Just start, Wayne, by saying about what operations you were involved with at the very beginning of your arrival there concerning Cambodia. What sort of things [inaudible]...

They were the basic, at the time, search and destroy missions.

If you could just say, “My Cambodia operations were the basic,” just to preface it.

Okay. My Cambodia operations were the basic search and destroy missions. Everything that we did in combat, as we were told, were, was for the purpose of eliminating the number of Americans that would be killed to bring the war to an end. And many of us thought it was still a noble cause while we were there fighting. That indeed we thought we were fighting the enemy, the Vietnamese and stopping a supply of arms.

And so how would you know that you had crossed over in a Cambodian operation rather than a Vietnamese operation. What would be the evidence you had?

It was common knowledge. Most of us, well, the unit I was in, I should say, it was common knowledge. The lieutenant was pretty much the company commander. They were all pretty much young Americans who were, felt a common bond of sorts. The survival – we needed to survive. And therefore there was a great reliance amongst the unit. And we were told when we were going into Cambodia, it wasn’t an official campaign at the time and this was early ’70, you know, and it wasn’t officially declared that we’re going into Cambodia, but we knew we were going into Cambodia to get enemy caches of weapons and to get infiltrators.

When you'd go into Cambodia did the Communists, the North Vietnamese, show signs of preparing for you to go in, or was it, were they taken by surprise?

Well, sometimes they were taken by surprise.

Would you say, "Sometimes the Vietnamese were..."

Okay. Sometimes the, the Vietnamese were taken by surprise. We had NVA prisoners, NVA documents and weapons and plans and so it was successful in some ways, and for us it was, you know, I was happy about it. I was happy about the idea that we could get the NVA before they got us because surely that’s what they were going to do. And that was what in the mind of us.

What about the feeling of all the other guys? Was it generally that? The idea was that it was a good thing because you were getting to them first?

Yes, very much so. It was a good idea for us to strike the Communists as we still believed it was the Communists before they struck us. We saw, and it was ironic, because we saw that it was unfair for the North Vietnamese to be supplying weapons through Cambodia into the South. But it was okay for us to go and get the weapons. Very clearly, it was acceptable for us and we wanted to. Again in our minds it was uh going to be a quick end to the war and that’s what we wanted.

What about the air support that was going on at the time on the border and inside Cambodia. Could you tell me what you knew about it?

Well, I knew that there was, we knew that there would be air support whenever we went out. That was pretty much – we expected it heavily and it usually always came. Uh, whenever we had any kind of action, usually heavy action, we would call in air support, we would call in artilleries and there were, artillery units along the border that could easily give us support and cover and help us to pull back when it was getting very tough or when we stumbled on something that we didn’t expect.

I’ll ask you that again. You said we expected air support, but you didn’t say where. So people won't know what...so I’ll ask you the same thing about air support and how useful it was for you.

Well, air support was very useful for us when we went into Cambodia. It was invaluable because it helped pull us out of several uh uh tight spots that we got into with the enemy in Cambodia.

What about the effect of the operations on the enemy, on North Vietnamese. Do you think they spread further back into Cambodia after that or did they disperse throughout the border, or what was their thinking?

Well, when we went into Cambodia and we were able to find caches and we were able to, to kill the enemy they didn’t usually return in the same area. You know, so we would sometimes go back like for, and many times we would go through the Plain of Reeds region of South Vietnam into Cambodia. And on those operations we would go near or around the area that we had gone into previously, on previous operations. But usually they would never be occupied. The enemy would move their positions and would move their, alter their lines of infiltration into the South.

I think you are talking about periods now before the invasion when you say that.

Yes, I’m talking about periods before the invasion. The invasion was, you know, the invasion was a major thrust. That was, it was an invasion by every stretch of the imagination. I’m talking about operations prior to the invasion, operations that when we knew, and in essence we were sending information back through headquarters and intelligence to confirm that NVA supplies and weapons and soldiers were coming through the South. So this was I suppose in some ways the period that could have been used by the general staff to confirm that we needed to go into Cambodia.

What about the presence of Cambodians, civilians, or villages or even troops. Did you ever see any Cambodians in the sanctuary areas that you went into?

Usually not.

Say, “Usually we didn’t see...”

Yes. We usually didn’t see the Cambodians, but it was hard to tell in some ways. There was some Cambodians that looked similar to Vietnamese but for, for the most part at least we confirmed them as being NVA.

And were there any uh Vietnamese civilians there as well or were they just purely military?

No there were civilians there also.

Could you say Vietna—...?

Yes. There were Vietnamese civilians there also, but they were supportive of the military or they wouldn’t have been there. In combat we, we didn’t think of distinguishing who was, who was civilian and who was enemy and in fire fights it was very crazy. Although we wanted to go into Cambodia, it was very frightening. I mean, we were real scared. We knew that we weren’t in our home ground and so it was very scary for us. And through fear sometimes we, we overreacted.

What size operation are you talking about?

Well the operations varied. We would have squads going through. We would have, depending on what supposedly, according to our company commander, depending on what intelligence he got about uh various troop, enemy troop movements in Cambodia, from Cambodia into Vietnam, we would be assigned to various um blocking forces to stop the infiltration. And, and based on that we thought that it was, wait a minute...I’m sorry.

When you do it again, just say what period you’re talking about.

Okay. Would you ask the question again.

What size of operations were you involved in and what period?

Okay. I’m going into Cambodia the operations varied, prior to the invasion. Usually it was a company size operation, but other times there would be vari—various squads going in deeper and various forms of reconnaissance. As I understood it we would go in to different parts of Cambodia according to the intelligence that our officers received regarding troop, enemy troop movements from Cambodia into South Vietnam.

And what about ARVN? Did you occasionally go in with ARVN, or was this purely an...

Well, we were, you know, I, I should say I was just, when we went into Cambodia, we were predominantly with Americans. There were ARVNs in other parts of the operation. And ARVNs were also going into Cambodia as far as I knew, and we knew, but the thrust of the operations were more Americans, that I knew of.

And in this period of ’69 did you know about these secret bombings – B-52 bombings on the Sac Therese?

Yeah. We knew of, it was again, it was pretty common knowledge. And anyone...

It was common knowledge then?

Okay. Yes. It was common knowledge that bombing was going on in Cambodia. Again, when we went into various operations, I mean, we would get air support. When we would find, or we would locate various um enemy caches, sometimes we would just blow them up, other times we would call in artillery and other times bombing would take place. Depending on what was our intelligence about the size of the enemy and the number of weapons we would use or call in B-52 strikes. B-52 strikes were real...that was also scary. Because I remember we would be pulling back and in pulling back the ground would shake and our feet would rattle, and it was, it was very scary. But again it was toward a noble cause, we were told.

Can you explain again the scariness of the B-52’s and explain how far away it was you were when you felt this?

Well, first of all, B-52 strikes, and those were the only ones I knew – I wasn’t involved or near any B-52 strikes in South Vietnam, it was in Cambodia. And you couldn’t even see them you know they were so high up. And you would only hear the explosion and feel the earth shake, and it was I guess like a volcano might be. You know, like you can be so far from it yet feel the intensity of it. And on a sadder note, I felt sorrow for anything that might have been in its way. Those things were so fucking destructive.

Just uh tell me, Wayne, about your experience in the invasion. What your operation was, or what your unit was doing?

One second. Okay, thank you.

Um, my role was that of a combat medic, and as such when we went into Cambodia, in the operation, my role was to be as quick as possible to get the wounded taken care of and evacuated. The main thrust of the operation for us, the second of the 60th Ninth Infantry Division was that of a a blocking force. We would enter Cambodia, hold our position, our general position, and find any weapons, any enemy whatsoever we could. And so I was not a combatant, and I was thankful I wasn’t a combatant. I was...and I rationalized it but I was still pleased that I was a medic because for me I was helping to save lives even in Cambodia and even in the face of the horrendous war that it was.

Can you tell us um how the invasion differed from the other operations you'd been involved with, and actually say, “It differed, the invasion differed...”

The invasion differed from other operations that I was involved in prior to uhm 1970, in the sense, in the level of escalation, in the level of support...

Could you, do that again, but...

Okay.

“Involvement in prior operations in Cambodia...”

Okay. Yes. Uhm. The invasion of Cambodia had been significantly different from prior operations in Cambodia, prior operations to the invasion, in this way. That we were fully equipped and had a lot of support of, of men, supplies, food and when men were wounded we would get replacements. Uhm...that...I lost it.

Just start again.

Yes.

Just tell us the difference between the invasion operation and the other operations you were involved in in Cambodia.

Okay. The invasion of Cambodia was different than earlier operations that I was involved in in Cambodia in this way. That the number of men and the amount of supplies that we had. We had more air support during the Cambodian invasion prior to other times when we went in. I mean, there were, we could see the helicopter gun ships above us, like this, at that time of the invasion as opposed to prior operations to the invasion of Cambodia, we would have to call in air support. I mean, they were readily available but the operation was, it was a sense that we were really doing something this time, rather than just nit-picking and catching a, a few enemy or, or twenty or fifty or whatever. And maybe a hundred pieces of arms, this time we were really going to get the heart of, of the um supply source. And in some ways we did. We saw some of the supplies and the men and the dead NVA soldiers and it was encouraging for us.

Tell, tell me what you said before about how it was sort of a strange feeling afterwards because you thought this would end the war.

Yeah, it was ironic to go into Cambodia for us, during the operation and even prior operations to the invasion of Cambodia, because we saw it as a way to help end the war. It was, we knew or believed reasonably so, that we could control areas of South Vietnam. Obstensibly, (clears throat) we believed (cough)...Excuse me.

[Inaudible] some water?

No, (cough), just some of that co—...

Tell me what you were saying before, about the feeling you had about what you thought it was going to achieve.

I thought the invasion of Cambodia and the operations that we ran into Cambodia, prior to the invasion, were toward a peaceful end. And it’s so goddamn ironic, but we saw ourselves as going to the source of the supplies. In South Vietnam, in the Mekong Deltas, specifically, the 9th Infantry Division had made its mark. We had pretty much controlled the main areas of South Vietnam. We had Viet Cong um attacks and snipers and mortars, but we didn’t have the major kind of NVA uh offenses that were coming through the South. And so we knew that these arms and men were coming from Cambodia into South Vietnam, so for us it was very practical and the thing to do to invade Cambodia, or to violate Cambodian space to go to the source of weapons and men.

See all we were interested in, you must understand, we were interested in living and saving our buddies. That’s what the war meant to us. So we knew that these weapons were coming from Cambodia so we went there. And I’m glad we did at the time. We believe, and I still believe in some way, that by stopping the flow of those arms helped save some men. It violated Cambodia, but that’s way, that's the way the war was. It was one massive violation.

What about the feeling of your buddies toward the actual operation? Was the morale good on the operation, or were there any problems?

The, the morale was generally good on the oper—...

Could you say...

Okay. Yes.

...morale...

The morale of, the morale of we men going into Cambodia was generally good. Most of us genuinely believed that by stopping the flow of arms and killing the NVA before they got into the South would have been in our best interests. And so morale was good. There were peculiar feelings about invading Cambodia, because if we had been killed there, who would know? I mean, no one in America knew that we were in Cambodia in ’69, you know, so it was eerie, and surreal in some ways.

But the morale was, was better I should say going into Cambodia, because there was more of a sense of purpose in that the actual flow of weapons and strategists of the NVA North Vietnamese Army wouldn’t be getting in and, and attacking us and helping to organize the Viet Cong in the South.

What sort of operations did you take part in once you were in Cambodia on the op— on the invasion? Was it, did it vary very much?

No. the operations into Cambodia were pretty much the same every time we went in, prior to the invasion, we went in to simply kill as many of the enemy as we could and to take as many of their weapons as we could. And/or have artillery um destroyed or, or air strikes.

What about the actual invasion then? What sort of operations? Did they differ very much?

Yeah, the operations differed during the invasion as opposed to prior to the invasion in the way that we, we blew the hell out of Cambodia during the invasion. I mean we relentlessly bombed them and shot them up and they killed a lot of us too. And interestingly enough we weren’t told of the casualties in Cambodia. It was all to a minimal. We really thought we were very successful and that it was a major success for us.

Only after the operation was over did we realize how our ranks had been decimated. And indeed how many people had been killed and that’s when the reality struck us. Because, and, and I have to say that the morale was high, going into Cambodia, because it was becoming more stagnant in South Vietnam. So once going into Cambodia and having this high and then going back to South Vietnam in the same kind of combat that’s when I think the infantry men in my unit had a real change in morale. We um, we saw through the war. The war was futile.

What about going back into Cambodia after the invasion? Did that take place or not?

Well, yes, it was constantly going on for as long as we thought there were any kind of weapons. Once we entered Cambodia, uh for the invasion then it was our space. We did what we wanted to.

But after the pullout in June 1970, did you go back in again after that?

Yeah. Yeah. After, after the pullout in 1970, after the pullout of the major invasion, yeah, we still ran sweep operations, you know, there was less intense but we still had thought that they might send more supplies through, so yes.

Did you have to be doubly careful because Nixon at that point had said all operations had ceased in Cambodia, so was there any problem about that or...?

Well we didn’t have reporters with us, you know, so nobody knew. You know, several of of the uh grunts with us, you know, they wrote letters home, but nobody really knew. We did what we wanted to do. It was our war.

What was the fighting spirit like on the ARVN side? Cause a lot of them were trying to get revenge, I think, from the massacres of Vietnamese that had taken place.

Well, I don’t know a lot about what the ARVNs were like at the time. Uhm during my combat time in Vietnam, we didn’t like the ARVNs, we didn’t think that they were good fighters, we thought that they oftentimes were, were cowards. Later after leaving Vietnam and reading some of the facts of the war I understand that the ARVNs were in far more combat than the Americans.

Cut.