WE START WITH THE QUESTIONS FOR THE MX PROGRAM. WHAT COULD IT BE, THE STRATEGIC UTILITY?

As concerns the MX missile, which has now been commissioned for full duty in the armed forces of the United States of America, its development was within the limits of the SALT-II treaty, under which each side was entitled to develop one new type of strategic missiles. Such a missile, SS-24, was developed in the Soviet Union, its counterpart, MX in the United States. It seemed at first that both sides were within the SALT-II treaty limits. But as concerns the latest developments, I would like to point out the following: till this very day the Soviet Union adheres to the limitations imposed by the SALT-II treaty. It is common knowledge, that the President of the United States refused to keep within the limits o the treaty. Soon afterwards, the deployment of the MX missiles started. Without any question, the deployment of these powerful missiles with ten nuclear warheads, very high accuracy, does not influence in a positive way, I would say, the normalization and strengthening of our relations, which have just started to marginally improve after the Washington summit. Obviously, there is a danger, that the Unite States will disregard SALT-II treaty and follow the path of unwarranted build-up of its strategic armaments, including such as the MX missile. It would have seemed, that this is a good point in time to stop to bide some time, at least to wait the reopening Geneva of the Soviet-American negotiations on the strategic offensive armaments reductions. It is quite obvious, that the deployment of MX missiles is contrary to the spirit of the obligations, which the leaders of our two countries have taken, and which we reflected in the joint Soviet-American statement, adopted at the summit in Washington.

HOW THE FUNCTION, THE STRATEGIC MILITARY FUNCTION MX WAS PERCEIVED WHEN IT CAME ON THE STAGE?

First of all, I would like to remind you, that at the very last stage of negotiations on the SALT-II treaty the Soviet Union proposed to permit each side to develop a single new type of missile with a single warhead. But the United States, obviously counting on its technological superiority, insisted that each side should have a single new type with multiple warheads. MX belongs to this class of missiles. As I have already said, it is very accurate, carries ten warheads, is very powerful, has a superior range. It has, naturally, introduced quite important change into the military strategic balance. You could call such a missile a first strike weapon,. At the time we expected the SALT-II treaty to be followed by the SALT-III treaty, which would have provided for further cuts in the strategic nuclear armaments. We expected MX missiles to be limited by that treaty. But the United States continued its build-up of strategic offensive arsenals, land-based, as well as sea-based. The MX missile was an element of this general build-up. We felt, that the United States pursued unilateral military advantages.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SS-18? IS IT KIND OF A ...WEAPON, AS SOME SAY? IN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING?

The SS-18 missile, developed in the Soviet Union, is a rather old model. The SALT-II treaty classified it as a heavy missile. It carried 10 warheads. I would like to remind you, that this missile is the, if may say so, the first-born among our strategic ballistic missiles. We have built a limited number of SS-18. We have not been developing a new missile of this class. The history of the strategic nuclear forces development in the Soviet Union has turned out in such a way, that we were placing an emphasis on the intercontinental ballistic missiles, whereas the United States were relying more on the submarine-bas ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Later on, the United States tried to focus on elimination of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles trying not to affect the two components of the nuclear triad, where they enjoyed superiority. As it is well known, we have decided to meet the Americans half way and agreed to cut our SS-18 missiles by one percent.

...NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE ARMS AS THE STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING, THEREFORE, MY NEXT QUESTION IS FROM A STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW, AND IT IS NOT AN ARGUMENT BECAUSE THE PROGRAM DEALS WITH MX. FROM THE STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SS-18, SS-19, OR ANY OF THE LARGER SOVIET ROCKETS AND THE MX? IS THERE A STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE...?

Yes, I would say that from the point of view of the strategic/military views on these missiles, they are identical; they should not be examined in isolation. Soviet SS18 and American MX; the entire forceof nuclear arms must be examined as a whole. Once again, I want to emphasize that the basis of Soviet weaponry is continental, medium-range missiles. The nuclear strategy of the US is based on submarines and heavy bombardment ..This is not surprising; the historic difference in structure of the US's and the USSR's strategic forces formed, first of all, out of the varying needs of border defense, and also, out of the structure of the missiles themselves I would like to remind you that it was the US that began to create hard fuel missiles, and these types of missiles are capable of... We at first relied on petroleum-fueled missiles, which are heavier...Today, yes. This is the result of some kind of modernization.

ARE BOTH OF THESE ROCKETS... THE HEAVY...THE SOVIET ROCKETS...AND THE MX PART OF THE NEGOTIATING...IN THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS?

Yes, certainly it's included.

CAN HE SAY THAT IN A FULL SENTENCE?

Ah, undoubtedly. I can't say about the MX missiles Why? Because in brief, each side, after the 50% reduction, (will have) not more than 4900 warheads, ballistic missiles, and submarines. How they will implement it, in other words, what will be the US's way of reducing their arms? I can't say. But I can say that we have already pledged our commitment to reduce our number of warheads. So, to talk about the reduction and collaboration on our SS-18—yes. About the MX—that's America's business I don't know what they are going to reduce in order to reach the levels we discussed at the meetings in Washington.

...MIRV MISSILES... TO MOVE FROM THE HEAVY MIRV MISSILES ON EACH SIDE TO A MOBILE, SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILE IS THERE... DOES HE KNOW WHAT THE CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY THINKING ON THIS?

From the point of view of guaranteeing the stability of the military/strategic/tactical situation, we think that the transition to mobile missiles/single warhead missiles is better than creating stationary missiles with multiple warheads, because these missiles are more vital, and can serve as a means of defense strike, in a second strike capacity. In other words, they will stabilize the the strategic situation. But I wouldn't want to say that the USSR is for this kind of missile, because the USSR doesn't want there to be any missiles at all. That would be best. And I want to add that the talks with the US—as long as the US opposes the preservation of mobile missiles as apart of the compound of nuclear forces, pleading the fact that they are hard to control... I think that this is unwarranted. Here, evidently, another motivation is hidden in their refusal to accept mobile missiles. In that, if they started to produce and deploy midget missiles, then that would be still another infraction of the SALT agreements, because this would be the deployment of a second type of new strategic missile.

[INTERVIEWER AND TRANSLATOR DISCUSS PRIOR ANSWER].

Yes, I said that this would be another, additional infraction.

[INTERVIEWER AND TRANSLATOR DISCUSS PRIOR ANSWER] IF THE SOVIET MILITARY HAS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LARGE, MIRV, ICBMS OR A SINGLE HEAD, MOBILE MISSILES, WHAT KIND OF PREFERENCE WOULD THEY HAVE? WHAT WOULD BE THEIR THINKING ABOUT THE PREFERENCE?

I want to assure you one more time that we consider that single-headed warheads and mobile missiles, they stabilize the military/strategic situation. That is, they summon the risk of war less, perhaps.

[FOLLOW UP QUESTION IN RUSSIAN FROM TRANSLATOR].

I think that this is the duty of every country... That will be defined during the negotiation process. I wish to emphasize again that we will adhere to and proceed from that program, which was proclaimed by the Soviet Union, the program of the liquidization of nuclear arms by the year 2000. We think that the first step—the signing of the RSBR (Russ.)treaty was done in that direction. If the US will have a political enough role, then, maybe in the near future, we can also get an agreement on a 50%reduction on strategic offense weapons. We are counting on the fact that in the future, we will be trying to reduce strategic offense weapons. Therefore, to speak about what's better or worse is not quite justified, because nuclear weapons of any kind are bad in themselves. In other words, as long as they are in the world, the threat of nuclear war will not disappear.

[COMMENT IN RUSSIAN FROM TRANSLATOR, NO QUESTION RECORDED].

It seems to me that such a question is not quite uniform, even with the situation in which today's nuclear arms developed. Here, and in the US, and in the USSR, all counted, there are so many arms, that to talk about vulnerability to a first strike is useless. There will always be a second strike, and this is equal to suicide—to start a war. There USSR, in response, and pushing the idea that Reagan agreed to in Washington, agrees that there can be no winner in a nuclear war. Therefore, it is useless and dangerous to talk about a first strike. One can only talk about the mutual destruction of two countries, and maybe the world.

THE QUESTION IS: THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE STATES WHO...AT THE TIME THE MX WAS DEVELOPED WERE CONCERNED ABOUT FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION. DOES HE HAVE ANY EXPLANATION FOR THAT?

I'll explain this very simply. This was already affirmed. As soon as the Pentagon has to get the money for the production of new types of nuclear arms the issue of vulnerability is immediately raised, along with some kind of American weakness. But as soon as the new weapon is built, it turns out that in general, they made too many of them, or that the USSR doesn't have that particular weapon at all and now has to catch up. That's the way it was with the heavy missiles, and that's the way it was with the submarines....

[FOLLOW UP QUESTION IN RUSSIAN FROM TRANSLATOR].

Yes, the USSR has had heavy missiles for a long time but I would say that this is during the... (Signing of a treaty), the world learned, and the signing parties, when they signed... understood perfectly who had what. Nonetheless, Treaty... was signed.

[BACKGROUND COMMENTS].

I wanted to add that if we still had heavy missiles, the US would remain untouched, but at first we insisted that they be reduced as well. Because the advanced bases would be left alone. And that was the basis of the compromise, that the USSR would keep its heavy missiles and the US would keep its advanced bases.

[INAUDIBLE BACKGROUND COMMENTS].

Yes, in 1980-1981 I participated in the negotiations on nuclear arms in Europe. That's what they were called then....

WAS HE SURPRISED BY THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE SS-20?

No, I was not surprised because the lawful emergence of our SS-20 missiles, which, in the first place, we should modernize our alignment of strategic forces, at that time, we had very old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles—that's the first place, and in the second place, we already knew that the US was going to deploy new missiles, Pershing and Cruise, in Western European territory....

IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING, THE INTENTION TO DEPLOY THE PERSHING AND THE CRUISE MISSILES SEEN AS AN INTENT OF THE UNITED STATES OR AS A RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS’ WANTS?

Well, it's better to ask that question of those who installed such missiles. But I would like to say that the US alleged that the Western European allies invited them to strengthen the defense of Europe and many Europeans say that they have to heed the voice of the elder partner. So, here were some mutual concerns..

WAS THE GENERAL IN THE GROUP THAT LEFT THE NEGOTIATON IN GENEVA?

I worked in that group, but when it abandoned Geneva, I wasn't there any longer. But the feelings I had, even in Moscow.... When our group came back from Geneva and shared their impressions, we formed the impression that was, well, depressing. In other words, why did the US, in a situation when nuclear weapons were becoming, well, practically useless, why did they at that time not agree to the elimination of nuclear missiles?

"TO CONTINUE"

Yes, at that time, we were talking not about the complete elimination of all medium-range missiles but about the reduction of their numbers, a decrease in quantity. This was called—the situation that developed at that time—because, at that time, the still had been no meeting in Reykjavik or Geneva, no one was looking at the fact that one can simply refuse in the global... to have medium-range missiles. All of these opportunities appeared somewhat later.

[BRIEF COMMENT BY TRANSLATOR].

No, then we couldn't believe this was the honest situation of the US. At little bit before he put forth his proposal, we proposed the nuclear-free zone in Europe (the "liberation” of Europe from tactical and medium-range missiles). The US categorically rejected this proposal. Therefore, the USSR couldn't help but regard Reagan's propose as anything but purely declaratory.

BETWEEN WALKING OUT OF GENEVA AND THE COMING BACK TO GENEVA THERE WAS A CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HOW DID THE CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGE THE INSTRUCTION TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION?

To answer this question, one must look at Geneva, to the first major talks at a high level; this was a big step forward. They knew that nuclear weapons is impossible, and that it was no longer possible to start a war. Nuclear weapons were devalued, and, naturally, this situation allowed the USSR to reappraise its attitude toward the negotiations and give far-reaching off' which didn't affect French and English arms, didn’t touch advance bases, and enabled them to embark on the dismantling of their weapons in the Asian parts o the USSR. From this moment, progressive movement towards negotiations to dismantle medium-range weapons in the US and USSR started.

THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN THE FUNCTION OF ARMS CONTROL...WITHIN THE DIFFERENT SOVIET LEADERSHIPS? WHETHER THEY PERCEIVED THE FUNCTION OF ARMS CONTROL DIFFERENTLY?

I'm sorry, I just don't know how our highest leadership was thinking, so I can't speak for them.

WHAT KINDS OF INSTRUCTION WERE THEY GETTING IN THE FIELD... TO WHAT EXTENT THAT REFLECTED THE DIFFERENCE OF ATTITUDE?

I can say that a review of the entire nuclear arms situation and the issue of war and peace, enacted in the 27th Congress of our Party, enabled us, in our foreign policy, to begin to advance towards ne ideas. It is from this moment that we started to offer more concrete, open offers on weapons reductions, and... The Soviet activities in control and reduction of nuclear forces offers in especial clear example. Verification ceased to be an obstacle to negotiations. The USSR became completely open, in order to verify the arms reductions. And, about the RDC and R (Russ.) missiles, the control (verification) is so comprehensive and deep that, at times, even the US didn't accept Soviet offers, we went so far.

WHAT WAS THE GENERAL’S CAPACITY IN REYKJAVIK? WAS HE PART OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAM?

In the capacity of a...?

WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF REYKJAVIK?

The main impression I and others who have worked in the negotiations have is that evidently, we can destroy nuclear weapons—-medium range and tactical missiles. This impression was born thanks to the signing of the treaty. Only the President's willingness to adhere to the SALT treaty supported the system. The Washington summit, which led to the signing of the new treaty, outlines a program which, under definite conditions, can be endorsed in the first half of next year in Moscow.

...THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT THE ZERO OPTION...?

I already spoke about that. What we felt was that the US and USSR were ready to realize that nuclear weapons cannot be a defense of a guarantee and Reykjavik showed that an understanding with the US on nuclear weapons in the first place, Most importantly, we agreed to a global...

DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS... WHAT DID HE THINK OF THE KIND OF PUBLIC DISCORD AND THE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT AND WERE THEY HOPING IT WOULD BE AN ADEQUATE MOTIVATION FOR THE AMERICANS TO WITHHOLD THE...?

The USSR has always considered public opinion. The anti-nuclear movement which exploded in the early 1980s was taken into consideration, absolutely. We kept not only Europe, but the countries of Asia in mind as well. Because, in cutting down our forces in Asia, we are securing the security of the Asian countries. I want to say again that we considered the opinions against nuclear weapons…

WHAT ARE SOME MEANS TO ENHANCE EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE FUTURE?

We've made the first step—with tactical weapons. Conventional forces... I think that the consultations conducted today with NATO and WTO countries on nuclear arms control will soon end successfully. Maybe at the end of this year, we will be able to talk about a specific agreement on the reduction of forces in Europe. That would be a big step.

WHY WAS IT IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM TO LIMIT SDI? BOTH IN GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK?

From the point of view of military danger, SDI does not call forth fear. We will find a way to answer SDI. The danger is something else. It is that if these bases will be created, the INF Treaty will be killed. This would provide a reason for not limiting strategic nuclear weapons, and to the contrary, to intensify the arms race. That is, to be short and clear, the SDI program is destabilizing the situation. It closes up the negotiation opportunities.

DOES HE THINK THAT SOME AMERICAN STRATEGISTS THINK THAT SDI IS A GOOD IDEA?

I think that some military experts and strategists of the US have two sets of thought on this subject. The first is that they are counting on US technical superiority. They will have the edge by creating the system. That's one. The second is that they are trying to put an economic strain on the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union also started producing such a system, then, of course, there would be a colossal waste. Under present conditions, when we are trying to develop perestroika and coming up with new industrial programs, of course it would be difficult for the Soviet Union. In defending SDI, many military experts are counting in this economic strain.

ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE WITHIN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES THAT THINK THAT BALLISITC MISSILE DEFENSE CAN BE UPDATED?

No, we don't have such people in our military. We thought it out very well, our scientists thought out the idea of building an anti-ballistic system, and we arrived at the conclusion that to create a 100% anti-ballistic system under current conditions is simply impossible. That, in the competition in battle or in offensive weapons, the ABM system will always lose. There is no guarantee that all missiles will be intercepted, and the very ABM system will pose a heightened risk, a heightened provocation. If one side decides that it can inflict the first attack and cover itself by means of this nuclear umbrella, someone could believe this and push the button. That's where the danger lies in creating an ABM system.

BUT THE SOVIET MILITARY DID CONDUCT SOME EXPERIMENTS WHICH CAN BE PERCEIVED IN THE REALM OF SDI, SUCH AS ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND SUCH...WHERE DOES THAT SPEAK WITHIN THIS THING?

I want to say that the experiments on land-based and space-based systems were not conducted and will not be conducted by the USSR. I want to assure you of that. As far as anti-satellite systems are concerned, yes, we did do some experiments, and we have a model of such a system. But it is much older that the American ASAT system, which was also tested, and is more effective. By the way, the USSR offered to prohibit anti-satellite systems, and when the US said that we had an anti-satellite system, we offered to destroy any existing anti-satellite system. The US reacted negatively.

I ASK EVERYBODY...WHAT IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR ABOUT?

If you exclude the social side of the question, in connection with which we have had and will probably continue to have serious clashes, I see the conflict as one of too little mutual trust between us, between our countries. Too little contact on every level. To some extent, I saw and felt the propaganda that exists in the United States in the movies, appearances, and even among high government officials, which incorrect informs the American the American person, about the USSR. Well, you know about such movies as Rambo and a series of others. In the past, a President who called our country a "fiend of hell” all this hindered a good understanding between our countries. The things that have happened lately, foremost, I would say, being Gorbachev's visit to Washington, broke the ice, the misunderstanding of the Soviet Union as a country to be feared. I think that if both sides count on good, sensible, friendly contacts with each other, this will serve the interests of the American an Soviet peoples, and we can overcome past conflict between our countries.