I'll repeat the question. So we get it on tape. Before you became secretary of defense in 1969 were you aware that President Nixon had a plan for Vietnam, the one he discussed in his campaign, and what was your perception of what the plan was?

Well, at that particular time a definite plan had not been worked out. It was my responsibility after I became secretary of defense to go to Vietnam and ah come up with a plan that would be followed by the Administration, and, of course, that was the Vietnamization plan that was outlined ah to the Congress and the American people in April.

What was your, your plan for troop withdrawals from Vietnam and what kind of pressures on one side or another were there for a withdrawal?

Well, Vietnamization was not just a plan for troop withdrawals. For four years the war had been Americanized in Vietnam, and the policy of the Johnson Administration, as a matter of fact, starting in 1963 when President Kennedy made the decision to turn over military combat responsibility to the American forces in Vietnam, that decision was made in '63, we went from 357,000, I mean 357 troops, to about 6000 troops in a very short period of time. And a policy of Americanization was followed from '63 thru '68.

The policy of Vietnamization was to turn over the responsibility for the ground combat and air combat to the South Vietnamese. Ah. It was a policy of giving them the equipment and the training so that they could follow up their responsibility to their country. You cannot guarantee the will and the desire of any country, but you can give them the tools to do the job. We had not been giving then the tools to do the job. We had been doing the job for them from '63 to '68.

Where were the pressures coming from on one side or the other either for withdrawal of the American troops, were the pressures for withdrawal or pressures against withdrawal?

Well, I think the American people had become fed up with the Vietnam War and the fact that American troops had been co—become bogged down there and had taken over the complete responsibility. Ah. I, I believe that there were pressures that were felt from the Congress and certainly during the campaign. I think if President Humphrey ah, or Vice President Humphrey at that time, ah would have indicated in the slightest that there was another plan to get Americans out of Vietnam, because each year during McNamara's term the number of troops went up and up and up during that Johnson Administration.

During Clark Clifford's ten months in the, as secretary of defense, during the end of the Johnson Administration, the number of troops went up and up and up. Ah. And, I think if Humphrey would have indicated that there was some plan, he probably would have won the election. Ah. But, as you know, President Johnson ah had Clark Clifford go on Meet the Press ah two weeks before the ah November election of 1968 and indicated to the American people that there was no plan to remove a single American from Vietnam. And, this position was echoed by the then Vice president, the democratic candidate for president of the United States that they had no plan to withdraw any American.

As a matter of fact, ah, Secretary of Defense Clifford, at the time, when I came out and said there was a plan in the Pentagon and that that plan should be implemented, ahhh, denied that there was even a plan in ISA or any other place in the Pentagon to withdraw a single American from Vietnam. I think that was a mistake because the pressures were on as far as the American people were concerned. The pressures were on as far as the Congress was concerned and, if we wouldn't have moved in the direction of Vietnamization, our whole military force structure would have been destroyed in the United States and we would not have been able to meet the NATO commitments and the other commitments which were treaty commitments that had been made but, had been made by the American government, because the Defense Department was suffering, the ah military acceptance of, even people, the military people ah was going down and it was necessary for us to come up with a plan that would give the South Vietnamese the responsibility in that area. We couldn't assure that they had the will and the desire to carry forward.

We couldn't estimate that the Russians wouldn't live up to the peace agreement of Paris, but ah certainly ah we had to act and ah I felt that the pressures were on from the Congress and from the American people. Matter of fact, there was... my plans for withdrawal were always in greater numbers than really were approved but I had to keep the pressure on on the withdrawal program from the time of Midway in late May of 1969 right through the four years I served in the Pentagon.

Where was the resistance to withdraw coming from? Was it coming from the Joint Chiefs? Was it coming from Kissinger? Could you define it?

Both areas. There was some resistance that my program was too rapid.

Where was the resistance coming from?

From both.

Well, could you, you spell it out?

I, I, I, I... you mean by numbers.

No, no. Could you actually cite it? Who was resisting the withdrawal?

I would say there was resistance from both areas as to the numbers I recommended.

I'm sorry...?

The numbers of withdrawal.

No, I mean, were the joint, were the Joint Chiefs resisting it? Was Kissinger resisting it? Was Nixon...?

In both areas the numbers that I recommended were greater than some times the numbers approved.

Well, for example, in 1970, in April, 1970, you met with Nixon and urged him to withdraw 60,000 men by November pointing out that the election pressures were were building up. Could you recall that meeting with Nixon and what he said to you and what exchanges you went through?

Well, I, I, I had a program that was worked out well in advance as to the manner in which we could turn over the responsibilities to the South Vietnamese. My program levels were always just a little greater than those that were finally approved but they were somewhere in the general ballpark. You're talking about 20 or 30,000 differences from time to time, but the program that I had worked out ah in ah early in 1969 was generally followed. The numbers were not always the same. My numbers were somewhat larger as far as the actual withdrawal figures were concerned. Ah.

I, I want to make clear that I had tremendous support from General Abrams. Sometimes the Joint Chiefs were not as supportive as Abe was over in Vietnam. Abe gave me tremendous support on all of the withdrawal figures and on the entire Vietnamization program. He understood what the atmosphere was in the United States and the need to change the policy of ah the Defense Department under McNamara and Clifford, and he gave me tremendous support. Ah. I wrote a little article about that for the Reader's Digest ah on Abe and ah the tremendous support that he gave me as the military commander in Vietnam.

Did you, what kind of relationship did you have with President Nixon as far as your withdrawal plan was concerned?

He generally was supportive. Ah. There were some differences as far as the figures from time to time. But, ah, certainly he gave tremendous support to the whole Vietnamization program in turning over the responsibility to the South Vietnamese.

Now, I want to ask you what kind of re, relationship you had and what kind of support or opposition you had from Kissinger. Could you mention his name when you answer the question?

I had fine support from sec—ah, Secretary Kissinger. At that particular time, he was the ah presidential advisor on national security affairs. I had known him I guess longer than anyone in the administration. We had, he had contributed to a book which I had edited in 1960 and I had known him over the years and I would say that he ah gave me good support ahh on the Vietnamization program, as well as the Defense Department budget.

I had ah, of course, one of my, I had two goals in mind when I became secretary of defense. Ah. One of them was to ah get ah America disengaged from ah Southeast Asia because I always had been a supporter of General Eisenhower and ah when he was president he said we should never get bogged down in a land war in Southeast Asia and I supported him in the Congress all during the '50s on that issue and right all through the 1960's or that particular issue.

Ah, Secretary Kissinger then the presidential advisor, gave me good support on the Vietnamization program. There were some difference sometimes in the figures. Perhaps, I was for a little more rapid implementation of Vietnamization. Ah. He gave me good support in ah a a change in the draft. That was one of my goals. To get the draft fair. It was unfair. With all of the deferments. They told me I couldn't s—establish a lottery thing. It would never be approved by the Congress. I got it approved by the Congress. And, I moved forward to the volunteer force and when I left defense, selective service was not being used to draft young men and women into the military services. And, I got good support from ah President Nixon and the National Security Advisor, ah, Henry Kissinger ah on those programs.

Did you have a...

Well, I was very close to the Congress, having come from the Congress and spent nine terms in the House of Representatives on the Defense Appropriations Committee, and I can only say that the Congress gave me 100 percent support. I never lost a single vote during the time I was secretary of defense. I had great support in the House of Representatives, and in the United States Senate and for that I will always be grateful.

To get to this question of, of, of what was in your mind ah the proportion let's say of domestic politics as it related to Vietnam? Did you see Vietnam as a domestic political issue basically?

I think it would have been a tremendous domestic political political issue, even greater than it was, if President Nixon would not have approved the Vietnamization program. I think that that gave him time to move forward on other domestic issues and it quieted the tremendous discontent that had been built up from '66 to '68 over the Vietnam issue.

Ah. I think that the press in this country, the media was supportive of the phased withdrawal program in Vietnam, and I think that they ah did understand what was being done. That there was a tremendous build up had gone on there when President Nixon became president and I became secretary of defense. There were 550,000 Americans on the ground engaged in ground combat. There was another million Americans engaged in air and sea support of that effort, and, ah, I believe that the American people, the press, the radio, TV, the media people, generally did a very good job in supporting this change of direction that came about early in the Nixon Administration.

Why did you think Vietnamization was working? You took these trips to Vietnam, but you remember there was the incursion into Laos which was presumably a test of Vietnamization that didn't really work very well. I mean what were your measures for judging? Did you think...?

Well, I thought the Vietnamese handled themselves very well on those missions. Ah. They had ah that was early in the Vietnamization program, but, ah, they did handle themselves very well. There was no question in my mind that they could do the job. I did not believe that they were weaker individually than North Vietnamese. I felt they came from the same stock and they could do the job if they had the will and the desire to do it.

Now, there's no way that you can instill the will and the desire into a nation. There's no way that you could foresee the amount of military equipment and aid that the Russians were putting into North Vietnam in violation of the peace agreement at ah that Advisor Kissinger had negotiated in Paris. But, I do believe that they ah were capable of handling the military situation.

But, when you planned Vietnamization, when you conceived of it and you pushed it, was it predicated on on the Vietnamese, the our South Vietnamese continuing to get American support as long as possible...?

Stan, excuse me. Move your left elbow a little bit.

It was conceived on the idea that...

Excuse me... start again.

It was conceived on the idea that there would only be replacements placed in the country by the United States. Replacement and spare parts for their equipment, and it was also predicated upon the conditions that were outlined in the Paris Peace Accord which the Russians and the Chinese would follow the same rules as far as...

Excuse me. We're getting, you're getting a little ahead yourself. The peace accord doesn't come til '73. We're talking about now...

The peace accords came ah, as you know the peace accords started and the negotiations in those particular provisions were agreed upon in '71.

I'm sorry. Would you repeat that that the Russians had agreed not to continue supplying in '71?

No, the peace accord discussions started in 1969, but it was always anticipated through all of the discussions that there would be a provision that only spare parts and no new equipment would be placed in the North by the Russians and the Chinese. When the peace accord was finally signed in 1973, early in '73, think it was about January 23, I may be off a day or two on the date, that particular provision that had always been part of the discussions and always a very important part of the Vietnamization program was in the agreement.

But, before the agreement was signed, we were sending in all kinds of stuff. The Enhance Plus program?

So were the Russians, but it was anticipated that once the peace agreement was ah peace agreement was signed that there would be only replacements from the United States and from ah the Russians and the Red Chinese. I'm sure you're familiar with that provision.

Were you concerned about the morale of the American troops in Vietnam towards, let's talk about 1971, early 1972; drugs, fraggings, ah, could you discuss that?

Yes, there was. We had a program that we...

Sorry, could you repeat the subject?

We had a program that was going forward there under ah General Abrams' very fine leadership to deal with the the drug problem, which became a very severe problem as far as Vietnam was concerned, and I think General Abrams and his people moved forward ah on that program ah very adequately. I had to sometimes ah keep after them a little bit because ah they were involved in the training programs and turning over the responsibility to the Vietnamese, and ah, it was necessary to get after them from time to time on ah on those other personal military problems that did exist as far as our troops were concerned.

Were you concerned that there might be a backlash from the American military if Vietnam didn't produce a victory? How, how did you keep the military together?

The military ah became a very much ah ah a part of the Vietnamization program. Not only did I have General Abrams support but I had support of most people that had looked over the challenges which the United States faced as we moved into the decade of the 1970's and the 1980's. During the Johnson Administration we had robbed our NATO forces of some ten billion dollars worth of equipment. As you know, when I was in Congress, I accused ah Secretary McNamara and President Johnson of following a program of fighting now, paying later, and ah, I felt that ah they had under-funded the budget and were robbing our NATO forces and other forces all over the world.

Ah. And, when I became secretary of defense, I found out that that's exactly what they'd done. And, our military understood that. They understood that if we were going to get the kind or support that was needed and necessary for the military forces in the '70's and on into the '80's, that we had to build up American support for military people. People are the most important thing in the military. Tanks and airplanes and ships are very secondary.

But, we didn’t have the kind of support that was needed and necessary because there was a lot of disenchantment from 1965 to 1968 with the Department of Defense and with our military personnel. So, what I tried to do is develop a program of participatory management in the Department of Defense. To bring the military leadership and the civilian leadership together. We started out very early with a conference at Airlie in which I took them for three days and we sat down and went over all of the problems of the deterrent force of the United States as it met its treaty commitments.

The Vietnam commitment was not a treaty commitment. It was not a commitment that had been approved ah constitutionally as ah all treaties are approved, but it was something entirely different, and so we tried to bring the military and the civilian leadership together to plan for the future. And, the way to plan for the future was to disengage Americans from the kind of activity that they'd gotten involved in in Vietnam and to turn that responsibility over to the people there. You know, Southeast Asia the wars have gone on there for hundreds of years. They will be fighting in Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam for the next fifty years. And, we have to understand that. There's not much we're going to be able to do about that. We're not in any position where we should choose that area of the world to become involved in ground combat.

I remember so well, ah General Eisenhower and I traveled with him in the campaign in 1952 in which he outlined ah his speech that he would go to Korea because he felt it was a mistake for America to get bogged down in that kind of land combat in Southeast Asia. I became a disciple of the Eisenhower philosophy as far as that area of the world was concerned, and that's why, with participatory management, getting our eye back on the ball as to what American commitments were and what the important commitments, military and from a foreign policy and a national security viewpoint were in the world in which we lived.

Why did you have...

We're running out of...

Why did you have misgivings about the bombing in Cambodia in 1969 and what changed your mind about it?

I didn't have any reservations about bombing Cambodia in 1969. My disagreement with the president and with Kissinger and with the secretary of state were keeping them secret. I recommended bombing the Cambodian sanctuaries in 1969 and, I think, there's some un—misunderstanding about that.

My recommendation was to bomb those sanctuaries which were occupied by the North Vietnamese and which they were using after they attack American forces and running back into the sanctuaries. I had no reservation about the bombing of those occupied sanctuaries in 1969, but I didn't want it kept secret because I felt I could get the support of the Congress and the American people to protect American troops in South Vietnam as we withdrew and I felt it could not be kept secret because I had 16,000 military people that would have to be involved and I told the National Security Council, the president, the presidential advisor for national security, and the secretary of state that their proposal to keep it secret just would not work.

And that's my disagreement. And, I think its been misinterpreted. It had, it did not have to do with the bombing. It had to do in the manner in which they wanted to carry out that bombing which I thought would lead to trouble and I felt I could get the kind of support that I needed from the American people and from the Congress to go forward with it and I did not want it on a secret basis. And, that's where the disagreement uh existed.

Why did you have reservations about putting US ground troops into Cambodia in 1970?

In 1970 I felt that it was important to use...

I'm sorry, would you move your shoulder one more time...?

I felt it was very important to use South Vietnamese troops in 19 ah 70, not only in the incursions in Laos, but also in the incursions in Cambodia. I felt that it was absolutely essential to give them that kind of training and that kind of responsibility. As you know, the military commanders, US military commanders felt that you could not guarantee success without using Americans. I disagreed with that particular proposal. I felt that it should be the responsibility and give the South Vietnamese the complete test at that time.

What (clears throat), how did you see the results of the Cambodian incursion? Did you think ah the Cambodian invasions? Did you think it was successful or not?

Now, the results show that it was successful. At that particular time, I was not sure whether the incursion was successful, but now, as you know, as we go over the reports from both sides that we've had recently ah that was a successful incursion. But, I still believe that it would have been better to give that total responsibility to the South Vietnamese.

Did you anticipate the domestic opposition that would take place when that attack against Cambodia happened and how did you feel at the time that it happened?

Well, at that particular time, I felt by using American troops in Cambodia, instead of using the South Vietnamese troops, that it might set back the kind of support that was needed and necessary to carry Vietnamization out for the full course. And, it did cause some problems. And, I had anticipated those problems and I had outlined those problems at a National Security Council meeting. Ah because I felt that at that particular time we had to do everything we could to bring the Congress together, bring the American people together to support our overall program of withdrawal and turning over the responsibility to the South Vietnamese.

Could you recall to us what was your reaction ahhh when we had that outburst at the time of the Cambodian incursion? Kent State, the kids demonstrating and so forth in Washington, what was your own personal reaction to that?

Of course, I was very ah concerned about it. My reaction was great, deep concern.

Could you elaborate a little more? Wha, what kind of moves would you have recommended one take to to meet tha—that kind of...?

Well, I had anticipated that there would be that sort of reaction if we moved forward and used American forces in that operation.

I just want to go back now. There seems to he a feeling ah in the country among people that the defeat in Vietnam, the thing that defeated us was not communists in Vietnam, but the politicians back home. Could you talk about that a little bit?

Well, I don't think we were defeated in Vietnam. I think the South Vietnamese were defeated. The South Vietnamese were defeated not for lack of equipment or training, but because of a lack of will and desire to face up to the North Vietnamese and the increasing support the North Vietnamese were getting during that period from the Soviet Union. I think that defeat was a defeat for the South Vietnamese. I, see there's no question about that. But, I don't believe that it was the responsibility of the American people, the American Congress or any American administration to take over complete and total responsibility for ensuring the will and the desire of another country to resist their neighbors to the north.

Looking at the world today, post Vietnam world, what has Vietnam done to us domestically and in our foreign posture?

Well, I would hope that had, Vietnam would re-establish the Eisenhower doctrine. I call it the Eisenhower Doctrine as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, and as far as Asia is concerned. I think President Eisenhower was very wise in his advice to the Congress and to the American people that we should not get involved in ground combat in Southeast Asia or in Asia. And, I think that ah the experience of the Johnson and the Kennedy Administration in changing American policy to one of ground combat responsibility is a lesson that has well, been well learned in the United States.

What has Vietnam done to us domestically? What has it done to our society in your estimation?

Well, I think we've gotten over the ah the problems that were caused by the Kennedy/Johnson Administration in engaging in ah Southeast Asia. I think that the American people are now willing to support a credible deterrent as far as our military force is concerned. I think that they will be very careful in, ah instructing their members of the United States Senate on the kinds of, on the kinds of treaties and military and national security commitments this country makes in the future. But, I think the American people are willing to support the kind of national security and national defense policy that's needed and necessary for the free world to have a credible deterrent.

Did you sometimes feel that your prerogatives as defense secretary were being usurped by Kissinger when he was the head of the National Security Council staff? Could you discuss that?

No, I had no problems with Secretary Kissinger usurping any of the authority of the Department of Defense while I served as secretary of defense. I had disagreements with Secretary Kissinger, such as, the Cambodian bombing. I didn't want it kept secret. I felt that was a mistake. Ah. His position ahh prevailed. Ah. But, as far as the kind of support I got from ah the president and from the secretary of state and from the national security advisor ah there certainly were some disagreements, but, basically, I had strong support. As you know, when I became secretary of defense, I was not the first choice of the president. Ah. I had urged him to appoint Scoop Jackson as Secretary of Defense cause I felt it was good to have a democrat.

Scoop backed out at the last minute, because he ah felt that it would interfere with ah possible presidential ambitions that he had. And, ah, at the last minute I became secretary of defense because I had, evidently the president thought I had led him up a blind alley on Scoop Jackson, and I'd been on the Defense Appropriations Committee a long time and I decided to, that I should do this.

Ah. But, I did it with very strong understanding that I would have complete control over military and civilian personnel in that department, and that I'd also ah have ah access on all budgetary matters. That I would have, not have to go through the office of management and budget on those particular problems.

Ah. I believe that ah the support I got was ah good support and strong support. I won most of my battles in the National Security Council. I can't say that I won them all, but I can say that I won every battle that I got into or every issue that I go, presented to the Congress of the United States and I'll be forever in debt to the House of Representatives and the United States Senate for the tremendous support they gave to me and to the Department of Defense. Each and every one of those forty-eight months as I served as Secretary of Defense.

Okay. Good.