Interviewer: FIRST OF ALL PROFESSOR, COULD YOU TELL US WHAT YOU REMEMBER ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN 1952 AND 1954 IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE CONTINUED FOR THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY AND EVENTUALLY COLLAPSED? WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS?
Grewe: Those were the first negotiations at all with the allied powers.
Grewe: For many years we lived on that occupation statute with a very minor political role, no freedom of action at all...
Grewe: And in 1951, the negotiations to liquidate the occupation regime started.
Grewe: But they were, from the very beginning, linked up with the plan to rearm West Germany and to do it in the framework of the EDC, the European Defense Community, is a project that was brought up and later on ended up in the negotiations in Paris.
Grewe: I was not directly involved in the EDC negotiations, but in those negotiations which run parallel to them.
Grewe: That means liquidation of the occupational regime, and so I was very much interested in the other parallel process.
Grewe: ...Just ended up in '52 with the first signature of the treaties in Berne and Paris, May '52.
Grewe: And then two years where nothing happened because Parliament did not ratify, as it means in the first line, the French National Assembly didn't ratify, ....because opposition and resistance to German rearmament was still very vivid in France, and So, at the end of August '54, the French Assembly finally voted down the EDC project.
Grewe: So we had to start from scratch again.
Grewe: And there was an interim period of two weeks which were very dramatic when Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles came to all the European capitals in order to discuss substitute solution for the EDC.
Grewe: And so, and in the first days of October 1954, a nine power conference was assembled in London in the Lancaster House in order to confirm the new substitute solution which meant that instead of EDC, West Germany would immediately adhere as a direct member to NATO.
Grewe: This was two weeks later confirmed by the Paris Conference at the end of October.
Interviewer: NOW THAT MEETING AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE, THE CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER, MADE A VERY IMPORTANT CONCESSION AS FAR AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CONCERNED.
Interviewer: CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT THAT WAS AND HOW THAT CAME ABOUT?
Grewe: Well, at the Lancaster House there were some dramatic discussions because there was still some resistance on the French side.
Grewe: The French Premier was Mendes France, and I still remember a dramatic struggle between him and Anthony Eden.
Grewe: Eden very energetically put into reason, so to speak, and one of the elements to calm down the situation and to bring in an important concession was Adenauer's declaration that West Germany would never like to own or to produce nuclear weapons.
Grewe: ABC nuclear biological chemical weapons.
Grewe: And this was the guideline for a whole foreign policy in the following years and we always have sticks to this decision and that was the reason why we were not so enthusiastic to sign the new Non-Proliferation Treaty, many years later, because we felt we had already done what was necessary and it was not absolutely important to take over such a...ah...such an obligation...
Grewe: with the...with the Soviet Union.
Interviewer: OF COURSE THERE WERE, AT THAT TIME AND THROUGHOUT THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES, AND INDEED UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, SOME VERY POWERFUL POLITICAL REASONS WHY GERMANY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Interviewer: WHAT WERE THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS FROM THE EAST AND FROM THE WEST ON GERMANY AT THAT TIME?
Grewe: First of all, the Germans were not enthusiastic about being re-armed at all.
Grewe: There was heavy opposition in Germany against the whole rearmament project.
Grewe: And so, the government didn't want to complicate this debate by bringing in the nuclear question.
Grewe: So the debate on German rearmament in the first years was centered around conventional weapons.
Grewe: And the nuclear question came up only many years later.
Grewe: Then of course, there was always the strong opposition from the eastern side; from the Soviet Union.
Grewe: They tried to torpedo the signature of the EDC in '52 and they sent some notes before the final signature of the Paris Treaties in October '54.
Grewe: Always at the very last minute, they send some notes with some attractive offers and try to disturb the...
Grewe: climate for signature in the west.
Interviewer: THOSE WHO OPPOSED REARMAMENT IN GERMANY ARGUED AT THAT TIME, AND INDEED THERE WERE MANY GERMAN HISTORIANS ARGUING NOW, THAT 1954 WAS A MISSED OPPORTUNITY.
Interviewer: THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING OFFERS WHICH WERE SINCERE, THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PULLED OUT AT LEAST GERMANY.
Interviewer: THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF A NEUTRAL, DISARMED BUT UNITED GERMANY AS A BUFFER STATE.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK THAT WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY AT THAT TIME?
Grewe: No.
Grewe: I don't think so.
Grewe: The main offer came already in March '52 only a few weeks before the first signature of the Bonn Conventions in the EDC Treaty.
Grewe: That was a famous Stalin note of March 11th, '52.
Grewe: And I still remember, I was present in the discussion between Chancellor Adenauer and the three high commissioners, when this note just had arrived, and it was discussed and Adenauer from the very beginning did not consider this as a real serious offer.
Grewe: He always felt it was a maneuver to disturb the negotiations and this was always...this was also the feeling of the three high commissioners.
Grewe: Later on they changed a little bit their view, at least in Paris the...was inclined to take this offer from Stalin's side as a serious one.
Grewe: Which did not mean that they liked it.
Grewe: Of course, they didn't.
Grewe: They considered it as highly dangerous...
Grewe: and the Stalin offer was the offer of a neutralized Germany with some armed forces but very restricted and At least with the obligation of the future reunited Germany, not to adhere to any alliance in the west and in the east.
Grewe: Adenauer never considered this as a...a...as an acceptable offer because he felt a neutralized Germany could not survive between east and west, and it could never defend it's neutrality which those restricted forces.
Grewe: And so in every international crisis, it was open to...uh, interventions, be it from the east or from the west, and it would be a very dangerous and unacceptable situation.
Grewe: And therefore from the very beginning, he declined to make any soundings...in Moscow.
Grewe: Moreover, we were not able to do such soundings because we had no diplomatic...no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
Grewe: We were not the addressees of the Stalin note...and so...how to do it.
Grewe: A new conference in Germany between the four major powers would not be very fruitful.
Grewe: We had have had many such conferences, and they always were mere propaganda....and not really serious diplomatic negotiations, so we felt it was of no use to have a new four-power conference in order to sound out the Soviet intentions.
Interviewer: ADENAUER USED TO SAY, AT ANY RATE, PUBLICLY, THAT REUNIFICATION WAS STILL A VERY HIGH PRIORITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT IT COULD ONLY BE DONE FROM STRENGTH AND HE IMPLIED, IN A SENSE, THAT AN ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST REARM GERMANY, WOULD BE ABLE IN SOME WAY TO ACCOMPLISH REUNIFICATION.
Interviewer: TO THE SOVIETS, THAT MUST HAVE SEEMED ALMOST AS THREATENING A POLICY AS...ROLLBACK.
Interviewer: DON'T YOU THINK? WHAT DID ADENAUER MEAN WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT REUNIFICATION FROM STRENGTH?
Grewe: Nobody knows exactly.
Grewe: And I suppose he himself did not quite clearly know what it meant.
Grewe: He only had the feeling that in negotiations with the Soviet side, you have to be in a position of strength.
Grewe: That does not mean that you wanted to use weapons, but you have to have a certain strength and that is what the Soviets also always tried to do.
Grewe: And so, this was a vague view on how to go on in the near future.
Grewe: Adenauer was, I think rather sure that reunification could not happen in the foreseeable future.
Grewe: And I think he was right with it.
Grewe: But German public opinion was not yet right for such views, and so in his public statements, he always exaggerated and was more optimistic than he really felt the situation justified.
Grewe: That was his dilemma.
Interviewer: LET'S MOVE ON TO THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Interviewer: IN DECEMBER OF 1954, NATO AUTHORIZED THAT EUROPE COULD BE DEFENDED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Interviewer: THERE WERE EXERCISES IN FACT HELD IN GERMANY IN 1955 BY NATO FORCES WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, REALLY PLANNED THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY OR EAST GERMANY.
Interviewer: WHEREVER.
Interviewer: DO YOU REMEMBER AT ALL WHETHER ADENAUER OR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF THE PLANS TO USE SO CALLED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT THAT POINT.
Interviewer: WHAT TIME THEY BECAME OF THAT AND WHAT THEIR ORIGINAL ATTITUDE TO THOSE PLANS WAS?
Grewe: Well, of course in the...uh...years from '55 and German conventional rearmament started...
Grewe: some fears developed in German public opinion.
Grewe: What the nuclear implications of rearmament were.
Grewe: And such maneuvers which you mentioned, and other events, of course, increased the fears and the climax of this emotional development was the big anti-atomic campaign in 1957 and 1958 where hundreds thousands of people demonstrated against atomic weapons in the big cities of West Germany.
Grewe: It was a rather short living campaign, because after...had died down, and in spite of all those demonstrations, the decision was taken to accept the dual capability role of the Bundesvier.
Grewe: And public opinion in Germany acquiesced with that.
Grewe: And so after '58, for several years there was not...
Grewe: no longer a great debate about nuclear weapons—
Interviewer: LET ME JUST GO BACK TO THAT DEBATE.
Interviewer: ALTHOUGH IT QUITE SHORT, IT WAS VERY INTENSE WASN'T IT, AT THE TIME? CAN YOU REMEMBER THE ATMOSPHERE IN GERMANY AT THAT TIME? IS IT THE CASE THAT THERE WAS REALLY A QUITE DEEP DIVISION IN GERMAN OPINION THAT—FOR A BRIEF PERIOD THEN?
Grewe: Yes.
Grewe: Of course there was a...a deep split in German public opinion, the same way as it is today.
Grewe: We have a very strong peace movement in Germany.
Grewe: But we have a majority of the populations which was in favor of the decisions taken by the German parliament to accept the NATO decision of '79 about the stationing of...and cruise missiles.
Grewe: And the same split was already in existence in '57 and '58.
Grewe: On the side of the opponents to nuclear weapons, there were people who were really peace-loving people and pacifists and so on.
Grewe: But there were also people who were inspired from the east, and sympathizers with communism and so it was a mixed group on the opposition side.
Grewe: The same way as you have it today.
Grewe: Today the peace movement consists of really true pacifists and peace-loving people and you have the Greens, and extremists and you have people who are playing the Moscow game.
Interviewer: WHY DO YOU THINK IT WAS SO SHORT LIVED? WHAT WAS IT THAT MADE THAT WHOLE MOVEMENT DISAPPEAR SO QUICKLY?
Grewe: Well I think people realized that the defense of West Germany was not possible without the nuclear brella from the United States and was the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe.
Grewe: And I think they realize that the defense of western Europe could not be done by some forces which had nuclear weapons, like the Americans, and the Bundisver which was completely deprived os...of those weapons.
Grewe: And at least in the case of war, they felt there had to be a unified weaponry on the western side, and so, I think they came to realize that it was unavoidable.
Grewe: They were never enthusiastic about, but I think they realize it was unavoidable.
Interviewer: COULD YOU OUTLINE FOR US THE MAIN PRIORITIES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, AT ANY RATE, IN SECURITY AREA?
Grewe: Well in the field of security we were aware from the very beginning that Germany--West Germany could never be defended by the Bundisver...or even by the European force without the support of American nuclear weapons and without the presence of strong American forces on the European continent and in particular, in the Federal Republic.
Grewe: Those last two points were intimately interwoven because the nuclear em...umbrella was only guaranteed if there was a presence of conventional forces in Germany which would more or less automatically bring the nuclear escalation and therefore have the effect of the nuclear deterrence with the...
Grewe: east.
Grewe: So our main priority of course, had to be,...always to keep the American forces here in Europe and in Germany and even if we very often felt that the American strategic ideas were in many respects dangerous for us, and not advantageous, we had no choice but to acquiesce in order to keep the main position in tact.
Grewe: And you can follow the...line from the mid fifties throughout to the present day.
Grewe: We had no other choice and this was in the background when we decided the question of the dual capability of the Bundisver and later on of the decision of the NATO Council in '79 and even during the last discussions on SVI.
Grewe: This was the main consideration.
Grewe: Nobody was really enthusiastic about this SVI concept, but many people felt we had to go along with the Americans in order to keep the western unity intact.
Interviewer: YOU MENTIONED THAT IN SOME CASES YOU FOUND THE STRATEGIC IDEAS DANGEROUS FOR GERMANY.
Interviewer: CAN YOU GIVE US AN EXAMPLE OF THAT? FOR EXAMPLE, THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE NOTIONS OF MR.
Interviewer: MCNAMARA.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE GERMAN REACTION TO THAT?
Grewe: You see our problem was always a split feeling with these nuclear weapons.
Grewe: On the one side, we strongly felt that European conventional forces were too weak to defend western Europe against the very strong conventional forces of Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
Grewe: And therefore, we needed the nuclear weapons and we needed early use of nuclear weapons.
Grewe: But on the other side, we realized that the early use of nuclear weapons would destroy our country.
Grewe: So between those two points, it was always very difficult to find a sound middle course.
Grewe: And therefore sometimes, we were alarmed by the so-called Ratford (?) plan...uh...of massive retaliation and later on we were alarmed on the strategy of flexible response, so the viewpoint in Bonn about strategy always has changed and was split between those two ideas.
Grewe: As far as the McNamara strategy was concerned, and the ideas of Maxwell Taylor, the Chief of Staff at the Kennedy period, I think we were for some time, alarmed by the idea of threshold and pause.
Grewe: That would mean a high nuclear threshold and very late use of nuclear forces.
Grewe: And the idea of a pause, that would mean after the Soviet attack, not immediate use of nuclear weapons, but an interim period with an effort to negotiate.
Grewe: And we often feel that meant that the Soviets could, without being prevented or punished occupy some parts of western Germany.
Grewe: For instance, the corner around Hamburg, or other important places.
Grewe: And then after this first attacks, there would be a pause in diplomatic negotiations and we would never get back those places.
Grewe: And therefore, this prospective was rather alarming and this was the reason why people like...Strauss went to Washington in summer of '61 and had some vivid discussions with McNamara and his people.
Interviewer: YOU WERE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT ONE OF THOSE VIVID DISCUSSIONS.
Interviewer: COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED THERE?
Grewe: Yes.
Grewe: I...I r...remember very vividly, the discussion which we had in an informal party at Paul Nitze's farm in Maryland with many important people present.
Grewe: People like Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze himself and Maxwell Taylor and Chip (Borne) others.
Grewe: And Strauss was in a position which was not very easy to keep because he was more or less alone.
Grewe: I was the ambassador, but ambassadors always have to be silent and not too active.
Grewe: And so, he had to do the main job.
Grewe: I still remember after this discussion at the swimming pool in Maryland.
Grewe: Strauss and myself, we went—we rushed to Washington because there was a meet the press occasionally a little later, and we were late and came only one minute before it happened, and then the reporters threw out a lot of questions on Franz Joseph Strauss (?) and also on myself at this occasion.
Grewe: And so I remember all this very...
Interviewer: DID FRANZ JOSEPH STRAUSS EXPRESS HIMSELF VERY FORCEFULLY AT THAT SWIMMING POOL MEETING? DO YOU RECALL WHAT HE—DID HE GET ACROSS HIS POINT?
Grewe: Yes.
Grewe: Yes, I think he did so.
Grewe: I think...
Grewe: I think he did so, and he did very effectively —
Interviewer: DO YOU REMEMBER ANY PARTICULAR THING THAT HE SAID TO THE AMERICANS THAT MIGHT HAVE ACROSS TO THE THEM—UNDERSTAND WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT.
Grewe: I don't remember the details, but I'm sure that he must have mentioned those fears concerning occupation of Hamburg and the West German frontier.
Grewe: I remember another very important discussion on the same subject when Adenauer came to Washington for the second time during the Kennedy administration in November '61.
Grewe: And at that time he had a cold--Adenauer, and he was ill and not in his best fashion.
Grewe: And so, the whole discussions were mainly conducted by Franz Joseph Strauss...and I think he impressed the Americans, including Kennedy and McNamara by the strength of his arguments and he is a very effective and convincing debater and so this conference in November '51 was more or less from our viewpoint, saved by his contribution.
Interviewer: DURING THIS WHOLE PERIOD, AS WELL AS THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DEBATE, THERE WAS VARIOUS PROPOSALS STARTING WITH CHRISTIAN HERTER, THEN THE ROBERT BOWIE ONE, AND THEN FINALLY THE MLF PROPOSAL FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF A EUROPEAN MISSILE FORCE.
Interviewer: ROBERT BAUEY HAS SAID TO US, THAT THE MAIN MOTIVE BEHIND HIS PROPOSAL WAS HIS FEAR THAT FRANCE WAS ADAMANTLY PROCLAIMING THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE.
Interviewer: AND HE SAID, "I DID NOT SEE HOW—UNLESS WE DID SOMETHING VERY DEFINITE TO MAKE THE GERMANS FEEL THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED AND THEY DID HAVE SOME SAY IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEMSELVES, I DID NOT SEE WHAT WAS TO PREVENT EVENTUALLY FROM INSISTING THAT THEY TOO HAD TO GO IN THE SAME WAY AS FRANCE." AND BAUEY SAID TO US, OF COURSE, FRANZ JOSEPH STRAUSS HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HINTED THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE 1954 AGREEMENT WOULD LAST FOREVER.
Interviewer: AND THE AMERICANS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT STRAUSS.
Interviewer: WERE YOU AWARE OF THOSE ANXIETIES AND DO YOU THINK THERE WAS ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR THEM? OR DO YOU THINK THAT THE AMERICANS MISUNDERSTOOD THE GERMAN POSITION?
Grewe: I think the American ideas about those fears were exaggerated, but we realize that they felt like that.
Grewe: And so when the American proposal for the MLF were presented to us in January '63, I think it was we accepted because we felt we couldn't...we couldn't deny.
Grewe: We couldn't refuse.
Grewe: We were not as enthusiastic about, because we felt the whole project was a half hearted one.
Grewe: They tried to give us a certain feeling of equality and nuclear parity, but in effect it did not, and it reserved the American monopoly of decision...as to the use of nuclear weapons.
Grewe: And so it was not a very clear and convincing concept.
Grewe: But, because it came from the American side, it was just presented with this argument that...
Grewe: wanted to give us parity.
Grewe: We couldn't say no and so we entered into the world negotiations.
Grewe: German public opinion was never favorable.
Grewe: The MLF was always heavily criticized within Germany and also within the German parties, including the Christian Democrats, which were the government.
Grewe: And then came the time when suddenly the American policy changed...
Grewe: and Non-Proliferation got the priority over the MLF, and one day we realized that we were the last people to defend the MLF project and it was hopeless.
Grewe: That was in 1965 I think.
Grewe: And of course we were not very glad because for many years we had tried to defend the project and suddenly we had to realize that it was hopeless.
Grewe: And then came the discussion about substitute solutions and the main substitute was the creation of the so-called...nuclear planning group...which would mean that we did not participate in nuclear weaponry but we got a certain participation in discussing the nuclear plans and the strategic goals and the targets of atomic weapons.
Grewe: And this was something which we considered important.
Grewe: And so, in general, we felt that the creation of the nuclear planning group was a good thing and was fruitful, and well it still exists up to the present day.
Interviewer: THAT PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN A SORT OF SYMBOLIC ACCESS TO HARDWARE, WHICH YOU HAD NO REAL CONTROL OVER, WAS IT?
Grewe: Yes.
Grewe: At least one quarter that this was the case.
Grewe: Yes.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK THAT FRANZ JOSEPH STRAUSS, PARTICULARLY USED THE FEAR THAT HE KNEW EXISTED IN HIS ALLIES? THAT GERMANY MIGHT WANT TO DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, OR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FEAR OF THE AMERICANS THAT THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS MIGHT GET TOGETHER TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOME FORM.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK HE SORT OF USED THOSE FEARS WITHOUT ANY REAL INTENTION OF ACTING ON THEM, AS A POLITICAL PRESSURE POINT?
Grewe: There were always certain ideas on the American side, as well as on the French side...uh...to give certain participation to the Germans in the field of nuclear weapons.
Grewe: There were some Americans, even some defense ministers who argued that Germany should get nuclear weapons, and become more independent from the American nuclear brella.
Grewe: I think it was Thomas Gates, as the Defense Minister, who advanced those ideas.
Grewe: And there were always—also some French...
Grewe: thinkers--strategic thinkers who were in favor of such ideas and...Again also, the French Defense Minister.
Grewe: And so, it was very difficult, I think, for Franz Joseph Strauss to be completely negative to such ideas and he had to open up the discussion with his French partner on such things.
Grewe: I cannot say how serious he really was with it, but as a...uh...as a sounding out discussion and a...
Grewe: as...
Grewe: even as a...maneuver, I think he used it, yes.
Interviewer: YOU KNOW THE FAMOUS PHRASE OF FRANZ JOSEPH STRAUSS, THAT GERMANY WILL NOT BE THE KITCHEN BOYS OF EUROPE; I THINK IT WAS SOME PHRASE LIKE THAT.
Interviewer: THE "BAKERS AND KITCHEN BOYS OF EUROPE" HE SAID.
Interviewer: IF WE DON'T ACCESS TO AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Interviewer: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THAT ACCESS TO AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAME FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN THE MID FIFTIES, A SYMBOL OF GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY, OF GERMANY'S ACCEPTANCE BACK INTO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AS A FULL MEMBER, JUST AS THE CREATION OF A NUCLEAR FORCE FOR BRITAIN AND FRANCE WAS SYMBOLS OF THEIR GREAT POWER STATUS.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK THERE IS A SENSE IN WHICH IT BECAME AN IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC THING FOR GERMANY?
Grewe: Not for the broad public.
Grewe: There were some thinkers and strategies to add.
Grewe: Such ideas.
Grewe: But I think it never spread really to cover the whole specter of public opinion.
Interviewer: BUT —
Grewe: I mean for public opinion, it was more important to know that nuclear weapons would not be used without our consensus, without being consulted...and that we had a certain participation in choosing the targets.
Grewe: We also did not want to destroy eastern Germany by nuclear weapons so we had to be very careful and interested in this respect also.
Grewe: But as this feeling that we needed nuclear weapons as a symbol of parity and political status was never very popular.
Interviewer: PROFESSOR, WHEN YOU WERE IN NATO COUNCIL BETWEEN 1962 AND THE END OF THE SIXTIES, YOU WERE VERY INVOLVED WITH THESE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT STRATEGY, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND SO FORTH.
Interviewer: CAN YOU REMEMBER THE ATMOSPHERE, ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS, BECAUSE THAT WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE OF A PROBLEM.
Interviewer: CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY INCIDENTS THAT ILLUSTRATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES AT THIS TIME? AND ALSO, WHAT WAS THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TO THE INCREASING FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO?
Grewe: Well the climax of course, was a time when DeGaulle threw out the NATO Council from France.
Grewe: And we had to move from Paris to Brussels, and so, in a very personal way, I felt the deep change which happened.
Grewe: And this DeGaulle decision was of course something which created some bad feelings and some hostility was in the alliance.
Grewe: Later on, the center of discussions were the French Forces as Force de Frappe...which did not very much convince the other NATO nations as far as usefulness and effectiveness of this force was concerned.
Grewe: And also, the French opposition to participate in the strategy discussions in the Council.
Grewe: You see, the only way out was to create a restricted NATO Council—the so-called Defense Planning Committee which consisted of all the NATO no...NATO nations without France, in order to discuss their...the strategic decisions.
Interviewer: BECAUSE THE FRENCH OBSTRUCTED ANY OTHER DISCUSSION OR WHAT?
Grewe: They did not want to participate in those decisions...and they did not want to NA— the NATO Council to discuss it.
Grewe: And so, the compromise was that a special body was established in order for those discussions.
Grewe: And that was the Defense Planning Committee.
Interviewer: IN THE LATE 1950'S WHEN DE GAULLE CAME TO POWER IN FRANCE, THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL AND POLITICAL...BETWEEN ADENAUER AND DE GAULLE.
Interviewer: THEY GET ON VERY WELL AS PEOPLE.
Interviewer: AND DE GAULLE HAD THESE AMBITIONS FOR A THIRD FORCE, INDEPENDENT EUROPE...QUITE VAGUE BUT A CLEAR IDEA THAT WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM NATO, QUITE DIFFERENT FROM A EUROPE THAT CLOSELY ALLIED TO THE UNITED STATES.
Interviewer: FOR GERMANY AND FOR ADENAUER, THIS MUST HAVE BEEN A VERY DIFFICULT BALANCING ACT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PARIS.
Interviewer: CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT A LITTLE BIT FOR US?
Grewe: Yes.
Grewe: It was a...long standing difficulty for German foreign policy.
Grewe: We wanted a very close relationship and friendship with France, and we wanted the same thing with the United States and...if those two got across, then it was difficult for us to make a decision.
Grewe: And this led to the—to a situation where there was a split within Germany.
Grewe: There was a Gaulist faction around Adenauer and his friends, and there was a more Atlanticist faction which tried to avoid the—excuse me.
Grewe: Madame— huh? You see, we have only the cleaning woman in the morning, and so they have to use the time.
Interviewer: SO YOU WERE SAYING, THERE WAS A DIVISION IN GERMANY BETWEEN—CAN YOU START AGAIN?
Grewe: Uh...well and the difficulty to maintain our close relationship with Paris as well as with Washington, sometimes led to difficult situation—an embarrassing situations.
Grewe: And also there developed a split within West Germany some certain Gaulist faction around Adenauer and some people in the CDU, and a more Atlanticist faction around the form of Prime Minister Schroeder and other people.
Grewe: And this led, for instance, to a situation where the French-German Treaty or friendship signed in January '63, was a few weeks or months later grounded up by a preamble which was clearly Atlanticist and took away something from DeGaulle's ideas about the French-German corporation.
Grewe: And it has in a way, disappointed DeGaulle and diminished his enthusiasm for the whole project.
Interviewer: BUT ADENAUER WHO WAS SUCH A FIRM ATLANTICIST IN THE EARLY FIFTIES—WHAT ATTRACTED HIM TO DEGAULLE'S IDEAS? WHY WAS HE THE GAULIST?
Grewe: Well, Adneauer also of course was always an advocator of German-French co-operation and friendship.
Grewe: But, you are correct, he was a great promoter of the Atlantic alliance idea...in Germany.
Grewe: I think he was impressed by the personality of De Gaulle.
Grewe: He was very strongly influenced by him and by his style to argue and..
Grewe: and to deal with him.
Grewe: And on the other hand, there were sometimes disappointments with American diplomacy.
Grewe: Situations we...where we were not consulted, and confronted with a fait accompli which really did hurt us and...so, from time to time, Adenauer had the feeling that he would be in a better situation to side with De Gaulle.
Grewe: So this was, for instance, the situation in '61 during the climax of the Berlin Crisis.
Grewe: And I still remember I was a member of the Washington Ambassadorial Group, which drew up the plans for the Berlin contingency.
Grewe: And in those discussions, where there was British and Americans and the French and we; there was a certain...uh...front line between the Germans and the French on the one side, and the English and the Americans on the other side.
Grewe: And this is— was the consequence of this constellation which I just described...—
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE POINT OF DISAGREEMENT THERE?
Grewe: The point of disagreement at that time was that on the Anglo Saxon side, there was a much greater preparedness to offer concessions to the Soviet Union in order to in order to clear up the Berlin situation.
Grewe: And there was a greater preparedness to enter into negotiations with them.
Grewe: Whereas De Gaulle strongly defended the position; no negotiations as long as there is an ultimatum.
Grewe: He did not want to negotiate under the pressure of an ultimatum and he strictly stick to this position and Adenauer joined him.
Grewe: Joined him also because he felt in such negotiations with Moscow it might "be that there were some political concessions which were harmful to Germany.
Grewe: Concessions which for instance, concerned the recognition of the GDR and the recognition of the Oder Neisse Line.
Grewe: Both points, which at that time, were not very favorably accepted in Germany.
Grewe: But also, other political concessions, for instance, a military disengagement in Europe.
Grewe: And an obligation of the Federal Republic to repeat the renunciations of atomic weapons with, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Grewe: And other similar ideas.
Interviewer: DURING THE MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE BERLIN CRISIS, PRESUMABLY IN GREAT SECRECY, SOME OF THE MCNAMARA WHIZ KIDS HAVE TOLD US, PARTICULARLY WILLIAM KAUFMAN, THAT THERE WERE CONTINGENCY IF THE SOVIETS OR THE EAST GERMANS BLOCKED AN EXPLORATION IN FORCE, DOWN THE AUDUBON FOR EXAMPLE, TO USE A NUCLEAR WEAPON AS A DEMONSTRATION, BUT PROBABLY WITHIN EAST GERMANY.
Interviewer: AND KAUFMAN SAID THAT WHEN THE GERMANS THE SUGGESTION THEY WERE APPALLED AND TREMENDOUSLY UPSET AND HE SAID, "AND THESE ARE THE SAME PEOPLE WHO ARE ALWAYS URGING US TO BE WILLING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS" AND IN FACT KEPT SAYING THAT THEY WERE AFRAID THAT WE WOULDN'T USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Interviewer: WHAT'S YOUR REACTION TO—FIRSTLY, DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THAT AND SECONDLY, WHAT'S YOUR REACTION IN THEORY TO THE STORY?
Grewe: I think at those discussions, all possibilities were discussed.
Grewe: And all options were examined.
Grewe: Perhaps including the option of nuclear demonstration in East Germany.
Grewe: I think it was never very seriously included in the contingency plans which were finally accepted.
Grewe: But it was discussed, I think.
Grewe: And it may well be that at that time it was not enthusiastically accepted by the Germans side.
Grewe: I told you, at the beginning of our conversation here this morning that we always were split between those two possibilities.
Grewe: We wanted early use of nuclear weapons and we did not want it because it would destroy our country.
Grewe: And so, you had to shift from time to time, from the one position to the other.
Grewe: And it may be it was not always very logical to foreign observers to see such shifts.
Interviewer: DO YOU HAVE SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE AMERICAN— AT TIMES, IMPATIENCE WITH THE GERMAN— OTHER AMERICANS HAVE SAID TO US, "ANYTHING THAT WE PROPOSE, ANY CHANGE THAT PROPOSE, THEY WILL ALWAYS OPPOSE.
Interviewer: THE ONLY CONSISTENCY ABOUT GERMANY IS TO LEAVE EVERYTHING AS IT IS." DO YOU THINK THAT'S FAIR?
Grewe: I think it's exaggerated but there is some truth in it.
Grewe: In the same way as we were always irritated by some American attitudes....And
Interviewer: LIKE WHAT?
Grewe: Huh?
Interviewer: FOR EXAMPLE.
Grewe: Well, for instance, by the inclination the American side to do things without real consultation...and to present us with fait accomplis and to make their own lonely decisions.
Grewe: This was something which always irritated the German side.
Grewe: And also, the fact that American policy, very often completely changed from one administration to the other.
Grewe: We talked about the Berlin question, you see, in the early fifties, the Americans told us "We want to keep the occupation regime in Berlin." And the exclusive responsibility of the three powers in Berlin.
Grewe: And later on, when John Kennedy came to power we suddenly heard why don't you take a bigger responsibility for Berlin, including a military responsibility.
Grewe: And we had to tell them, "But, your former administration told us that was impossible, and could not be done in view of the Soviet attitudes." So we were often confronted with change in the American views, and...well...This is something similar, and I'm sure that the Americans were confronted with such...
Grewe: sudden changes in the German attitude, and I can well understand that often there was impatience.
Interviewer: ONE OF THOSE CHANGES OF ATTITUDE CAME WHEN WILLY BRANDT BECAME FOREIGN MINISTER, AND LATER WHEN THE SPD FORMED A GOVERNMENT IN THE OST POLITIK.
Interviewer: WHAT EXACTLY DOES OST POLITIK MEAN? EXPLAIN WHAT THOSE CHANGES WERE AND HOW SIGNIFICANT THEY WERE.
Grewe: Well for many years the public opinion in Germany was a little distrustful with the...with the idea of detente because they felt it would be done with heavy political concessions which would mainly touch our interests.
Grewe: And so...uh...in the sixties, German foreign policy became sometimes rigid, not very flexible.
Grewe: And but the time changed, and at the end of the sixties, it was quite obvious that certain positions of German policy could not be maintained.
Grewe: For instance, the non-recognition of the GDR and the non-recognition of the Oder Neisse Line, and things like that—
Interviewer: I DON'T KNOW IF OUR AUDIENCE IS GOING TO KNOW WHAT THE ODER NEISSE LINE IS.
Interviewer: IF YOU COULD SPELL THAT OUT FOR THEM.
Grewe: Yes.
Grewe: Well the Oder Neisse Line is the question of the German eastern frontiers, The frontiers as they exist now between the GDR—uh, betw...
Grewe: b..
Grewe: between the GDR on the one side and Poland on the other side as a consequence of the...conference and the...decisions of '45.
Grewe: But in Potsdam, there was no definite decision.
Grewe: The Potsdam Agreement said for the time being those territories eastern of the Oder Neisse Line, shall be placed under Polish administration, or under Soviet administration.
Grewe: And the definite decision on the German frontiers, is reserved to a peace treaty.
Grewe: So this was always our position that there was no final decision and as we had millions of refugees from those areas within Western Germany, there was a strong opposition against a final recognition of this situation at the Eastern frontiers.
Grewe: But later, in the sixties it became obvious that those positions became weakened, and that we had to adapt ourselves to the general trend of an opening to the east, and of an effort to come to a detente.
Grewe: And it was the policy of the Great Coalition, and later on of the Social Liberal Coalition, which came to power in 1970, end of '69 and in 1970...uh...to execute this change in policy.
Grewe: And this happened with the Moscow Treaty...1970 which Willy Brandt signed in Moscow.
Grewe: Which also did not really in a legal sense, perform the recognition of the frontiers, but established a kind of modus vivendi.
Grewe: And it expressed our preparedness to accept the present situation for the foreseeable future.