Now, he was therefore very conscious of the super-weapon, and I was very intrigued with it too, as one would have been earlier period about the possibility of creation of a an atomic a fission weapon. The... super was called a fusion weapon. So, he was, he was more interested in and alert to this than any of the other commissions, except perhaps Professor Bacher, who was a physicist who had been at Los Alamos, certainly was also conscious of it. Now that, I would say, is the background of sensitivity that Strauss had; he was not pushing for particularly, for more active development of the super prior to the detonation of the Soviet weapon, in August of 1949, and it was at that time that I thought the detonation of that weapon would just eliminate the opposition to any development of the super, because there were intensities of interest, Strauss was, would put more emphasis on super development than some other members of the commission and people would, so, there was a spectrum of opinion about it, and the bulk of the opinion was negative was, let's say, was very low-key on development of the super, whereas Lewis Strauss, on this relative scale, was, of the spectrum, was at the ultraviolet end, let's say, and David Lilienthal would have tended to be at the infrared end, because he didn't, he was a man of virtue and kindness, and he would prefer to believe that such a thing couldn't be done.. I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm being somewhat figurative here, but I think that expresses the difference in temperaments. So while there were debates over this, they were not very intense or serious, until the bomb went off, the Russian bomb. At that point, I thought that the debates would cease, and that everyone would see the importance of the Americans having an H-bomb, a super, if it could be developed, before the Russians got one. Um, and who knew, but that the Russians might already be working on one even while they were working on the fission weapon. Were working on the fission weapon. And maybe they were. In fact, I think there's some good reason to think they were, because they did detonate a hydrogen bomb so soon after. But however that may be, that was a concern. Well, it turned out that there was very strong opposition on grounds that you will hear from some of the scientists, and you probably heard from Robbie. Um... that I think were not shall I say, were strongly influenced by emotion even by scientists who one would think of as rational, super-rational.

DO YOU REMEMBER STRAUSS' REACTION TO THE GAC SCIENTISTS?

Yes. The, the gen-, during this period of months after the Russian bomb was detonated and before the January 1950 decision by President Truman to go ahead with intensive efforts, the General Advisory Committee was asked to express its opinion. And, they came out unanimously, although Zieberg was not present against, efforts to develop the super-weapon. And there were some separate opinions, such as the Rabi and Fermi one. Uh, and Robert Oppenheimer, who was the chairman of the General Advisory Committee, which was a very respected body of the leading scientists Oppenheimer, there's some evidence of not ambiguity, but of a duality of view, in things that he has written. ...Oppenheimer is a complex character that's not, I take it, to be a subject of my comments, but was a remarkable man. At any rate, there was the oppos-, the General Advisory Committee came out against emphasizing development of the super-weapon. Ah, Lewis Strauss led efforts to develop it anyway, and the Advis- Atomic Energy Commission voted four to one with Strauss being the minority opinion, not to intensify efforts on the super. After a while there was another vote by the Atomic Energy Commission, and Gordon Dean, a member of the Commission voted with Lewis Strauss, so that it became three to two, and... I think at that, about that time, the President Truman, appointed a small committee of three, which has a name which I don't recall, consisting of the Secretary of State Dean Acheson the Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal, to advise him on what to do about this. They had a working group of staff people, of course. The of course all the record on this I'm sure you've read-

IN FACT I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE YOU BACK A LITTLE BIT MORE...

Lewis Strauss and some others, of course

WOULD YOU LIKE TO START AGAIN AND NAME THE OTHERS?

Well Carl Compton was one of them, and of course a number of military people were among them, and I would, I don't want to take your time now to think back... who they were, they would have included well, I shouldn't conjecture.

(INTERVIEWER INTERRUPTS)

Felt that it would...

IF YOU COULD START BY SAYING...

Lewis Strauss, and some others, felt that it was of the utmost importance that if a super-weapon, now called a hydrogen bomb, could be developed, and there was no knowledge of whether it could or could not. There was theorizing about it. If it could be developed, he felt it was crucially important that the United States should have it, before the Soviet Union had it. And, and his reasons for that are, I think, should be self-evident, that if the Soviet Union had a super-weapon of a potency he believed would be a thousand fold...in a round number that they would use this to threaten the United States, and the security of the western and non-Communist world. Um, I think that was a, my own view is, that was a very rational point of view, that one would hope, as I think everyone, maybe not everyone, I think he hoped, that it could not be invented, created, but if it could be, we'd better have it first. Now, I would expect that the Russians, with equal logic and equal fervor, felt exactly the same way on their side, and one would expect that, and therefore we were in a race to see -- we didn't know that the other side was running, but we felt they must be. And indeed history showed with the atomic def-, the fission weapon, that they were... Strauss felt it very important that we get there first. Have I made this clear?

THANK YOU. CAN YOU REMEMBER WHO WERE THE PEOPLE WHO WERE MOST SYMPATHETIC TO HIS VIEWS?

Uh, Dean Acheson was, the Secretary of State. Um, I mentioned Carl Compton as a very respected—

HOW ABOUT EDWARD TELLER?

Well, Teller, of course, Teller was very actively in favor; Teller was attempting to invent the weapon and had been for some years, and of course Edward Teller was a very, who was a very intense man, he'd become more so in...since his experience. But Edward Teller wanted to invent, create this weapon. And he had ideas. And his first ideas proved not to work out, but then when Stanley Ulam came in with an additional idea, the combined effect, a year or so later, was indeed effective, and became evident on paper, and I'm getting off the subject a little, and on the general one-

LET'S TALK MORE ABOUT EDWARD TELLER AT THE TIME...

Well, Edward Teller was actively promoting a more intense effort to create the super. And he was doing this even before the Soviet bomb went off. He, he believed that this could be created, he wanted to believe it, he had advanced technical ideas on how, and he wanted to have greater support at Los Alamos rather than lesser support. I'd say inventors and true believers in many fields. Uh... he was dynamic.

HOW ABOUT SENATOR MCMAHON?

Senator McMahon…

I'M SORRY.

Senator McMahon...

SORRY.

Senator McMahon was strongly in favor of active and intense development of the hydrogen bomb -- that's what it was called. He came out, in this way, with what is called a 5,000-word paper, which was probably largely written by a man named Morden, of the staff of the Joint Commission some time during the period after the Russian bomb went off in August of '49, and some time within the next few months. I wasn't there, but of course I knew, in the paper later. So, he came out quite early favoring it, and sent this paper to President Truman, as I recall.

HOW MUCH INTERACTION WAS THERE BETWEEN LEWIS STRAUSS, TELLER, AND MCMAHON?

I think they were in close and frequent cordial, easy communication-

(INTERVIEWER INTERRUPTS)...

In spite of McMahon being a Democrat and Lewis Strauss being a very active Republican.

COULD YOU JUST TELL ME THAT AGAIN?

Yes. Well Edward Teller came to see Lewis Strauss many times, and found in Lewis Strauss a member of the Commission who was... spiritually favorable to the idea of intensifying efforts to develop a super-bomb, if it could be developed... Edward Teller had a... frequent contact-- I shouldn't, perhaps not frequent, but there was a, there was a regular, and continuing, and easy contact whenever it seemed worthwhile — between Teller and Strauss. Strauss and Brian McMahon were also on very good terms, and Brian McMahon was also in easy communication. What McMahon's co-, communication with Teller may have been I don't know. I would guess that there was such because the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy was a very important body at that time, and Teller, with the political sensitivity, would have made contact, but I don't know that on my own knowledge.

WHAT WERE YOUR REACTIONS WHEN TRUMAN ANNOUNCED THE DECISION TO GO AHEAD?

Uh... I was pleased and gratified. I expected it was going to happen. I just felt that the logic was so strong and I was so surprised at the opposition by the keenly intelligent, highly virtuous, equally patriotic, scientists for whom I have, had and have great respect. ...You know, I was, at first I was incredulous, then I realized, in retrospect, some of the elements in their minds -- at any rate your question was "How do I —" I shouldn't have said "Your question"...

IT'S ALL RIGHT.

At any rate I was gratified, because I felt that it was in the best interests of the United States, as my long letter, to which I referred, from Florence, indicated, I thought it was crucially necessary that we proceed, and that we in the United States have that weapon first, if it could be made. All the while hoping, as one should, that if somehow it was a physical impossibility, but, it's hard to prove something impossible, and so one has to keep on trying. So, when the Truman announcement was made, I was gratified, it was somewhat anticlimactic, because by that time, I knew that the report of his three-man commission, insisting — I referred to it earlier — of Acheson, Johnson, and Lilienthal, had come out unanimously recommending it. Now this was a very odd matter, and hard to explain, and Lilienthal first had opposed, and then joined in the unanimous recommendation to the President to go ahead. And a curiosity. Uh... perhaps in part because he was getting tired.... one has to think of the human elements in all of these; they were, I think, very important — I alluded to them without extending the remarks about the human elements in the scientists opposing the development of the weapon, which I think, in part, relates to just the general virtuous hope that it couldn't be developed, but that isn't a reason not to try. And the feeling of guilt -- and I think this is something that must be looked into. Here are these people who had, in a way, saved the world — they might have, if the, if the, if the Germans had in fact developed an atomic bomb, which they hadn't; later events proved they weren't very far advanced, but we had no way of knowing that, and the real intensity of drive on the part of the scientists, to, at Los Alamos and elsewhere, to create the bomb, was impelled by Hitler as visualized as the Antichrist. And this was a real driving force, so there's an emotional element in all of this... Many of these scientists, though certainly far from all, but many of them were refugees from Hitler Germany. Including Einstein who was way back in this, so the emotional elements were strong; I think that these men, and a few women, who had developed the weapon which had killed so many people, almost all of them innocent, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but in doing so had saved many more lives, I think it can readily be demonstrated by terminating the war rather than having it play out a scenario of island--to island, and that's something that I was in the very midst of in the Navy at the time -- I think that though the wrong people were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it saved many more lives, both Japanese and American than if the weapon had not been used. This -- I want to digress a little... because it relates to the use of the weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as against the demonstration of that weapon, which maybe you're going to go into elsewhere. In a relatively unpopulated area, which Strauss had favored, and a number of others had favored, but were overruled.

They were out to save the world from what I called the Antichrist--Hitler-- even after that, in...when that war ended, before we had the bomb the Japanese war was killing thousands of people, and the war plans were clear, that thousands and thousands...were going to be killed on both sides. And so the development of this instrument was in the course of patriotism and yet it was a terrible thing, and it directly killed a lot of people who would not have been the ones who would have been killed otherwise, and the ones who would have been killed otherwise, in a conventional war, would... have been killed without any implication of the scientists who were working on the nuclear bomb. I think, if I had been one of them, I would have a mixture of a sense of achievement and a sense of guilt, "Why was I the instrument of Fate, or one of them?" you know, and I would have thought of Ecclesiastes which you... might remember, and which maybe some of them have, and it goes something like "For in wisdom is much grief, and who increaseth knowledge increases sorrow." And this is kind of what happened; how much better it would have been if the nuclear bomb couldn't have been created. Oh you know, I think this kind of feeling goes through some of them...and I, as I say, I thought they came out with an unsound recommendation. But the President and oddly enough, if you will, oddly enough, David Lilienthal and his recommendation, came out to go ahead with the device.

WHAT WAS STRAUSS' REACTION TO THAT RECOMMENDATION?

To the recommendation of...

THE GAC.

Well, it was strongly to oppose it, and to...

COULD YOU START BY SAYING, "STRAUSS'..."

Yes. Well, Lewis Strauss was quite greatly disappointed in the, in the, in the findings, the opinions, of the General Advisory Committee, which recommended against development of the efforts to develop the hydrogen Bomb. Uh and he therefore felt that it was his duty to try to oppose this; up to the decision-making level which would ultimately be the President. Now his view, I think it's worth stating, and it also was my view at the time expressed in my letter, and remains, that the United States should have proceeded with trying to develop the weapon, but not to test it, and that simultaneously and concurrently, immediately, we should try to negotiate with the Soviets for a pact, an agreement, under which neither side would either develop or test the weapon. I, his, Strauss' feeling, which you're more concerned about with, than mine--but mine was the same -- was that we should do both. We should immediately negotiate with the Soviets, but we shouldn't wait for that, and...this harks back to the negotiations with them under the Acheson-Lilienthal, and the Baruch program, while they were developing their bomb. And the, his feeling was, and I think it was absolutely right, that therefore we should develop, but not test, and we should concurrently go ahead with discussions. Now, as it happens, these didn't come about. Uh, and the development did go ahead, and ultimately we tested, and it turned out that they must have been developing at the same time, because they tested less than a year later. I think our test was fifth — 1952, the really meaningful test, and their test was less than a year later, in 1953. So, that was very unfortunate but some of the scientists felt that we should not develop, but should negotiate and Strauss' feeling, and mine, was that, while we were negotiating, the Russians would be — we had no assurance that they wouldn't be developing on their own. And he believed, and I think... the reasonable position is one must believe that they would have been trying to develop on their own, covertly, then they would have felt that was in their best interest and they, that they should have done that. So an opportunity was lost and I don't know, but there's one of the lessons, maybe, that can come out of some negotiations that might be more fruitful in the future, and we're continue to be confronted with this kind of issue, in which one... can one take any risk if one is, let's say, the President of the United States, or down the chain of command, as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission — Can one take any risk that the Russians are developing a weapon while we are not developing one? That was the issue. And there were those who felt -- David Lilienthal was one --who felt, "Well, we can take a chance; it isn't much of a chance; and we could catch up," and so on. And Lewis Strauss felt that we could only take zero risk; and there were others who felt we could only afford to take zero risk. And if you were responsible for the country, you might think that way too. Think about it when you're not sleeping some night.

HE DESCRIBED THE SOVIETS AROUND THIS TIME AS "GODLESS ATHEISTS."

As, as what?

"GODLESS ATHEISTS."

Oh. Ah, Lewis Strauss did?

LEWIS STRAUSS DID.

Well, that's plausible.

DO YOU RECALL HIM SAYING THAT?

I don't recall him saying that, but it's entire plausible. He was a deeply religious man Lewis Strauss was, he had he had that real kind of faith, which can't be put into words but he believed he believed in God, and in a way that I can't define or describe, but I felt was there. After all, many people-–

DO YOU RECALL HIS CONCERN WITH ATOMIC ESPIONAGE?

Oh, he was deeply concerned, he was-- and it follows, it's consistent. He was distrustful of the Russians, he was generally skeptical about motivations of other people I should say that Lewis Strauss had a remarkable combination of intellectual capability, and capability to understand the motivations of other people. And much of his effectiveness in what might be called a political-- broadly speaking, political way -- was having and utilizing this sense of what would motivate other people. And combining the intellectual with this intuitive appraisal of people, made him a very effective person. You might not always agree with how, what he was effective at, but it increased his influence and effectiveness.

DO YOU REMEMBER HIS REACTION TO THE ARREST OF KLAUS FUCHS?

Yes, his reaction was somewhat, well, "I told you so." Not necessarily about Fuchs himself, but a... Lewis Strauss felt that there was a great deal of spying going on, and he had some awareness of this in the Navy, of course, and he was distrustful of the British -- not because he was anti-British, but because he felt the British were careless in their security and indeed history has proven that they were, not that we were perfect in ours. And he was an intense constructionist, when it came to security classifications, And for granting of security clearances to individuals in the atomic-energy program. Uh, he had this he was certainly the strongest person, he had the strongest feelings about not taking chances on matters of loyalty. And not only matters of loyalty, but matters of security risk. A person can be loyal and a blabbermouth, and can be just as dangerous, maybe more so, in a way. So he was very... he had an intense, almost a fixation on this matter, of spying and leakage and he was at odds with David Lilienthal, and with Carroll Wilson, who he felt were lax, and somewhat especially with Carroll Wilson, who had certain British ties, and he had no doubt about... I am sure, but I certainly have none whatsoever, about their loyalty and patriotism, of Lilienthal and Carroll Wilson and the like but he felt they were lax, and subsequent events proved that they were, because people had access to the Atomic Energy Commission, who later defected to the to the Soviets.

ANOTHER QUESTION ABOUT LEWIS STRAUSS. HOW DID LEWIS STRAUSS ASSESS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS?

Well, as a general point, he felt that atomic weapons were of the highest importance both militarily and politically, because they were...

CAN YOU START BY SAYING...

Lewis, yes sorry... Uh, Lewis Strauss regarded atomic weapons as of the highest significance in military and international political forces, and influences for the reason that they were the most potent weapon, and therefore were you know, self-evidently the weapons of greatest concern.

WHAT WAS HIS ATTITUDE ABOUT THE WISDOM OF AN INCREASING RELIANCE BY THE US ON ATOMIC WEAPONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY?

Well, I, my recollection is that he believed in being strong militarily, both with nuclear weapons and with conve-, what are called conventional weapons. Uh, that's what his basic feeling was, that we should be strong or we would be, in one way or another, attacked or undermined. As to the amount of emphasis to be placed on the... nuclear weapons, I would just say that he felt that great emphasis should be placed on, that we had to be superior to any other country. Not to use them, but that if we were inferior, he felt, the other country might use them. If we were superior, his feeling was that we would not use them, but the other country would not either. That's self-evident, simplistic, but that was his view. And furthermore, he had the feeling that if we were stronger, and...we had the monopoly for a while, in nuclear weapons, that, if we just... at least displayed a possible willingness to use them, then that would act as a deterrent to conventional warfare, because the nuclear weapons were so much more powerful than the conventional weapons that if, for example, the Soviets felt that we would use them if the Soviets invaded western Europe, then the Soviets would not invade, as long as we had the weapon. So, he felt they would be a very strong deterrent, and that we had to stay ahead. Ah, you know, if you -- this is an aside, but if you think about it, we've had no major war in what is it's 40 years, and you can't prove that it's post hoc ergo propter hoc, but there certainly is a strong relationship between the horrible nature of nuclear weapons, even before the super weapon, and an unwillingness to use them that of course reaches a point at which, if the unwillingness to use them becomes strong enough, then the ability of a foreign power, namely the Soviets, to use conventional weapons against, let's say, western Europe, becomes greater. So this is a very complex issue.

HOW DID HE VIEW UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING?

I don't know. Uh... I would think he favored it, but I don't, really don't recall the issue coming up.

WERE THERE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND THE MCMAHON JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY?

Well there were, there was, indeed tension between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, at various levels and at various times. And I remind you that, in the summer of 19-, early summer of 1949, Senator Hickenlooper a member of that com- of the Joint Committee --I don't recall whether he was; no, he wouldn't have been the chairman at the time, but he was a Republican member -- brought charges against David Lilienthal as chairman of the AEC, charging him with, as I recall it, "gross incompetence." It was in stronger words than that. Uh, I had the good fortune, to be on the ocean going to Europe at the time, because I would have been very distressed by that -- I thought the charges were quite unwarranted and were essentially political in nature -- the Republican, Hickenlooper, attacking Lilienthal, as a Democrat. And I had no foreknowledge that this was coming; whether Lewis Strauss had any, I have, don't know; although he and I were very close in many matters, he never said anything about that, but he was very, he was very close to Senator Hickenlooper, he was a very intense, loyal Republican. At any rate, these charges were brought, and a kind of... hearings were held, and this proved to be very divisive within the Atomic Energy Commission. All at the time, the same time when I was in Europe, unfortunately not torn between the people that I liked and trusted on the commission, including David Lilienthal, who I thought had real shortcomings, but not the one he was charged with. So, there was that big tension. That was the start, that was a crucial point in American in American, the history of American science, in my opinion, and deserves some attention in your series because it split the scientific world; it began the split which became, let's say it began it split the commission the staff of the commission, and it began a split which led to the dreadful Robert Oppenheimer trials, which were such an evil influence, on not just the lives of those involved, but on American science by being so divisive. Now all of that, one could say, grew out of a tension between some parts of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, where political influences of wanting to have an opposition of one party to another entered strongly into the conduct of human beings. I should say what must be evident, that I've always been nonpartisan — neither party has been good enough to... for me to feel that I'd be a part of it.

LET'S JUST STOP THERE.

I went to the Sandstone test in 1948 in the Marshall Islands for a number of reasons. Primarily to be truthful, because I was very eager to see a bomb test. It was the first that I, would have been the first, it was the first that I had ever seen. And it was, indeed, very exciting. Lewis Strauss, to whom I was assistant, he being a member of the commission, was very glad to have me go, because he felt that my observational powers were such that I might see things that people dedicated to direct and immediate responsibilities might not see. The members of the commission were glad to have me go, for similar reasons, and I went to report back to Lewis Strauss and to the commission any observations that I thought were worthy of attention that might be useful for the future of the commission; the commissioners themselves did not go to the test.

LET'S TRY IT ONE MORE TIME, BUT SHORTER.

I went to the Sandstone test to observe for the Atomic Energy Commission, in a general way, in my capacity as assistant to Lewis Strauss, which was a staff position. I, of course, was very eager to go on my own, because I wanted to see an atomic bomb test.

STOP A SECOND.

I went to the Sandstone test in the Marshall Islands in 1948 as a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission, where I was on a member of the staff. I was there to observe any things that I thought would be of interest to bring back by someone who, as I was a general staff person, an assistant to Lewis Strauss, and in addition, let's say, I was very eager to see a bomb test. Uh...

WAS IT THE FIRST TIME YOU'D SEEN A BOMB?

This was the first time. Indeed, it was the first test after the Bikini test, and after the military uses. The, the Japan, uses against Japan.

OKAY, THAT'S FINE.