[Inaudible]...Paris Peace Agreements...

I believe that the Paris Agreements were doomed to fail and that that was not unexpected even by Secretary Kissinger. I believe he was astute enough to know that the North Vietnamese would not abandon their goal of unifying all of Vietnam under the North. I believe under the circumstances that prevailed the agreements were probably the best that could have been achieved by anybody.

I really believe that the Secretary did the best possible job, but leaving large North Vietnamese regular formations in the South was a situation that the South could not contend with. They couldn't defeat those major formations, and those major formations had the capability, from the very beginning to continue the war. The purpose of the agreement, so far as the United States was concerned, was to disengage the United States from the war and to get our prisoners back out of Hanoi. And those two purposes were accomplished. There may have been some faint hope in Washington, among some people, that this cease-fire would prevail, but it didn't and that was predictable.

Cut.

Ready? The agreements furthermore denied the South Vietnamese, because they had no capability essentially, any means to counter North Vietnamese continued buildup in the North. In other words, the territory North of the Demilitarized Zone was sacrosanct. The United States agreed not to continue any military action against the North so the war-making potential of the North was not threatened. Whereas in the South, the entire war-making and defensive capability of the South was under North Vietnam siege.

All of the bases, all of the arsenals, the uh food supply, everything was uh fair game for the North, in the South. Not so in the North. It was as if, well an analogy might be, if California were at war with the rest of the country and the boundaries were at the Sierras, it was as if you had an enemy force holding the passes in the Sierras, and with major forces up there, and perhaps up in the Siskiyou Mountains and able to come down to Sacramento, or Fresno at will and strike at any place that they desired.

Cut.

Mm hm.

When United States removed its forces from Vietnam, it left a well equipped army and a well equipped air force. The air force itself was growing in capability, it had new airplanes, good fighter bombers. We had given them a beginnings of a pretty good intelligence collection capability in uh. But that was just the beginning. But the main thing we left them with was the lack of a strategic reserve and the lack of any way to counter with heavy concentrated fire power if and when the North Vietnamese would concentrate large formations to attack bases, isolated bases.

As you might imagine the defense of any area really is possible only if you have reserves available to move to reinforce that defense if it is attacked. Because an attacker generally masses overwhelming force to overcome a specific target area. Well the South Vietnamese had their divisions from close to the DMZ Demilitarized Zone up in Quang Tri Province all the way to the Delta. They were responsible for defending major cities, major population centers, rice-producing areas of the Delta, the major networks of roads. Even tried to defend the railroad for a while. The airfields, the military bases, all of these were uh considered and were in fact crucial to the continued existence of South Vietnam as an economy and as a people, really, as a state.

So, whereas they were capable of doing all of these things, so long as the North Vietnamese did not reinforce, they were not capable of defending all areas against a concentration of North Vietnamese force. And had the North Vietnamese really followed the peace agreement and not reinforced, not come across the Lao border with formations such as the 968 Division, had not come South with up to four or five additional divisions, the South could have handled it.

But when that breach was made when the North Vietnam, when North Vietnam determined that they would continue the combat phase of the war, and invade the South with major expeditionary forces, at that time the United States was committed to use our additional fire power to uh reverse the situation. Well we made those promises, of course. Uh, President Nixon did promise President Thieu that he would do that.

That if the North significantly violated the Peace Agreement, the United States would come to their assistance. Well not only did we didn't, not only did we not do that when they were in deep trouble in the fall and winter of 1974, but we reduced the military assistance to a point where they couldn't even maintain the forces that they had. So not only didn't they have a strategic reserve, they couldn't even keep their forces equipped to fight with what they had.

Cut please.

I didn't get into intelligence matter.

Now so far as reporting to Washington is concerned, that is reporting the military situation in South Vietnam from the cease-fire until the final collapse, uh there was in the first place no attempt by any official in Saigon of the United States, that is the Ambassador, Graham Martin, or anyone else no attempt on anyone's part to censor or alter or uh stop the transmission of any intelligence, raw intelligence data in the first place, or analyzed intelligence. That is, completed intelligence.

Everything that we produced in the way of analysis or collection in Saigon went to a number of offices in Washington. It went to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. It went to the State Department, the Intelligence and Research, it went even to, it went to the White House directly. Uh, it went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it went to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Uh, it went of course first and at simultaneously I should say, not first, to our headquarters in in Thailand and to the headquarters at the Commander in Chief Pacific. Furthermore, technical intelligence collection that is by by communications intelligence, is what I mean, went directly from Saigon without interruption, without analysis directly to uh...to the Washington area too, to the highest national authorities.

So, I cannot believe that any one in authority in Washington was being deprived of information concerning the North Vietnamese buildup, nor were they being deprived of our analysis that this buildup was becoming extremely dangerous, and that a major offensive by uh early 1975 was a very strong likelihood.

Cut please. Excellent. Very [inaudible].

Of, of course the Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese expected us to come back with heavy bombing if they needed it if the North Vietnamese violated it and threatened their existence. They had every reason to believe that we would do it. We not only told them that we would, we demonstrated in Cambodia up until uh we were refused authority to continue to do it in July of '73. We bombed heavily in Cambodia to protect the Mekong convoys and for other tactical reasons.

We had a headquarters established at Nakom Phanom in Thailand whose sole purpose was to control the re-entry of US airpower into South Vietnam. We asked the Vietnamese to give us target areas and they did. And they had a direct communication between I Corps in South Vietnam—the I Corps Commander and the base in Nakom Phanom.

[Inaudible]...I think we ran out a little before the end [inaudible]...

The drastic reduction of American materiel support to the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam very seriously impaired their capabilities to continue to defend the country. In early...in the early days of the cease-fire, the South Vietnamese were not hurting for anything. They had plenty of material, in fact they probably had more than they could use, or knew how to use. In the fall and winter of '73, they still had a remarkable capability to move large formations to reinforce threatened areas by air. They had C-130 transports, knew how to fly them and could make rapid shifts as they did to relieve Quang Duc in November of '73.

But by 1974 when the military budget was so drastically reduced, they no longer had that capability. Everything had to be moved on trucks and even at that, that was a pretty difficult thing too, when about fifty percent of the trucks had to be put on blocks because of shortages of spare parts and fuel shortage. So uh the ARVN without any large reserves even lacked the capability to mobilize and move tactical reserves into threatened areas.

Uh, that's one aspect of the affect of the American reduction of support. Others were in the medical field where, for example, in the Northern part of Vietnam, and north of the Hai Van Pass, northern part of South Vietnam, there existed virulent form of malaria. It’s a serious threat to the health of the soldiers. There is a specific drug for it that they had in ample quan— quantities while we were there, and until 1973. But when the budget was cut there was no more of that particular drug to ameliorate the effects of that disease.

They were in 1974 the so-called one time use bandages and syringes for the use of medical drugs and oh, blood bags, and that sort of things for transfusions those were gone. They had to wash the bandages. I don't know what they did for blood bags. And so on. Their medical support which had been pretty good was getting very very grim.

Cut please, thank you.

Yeah.

Now for the matter of corruption. In the first place we in military intelligence had very little capability to find out anything about it. But it became an important cause in the United States and I believe it provided a very good excuse for those people in the United States, the leaders in the United States who were opposed to continuing the war, it gave them a good excuse to say well, we're not going to support this corrupt regime any longer. So far as its real effect on the capability of the Republic of Vietnam to defend itself, and to fight its war, I think the effect was probably very slight.

No one was stealing hand grenades and ammunition of some POL, I’m sure, that's petroleum, lubricants and oil, and fuel, some people I'm sure, there's a lot of that got lost in the system. But uh I still believe that the effect overall was minimal there. It was much more serious psychologically in the United States.

Cut.

1974 I think was the crucial year in the change of the balance in South Vietnam. Throughout '73 there was more or less a stalemate. There wasn't much action in the first half of '73, the Communist offensive built began to build up in the last part of '73. They began moving in. But 1974 was much more significant. During that year, North Vietnam infiltrated about 100,000 fresh soldiers from the North these are soldiers not belonging to major formations. They came down to form and to build up new units in the South.

In addition, they sent down a number of additional divisions. They brought one over from Laos, they brought several in from North Vietnam. Meanwhile the ARVN wasn't getting any better. They were, the soldiers and the officers were living under a, in an economy that was extremely difficult for them, high inflation, their pay was still very low. They were suffering heavy casualties, in fact, during 1974, the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces suffered more casualties than they did in any previous year of the war except the major offensive— Tet offensive of '68 and the offensive of '72. Those two North Vietnamese offensives. So you can say that by the end of '74, the balance had significantly shifted in favor of the North.

Cut.

Mm hm.

You put in the economic stuff without, withou—...

We observed in Saigon during the period beginning in mid '73 and running through '74 some evidence of remarkable increase in the capability of the North Vietnamese Army in the South. Which I always called the expeditionary force because that was in fact what it was. These evidences were such as the logistical complex, the great supply base that they built all the way from Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province, just below the...what used to be the Demilitarized Zone, that didn't exist any longer, because they had taken over that territory in '72.

That complex stretched from Dong Ha all the way to the airbase at Khe Sanh. They built a new logistical set of roads that moved from the Khe Sanh area down what used to be Route 14 through the Highlands bypassing Pleiku and Kon Tum on the West. They improved the highway that was called the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos which is really a network of roads, putting concrete culverts, putting macadam surfaces, macadam surfaces on the roads.

They no longer had to move supplies by bicycle. They had great truck convoys, as many as 150, 200 trucks were counted on the roads at one time. One big convoy. They were not subject to any more interdiction of any kind on those roads. We saw tank maintenance battalions established just north of Saigon, close to the Cambodian border. All of these evidence: including such things as new headquarters to maneuver and control the operations of their divisions were established. I think three or four different new corps headquarters were established in the South. All of these showed us a remarkable new war-making capability of the North while the South was again deteriorating.

Cut.

Mm hm.

Great. When you say Khe Sanh...

In late February, 1975, the Congress sent over to Vietnam, to Saigon, a contingent of Congressmen and Senators to uh survey the situation and report back on whether or not, I think the basic purpose was whether or not the United States should uh pass a bill to renew the support of South Vietnam. We took them around the country, showed them different areas where the fighting was taking place.

They...most of them were interested in that. Some of them had ideas that they would rather look at uh prisoners of war, and, that is, enemy prisoners of war. Concerned about civil liberties in South Vietnam. But for the most of them were really interested in getting a good look at the situation. And they were provided with a good deal of information. Everything that we had on the North Vietnamese capability, and what we expected would happen we gave to them. All about the infiltration, all about the new formations, all about the battles that the South was then in the process of losing, the territory we lost, the crucial areas.

And I think they went back to Washington with a complete understanding of the critical situation that was being faced there in Vietnam. But I also believe that they knew at the outset when they left the United States and headed for South Vietnam, that regardless of what they saw there there was no way then, at that time, to reverse what had already been decided. United States would not continue to support South Vietnam. It didn't matter any longer.

Cut please.

Mm hm.

Now after the the defeat at Ban Me Thuot the South Vietnamese high command decided that they would have to withdraw from Kon Tum and Pleiku. They had major forces there major logistical installation—major airfield. So, they made that decision without consulting us. Now we were surprised because we didn't expect it to happen that quickly. But we were not...ah...you better cut it for now, John, I'm stumped for a word.

The withdrawal from the Highlands by the South Vietnamese came as a surprise to us at DAO, Saigon. We had no prior knowledge of it. For that matter, the South Vietnamese had no reason to tell us. It was their war and we had made that point many times that we were not involved in giving strategic advice, nor did we expect to be consulted when they made major moves. We learned about it because we had a liaison man up in the Highlands, up in Pleiku. He telephoned his office in Nha Trang on the coast and asked to be pulled out because everyone was leaving.

Cut.

The withdrawal from Pleiku and Kon Tum was inevitable because both of the major highways out to those outposts had been cut and permanently cut by major North Vietnamese Army formations. So the fault wasn't in choosing to withdraw. The problem was that the withdrawal was done extremely hastily without good planning. A withdrawal is probably the most difficult of all maneuvers to conduct.

Particularly when it's conducted under fire as this one was. The commanding general of II Corps moved his headquarters to Nha Trang on the coast, turned over the execution of the withdrawal to one of his Brigadier Generals who was a competent soldier. There was great need for secrecy in the withdrawal, but in the interest of secrecy, they didn't tell the province chiefs who had territorial authority over the provinces through which they were going to be moving they didn't even tell them about it.

The man in Kon Tum wasn't told at all. He saw the mobile forces of the ARVN the soldiers, the Ranger groups, the engineers he saw them moving out and so he started out too, but by the time he got started he ran into a North Vietnamese ambush on the pass between Kon Tum and Pleiku. Uh. As they got down further on Road, Route 7B, the North Vietnamese reacted very firmly against the column which was made up of ammunition trucks, a few tanks, I think we had about a battalion of tanks a small battalion, uh a number of ranger battalions, most of these on foot.

And they ran into a terrible ambush along the route, and these ambushes continued. The casualties were extremely high, particularly among civilians, who were, that is, most of these were dependents of the military who were trying to get out. And uh the remarkable thing is that so many of them did make it to the coast in spite of the heavy fires. Now this is great credit to the few of the Ranger battalions that performed the rear guard actions along the way, particularly in two or three different places. Once they crossed the major river that they had to cross then they had to fight through a series of North Vietnamese roadblocks in order to get into the coast. And then this last Ranger battalion turned around and set up on some hills above Nha Trang to protect the city.

Cut. That's fine. That also gives us the sense of...

By early April in 1975, the high command of the Vietnamese army, air force...I believe were ah, so preoccupied with the defense of the...Saigon area itself...and so concerned with ah, the imminent collapse of the country and perhaps ah, their families, who were in difficult straits, that they neglected, until a little bit late, the planning that should have been going on to...to regroup the forces that were brought back from the North and to redeploy them around ah, Saigon.

They were pushed into this effort by some people in the Defense Attaché Office, and after they got the, ah, got started, they did remarkably well in deploying the few forces, ill equipped forces, that they had left from the North into the defenses around Saigon. Hm hmm.

Cut.

During the first months of 1975, as the battle was progressing and becoming more and more intense, and during the period, ah following the collapse of Ban Me Thuot we in Saigon were...somewhat bemused by the reports that we were seeing from the United States in the papers and elsewhere that the South Vietnamese Army had ceased to fight, and it was in complete disarray, and in fact there was nothing important in the way of battles going on there...

Ah, it was hard for us to understand because we were reporting the events, but there were some major actions taking place all the while, not only from the fall of Ban Me Thuot. But the great ah, and disastrous withdrawal from the Highlands could hardly be called, ah, no fighting. The terrific fight out at ah, Xuan Loc just east of ah, Saigon...ah, in which the 18th ARVN division, ah, destroyed really the better part of at least one North Vietnamese division. Ah, it was a major battle, ah, and it was hard for us to explain, ah, to ourselves, ah, what was wrong with the, the analyses that we were seeing from Washington.

Cut please.

...then why should we help them?

[Incomprehensible] tactics and, and...

The last major battle...of the war took place at Xuan Loc...a few miles east of Saigon. In that battle the North Vietnamese used three divisions, successively, to destroy the eighteenth ARVN division. In attack after attack, they managed to break through the outer perimeter, established by the 18th, and the battle resolved into hand to hand fighting, in the little village, until each time the 18th ejected...what remained of the North Vietnamese force at the end of the battle and, the next day, prepared for the next attack. And this went on for several days...until the 18th, exhausted and, ah, decimated, had to begin its withdrawal towards, ah, Saigon...Hm hmm.

Cut please. That was a wonderfully [inaudible]...

In the first days of April, probably about the 3rd of April...out at the, at our headquarters at the Defense Attaché Office at the airbase...I went to my...commander, General Smith, and I told him that it was time for us to begin moving our people – begin reducing the staff at the Defense Attaché Office and planning for the movement...of our employees, our Vietnamese employees, who would otherwise be in danger if, ah...they had to remain in, in South Vietnam. Because the time was drawing short, we didn't know how much time we had...

So we did begin the evacuation...of our own American employees and begin moving on the planning and preparation for moving Vietnamese civilians...So far as the Embassy is concerned, and the people that they had responsible, responsibility for in ah, Saigon, I really don't know why Ambassador Martin didn't begin h his deployment ah, or movement of people as quickly as I did. I suspect ah, it's very logical that he would ah, be reluctant to do it, ah, very soon because of the appearance that it would have that the United States was, was moving out.

They were in downtown Saigon very visible. We were out at the airbase, in a secure compound, ah, not under the public view, and we could move a lot of people without, ah, it becoming obvious to the population of Saigon.

Cut please.

Was that all right?

How did you feel...[inaudible]

Well...[inaudible]

It was at the time that I told General Smith to, ah, begin the, or that he should begin the evacuation of Americans...I I made that decision, to tell him that, on the basis of my assessment of the North Vietnamese capability...I held no belief that any political effort on the part of anyone would change their, that is, the North Vietnamese, objective nor the course that they were then pursuing. Their major formations were closing in on Saigon. We had no longer any, ah...means to support the South Vietnamese.

I knew that the United States would, would not ah, recommit American military power in South Vietnam in any form. So it was just a matter of time before the entire, ah, state of South Vietnam would collapse, militarily and politically...Why I said that at that particular time, on the 3rd or 4th of April...ah, I can't recall any specific event that took place then just a, perhaps a, ah, a conclusion reached upon by the weight of evidence that ah that we had.

Excellent. We just ran out of time.

Yeah.

But we didn't get to how you felt.

(beeps) There about the last, the ah, we had a civilian mess hall for Americans...

How did I feel about it?...I think my...basic, most deep feeling was one of betrayal. I felt that the United States, particularly the Congress, because they were making the policy, had betrayed ah, a trust that the United States had given South Vietnam...And since I represented the United States, ah, I also felt that I was personally betrayed.

I had also made implied promises that...the United States would...honor the agreements that we had made at the time of the ceasefire. In fact, if you look back, we made a commitment there very, very early...when President Kennedy...was President. Our commitment wasn't a shallow, ah, momentary thing it was a lasting one. And then, when things got really tough...we really just cut and run.

Thank you.

Hm hmm.

Thank you.

Hm hmm.

You were...[inaudible].

The evacuation of Vietnamese from, ah, Saigon, during the last, ah, weeks of April, was handled from Tan Son Nhut Airbase by a team ah, established by General Smith, the defense attaché. The quotas were established and given to the various agencies who had employees or agents or whatever that they wanted to move. Ah, we always filled our quotas at DAO, and I believe most of the other people did who, who were given quotas to move people.

I have the impression, however, that, that quite frequently, ah, the Embassy...in Saigon was ah, slow or, ah perhaps remiss, in filling some of the quotas that they did have. They moved a little bit more slowly, perhaps, than they should have. I don't believe we ever sent out any half filled airplanes...because we could always fill the seats with, with, with other people that had to move...Hm hmm.

Did you get the right people out?

We got the right people out and a lot more in addition. I’m sure there were, there were many, ah, Vietnamese moved out of Vietnam at that period who didn't really have, ah, a...a critical reason to move, but all of those that ah, were in a, in a category of being endangered, ah, that we could get our hands on, I believe we moved them...There could have been some oversights, and probably there were, but, ah, they were the exception.

Cut please.

Hm hmm.

...that was the point you wanted to pick up [inaudible]...

There was, in the final weeks, there was some discussion of a...possibility of a political settlement, a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam an expectation on the parts of some that, ah...the North Vietnamese would be willing to compromise, hold off, ah, not invade Saigon and, ah, reach some modus v—vivendi with the South Vietnamese government. I gave this, ah, hope, which is the best I could describe it, ah, very little credence.

I felt that, ah, in the first place, the North Vietnamese had, ah, all of the cards. They had nothing to give away there was no reason for them to negotiate. The South Vietnamese had practically nothing to bargain with...ah, in the second place, I believe that the North had something to prove that they were going to conquer South Vietnam; they were going to go all the way; they were going to defeat South Vietnam and, by proxy, the United States.

Cut please.

Hm hmm.

Very [inaudible].

The North Vietnamese final campaign, '75, to defeat the South was a very well constructed plan and executed with some brilliance. The first blow, of course, fell at ah, Ban Me Thuot and it fell with great surprise. Ah, they denied their adversary the capability to find out what they were going to do where they were going to strike. They isolated that battlefield by cutting the major roads to the Highlands first...

Another example would be the ah, their attacks ah north, in the north on the coast. They cut the major route of communication to the two divisions that the South had, the South Vietnamese had, north of the Hai Van Pass. They could not withdraw that way. Ah, they were defeated then in detail. First...II Corps was defeated in the Highlands by the destruction of the 23rd Division. Then they went up north and struck there. They had already prepared the battlefield very well by moving troops and forces, artillery in very close to Da Nang, ah, forcing the Third ARVN division to withdraw in close to the city.

Ah, having completed that campaign, the next order of business was to redeploy to the south, and that they did very rapidly moving on trucks through the south, ah, down the major highways they came down Route 1; they came down Route 14 and, ah, prepared then the battlefield for the final, ah, assault on Saigon.

[inaudible] ...Would you then characterize it for us in terms of a conventional warfare.

Hm hmm. Yeah.

...was it guerrilla warfare?

Well, ah, yeah, I will but, you know, that guerrilla warfare ended, ah, in...real early.

We know.

Yeah. Ah, okay. This was a, a major, conventional campaign conducted with all of the ah, techniques and the equipment, ah, common to any conventional war communications, artillery support, tanks, motorized transport, ah, high volume of fire, massing of of superior forces at vulnerable and strategic locations, execution with, ah, great violence and often with good tactical surprise. Hm hmm.

Cut please.

So far as the,the cause of the defeat or, or why did it happen then...or who do you blame for the defeat of the South Vietnamese in, in 1975, I I have to...think about a a a rather complex set of factors, I think. One is that the... nn South Vietnamese Army and Air Force were greatly outgunned in terms of fire power, at the particular locations in which the battles took place, and the South Vietnamese did have, had no reserves to move in and shift the battle.

They didn't have the reserves to move and they didn't have the means to move them because the United States had cut their military budget so drastically that they had nothing, nothing to use for that purpose...Ah, they were extremely short on all classes, all categories of supplies at that time. So they, and, and this, ah...the United States' ah, refusal to continue to support them, of course, had attendant psychological efforts upon al—all of the ARVN all of the, the soldiers, and all of the officers, and all of the leadership of South Vietnam.

Ah, so there was a psychological problem; I think that they felt that defeat was around the corner. Their leadership, at the highest echelons, in my opinion, was never very good ah, they had no George Washington who could have brought them through this...period of extreme peril. And also I remember that in the great offensive of 1972, where the armed forces of Vietnam fought again extremely well and very hard, and managed to hold the North Vietnamese offensive, ah, away from Saigon, and to maintain, in fact, control of all of all of their province capitals.

This was done without any United States ground troops, it's true but, we did supply them extremely heavy, ah, air support, and this was crucial in the defense of several of the areas in which they were attacked. They couldn't have done it without it. And they couldn't do it, certainly, in 1975 without, out our support...Those are the main reasons, I think, for the collapse at that time. Did I get of, ah, enough in there?

I think you got it. I think that's it. Do you want to just [inaudible] do you want to get [inaudible]

On the final morning, the 29th of April, '75, ah...I was in my command post at Tan Son Nhut... artillery, North Vietnamese artillery was falling intermittently on the airfield a hundred and thirty millimeter rounds occasional rockets were coming in, hitting around there...Ah, that morning Ambassador Martin...came out to see us at DAO, to speak to General Smith, and to see me, and I briefed him as well I, as I could on the situation, although at that time we were getting very, very poor reports from the field.

Of course, the only sources we had were the, the Vietnamese, ah, staff and, ah, they weren't, ah, in touch with a lot of their units at that time either. We knew that there was ah, an enemy formation of infantry somewhere close to Saigon, ah, close to the airfield, north, north of ah, about five miles...ah, I told the ambassador that we didn't have a great deal of time left – that we would probably have to leave that night. He went into my other office, where I still had one, ah, secure telephone, ah, operating, and he called ah, Secretary Kissinger's deputy in the National Security Council...that's it, huh?

[Inaudible]...pick up. I think they'll start the next roll again [inaudible]...yes, I think they should.

Ambassador Martin came out to Tan Son Nhut to see us and to... get a good understanding of what our situation was as pertained to the evacuation. Ah, he talked to General Smith; I briefed him on the enemy situation ...as best I could. We had very little information coming in then because, ah, d our only source was the ARVN staff and, and they weren't, ah, in full operation, and they, furthermore they weren't in contact with all of their units either.

After I told him about ah, what was going on I told him that we would probably have to leave that night because they were getting pretty close they were...closing in on Saigon, on the airbase...He went into my office and, ah, he used, ah, the only secure phone that we had left to call the White House. He talked to, ah, Secretary Kissinger's deputy on the National Security Council staff, and at that time got authority to ah, begin the evacuation from the Embassy. We no longer had any capability to use fixed wing airplanes; that is, for the evacuation, because of the artillery fire on the airstrip. We had to resort completely to helicopters.

Cut please.

We devoted most of our time on the afternoon of the 29th and the early evening to destroying by shredding most of our, of the few records that we had left, any classified materials. Ah, I personally used a sledge to ah, destroy some of the communications equipment that we had that had been, ah, pretty well damaged earlier, but I wanted to make sure about it. A Marine demolition team...ah, wired the entire building, which was a large building, ah, in our compound, with, ah, incendiary and explosives.

Ah, they, of course, waited until left before they fired that off...But, ah, most of the time it was just spent waiting in, in communication with the ah, with the fleet...out in the sea and getting helicopters in and out...and getting out the last of the Vietnamese out that were still waiting to be, ah, evacuated. We did have ah, a cart loaded with ah, boxes of ah, $20 bills that our finance office had that we had to take out into the courtyard and, and burn all of the $20 bills. Hm hmm.

[inaudible] ...your own evacuation [inaudible]

Ah, finally, that evening, ah, 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening, ah, General Smith, ah, decided that it was time for the rest of us to leave. So General Smith and I and th the few other Americans that we had left in the command post, ah, gathered together all of the Vietnamese that were still there to be moved, shoved them into a large Marines Corps helicopter, and we got in with them.

Ah, we left on the ground, of course, a a a company of US Marines, who...were... guarding the embass , ah, ah our location, and would ah, after we left, blow up and destroy the, our compound. As we flew out, of course, it was very dark, but we could ah see flashes of gunfire on the ground. We could see a few rockets, that is, illuminating the scene fired apparently by North Vietnamese, although it could have been some of the South Vietnamese that were still fighting, because they were they were still en engaged in in the outskirts of Saigon and we took the long flight... out to the US Carrier Midway.

What was that like leaving Vietnam?

It was, ah, a painful experience to have to leave, ah, Vietnam after having, ah, devoted so much of my ah military can career either to being there or working with the problem, I guess, since about 1964...and have to, having to leave under those circumstances ah...was a pretty excruciating ah thing to have to do...felt very bad about it.

Cut please.

Hm hmm.