CONGRESSMAN, LET’S GO BACK TO THE INAUGURATION, 1980, AND COULD YOU JUST DESCRIBE WHAT IT FELT LIKE IN WASHINGTON IN THESE DAYS?

Well, the country wanted change, but most of all they wanted a change in attitude. They were tired of the pessimism, the guilt, of the Carter years. This attitudinal shift, however, that Reagan symbolized, was probably misread a bit by the new people coming in. They thought the public wanted a massive change in policy. And actually, they wanted a policy tilt to the right, but not an extraordinary leap to the right. They wanted a President to give a new sense of direction and some policy changes. This got misread into a radical change of direction and a radical sense of attitudinal shift. As time went on, I think the administration came to understand that they’d gone too far.

NOW, ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS THE ADMINISTRATION DOES -- MOOD 1980, RIGHT AROUND INAUGURATION?

Well, the country wanted change. Most of all, they wanted a change in attitude. President Carter had come to symbolize pessimism, he’d come to symbolize a kind of an inward guilt. President Reagan came to symbolize optimism and a sense of confidence. Interestingly with this attitudinal shift, though, the country wanted a modest policy shift and this was a bit misread. The new people coming in through there was a desire for radical policy shift. In essence, I think there was a bit misreading of the American public at that time.

WHAT DID IT FEEL LIKE IN CONGRESS THAT WEEK? WAS THERE A SENSE OF A NEW GROUP OF OUTSIDERS SUDDENLY DESCENDING?

Within the Congress, and granted because this is an institution that's ongoing, there was a real sense of wondering what was happening, not a great sense of trust, a belief that the outsider had come in and some thought that maybe the people that had been designated to surround the President weren’t of the highest capacity.

NOW, THE PRESIDENT COMES IN WITH TWO, AT LEAST TWO, THINGS ON HIS AGENDA IN THE AREA OF NATIONAL SECURITY. ONE IS A GREAT DISTRUST OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. AND TWO, A PERCEPTION THAT WE NEED TO RAPIDLY AND MASSIVELY BUILD UP OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

By background, President Reagan had opposed every single arms control agreement that had ever been negotiated with the Soviet Union. He seemed to be saying, “This country had to go it alone more, it had to build up its arsenals to become the protector of almost every advanced cause around the world.”

YOU USED A PHRASE THERE, ‘GO IT ALONE.’ AND I RECALL THAT SINCE. CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT A LITTLE BIT?

Well, President Reagan symbolized a kind of nationalism that was in tune with the times in terms of people’s attitudes, but not totally in terms with reality. The fact of the matter is America will never be in the dominant position we were, let’s say, in the late 1940s as an economic base, as a military base. Relatively speaking, alliances have become more important, not less important. International organizations, more important, not less important. And so this President and standing for a kind of American nationalistic pride, was tapping something deep in the country. On the other hand, he was ignoring the kinds of things that other countries were going to have to give with in kind of a diplomatic way. And so it was a somewhat dangerous track to follow.

HIS EARLY MILITARY REQUESTS, AS I RECALL, SAILED THROUGH CONGRESS. IS THAT THE CASE? AND WHY WAS IT SO EASY TO GET THAT MASSIVE BUILDUP FUNDED?

Congress has become increasingly vulnerable to easy way outs, and the only institutional group that can rein in Congress is really the White House. And so when the White House says we want more for something but we won't tax to provide it, it was an easy thing for Congress to vote. The great compromise in Congress was we’ll give you more military on the stipulation you won't cut back substantially in the domestic area and in the stipulation that taxes not only won't be increased, they’ll be cut. And so the combination program of holding domestic more hold than liberals like to assume, a massive military buildup with a tax cut became a relatively easy policy for legislators from the conservative to liberal wing of both parties to support, and they did.

If YOU HAD TO CHARACTERIZE THE MAJOR ARGUMENT, OR SET OF ARGUMENTS, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION USED TO DEFEND ITS MILITARY BUILDUP, WHAT WOULD THAT BE?

Well, basically the administration argued that the United States had become very vulnerable and there was a great danger in the world and that we had to build back up our military armaments. Some suggested when you have overkill capacities of the nature we had, that this argument was flagrantly exaggerated. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had been building its arsenals rather substantially and it was something that no one could totally ignore.

I REMEMBER THERE WAS CONCERN, THERE WAS THOUGHT AT THE TIME, AND OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SAY, PARTICULARLY AS IT WENT DOWN THE ROAD A LITTLE BIT, THAT ONE OF THE REASONS HE NEEDED THIS BUILDUP WAS SO THE SOVIETS WOULD TALK SERIOUSLY WITH US AGAIN. IT WAS A BUILDUP TO FORCE TALKS. BUT THERE WAS ALSO TALK DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT I RECALL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF WINNING A NUCLEAR WAR IF IT WERE FOUGHT. AND I GUESS MY QUESTION IS WAS THAT A REAL SERIOUS THOUGHT? WAS THIS BUILDUP A BUILDUP TO TALK, DO YOU THINK, OR WAS IT A BUILDUP TO WIN?

I think no one in the administration really understood everything that was happening. There was a get tough attitude prevalent from the White House down to lower levels of government. But there was also not an understanding of where it was going to lead. And basically, anything that was the antithesis of Carterism was considered positive, especially if it was saber rattling. And they did it, and they did a lot of it. Whether or not it helped lead to more serious negotiations later on is something that will always remain conjectural. But at least in the early years, it was very machoistic.

My own personal view is that historically, when leaders get a little bit out of touch with reality, other political parties and other leaders in a democracy are voted in to replace them. But in this instance, what we've seen is a transformation of the leader that got out of touch, not a leader transformation of political parties. And that the last two years of the Reagan Administration are going to be perceived as the antithesis of the first six in some very serious ways.

I WAS GOING TO GET TO THAT LATER, BUT I THINK THIS IS A GOOD POINT TO DO THIS. GO ON, EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE MORE. IN WHAT SENSE?

Well, what happened with the Reagan buildup and the Reagan tough talk was a reaction in American society, a reaction that was symbolized by the nuclear freeze movement, the ground zero movement; most of all by what was happening in churches in small towns in America. It was a little bit elitist in the sense that it was thoughtful people. But everyone started to ask the fundamental questions, when you live in the nuclear age, what distinguishes us from other people? And one of the conclusions was that we're the first generation ever to have the capacity not to just wage war, but destroy civilization. Therefore, there developed in this country a kind of consensus for arms control ironically precipitated by an extreme anti-arms control attitude that seemed to be prevalent in Washington. We had two aspects to that. One was in the arms control front. The other was on the intervention front and the anti kind of cooperation front symbolized by the anti-U. N., anti-Lof C, tendency to intervene in Central America and South Africa. All of these issues came together to cause a reaction. Intriguingly, that reaction came to affect both political parties, not just the Democratic and you saw a reconsideration of administration policy that has lead to a shift in rhetoric where the evil empire language is no longer used, where the Secretary of State was going to Moscow to negotiate arms control rather than to rattle sabers. And you see the likely spin-offs, at least in the arms control arena, with the INF accord and conceivably more substantial basis for a START agreement.

IT’S INTERESTING, ISN'T IT? YOU HAVE THIS PRESIDENT WHO GETS ELECTED IN ’80 WITH AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, SWEEPS IN A LOT OF PEOPLE ON HIS COATTAILS. YET AT THE SAME TIME, YOU HAVE A BURGEONING NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT. IS THERE A CONTRADICTION THERE? WERE THESE TWO DIFFERENT PARTS OF AMERICA VOTING IN DIFFERENT WAYS?

Well, American society is very pluralistic and very divided and people vote for very many different reasons. In the Reagan case, the economic coalitions came together with the kind of new social conservatism with, frankly, a reaction against the leadership of his opponent. And Ronald Reagan has never been blessed more than by his opposition. In his first election, a President that had become discredited. In the second election, a candidate who appeared to symbolize a lot of very liberal values that the American people had considered less than perfect for the times. With this, though, the President precipitated some reactions. In the environmental area, remember this was the administration that began with Jim Watt, and Jim Watt precipitated the largest environmental movement in the history of the country. Watt became the greatest thing that ever happened in environmentalism. Likewise with arms control, the combination of Weinberger and the Secretary of State at the time, Al Haig, precipitated the greatest arms control movement in the history of the country. And intriguingly, movements that start from the bottom up emanate with great strength in Washington. And they did and now you're seeing a shift backwards in policy and arms control and environmentalism are now popular.

YOU'RE A REPUBLICAN, YOU SUPPORTED THE FREEZE. IN FACT, I THINK YOU WERE ONE OF THE SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION, AS I RECALL. WHY? WHAT MADE YOU DO THAT?

Well, I think first it has to be emphasized that the nuclear freeze movement is something that is grass roots thoughtful. As a symbolic initiative coming from the American people reflected in your Congress, it implied a vote of no confidence in those people that indicated that arms control was against this country’s best interests. Now, in terms of the subtleties of agreements, the nuclear freeze has many liabilities. It’s not as good as a START agreement. It’s not as subtle as many other different approaches to arms control. But as a reflection of the American people and the American Congress saying to the administration, “You can't go it alone. The nuclear age demands serious attention to arms control.” It made a great deal of sense to rally behind.

DID YOU FEEL PRESSURE FROM YOUR CONSTITUENTS TO VOTE THE WAY-- TO TAKE THE POSITION YOU DID? OR DID YOU LEAD THEM IN THAT CASE, WHICH?

Well, as a basic rule of thumb, it’s my perspective that in Washington, you have a number of people that have come to stand on progressive sides of arms control issues, but the fundamental leadership in America has come from unelected people from the bottom up. And Washington has been a barometer of American public feeling more than leadership on these issues. There are some in Congress that have had long history and ties to arms control, but much of the knowledge came from the American public, not vice versa. Real leadership in this country at this time does not come from elected personages.

I KNOW THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE IN MARCH, AND I THINK THE FREEZE RESOLUTION WAS ON THE FLOOR, I GUESS FOR A SECOND TIME, AT LEAST THAT, THE PRESIDENT GAVE HIS NOW FAMOUS STAR WARS SPEECH, MARCH 23RD STAR WARS SPEECH. WERE YOU LISTENING TO THAT? AND I JUST WONDER WHAT YOUR REACTION WAS?

My sense for the Star Wars speech was that it had a modicum of rationality behind it; but mainly, it was a kind of, what might be described as public affairs gloss rather than great substance. The fact of the matter is there is no such thing as a perfect nuclear shield. The fact of the matter is that even though it is possible to develop some kinds of deterrent missiles to shoot down some offensive missiles, there is no perfect way to shoot down all offensive systems. And that it was almost a cocoon approach to arms control. It was as if that through technology we could develop an anti-ballistic missile system that made arms control relevant. It was the greatest assault on arms control that could be devised by the human mind.

WAS IT ANOTHER ATTEMPT, SOMEWHAT LIKE THE BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC FORCES TO PUT US IN A POSITION WHERE WE DIDN’T HAVE TO RELY ON COMPLICATED AND STICKY, UNPLEASANT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENEMY BUT COULD GO IT ALONE?

Well, the theory of Star Wars is very simplistic. We as a society can put a shield around our country that will make us invulnerable from nuclear attack. Actually, though, when you think it through, even if one posits all of the pluses of Star Wars, the capacity to shoot down a given percentage of missiles that leave the Earth’s atmosphere, there is no scientist that believes it can be more than 90 to 95 percent effective once a trillion dollars is spent against one particular type of delivery system. But in substance, if five percent get through, you've got 25 warheads per state, each with a destructive power 30 to 50 times Hiroshima, Nagasaki. In other words, a successful Star Wars approach cannot obviate nuclear winter. And then there are many other types of delivery systems, whether they be on sailboats, whether they be on knapsacks, whether they be through the mails that can be developed and have been developed. And there are many ways of developing counter systems to Star Wars defenses, the so-called balloons that can be sent up. This was sheer fiction.

JUMPING BACK JUST A LITTLE BEFORE THE STAR WARS SPEECH, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CLEARLY VERY UPSET ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT. REAGAN ENGAGED IN WHAT I THINK FOR THE PERIOD WAS FAIRLY UNCHARACTERISTIC AT ONE POINT. HAIG CAME OUT THE NEXT DAY. WHAT DO YOU THINK THEIR FEAR WAS THERE? WERE THEY MISREADING THE PUBLIC’S MIND THERE?

The President has always spoken for a given number of Americans, partly in his political philosophy, partly the presidency always speaks for a large number of Americans. Ironically, one of the things the President did, though, in opposition to the nuclear freeze movement which was extraordinarily progressive, was the freeze movement caused the President to come up with a counterproposal, not simply Star Wars, but deep cuts, a so-called start approach. And whether or not this President is able to negotiate a start approach, one of the great gifts he’s given to arms control is that he has legitimatized in the arch conservative community the notion of the desirability of very steep cuts in nuclear weapons. That is a positive, not a negative. It was perhaps developed for public relations purposes, but it became the benchmark for arms control discussions. And as such, in many ways, is far more progressive than the so-called freeze approach. In fact, if you put up the two proposals, the notion of a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms, the notion of a freeze, the so-called liberals in American society were taking a conservative approach, the so-called conservatives were taking a staunchly liberal approach. And it all got embodied less in substance and more in collectives of who are the wes that are speaking? And the so-called wes in the arch conservative movement were talking steep reduction. The so-called wes in the liberal movement were talking a modest first step of evenness, or freeze. In any regard, both sides came to be saying we ought to do something and the only question was whether either side was sincere.

LET ME BEGIN THIS PART BY ASKING THE PRESIDENT, WHO MOVES FROM-- AND I KNOW SPECULATING ON MOTIVES IS KIND OF SILLY AND I DON'T EVEN KNOW IF IT’S MOTIVES THAT I'M LOOKING FOR, BUT IT IS MORE POLITICS, IS THE PRESIDENT RESPONDING? HAS HE SHIFTED ON THE ARMS CONTROL TALKS BECAUSE OF A PERSONAL SHIFT OR DOES HE FEEL THAT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUBLIC, THIS IS WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS? WHAT'S YOUR ASSESSMENT ON THAT?

I think when people assume the presidency, they get faced with reality and the reality of our times are that arms control is an imperative that can't be ignored. And it’s not only an imperative, it’s a time sensitive one. It can't be put off a lot longer because future arms control is more difficult than current. Once you put something in place, it’s harder to control than prohibiting it being put in place to begin with. And classically, that applies to outer space. This President finally has come to understand that. In terms of motives, people that doubt the motives of an American President, I think, err. I think quite sincerely, this President would like, in a sense, to have his cake and eat it, too. To be the President of an arms buildup and to be the President of arms control. He has it within his reach. It’s a serious possibility and it will be a mixed assessment historically.

BUT HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO BE THE PRESIDENT WHO WAS ABLE TO SAY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AT THE END OF HIS EIGHT YEARS, “I HAVE ONCE AGAIN PUT US IN THE POSITION WHERE WE DON’T HAVE TO, OUR SECURITY NOW DEPENDS ONLY UPON OUR OWN INITIATIVE.” I THINK THIS IS, MY FEELING IS THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, THAT WE WERE GOING TO PUT THOSE SHORE BATTERIES UP AROUND THE EDGE OF THE COUNTRY. WE DIDN’T HAVE TO TALK TO OTHER PEOPLE, WE COULD GO IT ALONE.

Well, there are two elements of the Reagan fortress America mentality. One was to build armaments up so that we could go it alone. The second was to say to international negotiations not only in the arms control field, but in all fields, that they're less important. In terms of arms control, A, he built up some of the missiles. Then secondly found, after building them up, that they weren't overly relevant. The battleship New Jersey didn’t have a lot of relevance to the conflict in the Middle East in Lebanon. The new missiles don’t seem to have a lot of relevance to enhancing American security. In terms of international negotiations, pulling back from the United Nations, pulling out of parts of its organs, running from the law of the sea talks may be as significant to national security as anything in the arms control arena. However, he’s shifted gears modestly, again in the last two years of the administration; one towards at least arguing with Congress for a little more support for some of the United Nations. And secondly, moving in the direction of arms control. The great question is whether the forces of nationalism that were a little irrational in the first six years are going to be so dominant that they can't be contained. And then the question of the Reagan legacy; has he legitimatized forces that say international negotiations can never be trusted? Has he legitimatized the notion that we can go it alone militarily and how are the American people going to respond over time? That's going to be the great question.

MIGHT WE FACE THE SITUATION WHERE AN INF AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED BUT THE SENATE WILL REFUSE TO RATIFY IT? I MEAN, THAT'S NOT REALLY A QUESTION FOR YOU, BUT...?

My own sense is any agreement this President signs will be ratified. On the other hand, the Senate may try to do some types of things that will be a little mischievous, the kinds of reservations that might make the agreements less meaningful and rejected, in fact, on the Soviet side. We've had a series of agreements signed that have not been ratified and the Soviets are questioning our capacity to ratify agreements once we sign them. On the other hand, we've also had an international circumstance where the Soviets have been more than a bit mischievous and it’s pretty hard to ratify agreements in the context of an invasion of Afghanistan, et cetera. The great question is going to be whether that international context also changes.

CONGRESSMAN, ON THE HILL AS ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS COME NOW TO TESTIFY AND PLEAD THEIR CASE, IS THERE A DIFFERENT FEELING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS THAN THERE WAS IN ’80, ’81, ’82, ’83?

The White House congressional relationship is never static. It always shifts. Initially, there was an assumption that Reagan was in the saddle and his principal spokesperson was Al Haig and David Stockton. Today, there's an assumption that Reagan is a little less firmly seated in the saddle, but his principal spokesmen also changed, more to George Shultz and in the international arena a new Secretary of Defense. And I think Congress relates to the people as much as to the man and the people surrounding the President are considered a little more reasonable than those he initially had surround him.

FIFTY YEARS FROM NOW, HISTORIANS ARE WRITING A BOOK ABOUT AMERICAN POLITICS AND A PARAGRAPH IS DEVOTED TO THE REAGAN YEARS AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. WHAT WILL THEY SAY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THIS EIGHT YEAR PERIOD?

It’s premature to assess a presidency before it fully unfolds. If an INF accord comes to be ratified, if a START agreement comes to be firmly in place, this President might achieve a rather interesting assessment. On the other hand, if these agreements fall apart, the Reagan years might be portrayed as very nationalistic at a time when greater international cooperation was clearly needed and the President might find his personal capabilities called into question in ways that I think he might find embarrassing.

AND DO YOU THINK THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE WILL RATE A SENTENCE IN THAT?

The Strategic Defense Initiative will be one of a signal political struggles of the ‘80s. Whether it is a continuing struggle for decades and decades to come will depend upon whether in the next decade or so responsible arms control can be negotiated. If it can't, we're going to have a much, much more insecure world environment in the next century.