Ladies and gentlemen, may I have your attention, please.

Moderator Evan Semerjian has just called tonight's meeting to order.

Good evening and welcome to The Advocates' special program on impeachment. The question of impeachment of the President confronts this nation for the first time in this century. It's a question unlike those which this program deals with ordinarily. Merely to ask, "Should the President be impeached?" which is our question tonight, is to cast a shadow on the integrity of the nation's highest official. Therefore in considering the question of impeachment we have a different format tonight, one that places the burden of persuasion wholly on the shoulders of the President's accusers. The question is a preliminary one: should a formal accusation against the President be voted now by the House of Representatives? Those favoring impeachment will present testimony and then be rigorously cross-examined. At the end of this ninety minutes we'll ask you in our audience to decide whether you believe the case for impeachment has withstood that cross-examination. And now let me introduce tonight's participants. The case for impeachment will be presented by Congressman Jerome Waldie, Democrat from California and author of the most widely supported resolution for impeachment introduced in the House. Congressman Waldie will be presenting five witnesses tonight who he will introduce as they appear. To cross-examine those witnesses we have a panel of three lawyers. Heading the panel is Mr. James Hill, an attorney from Atlanta and a familiar face to regular Advocates viewers. On Mr. Hill's right is William Rusher, publisher of National Review; Mr. Rusher's association with this program enters his fourth season. And on Mr. Hill's left is Professor Henry Monaghan of the Boston University Law School and an expert on Constitutional Law. And now let's begin. Congressman Waldie, would you make your opening statement, please.

Should Richard Nixon be impeached? It is a measure of how far we have gone along the path of having liberties in this land corrupted by this President, and having had his office abused as terribly as this President has abused the office that we're discussing tonight in Faneuil Hall, the cradle of American liberty, the subject of the impeachment of the President. Yes, I believe Richard Nixon should be impeached. I believe the tyrannical conduct of this President in his abuse of office, I believe the insensitivity of this President to the liberties of the people demand his impeachment, and perhaps demand his removal from office. And in furtherance of that case we will present five eminent witnesses who too believe that the President has committed acts for which impeachment should lie.

Thank you, Congressman. And now, Mr. Hill, let's have your opening remarks.

There is a provision in our Constitution for impeachment, but because it nullifies election by the people, the most sacred guarantee of our Democracy, its use requires clearest evidence of the highest crime. The Constitution speaks of treason, bribery, high crimes, misdemeanors. The chaos of Civil War bred the only presidential impeachment trial; it paralyzed our government for months and is finally recognized as having been a purely political assault. As you listen to this case for impeachment, look for a sensible theory, consistent with the Constitution, one which can serve as precedent for the future. Be suspicious as we are of the consequences of any theory based on politics, not actual crime; and if it be based on politics, make sure it takes into account the President's many political successes as well as political short-comings, and if it be based on crime, be convinced that the evidence is clear now and not what may appear from some future inquiry. Thank you.

Okay, now, Congressman Waldie, would you please present your witnesses.

Yes, I call as my first witness Monroe Freedman.

Mr. Freedman, welcome to The Advocates.

Thank you very much.

Professor Freedman is the Dean of the Law School of Hofstra University and will testify as to a constitutional overview of the impeachment process. Now, Dean Freedman, what is an impeachable offense, as defined by the Constitution?

In the terms of the Constitution impeachment is on the basis of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. I was a little concerned with Mr. Hill's statement because until I heard him say that it is in no sense a political matter, I was about to say that no serious observer would make such a statement. The fact is that the phrasing of the Constitution is ambiguous, as are many important phrases of the Constitution, and we must look to the context of the Constitution in order to understand what was intended. Most significant for me is the fact that the impeachment process was purposefully taken out of the judiciary branch where it was placed in an earlier draft of the Constitution and put into the Congress, into the political branch of government.

Well, what are the impeachable offenses that you believe the President has committed?

I think it's a mistake for us to focus on particular acts in the context of the present question. In my view the important thing, the overriding consideration is that this administration has created a crisis of confidence in the executive branch of government and that what is called for is the extreme constitutional sanction of impeachment, if for no other purpose than as a symbolic cleansing of our national house.

Well, as each offense is raised against the President, we hear a chorus of response from those who maintain the President has not committed an impeachable offense that this is not conclusive proof, that we must await further evidence, or that this is just one small charge. What do you respond to those who so claim?

I think that's part of the problem of going off on the wrong path, of looking for specific offenses in a situation where we have a national crisis of confidence. Now, I would say that it is incorrect to talk in terms of burden of proof. Certainly, if we are going to, to speak in terms of certitude, or beyond any shred of doubt and so on, would be preposterous. In my view, though, what each member of Congress must do is make a conscientious judgment in political terms, recognizing that he or she is ultimately responsive to his or her constituency, that there is indeed a constitutional crisis, a crisis of confidence in the executive branch.

Well, but aren't we getting dangerously close in that situation to the contention that really we don't need any standards at all; if you don't like the President, you can impeach him and send him to the Senate for trial, or that if you dislike him because you're of a different political persuasion, you can impeach him and send him to the Senate for trial. Isn't that a danger in the standard you've proposed?

I don't think so. All of the words that you have used in your question are yours and not mine. I think that the history of this country, two hundred years with a single presidential impeachment, and the issue being raised now a rare one, plus the deliberation that the Congress is going through right now— the hesitation, the extreme caution—illustrates that that is not a serious concern.

Finally, Dean, many people suggest that we should never undertake impeachment, regardless of what the proof might be, because the trauma of the impeachment process would so disrupt the fabric of American life that it would outweigh the benefits to be gained. What is your response to that?

Make this a brief answer.

I will. I confess that that is a position that I have taken, but I feel that circumstances outbalance that, that the traumatic effect of rolling, recurrent crisis and scandal week by week will have a far more serious traumatic impact on our national life than the impeachment process itself. The time has now come where that balance has changed.

Thank you.

All right, thank you. Congressman. Let's go now to Mr. Hill and his panel.

Mr. Monaghan will ask some questions.

Dean Freedman, in the past you said that one of the few areas in which you agreed with Congressman Ford was on his definition of impeachment. Mr. Ford said an impeachable offense is whatever the majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history, and as I understand you, you've reiterated that position here today. I'd like to take a look at the language of the Constitution to see if it's as ambiguous as you say it is and whether or not one can in all fairness say that the impeachable offense is what the majority of Congress thinks at any given time. Now, there are five provisions in the Constitution that deal with impeachment, and we won't go through them all, but let's take a look at three of them. Article III, Section 2 talks about the trial of all crimes excepting cases of impeachment, which shall be by jury. Article I, Section 3, paragraph 6 provides in relevant part that when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Now, if impeachment is purely a political matter in your judgment, does it make any sense to use words like "trial," "conviction," and why should the Chief Justice preside over the trial?

Well, the question is in several parts. I think that it does make sense to use phrases like "crime," "trial," and so on because at common law impeachment was a crime. There were heavy criminal penalties—imprisonment, substantial fine, even execution—so that it was a natural enough thing for the framers to be concerned that if it were not made clear that there was to be no trial by jury that there might be mistake as to that.

But isn't it perfectly apparent that in common law, if you're referring to the English common law, that the impeachment always for the crime of treason, and it was always retrospective in nature in the sense that it was the subsequent judgment on the conduct of a crown official? But, well, let's pass that.

No, the answer is no. Blackstone disagrees with you.

Well, I don't . . . Well, let's pass that. Because that is not the case; we obviously can't debate here what the authorities were in common law.

Well, I can quote Blackstone to you on that point. What he says is . . .

With respect to Article IV—if we may move on—with respect to Article IV, Section 4, paragraph 1, the President, Vice President, and civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors. Now, if it's purely a political offense in the manner which you talk about, why wasn't it sufficient for the framers of the Constitution simply to say that the President . . . The framers were lawyers. The vast majority of the framers were lawyers. They knew how to use language. It's a lawyers' document. Why don't the framers simply say that the President shall be removed upon a vote of a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate?

Is this a question I get to answer?

Yes.

The . . .

I thought you answered them all.

The constitutional phrasing was drawn, quite appropriately, from the common law. Blackstone, who was perhaps the leading common law commentator, defines impeachment as a political crime—that is a wrong against the body politic, and he says, "The first and principle high misdemeanor is the maladministration"—and Blackstone underlines that word, maladministration—"of such high officers as are in the public trust and employment. This," he adds, " is usually punished by the method of parliamentary impeachment," so it's perfectly reasonable that this language would have been used, and it's perfectly consistent.

Apparently you think the language is not decisive. Well, let's take a look at the drafting of these provisions in the Constitutional Convention. Now, the Convention considered and rejected malpractice and corrupt conduct as a standard, isn't that true?

Yes, that's right.

The Constitutional Convention also considered and rejected malpractice or neglect of duty as a standard, isn't that true?

Yes.

Most importantly, and most relevantly in terms of what you just said, the Convention considered and rejected the standard of maladministration.

Yes.

That was taken out on Madison's objection because Madison said so vague a term would be the equivalent of giving the President tenure only at the sufferance of the Senate. Now, isn't it perfectly apparent, from what the framers of the constitutional provisions did, that they rejected standards which were clearly non-criminal or not quasi-criminal, such as malpractice and maladministration and deliberately inserted a much more rigorous standard of criminality?

No, I don't think that's so. First of all, you noted that they rejected corruption, yet they used the word "bribery"; they may have rejected the word "maladministration" and yet they adopted the phrase "high misdemeanor" which embraces it. Madison himself, whom you relied on, referred to a high misdemeanor as a situation where the President neglects to superintend the conduct of his or her subordinates so as to check their excesses, and I think we have a prime example of that.

I'm going to explore some there, Mr. Monaghan, thank you. Let me just ask you, Mr. Freedman, on your standards, if there be any, would you, if you were in the Senate, now vote to convict the President of impeachable offenses.

Mr. Hill, I don't mean to duck that question, but the fact is . . .

Then don't; then just answer it.

That fact is that one cannot, I think, conscientiously answer that because the Senators will act after a trial.

I understand, but . . .

And I do not know, I cannot tell you frankly, what my answer would be with a defense put on by the President, which we have not seen now, and with a full case presented against him.

Mr. Hill, just to make it clear for the viewing audience, when you're talking about a conviction, you're drawing a distinction, aren't you, between the impeachment we're discussing tonight and the subsequent conviction which could follow?

Yes, sir. I wanted to find out if the witness would vote to put the country to that sort of thing when he was not yet confident that the President should be convicted, and now I have the answer.

That's not my response. My answer is that it is premature before trial to make that judgment. If you ask me whether I believe that the House of Representatives should issue a bill of impeachment which would initiate the trial in the Senate, I would say yes indeed.

All right, sir. Now, you have spoken of lack of popularity, loss of confidence and public opinions; let's look at this popularity. The last Gallup poll showed President Nixon with 32% approval, did it not?

I confess I don't know.

Well, you . . .

Nor incidentally is . . .

You don't dispute it, do you, if you say there has been this loss of confidence.

I cannot dispute that, but I would dispute your use of the word "popularity"; that is not mine.

I'm sorry. Well . . .

Mine was "crisis of confidence" in the integrity of the executive branch of government.

All right, sir. In 1951 President Harry Truman's approval rate by the people was 23%, was it not?

I will accept your word for it.

Yes, sir. Well, you were the one who suggested this criteria . . .

No, I beg your pardon, it was not a criterion based on, as you characterized it, a popularity poll. What I am talking about is the kind of language that has been used by responsible people of both parties. Senator James Buckley referred to "a political crisis of the most profoundly disturbing proportions." Senator Brooke, a Republican, has called for resignation. Republican Representative Packwood has told the President to his face, "Sir, you have destroyed your ability to lead this country." The Wall Street Journal . . .

All right, Mr. Freedman, I have to cut you off so that they can ask other questions.

I believe that that fills up the time, if Mr. Rusher will ask a question.

Just very briefly, since our time is short, sir. I do understand you to be saying that what we might call conventional crimes need not be proved against the President for conviction.

That is certainly correct, yes.

But something that you've described, I believe, generally, as maladministration.

Not maladministration pure and simple, and I think this is why Madison rejected that phrase.

Then, very briefly . . .

But maladministration—that is, of such seriousness as to bring about a crisis of confidence in the executive branch of government.

Now, sir, if a President is guilty of things which we may take, for the purpose of hypothesis, to be seriously against him, and we are determining whether or not he should be impeached, wouldn't it be proper also to consider the good things, the successful things that he has done—in the case of Mr. Nixon, the fact that he did bring our prisoners of war and our American soldiers home from Vietnam, the fact that we are progressing from war in the Middle East to negotiation in the Middle East? If we are going to have, in other words, the kind of broad standard for judging this man that you want to impose, and by which you favor his impeachment, shouldn't we consider what he has done that is good?

Make this a very, very brief answer.

The answer is yes, I have done so, Mr. Rusher.

And you can't find anything.

No, no, I didn't say that.

All right, I'm going to have to interrupt. Thanks very much, Mr. Freedman, for being with us tonight.

Well, I think one thing we've established— or at least the panel supporting the President has established—is that his latest appointee for the Vice President, Gerald Ford's judgment can't be trusted very well either. I call as my next witness Mr. Thomas Emerson, Professor of Law at Yale.

Mr. Emerson, welcome to The Advocates.

Professor Emerson will be discussing what constitutes an impeachable offense, and he will also be discussing activities on the part of the President that he believes amount to an obstruction of justice. Professor, would you tell me what you believe constitutes an impeachable offense under the Constitution?

Yes, in my view an impeachable offense—at least so far as the removal of the President is concerned—is an offense, or a series of offenses, which subvert the fundamentals of the democratic process. I do not think it requires a criminal offense, or an indictable offense, but it ought to be one which fundamentally undermines our political way of life.

Well, I presume you would agree that we've had such a pattern of conduct on the part of this president. To be specific, I have some reference to the Huston Plan; would you describe that and determine whether it fits within your definition?

Yes, I think that is an example of gross misconduct which justifies impeachment. In June of 1970 President Nixon appointed a committee headed by Tom Huston, an assistant White House counsel. The purpose of the committee was to prepare a plan for political surveillance of various groups, mostly black groups and anti-war demonstrators. The plan was submitted to the President on July 25 of 1970, and it included as the method of maintaining this political surveillance wire-tapping, bugging, burglary and opening of mail. The President approved the plan, and I think that by doing so, he undermined the basic fundamentals of the democratic process.

Well, was there any question in the President's mind that those recommendations, and those acts so recommended, were illegal?

No, there was no question about that because Huston, in the memorandum, had expressly pointed out that these methods were, and I quote, "clearly illegal." Now, I should say that five days later the President withdrew, or at least it is claimed that he withdrew, his approval on the objection of J. Edgar Hoover. However, I should also add that many of the proposals in the plan were put into effect later when the plumbers' unit was organized.

The President apparently was alleged, and people believed, that he contacted Judge Matthew Byrne while he was trying the case involving Ellsberg, and that the contact was in an attempt to influence justice. Do you want to comment on that allegation?

What happened there was that while Judge Byrne was trying the Ellsberg case, John Erlichman, one of the President's chief advisors, invited him to a meeting and asked him whether he would consider taking the position of Director of the FBI, which was then vacant. At that meeting President Nixon came into the room, was there for at least a minute, and was fully aware of what was going on. Under the circumstances of the fact that the trial was in progress, to offer a federal position to the judge who was trying the case seems to me to be both an obstruction of justice and an unfair invasion of the constitutional rights of the defendant.

Maybe one of the greatest . . .

One more question, Congressman.

Yes, maybe one of the greatest outrages the President has perpetrated on the national fabric was his dismissal of Archibald Cox as the Special Prosecutor. Does that constitute an impeachable offense?

I don't think it's a constitutional offense, but I think it was illegal, and Judge Gesell in the District of Columbia held that it was illegal because it was in violation of the Departments of Justice's own rules. Whatever it was, however, it was a clear breach of trust because the President had assured the country that Archibald Cox would be independent. I therefore think that it's clearly relevant to the question of impeachment.

All right, thank you. Let's go now to Mr. Hill and his panel for some questions.

Professor, does Huston, going back to 1970 at the time of that Huston memorandum: was there not first a committee meeting between the President, FBI Director Hoover, CIA Director Helms, Defense Agency Director General Donald Bennett, and National Security Agency Director Admiral Noel Gayler out of which those gentlemen asked Huston to prepare some proposals? Isn't that what happened?

There was a meeting of that sort, yes.

All right, sir. And then did not Huston prepare his memorandum and send it back and all of them approve it?

I'm not sure whether all of them approved it.

Well, one objected to it. Excuse me.

It was a memorandum submitted on behalf of representatives of those four agencies, that's true.

And the President and the others approved it, save FBI Director Hoover, isn't that correct, who objected to it?

Hoover at some point objected to it. I don't think it's clear at what point.

And immediately—that is, within the week of Hoover's objection—the President withdrew his approval and never implemented it, isn't that correct?

That is correct, but he withdrew it not on grounds that it was illegal, or on grounds that it was unethical or unconstitutional, he withdrew it because J. Edgar Hoover pressured him to withdraw it.

All right, sir. And it was the object of the memo to preserve national security internally by some means that you say would have been illegal had it been implemented, is that correct?

It's all done in the name of national security, yes.

Yes, sir, and national security is not of small importance to this country.

No, of course not . . .

That's fine. At that time there were national security leaks going on all over the country, weren't there? Papers being taken and published and distributed about that were secret papers of the Defense Department?

There were matters happening in which the government was quite interested, but the problem that I'm raising is the method by which the government sought to pursue its interests; its methods were unconstitutional. I'm not saying its ultimate aim was unconstitutional.

Do you know of any of the other gentlemen that I named who withdrew approval, other than the President?

No, I don't.

Do you propose that they be impeached?

No, the President is clearly responsible for this. It was said in the memorandum that it was illegal, he gave his approval, that's his judgment.

Then you propose to impeach the one who withdrew his approval and not impeach those who continued to approve, is that your testimony?

No, wait, I wasn't talking about impeachment of various subordinates of the President. I thought the issue tonight was the President's impeachment. If all that anyone of those ever did was to approve that memorandum, that in itself might not be impeachable; it's in the context of a whole pattern of misconduct that I'm stating that it's an impeachable offense.

In 1972, in April, the Head of the FBI resigned, and the President was searching for a new one, is that right?

That's correct.

As far as you know, would Judge Byrne have been a qualified man? He was a former FBI agent and District Attorney.

It's quite possible he would have, yes.

All right, sir. Now, is it not the sole evidence on any conversation about that that the Ellsberg trial was never mentioned?

Of course it was never mentioned. It didn't have to be.

And was not Mr. Ehrlichman, according to the sole testimony, specifically told he might sound out Judge Byrne for that post or his interest, provided he could do it without compromising the Judge's judicial duties?

The essence of the conversation was that— the implication of the conversation was that—after the trial was over, and the implication is that if the trial went well, then the Judge would be considered for Director of the FBI. That seems to me is spelling . . .

That's the implication you get.

That's the implication I get and I think anybody would get.

Did Judge Byrne, who you say as far as you know would be qualified to head the FBI, meet twice with Ehrlichman?

Yes, he met with him two days later.

And did he publicize it?

Later . . . Not at the time.

Not then, did he?

No.

But after he brought up the thought that he perhaps ought not discuss that job further because he had criminal trial. Was he ever approached again?

No, not after twice.

May a judge, trying criminal cases on a long calendar brought by the government, ever be offered another post in the government without running the risk of their being some effort to corrupt him?

He may never be offered a post that is so distinctly related to his conduct in that case, no.

Mr. Rusher.

Mr. Emerson, I have been led by your statements to suppose that you are going to allege that one of the reasons for impeaching Mr. Nixon was his intimidation of the press. Is that one of your complaints about him?

That's correct. We didn't get to that.

Can you, since it's in my time, do it as briefly as you can, and let me ask you a question about it?

Yes. From the time that Vice President Ag-new made his speech in Des Moines in the fall of 1969, attacking the press, through the statements made by Clay Whitehead, the Head of the Office of Telecommunications in the White House, the White House has engaged in a campaign of attack and harassment and intimidation of the press and the broadcasting industry. As it was stated in one of the memoranda which Senator Weicker produced, their attempt was to break down the institution of broadcasting.

I ask you, sir, whether in your opinion the press of this country is in fact intimidated?

The President intimidated?

No, has the press of this country, in fact, been intimidated?

I think they have, yes. They have said so.

And do you think the institution of broadcasting in this country has, in fact, been broken down?

Without a doubt. No, not broken down; I say they have been intimidated. I don't think it was that successful.

They've been intimidated, but not broken down?

Yes.

Is that correct? When Mr. Nixon, for example, attacking the press directly, or certain segments of it, in his last Washington press conference—did you watch that, by the way—on television said that certain reports in the press were the most vicious and distorted he had seen in twenty-seven years of public life, was his attack an impeachable offense?

Not that in itself, no.

What do you mean, "not in itself"?

Well, I mean, that statement seems to me a fair reply by the President to criticism of him in the press.

He has as much right to defend himself as anybody else, doesn't he?

Yes, of course he does, but he does not have the right to defend himself by using government agencies to harass and coerce the press . . .

Mr. Monaghan, I believe, has a question.

I'd like to address myself, Professor Emerson, to the firing of Mr. Cox. We're not required, are we, to accept Judge Gesell's view that the firing was illegal?

No, but it clearly was illegal in the sense that the Department of Justice's regulations would not comply with it.

Yes, but Elliot Richardson on the Dick Cavett Show said that at worse the firing was only a technical violation of the law. There's no doubt that had that regulation been repealed, as it was repealed a few days later, that the Special Prosecutor could have been fired. The most that can be made out of this is that it's purely a technical violation. Isn't that true?

The most that can be made out of it was that it was merely a breach of trust.

Now, that's a separate point. The first point you made was that it was illegal, and I suggest to you that there's nothing but a technical objection, at best, assuming that Judge Gesell is right. Now, what's . . .

No, I don't think it's technical: if the rules provide something, the rules should be followed. That is not technical.

Two days later the regulations were repealed and there's no doubt that he could be fired. The President simply didn't dot his t's and q's, if you assume that Judge Gesell is right to begin with, as I do not. Now, let's take a look at the question of breach of trust. I want to take a look at the firing from the point of view of the President. Could the President have fairly concluded that the Cox staff was not impartial and out to get him? It's true, isn't it, that the White House has constantly complained about leaks from the Special Prosecutor's office? That's true, isn't it?

That's true.

It's also true that yesterday's New York Times reported nine of the top ten officials in the Cox strike force were liberal Democrats, something not designed to inspire confidence in the President, I wouldn't think.

This is not the basis on which the President fired Cox.

Now, we want to find out exactly what kind of confidence the President ought to have had in Cox. But finally, of course, we have Mr. Cox's unfortunate

One more question, Mr. Monaghan.

Couldn't the President have fairly concluded that the time had come to get rid of the man whose track record rightly or wrongly convinced the President that he was being the victim of a vendetta.

That wasn't the reason he fired him; the reason he fired him was because . . .

That's exactly the reason he gave. That's exactly what was going on in the President's mind.

Well, have you finished your answer, Mr. Emerson?

No. The reason he fired Cox was that Cox insisted on obtaining memoranda and paper and documents from the President which the President didn't want to give up.

On a claim of executive privilege, which was subsequently rejected by the courts, and he wouldn't settle it. I mean, it certainly seems decidedly unfair to the President to say that he was acting irrationally from his own point of view.

All right, there being no question pending, I want to thank you very much, Mr. Emerson, for being with us tonight.

I suppose the President could have fairly concluded that that was the alleged reason for firing Cox, that he had too many liberal Democrats around him, but he could have equally fairly concluded that the reason he had to get rid of Cox was that Cox was getting too close to establishing culpability of the President, and this simply points out that those sorts of decisions will be made subsequent to impeachment upon the trial of the articles of impeachment in the Senate. My next witness is Congressman Paul "Pete" McCloskey.

Congressman, nice to have you with us tonight.

Congressman McCloskey is a colleague of mine. He's a Republican Representative from California. He also is a former Republican candidate for President of the United States, running against Richard Nixon in the last primary, and he was a former District Attorney. He will talk tonight about the probabilities, in his view, that the President has committed specific violations of the federal criminal code. Mr. McCloskey, will you tell me what the reasons for your introduction of the resolution of impeachment might be? What do you believe the President has done warranting impeachment?

Well, I'd like to accept Mr. Hill's challenge, and try to enumerate specific felony statutes of the United States criminal code, which I believe that the evidence shows that the President has violated: not the innuendo or the speculation, but the facts that have been admitted by the President himself. And I'd like to trace this against the background of the Fielding break-in in September 1971 to which Egil Krogh has just pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy to deny civil rights, Section 241 of the Criminal Code. That crime occurred in September 1971, and at some later time that we do not know the President learned of that crime. Now, I don't hold him responsible for the commission of the crime itself because we don't have evidence to indicate that he knew in advance that illegal conduct was to be employed, but he has admitted in his speeches that he learned of it subsequently. Now, against that I'd like to read three sections of the Criminal Code: Section III states that whoever knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment is guilty of felony. Section IV reads that whoever having knowledge of the actual commission of the felony, cognizable by a Court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority shall be guilty of a felony. And finally Section 1510 reads in part: Whoever willfully endeavors by misrepresentation to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator.

Mr. McCloskey, I'm going to have to interrupt you here a moment, because we're running short of time. Do you believe that the President has violated any of those sections, and, if so, would you state in what regard?

Yes, and let's go to his speech of May 22 when he said he instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to insure that the investigation of the break-in, the Watergate, not disclose the activities of the White House Special Investigations Unit. This was the Fielding break-in. On April 18 of 1973, during the Ellsberg trial, when Assistant Attorney General Petersen sought to bring this matter before the Ellsberg Court, the President has admitted to instructing Mr. Petersen not to go into that matter. He has attempted to prevent the flow of this evidence, this information, about a prior crime from passing before the Court and to investigators.

Now, we must get into the last question I want to ask you. How does the question of the withholding of the tapes by the President fit into this pattern you've been discussing?

Well, the tapes have occurred subsequent to all these events, and they occurred subsequent to a ruling by the Court that executive privilege would not lie to prevent the tapes from being introduced in evidence. The Court ruling gives the President the power to contend that the tapes should not be disclosed, but then a court can overrule him, and a Court has. Nevertheless, even today General Haig, the men closely around the President, the attorneys for the President are engaged in what appears almost to be a conspiracy to obstruct justice today in preventing these tapes from passing into the new Special Prosecutor's hands, Mr. Jaworski. These have been asked for by Mr. Cox weeks ago and not produced.

Mr. McCloskey, if you were to present . . .

Make this very brief.

If you were to present to a grand jury today the facts that you have testified to, do you think you could procure an indictment against the President?

Very brief answer, Congressman.

I think any U.S. Attorney or District Attorney in the country could obtain an indictment on the facts that I've alleged.

Thank you, Congressman.

All right, let's go to Mr. Hill and his panel. Mr. Rusher.

On the floor of the House of Representatives on June 6th of this year you stated, did you not, we should limit our consideration, meaning consideration of impeachment, to instances of high crimes of a felonious nature, defining the terms "high crimes" and "misdemeanors" as the modern counterpart of felonies.

Yes, that's my opinion. I think that we owe that obligation to try to rid this country of the history of impeachment as a political measure.

So do I.

I think we should use it based on criminal conduct.

I couldn't agree with you more. You also said that with respect to the serious action of impeachment against the President of the United States I suggest that we as members of the House should be personally and individually convinced of the guilt of the President before voting his impeachment. Did you say that?

That's my view, that . . .

May I ask what happened today, when you ran into Professor Emerson and Dean Freedman and Congressman Waldie and found out their view?

Well, I've known Congressman Waldie’s views for some time, and I've known Gerry Ford's views that impeachment would lie on whatever the Congress said. In my judgment we ought to hold ourselves to a far higher standard.

I concur entirely, and so in your judgment, Congressman Waldie and Professor Emerson and Dean Freedman are all mistaken in attempting to turn impeachment into this gauzy kind of a preliminary, to a guilt that is only going to be coming late, is that right?

Well, I don't go as far as they do.

How far do you go?

Well, I go to the fact that impeachment is merely an accusation. We probably, under the historic law, need only show probable cause. If we accept Ben Franklin's concept, impeachment is a cleansing agent.

Then you've changed your mind.

I have not.

Well, if you haven't, then you still think that the members of the House should be personally and individually convinced of the guilt of the President before voting his impeachment.

That's my view, yes, sir.

Thank you. Well, to come to the statutory crimes that you do allege—and you confine yourself, I realize, to your own terms here, limiting yourself to felonies. The President, according to his own statement, as far as I know is uncontradicted on the other side, discovered the break-in at the Ellsberg psychiatrist's office on what date?

We don't know that . . .

Well, what has he said?

He knew it at least by March 15th, according to his speech.

March 17th, I think you will find upon checking more carefully.

You may be correct.

Right. And March 17th is the date, then, on which he says he discovered this. Do you know of anybody else who says he discovered it earlier?

No.

So there's time for news to be made tonight.

No, but I think that the President, as he has stated, occupying a position of high trust, that it's high time that he recognized the first duty of a trustee, which is to make full disclosure.

Now, we come to the question: having known from the 17th of March, 1973, forward of the Ellsberg break-in, when did Judge Byrne out of Los Angeles discover it, what date?

As far as we know, not until April 28th, when Attorney General Petersen threatened to resign unless the President changed his mind and made it available.

And since you mention not Attorney General Petersen, but Chief of the Criminal Division Petersen

Deputy Attorney.

And Attorney General Kleindienst, I believe, also appears to have known at about the same time, but Petersen, at any rate, knew before the 28th, therefore, didn't he?

He knew ten days before the 28th . . .

That makes it the 18th of April, so that your proposition for impeaching the President of the United States is that he knew of a specific break-in from the 17th of March to the 18th of April this year, by which time it had been communicated to the Chief of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department of the United States, and for that delay he should be impeached.

For thirty days the evidence indicates he deliberately held from the Justice Department evidence of a crime.

Thank you.

Congressman McCloskey, are we not suggesting embarking here on a purely political effort to reverse the recent election?

I've tried to make it clear that in my mind we would demean the process if we made it a political effort to set aside the election.

All right, sir, let's look at the track record so far. You introduced a resolution calling for the impeachment of President Nixon, did you not?

Yes, sir.

How many Congressmen signed it?

I haven't asked others to sign it. It specifies the four specific counts of felony and the one violation of his constitutional oath when he authorized the burglary.

Were there not thirty signers: twenty-nine Democrats and one—that is to say, you—Republican on your resolution?

Well, I'm honored if others have joined in it, but I didn't know that.

All right, sir. Now, the matter is pending before the House Judiciary Committee, is it not?

Yes, sir.

And that committee is organizing to consider that resolution and others, is it not?

Yes, sir.

And it has taken two important votes, has it not?

I'm not aware of that.

One to give the Democratic Chairman full, unbridled power to issue subpoenas, is that correct?

Yes, sir.

And how did the vote go, Congressman McCloskey?

I think that went purely on partisan lines, but let me point out that three out of four of my Republican colleagues two weeks ago voted $1,000,000 to staff this committee and to investigate impeachment. The Republicans voted three to one to fund that $1,000,000 for investigation. I think that's some idea of the seriousness with which Republicans view the situation.

Is it not true that on that vote twenty-one voted yes to give the Chairman unbridled power, all Democrats, seventeen voted "nay," all Republicans?

Yes, sir.

Then they took another vote, and that was to give the Republican Vice Chairman the same power, did they not?

I don't know that.

And didn't it go twenty-one voted no, all Democrats, and seventeen voted "aye," all Republicans? As a politician, do you see a trend developing, Congressman?

No, I frankly don't. In those procedural maneuverings that occurred two weeks ago. I think as the weeks unfold, you will find that despite disagreements between reasonable men, we are going to see this turn into a non-partisan effort to ascertain the truth.

But it has some distance to go, hasn't it? Does it concern you at all. Congressman, that you have a Congress with a majority of the party opposite to the President, who has just beaten that party's candidate in a general election by the people, and it is in that forum that you propose to say that that election shall not stand and the elected President go out? Does that concern you at all?

It really doesn't, Mr. Hill, because under the Constitution all of us take an oath to uphold the Constitution. The Constitution places this power in the House of Representatives, no matter what its political makeup; it's one of the two special powers of the House, one being to initiate revenue, the other being to initiate impeachment, and I think we're going to face that duty as members of the Congress, subject to our oath, not as members of any political party.

Mr. Monaghan has some questions.

Congressman, you said in the House that each member of the House, not the Senate, should be personally and individually convinced of the guilt of the President before voting his impeachment. Are you satisfied that the President is presently guilty of criminal conduct in his handling of the tapes?

No, I don't think the evidence is yet clear in the handling of the tapes, but as the coincidences build up I frankly feel that there is a growing duty of disclosure on his part.

Well, there certainly is some tension between the position you're taking here and the position you take before the Congress . . .

Well, I haven't suggested his impeachment yet on the tapes matter. That is an unfolding obstruction of justice . . .

Well, you've just suggested it here. Let's take a look at the question of the tapes. The tapes are presently under consideration by Judge Sirica. You plainly don't think it's wrong for Judge Sirica to continue hearing testimony or appointing experts to examine the tapes, do you?

No.

What would be the impact . . . And don't you think it's irresponsible for the House to return articles of impeachment on the issue of the tapes without waiting for Judge Sirica's ruling?

I think that they are parallel jurisdictions. We're under no obligation to await Judge Sirica's ruling. We should not impeach until we carefully consider, we ourselves should subpoena the tapes, and I think we will in the next couple of months.

What would be the impact on impeachment proceedings if the House returned articles of impeachment, which is the proposition (on the tapes) which we are debating here? What would be the impact on those articles of impeachment if Judge Sirica concludes that there's no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to link the President with wrongdoing?

One very brief answer, Congressman.

Well, the Congress pursues one track and the Court another, and you trace this erroneously. We're not impeaching him on the basis of the tapes yet, and I have not urged that there are grounds yet to impeach him on the basis of the tapes. Those are evidentiary matters that are beginning to indicate a pattern that a guilty person would follow, the course that he is pursuing, but that's evidentiary only, and that is not impeachable in its own right alone.

That's hardly consistent with what you set as a standard.

Okay, thank you very much. Thanks very much, Congressman, for being with us. Thank you. Now, before we continue, let me explain to those of you who may have joined us late that we're using a special hearing format tonight to consider the question of impeachment now, placing the full burden of persuasion on those calling for the President's impeachment, which Mr. Waldie advocates tonight. A panel of examiners, led by Mr. Hill, have only the obligation to challenge through cross-examination the testimony presented by the President's accusers. And now, Congressman Waldie, will you continue with your case?

I was on the Judiciary Committee when the vote to which Mr. Hill alluded—that represented a partisan approach to impeachment in his mind—occurred. The seventeen votes of the Republicans, every Republican voted against giving the Chairman the authority to get at the President's information that he has been withholding, and that was consistent with the action of the President, preventing anybody from getting at the information that he possesses relative to impeachment. It perhaps was a partisan vote, but the partisanship was on the President's side, attempting to obstruct the ability to get at the evidence in this case. The next witness that I will call is Mr. William Dobrovir.

Mr. Dobrovir, nice to have you with us tonight.

Mr. Dobrovir is a Washington attorney who has drawn up a bill of criminal particulars against the President, involving bribery and campaign offenses. Mr. Dobrovir, could you describe that instrument that you drafted?

Well, it is a study of approximately 170 pages in which are compiled all of the facts of public record, and in which are analyzed the principles of law which concern the possibility, or the probability, of President Nixon's criminal responsibility for violation of law as shown by those facts. The study concludes not that there is presently proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather that there is enough evidence to place him on trial for these offenses--that is, the familiar criminal standard of probable cause.

Now, in that document you allege that the President, there is reasonable cause to believe that the President had been involved in bribery, is that correct?

That is correct. The evidence shows a consistent pattern of obtaining money in the form of campaign contributions for President Nixon's 1972 campaign, in exchange for governmental benefits, and that is bribery.

Now, there are also some allegations that certain contracts were influenced and certain favors were granted by the passage of money, if I understand it. What did you mean by that?

Well, let's take a couple of instances. The milk deal, as it is commonly called. The facts are fairly simple. In 1969 three big dairy cooperatives put together a kitty of $100,000 and flew it out in cash to California and gave it to President Nixon's personal lawyer, who was at that very time putting together the money to buy the President's estate in San Clemente. The purpose of that gift was, in fee words of the lawyer for the dairy groups, to obtain a sympathetic ear at the White House. In 1970 the dairy people had interest in a question of reducing imports of dairy products, so another one of their lawyers, who is an old Congressional colleague of Mr. Nixon's, wrote the President a letter and said, "We're putting together $2,000,000 for your campaign, and, by the way, we would like the quotas of imports reduced." Two weeks after the letter was sent, the quotas were reduced. In 1971 the dairy people were interested in the question of how high the price support for milk was going to be. They scheduled a meeting with the President for March 2 3rd in the White House; on March 22nd they gave him $10,000 for his campaign. On March 23rd they met with him. On March 24th they gave him another $25,000, and on March 25th the price went up.

I want to interrupt you at that moment. You also mentioned in your paper, allegations of bribery and extortion and obstruction of justice and conspiracy, I believe, involving the President and International Telephone and Telegraph. What is that about?

Once again the facts are really quite simple. ITT is a conglomerate corporation; it grows and has grown by merging with other companies. In 1969 the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the antitrust division decided to move against conglomerates by seeking to prevent any future mergers by ITT. ITT didn't like that; they wanted to buy the Hartford Insurance Company, a $2 billion financial institution. And in 1971 they exerted a great deal of effort to get the anti-trust case dropped. They promised $200,000 to the Convention of the Republican Party, then expected to be held in San Diego. Ten days later the case was dropped—was settled—by the approval of the Justice Department of the acquisition of the Hartford Insurance Company. Ten days later they delivered $100,000, and President Nixon, according to the testimony of the Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst, intervened personally and ordered Mr. Kleindienst with some rather rough language to delay the prosecution of the case at a time when ITT needed more time in order to make its slush fund available and in order to present its case for settlement.

Okay, with that interesting testimony, I think that Mr. Hill and his panel have some questions now.

Sir, you quickly cited some dates and some happenings and drew proprietary results from them. Could I fill in some with you? Did you ever read Senate Bill S1277, introduced April 5th, 1971?

I have read that bill and a number of other bills.

Were they to raise the milk price supports?

Yes, indeed.

Higher than the President raised them?

Yes, indeed.

Were they, among the twenty-seven Senators who signed them, did we find Senator Gaylord Nelson, Senators Proxmire, McGovern, Mondale, Tunney and Muskie?

Yes.

And is it true, sir, that, according to the identification of associated milk producers' political action groups, that before that bill was introduced in early 1971, in October of 1970 those people had given Senator Proxmire money?

Yes.

Is it true, sir, that before that bill was introduced, but just before, that same milk group had given Senator Mondale money?

Yes.

Is it true, sir, that on four occasions in 1970, before he introduced that bill in 1971, those same milk lobbyists had given Senator Muskie money?

Yes.

All right, sir, and then is it true that under the pressure of those Senators, serving those constituents, the President relented from his stand not to raise price supports and raised them less than those Senators asked in that bill?

No.

All right. What did . . . You know, sir, if you get this crowd to take over the nation, I hope they do better than they did with the Democratic party.

I just answered your questions, Mr. Hill.

All right, sir. Did the President not allow an increase in milk price supports after those Senators and twenty-four others introduced that bill?

Yes, but the bill wasn’t enough.

Wasn’t the bill calling for more support than the increase that was granted?

The bill would have mandated, as I understand it, 85% of parity, the figure which was then promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, at the Present’s orders, he had now admitted, on March 25th was the figure 85% of parity.

All right, sir. You have brought an action, I believe, to get the President’s conversations about milk. Have you brought an action against any of those Senators to get their private files about their conversations with those milk lobbyists? And their money contributions?

The lawsuit, which I think you’re referring to, in which I am Counsel, has alleged that campaign contributions from the dairy industry to the President were the prime motivating factor in obtaining this price increase. We have alleged in the lawsuit, as well, because we like to be impartial, that there were indeed these same introductions of legislation to which you refer in the course…

But…

May I finish my answer, please?

Oh, please.

In the course of the discovery in the case, in which we have taken some twenty to twenty-five depositions and subpoenaed volumes of documents, there has been no support for the claim that the President’s decision was in any way influence by the so-called pressure from Congress. And I think it’s probably fair to say that if the President was, as he said, persuaded by a Congressional gun to his head in 1971, that was the only time in the history of his administration that he has been persuaded by Congress to do anything. The discovery in the case has revealed a great deal of evidence that points more and more directly to the President's principal servants, to Mr. Haldeman, to Mr. Colson and to Mr. Ehrlichman, as being involved both in the collection of the campaign contributions and in the decision to increase the price support.

All right, sir. George Meany met with John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson during their campaigns, didn't he?

I don't know. I suppose so.

Excuse me, are you next? I'm sorry.

The question is that he may have said some things to them about what labor wanted; do you suppose he got any of it?

I'm not familiar. You can speculate and so can I.

Well, we won't ask you about that since you're not familiar with what labor does. Let me ask you, though, are the familiar with the variety of views we have heard over here as to what it takes to make an impeachment.

I have listened to them.

Which of the various ones we've heard do you come closest to?

I think I probably come closest to Congressman McCloskey.

And then furthest, presumably, from Dean Freedman?

Yes, as a matter of fact.

Tell me, sir. IT and T, this other bit of villainy that concerned you so; the problem—at any rate, the case for Nixon impeachment with respect to IT and T, involves taking the contribution that was made, first pledged and then made, to the tune of $100,000 to the Sheraton Corporation of America in San Diego for the purpose of—or at least ostensibly for the purpose of— attracting the Republican Convention of 1972 to that city, and tying it up with the decision of the Justice Department and the President in Washington, with respect to the disposition of the anti-trust action against the IT and T, which is the parent corporation of the Sheraton Corporation of America. That's fair to say. All right, then, with regard to the money that Sheraton Corporation had to turn over to get the convention to San Diego, I presume that as a sophisticated man, based in Washington, you know that corporation hotels do put up pledges of money to get political parties to have their conventions in their cities?

That is common. I think if you know anything about the ITT Corporation, you know that no executive of that company makes a move unless it is ordered by Harold Geneen, the Chairman of the Board of ITT.

Certainly not with regard to the $100,000. I would dare say that there is nothing in the least extraordinary about either any executive of Sheraton, or Harold Geneen, doing such a thing because all of the hotels of good size do it in all of these convention cities. Now, isn't that true?

Well, let me help you tie it up because . . .

Just answer my question. I'll help you tie it up, but you answer my question. Is it true or isn't it that hotels do that in convention cities?

Yes, it is.

Well, of course it is. And isn't it also true that over half of all the federal anti-trust suits are settled in one way or another?

Many are.

A lot are, you bet your life. And isn't it true that Archibald Cox—and I would suppose that even these enthusiasts for impeachment might consider him a fair man—has said that the particular settlement in ITT that you claim was a $100,000 bribe was desirable from the standpoint of the government of the United States.

Yes, indeed.

And didn't Erwin Griswold, who was the Solicitor General of the United States under both Johnson, and, I think, later, Mr. Nixon, and was formerly Dean of Harvard Law School, call it a very substantial victory for the government of the United States.

Mr. Griswold was defending a decision.

And both of these men were wrong, and you are right, is that it?

Shall we talk about Charles Colson?

No, let's talk about IT and T. Don't change the subject.

Charles Colson, in a memorandum which has been produced in the public records, stated that the settlement of the ITT case would come close "to the very door of the Oval Office." He tied it directly to the President. He said the President was involved.

Sir, I haven't said the President wasn't; I'm inquiring whether or not the fact that he was has any connection with $100,000 to get a convention in San Diego.

ITT officials have so said.

Dita Beard is the ITT official you're talking about; I saw the memorandum too, and she was bragging, of course, because she wanted to make her job important. But in point of fact there is no . . .

One very brief question and answer.

Okay, then . . .

One very brief one.

Special Prosecutor Jaworski has just asked the White House for the tape of Mr. Nixon's phone call to Attorney General Kleindienst, April 19th, 1971, ordering him to drop the IT and T appeal.

Yes.

The order was later reversed but Jaworski wants to hear what Nixon said. Wouldn't it be nice for the House to find out before it votes impeachment on your recommendation?

Very short answer.

If the tape exists.

Okay, that's it.

And if the tape exists, they should ask for it before voting to impeach.

If it hasn't been erased.

Thanks very much, Mr. Dobrovir. Okay, Congressman.

It is true that we have produced witnesses that have presented varying views as to what constitutes an impeachable offense. We did so on purpose. What is so startling is that the case for impeachment against the President is so gross, the facts so demonstrable that it accommodates any theory for impeachment that we might present. The next witness we'll call is Mr. Aryeh Neier. Mr. Neier?

Mr. Neier, welcome to The Advocates.

Mr. Neier is the Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and he will testify tonight relative to possible violations of the President of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Neier, you and the organization that you represent—the American Civil Liberties Union—have concluded that the President should be impeached.

That's correct.

Would you describe why you arrived at that conclusion?

Yes, it was a decision that we arrived at, recognizing the gravity of the step that we're taking and that we're calling upon the country to take. I fall somewhere in the middle among the various panelists who have spoken about the reasons for impeachment. My own view is—the ACLU's view is—that impeachment should lie when there is a very serious damage to the nation's constitutional fabric that is done by a civil officer of the United States, a President of the United States.

Let me interrupt. Relate, if you will, that standard to actions of the President of the United States,

Well, the ACLU picked such issues as the President's secret bombing of Cambodia and his deception of Congress and the American public on that issue. We picked his obstruction of the FBI investigation of the

Watergate break-in. We picked the creation of the Special Investigations Unit, the Plumbers, a secret police in the White House, responsible only to the President, the approval of the Huston memorandum calling for burglaries and wiretapping and mail covers; all of these kinds of things, we think, constitute impeachable offenses. Taken together, we think they constitute an overwhelming case.

What sort of activities did the Plumbers involve themselves in?

Well, the Plumbers were involved in the Watergate break-in itself—that is, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy, members of the Plumbers, were participants in that burglary. Mr. Egil Krogh pleaded guilty for the break-in at the office of Dr. Fielding, Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Another member of the Plumbers, again Mr. Hunt, has pleaded guilty to State Department's cables, dealing with the assassination of President Diem in an effort to make it look as though a dead President was responsible for the assassination of President Diem of South Vietnam.

Will you explain how the President is involved in those acts that appear to have been committed by others than the President himself?

Well, the President himself has said that he created the special investigations unit, the Plumbers. He said so in his May 22nd address to the nation. The President has said that he blocked the FBI investigation when it came too close to the Plumbers. The President has said that he blocked Henry Peterson when Peterson's investigation of the Watergate break-in came too close to the Plumbers. The President approved the very methods that were employed by the Plumbers when he approved the Huston memorandum. The President's principal assistant, John Ehrlichman, specifically says that he authorized covert operations to obtain Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatric files. The President, it seems to me, has taken on his shoulders complete responsibility for all of the acts of the Plumbers.

One more question and answer.

Yes. In the cover-up of the Cambodia bombing activities, how do you determine that to be an impeachable offense? Aren't presidents permitted to keep secrets and, in fact, to lie to the American people?

Well, I don't think presidents are permitted to lie to the American people. I think perhaps all presidents have from time to time, but I don't think any president has lied so seriously, so blatantly, so systematically as this President. This President who claimed that we were respecting the neutrality of Cambodia while we were bombing the daylights out of Cambodia. It seems to me that this President has engaged in a grosser deception than any other President, and he has deceived the Congress while he was deceiving the American public.

All right, thank you very much. Mr. Hill and the panel have the floor.

Mr. Rusher.

Mr. Neier, since we have no direct witnesses and testimony of our own, I'll have to take a moment in my question, which is about Cambodia, to state the case for the President which you perhaps forgivably omitted to do. The President's argument was that the supply lines of the North Vietnamese ran through a portion of Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border, that in order to protect American troops fighting in South Vietnam, it was necessary for the United States to bomb, across that border, those supply lines, that this was done with the entire knowledge and consent of the chief of the Cambodian government at the time, Prince Sihanouk, who stipulated, however, that if it ever became public that this was going on, this bombardment of the North Vietnamese supply lines in Cambodia, then he would have to denounce it. Now, we may choose or not to accept the President's version of the event, and his reasons for doing what he did, and I might add that he said that respecting the request of Prince Sihanouk, that he not publicly announce the bombing, he nevertheless did tell several of the leading Members of Congress concerned with the armed forces, and Senator Goldwater and Congressman Thomas Morgan of your state have both declared publicly that they were so advised, and they are members of the Armed Forces Committees, respectively of the two Houses. Now, I ask you to accept for a moment--I'm sure you would disagree with the explanation, but accepting it just for the moment--if it were true, would there be anything bad, let alone impeachable about Mr. Nixon's action in keeping the bombing secret?

Yes, I think there would be something very bad and something very impeachable about keeping it secret from the Congress and the American public. Well, I would ask you to think of the analogy of Mr. Pompidou agreeing to bombing of France, and Richard Nixon sending American planes to drop bombs on France, and at the same time deceiving the American public and the American Congress about it. It seems to me that the American Congress and the American public would think that the word of President Pompidou, or the word of Prince Sihanouk, or the word of any one person, does not permit the President to lie to them about this country's involvement in war. Congress is given exclusive . . . jurisdiction by the Constitution of the United States to take this country into war. Other presidents have abused that particular provision of the Constitution . . .

Congress . . . Well, don't . . .

This President didn't even allow the Congress to have a say in the matter. The Congress never knew about the matter. Only those people whom the President said had a right to know, or a need to know . . .

Mr. Neier, I'm going to have to stop you if I'm to have any more questions at all. The President, in this particular case, was telling leading members of the Congress. Should Senator Goldwater and Congressman Morgan also be impeached, since they conspired with him to conceal this thing?

Why shouldn't Congressman Waldie, or why shouldn't my Congressman, or why shouldn't your Congressman, have a right to know about this, so that they can vote on the matter?

Suppose you answer my question, Mr. Neier.

Are there to be just a few mandarins . . .

Answer my question.

The answer to your question is that the laws of this country have been held to say that a civil officer of the United States—that is, someone subject to impeachment—does not include a member of Congress, so therefore there is no impeachment process that is relevant, therefore there is no way of asking if that should happen.

Otherwise they should, however, be subjected to the same . . .

I'm saying that any officer of the United States who deliberately concealed the United States involvement of war committed a grave wrong against the Constitution; that those who are susceptible to impeachment, such as President Nixon, are those against whom impeachment should be brought.

And when President Eisenhower, who was a civil officer of the government of the United States, after five years of U-2's flying over the Soviet Union, making military reconnaissances of the Soviet Union, found one of them shot down and proceeded to tell a flat-out lie to the American people, to the world, and to the

Congress; should he too have been impeached?

Now, Mr. Rusher, I said to you before that I think that every President, or most Presidents—I don't want to libel them all—but most Presidents . . .

You only want to libel one of them.

Most Presidents have, in some way, concealed things from the American public.

Concealment is not necessarily true, but that was a lie.

Okay, that was a lie. However, I said also that no one has lied so blatantly and so consistently as Richard Nixon.

What about Eisenhower? Should he have been impeached?

Let me answer the question.

Well, Mr. Neier, I'm going to ask you to please answer yes or no, whether you believe that, under the circumstances Mr. Rusher put to you, would you believe in the impeachment of President Eisenhower?

I would not have argued for the impeachment of President Eisenhower for that because . . . and I want to finish the answer.

Mr. Neier, now wait. I'm sorry. I want a question to be put to you.

That's a yes or no answer, which I don't like to give.

We're having considerable difficulty in getting yes or no answers. I'm a little concerned, with all the witnesses. I'm a little concerned about your testimony with respect to the Plumbers. Now, you began your testimony with the pejorative label that the Plumbers were a secret police.

That's right.

Do the Plumbers have the power to arrest?

They were a secret police . . .

Yes or no, that's all that's required.

No one knows what power they have except the President who gave them power to do what they wanted.

Do you have any evidence that they had the power to arrest?

The President authorized them to engage in burglary.

Not burglary, the power to arrest. Isn't that the essence of a police force?

Mr. Monaghan, they were given no legal power; that's my whole point.

They're not a secret police.

They still engage in the functions of a police.

They're not a secret police agency.

They still engage in the functions of . . .

Is the FBI a police agency?

The FBI is a police agency.

I'm just going to ask for this to be handled on a question and answer basis, Mr. Monaghan.

I don't know who that ought to be directed to. Now, is it your position that the creation of the Plumbers was unconstitutional action?

Yes.

Simply the creation, not what they did, but the creation of the Plumbers?

Well, you can't separate what they were doing from the creation.

You certainly can separate the two.

No, you cannot. If they were created to do one thing . . .

Yes or no. Just a yes or no answer to this.

All questions aren't susceptible of a yes or no, Mr. Monaghan.

I'm being overruled on that also?

The answer is that the creation of an organization . . . The creation of an organization . . .

Could Congress have authorized the creation of this unit?

If it had been bound by constitutional provisions, yes.

I see. Could the President have ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate national security leaks?

Not by means of burglaries.

I see. Couldn't he have ordered the investigation—let's just focus on that—couldn't he have created a unit to order the investigation of national security leaks?

Of course, but he chose not to because he wanted to have an organization which would engage in burglaries.

If Congress could create such a unit, how does the existence of the unit—the simple existence of the unit—violate civil liberties?

Because the unit existed in order to violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against...

Is there any evidence that the President, excuse me, is there any evidence that the President knew of the burglary?

There is . . . Yes . . .

Isn't the fact . . .

Yes, that the President knew of the burglary of Dr. Ellsberg's office for 39 days and concealed that from the Court.

Is there any evidence that the President knew of or authorized the burglary before it took place?

There is evidence that the President authorized burglaries in the interest of national security.

Yes or no.

Yes.

Did the President—your testimony is . . . Isn't it true that Mr. Krogh testified that he alone gave the order with respect to the burglary?

I answered your previous question.

I see.

Okay.

Do you know what the Plumbers were investigating . . . With respect to Mr. Krogh isn't it true that Mr. Krogh's is the only testimony we have on this subject, that Krogh said that he alone gave the order?

No, that's not the only testimony.

With respect to the burglary . . .

That's not the only testimony . . .

And he did not tell the President.

No. John Ehrlichman testified before the Senate Watergate Committee that he specifically authorized covert operations to obtain the psychiatric files of Dr. Ellsberg.

One very brief question.

Let me ask one question if you would, Mr. Monaghan. Was it an impeachable offense for the President of this nation to train, orchestrate, transport, and assist the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, and when that was happening, issue statements from his office that the United States of America had nothing to do with it?

I would go back to the answer to my first question, and I would say that if that action had been taken as part of a series of actions which ripped apart the fabric of the Constitution, then I would say that taken in toto, those are acts . . .

To add to that, that same President got us into Vietnam until we had half a million people wallowing around over there. Would that make it impeachable?

One very brief answer.

I don't think that President's actions with respect to Vietnam were the actions that you described.

Thank you very much, Mr. Neier, for being with us. All right, Congressman Waldie, that completes the testimony, and at this time would you please present your brief summary.

We can take no more from this President. We have had our sensibilities outraged too often by this President. He has abused us too often. We now must draw the line in the only way that the people can when they are burdened with a tyrannical president. We must implement the people's sole constitutional remedy and impeach President Nixon. In doing so, we not only cleanse our system of the ugliness of its present corruption, but we also make it very—yes, if you will, perfectly—clear to future presidents and to our present politicians that Americans demand the morality, conscience and integrity in their leaders, and they do not have such in President Nixon. As Mr. Cox said the night of that Saturday massacre, it is now up to the Congress and the people to uphold the principle that ours is a government of laws, not men.

Thank you. Thank you, Congressman Waldie. Now, gentlemen of the panel, while you have no responsibility to make any argument here, you may wish to comment on what you've heard tonight, and I'll begin by asking Mr. Hill to comment.

I think it's typified by the fact that Congressman Waldie said a unanimous Republican vote is partisan for the President, and a unanimous Democratic vote is wholly impartisanship. But quickly, I think that the impeachment gang struck out on this Huston memo—that is, trying to impeach a President of the United States for considering and rejecting a measure to secure our national secrets—struck out on considering a fine judge, former FBI agent, to head that bureau, possibly insensitive, but hardly impeachable. Nixon resisted Senators McGovern, Tunney, Muskie, and others who urged huge milk price increases, finally giving a little under their partisan pressure, hardly bribery. They struck out on his protecting our servicemen from enemy weapons by bombing their routes through Cambodia with Cambodia's permission. He should have been impeached if he hadn't done it. They seek to capitalize on the fact that Richard Nixon is our thirty-seventh imperfect President, because all have been human and not divine. If that were grounds for impeachment, our last President would have been George Washington. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Hill. Thank you. Mr. Monaghan, your comment, please.

I voted against Richard Nixon in the last two elections, and I don't have any cause to regret that. But the question is not whether Mr. Nixon should have been elected in the first place; the question is whether he ought to be removed now under articles of impeachment, an extremely severe step. Now, you've heard a broad range of issues debated here; there are varying degrees of importance. Some of them surely should be investigated further. Nobody disputes that. And the House has the apparatus to engage in that kind of an investigation, the House Judiciary Committee. Now, what you've heard here is that there should be no further investigation by the House. The point being offered to you is that the House should now act and return articles of impeachment without considering the testimony of a single witness or examining a single document. Now, surely the case for impeachment must be extraordinarily clear before one takes such a drastic step, and surely there's an extraordinarily heavy burden on the proponents of such a step. I submit to you they have not made their case. Let's look at their case. There's considerable disagreement over the standards; laughingly passed off is that any theory will do to convict President Nixon. Most importantly, we have this accumulation theory. The accumulation theory reduces itself to this: throw enough things into the pot, stir them up, and maybe some of the resulting paste will stick.

All right, thank you, Mr. Monaghan. Mr. Rusher.

Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard tonight the best case that could be made for Nixon's impeachment by five McGovern Democrats, one embittered Republican—two Congressmen, two Law Professors, two practicing lawyers—and what precisely does it boil down to? What single instance of Presidential crime or high misconduct has been persuasively demonstrated, instead of merely alleged? Is our press really intimidated? Was Archibald Cox just wrong when he called the IT and T settlement a desirable one? You know that Congressmen Waldie and McCloskey and the others disapprove of Mr. Nixon's policies, but he was elected President, they weren't. And I will make a prediction: that if they succeed in engineering Nixon's impeachment on no better grounds than we have heard tonight, it will tear this country apart for good. What is going on here is a power struggle, pure and simple, and if we abandon the normal rules by which such struggles are conducted, in favor of such politically atomic weapons as impeachment, we will regret it till the day America dies. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Rusher. Well, as promised, we now turn to you in our audience and ask you to participate in tonight's debate. You've heard the accusations against the President, and you've heard them subjected to close questioning. The question that remains for you to decide is whether you believe enough of the case for impeachment remains unchallenged to warrant an affirmative vote by the House of Representatives on any of the articles of impeachment considered tonight. Should the President be impeached? Send your yes or no vote on a letter or postcard to The Advocates, Box 1973, Boston 02134. We're asking you, in effect, to say what you think your Congressman should do on this question of impeachment. If you believe Congress should vote affirmatively now on any of the articles of impeachment, vote yes. If you believe that Congress does not have sufficient basis for impeachment now, vote no. Remember that address: The Advocates, Box 1973, Boston 02134.

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Next week The Advocates will return to its regular format and its regular hour length to consider another question of national importance. So let's look ahead to that time.