Can you describe what happened in March 1965 and how the Americans arrived without any consultation or prior knowledge of the South Vietnamese government?

I would say that at this period of time the relations between ah the Vietnamese government...

Start again and say when it was?

Your question is ah...There is no need to refer to your question anyway.

Yes. Say, in March of 1965 when the Marines came. In other words you’ve got to repeat the subject because the questions won’t be...

Ahhh, yes. In March 1945...

March ’65.

Yeah. I’m sorry about it.

Okay. Go ahead. Start again.

Well, at this period of time, I mean in March of 1965, the relations between the Vietnamese government and the American government represented in Saigon by the ambassador were quite close but, ah, talking specifically about the landings of the Marines in Da Nang on March 8, 1965, I would say that ah, there was no prior consultation about it.

I remember precisely that on the same day Dr. Quat, the Prime Minister, called me on the phone and asked me to join him in his office and ah, once there I found an...American officer who was supposed to get along with me to drop the communiqué. And by then we learned that ah, it would be a landing of the Marines.

And ah I asked Dr. Quat, the Prime Minister, later on if he was precisely consulted on this problem of the landing of the Marines, and Dr. Quat said to me that, well, there was an understanding about the overall problem, but in terms of precise consultation about this very specific problem of the landing of the Marines in — hhhe’s like me and he learned at the last minute that, ah, the Marines would land in in on the date that mention in the communiqué that we are going to produce.

And what about in the summer of...July when another, when there was another big American buildup?

Yes, in July 1965 I remember that ah, President Johnson by this time decided to send to South Vietnam more than 150,000 troops. I was at this time, ah, Special Assistant to Prime Minister Ky, and I got the phone one morning from the US Embassy in Saigon informing me that President Johnson did...decided to send 100,000...150,000 troops to South Vietnam, and the US Embassy by then asked me to inform the Prime Minister about the new decision from President Johnson.

I informed Prime Minister Ky about this problem and ah, as usual I asked that he, if there was a prior consultation between the two governments about this sending of a new important batch of US troops in South Vietnam, and Prime Minister Ky by then said to me that there was an understanding that ah, well, the US is ah, trying to help us as much as they can, but ahh, he doesn’t remember exactly...uh...how it was ah, this problem of sending the...this large a number of troops to South Vietnam.

Could you talk about the impact of the American intervention on South Vietnam and on the South Vietnamese? This whole bulldozer effect, money and the corruption in a sense, not only financially but morally, could you describe what it meant?

In general terms and one can say that it was really a bulldozer effect, uh, in every sense of the word. Bulldozer in the sense that a lot of money was brought to South Vietnam at this time to do a lot of things in...a short period of time.

The Americans ah, are impatient by nature. I think that you agree with me about it, and by the...at this time they would like to accomplish everything. At, uh, a very, very short, within a sh—short period of time.

And, so, by the time they see that the, the South Vietnamese were perhaps a little bit slow in doing things, they jump on, on the problem and they try to do themselves everything. Or, they try to have some short cuts with the, those people they were dealing with.

One concreted example, I was in the government, by then in Saigon, and I happened to, wi—to deal with the problem of distributing the budget to the provinceships. And, ah, each time I deal with the US mission in Saigon, the AID mission, I mean, the say that well, for a lot of programs they prefer to deal directly with the local authorities.

And, by then, the central government in Saigon was ah, completely cut out of the channel while the representative of the Americans on the spot at the level of the provinces deal directly with ah, either the ah, authorities in the provinces or with the entrepreneurs in in— all sorts of things done at at the at the at the level of the provinces, you see.

What did this do to the South Vietnamese government?

I have to confess to you that ah, the problem is quite a serious problem for all of us in South Vietnam because ah, it has a tendency to encourage the Vietnamese to rely too much on the Americans. Each time they have the difficulties they say that well, the Americans are going to do it.

Ah. Each time ah they think ah that they have some other ideas, they say that well the Americans want it and, ah, that with all their ways of doing they are going to do it anyways. There is no use for us to object about a such-and-such a project, you see.

And ah, and the overall effect is not only in terms of military problems but in terms of social and political problems there is a tendency of the South Vietnamese to rely too much on the Americans and I think that it is unhealthy.

And, this tendency was ah, later on more and more accentuated by the coming more of the Americans and the the pouring in of the US Aid and it created some sort of bad habits among the South Vietnamese and we in the South Vietnamese government would deplore it but sometimes it was quite difficult for us to raise a point because the Americans in their arguments said that, well we have to do it, we have to accomplish it and we have to implement the programs, we have to finish the projects, yes.

With all the money that was being poured in by the Americans, how corrupt were South Vietnamese officials?

With all my traveling around the world I would say that South Vietnam was not as corrupted as ah people want to to ah to to talk about it because it is a matter of degrees. But, somehow, I have to admit it that the large quantity of US money poured into Vietnam provoked ii...a lot of bad habits as I have mentioned aaah to you already and these are bad habits and created corruptions, you see.

In, in terms of corruptions ah, you have ah, one can say that not only uh corruptions in terms of money, but corruptions in terms of ehhhh, social fabrics to, you see, and ehhhh, it tends to change ah the nature of the society in South Vietnam.

Can we just stop here?

Yeah.

Um, can you just switch off now?

Just a moment. Right.

Go ahead. Just answer that.

We South Vietnamese, we are very concerned about the ah, the fact that the communists are—were very shrewd in trying to take advantage of the American presence in South Vietnam to make the propaganda that they were the only one who fought for the independence of the country and against the, only foreigners, first the French and after that the Americans.

And, ah, among us we have a lot of conversations about the impacted of the huge American presence in South Vietnam not only in terms of ah, reaction in the eyes of the Vietnamese people, ah, but ah reaction in terms of ah, eh international public opinion too.

We were very, very concerned about this problem of what we call the identity of the nationalist cause. We would like ah, to appear ehhh before the Vietnamese people as an authentic government trying to fight for the independence of the country and against the communism but in the same time we would like to appear as a genuine Vietnamese nationalistic government in the eyes of the international public opinion, and the huge presence of the American was for us quite a problem.

But, in the same time eh, the problems developed so quickly and a lot of Vietnamese ah, thought ah, that perhaps it was within the context of an overall fight against international communism. The way the war of Korea...

Just ran out. Can we just…?

Just a moment. Go ahead.

Okay.

The South Vietnamese were concerned about this problem, but, ah, due to the necessities of the war...

Excuse me. I’m sorry, would you turn and face Mr. Karnow the way you had before. I’m sorry to interrupt. Please do it again.

Okay. We are concerned about this ah very particular problem of how to conserve for the South Vietnamese some sort of ah authentic identity in the eyes of the Vietnamese people and in the eyes of international public opinion but in the same time it, most of the Vietnamese thought at this time that it was a kind of international struggle between the free world and international communism. And, so, for the sake ah, of this international struggle, we had to accept the presence of the American troops in South Vietnam.

Let’s go back to this subject of corruption that you’re talking about. Now, could you go over that? Do it again and talk about how all the money came in and corrupted with some illustration of how it corrupted people...financially and also you touched on how it was tearing at the social fabric?

Oh, well, ah...it is quite difficult to get into the details of the problem, but in general terms I would say that ah it was ah so easy for ah everyone to get a share of the pie, that aaah, ah money was so easily available that it very easily corrupted everyone.

I think a concrete example. For instance for the businessman it is for him to get some sort of authorization from the government to import such and such a product. You see. By the time he can import it, import it into South Vietnam such and such product he can sell to the ehhh, open market with ehhhh, quite a substantial difference.

He gets a lot of money from it and by the time he gets a lot of money ehhh, ah fr—from it he he was very willing to share one part of the money to those officials who grant to him the permission to import ah, such a products. You see.

Another concreted example and ah ah the Americans by the time they came to South Vietnam, they need to construct a lot of ah housing, for a a lot of barracks and for the camps for the soldiers and so forth, you see, and they need the Vietnamese, South Vietnamese entrepreneurs to do it, you see. And, the South Vietnamese entrepreneur, they rush into these project but in the same time for having the facilities from the authorities and and they have to pay in in in their ah their share in it.

And, so it was a kind of very, very easy situation ahh, where ah money was available for everyone, and ah, it tends to create a situation in which eh, corruption became a more than a temptation for, for those people ah, in this outside world as well as for those people inside the government.

What about the corruptions. You said the way it affected the social fabric of the country. How?

Well, Vietnamese are by tradition ah very, very respectful of their families, for instance, you see. Ah. But by the time eh, those people who get their money the quick way, ehh...if it happens tha—that they were scolded by their parents about it, they bypass it very easily.

You see, they said, they thought that perhaps it is the opportunity of their life and so they go ahead making their money ehhh without regards to problems of moralities, to problems of traditions to and to other problems too, you see.

So I think that ah, to certain degree it see I would say that it completely destroys South Vietnamese society the way it had been portended somewhere but to a certain degree it it iii—it was a very, very very bad for the Vietnamese society.

Could you describe why the Vietnamese could not understand that the Americans would not stay there forever? Remember talking about how they saw this tremendous investment — Cam Ranh and so forth that it was very hard to understand the Americans would ever leave. Could you just discuss that subject?

Well, one has to remember that in 1950s even in 1960s...the South Vietnamese knew very little about the Americans. All they knew about the Americans ah ehhh...was for instance the statement from ehh Secretary Dulles by the time of President Eisenhower, the very moralistic tone of John Foster Dulles. And, later on, by the very, very idealistic tone of John F. Kennedy.

And so the Vietnamese put a lot of hopes on the Americans and ah, they saw the Americans intervening in South Korea and later on the Americans intervening in South Vietnam. They took it as a whole attitude of the Americans and the Americans were so strong, so powerful. So, the Vietnamese couldn’t think in terms of ah the Americans intervening in something and not succeeding.

And so it is a kind of blind trust that the South Vietnamese wrongly or rightly put into the Americans and by the time the Americans came en masse with half a million men, with ah tremendous power in terms of economic aid, when they saw that the Americans building with billions and billions of dollars the air strips in Da Nang, in Cam Ranh, everywhere around the country, they couldn’t think that the Americans once having committed their troops in Vietnam, having spended so much money in Vietnam could one of these days leave everything behind and call it quit. It is unthinkable among the South Vietnamese to think that the Americans could quit.

Myself, as a representative of South Vietnam in Washington, to a certain degree I understood the problem. I did try to convey the impression at home, but, well, it is quite difficult for the man in Saigon, including those in the government. Not only the man on the street, but those in the government itself to understand that the Americans got fed up with the war and that one of these days the Americans could get out of the war. Well, ehh, regardless of what they have spended already in Vietnam.

Do you think that Vietnamization should have started earlier and how could it have started earlier instead of the American buildup?

Well, in retrospect I would say very easy to see things in retrospect right now, but I kept for long years the conviction that if the Vietnamization program could be successful it should be started at the very early stage even at the time of the first intervention of American troops in 1965.

My opinion was by this time and I still think that my opinion is the same, if the Americans committed some sort of symbolic amount of troops to reassure the South Vietnamese that the Americans were to help for good the South Vietnamese, but up to the Vietnamese to fight their own war in 1965, perhaps the situation could be different. But now it is a matter of conjecture right now you see.

Well, could you discuss the fact that the Americans came in, I guess you already have, it weakened the South Vietnamese in a sense?

I think that I have mentioned earlier that ah the presence of the Americans, the way the Americans...fought the war. The Ameri—the way the Americans behaved created among the South Vietnamese a lot of habits, a lot of bad habits I would say.

Talking in terms of military situation for instance, the South Vietnamese ah, behave as if they were Americans. Every time they need to move they call innnn, innnn, they call in the helicopters for moving them out. Every time they need to ahhh, um, to test the, the, the enemy, they send hundreds and hundreds of shells of artil—artillery before, you see.

Well, I, I would say that the Vietnamese should remember that they didn’t have exactly the same mobility the way the Americans have. They didn’t have the same kind of equipment that the Americans have and that they have to fight their own war.

Instead of fighting their own war, they copied the Americans about almost everything and by the time the Americans left in 19, ummm before 1972, 1973, well, the bad habits ah got there ah there as there solid, got there solidly among the South Vietnamese already, you see.

Okay. Did we finish the roll?

Yeah.

Why wasn't there enough equipment after 1973? The Enhance Plus Program sent more than a billion dollars worth of equipment.

One I would say that the Enhance Plus Program was some sort of political device to induce Mr. Thieu to accept the Paris agreement. It was a kind of assurance to him after he had refused to accept the draft brought about by Dr. Kissinger at the end of 1972, but in practical terms Enhance Plus Program didn't represent as much in terms of military value to the South Vietnamese because it was, it was quite a kind of heterogeneous equipment brought from Iran, brought from South Korea, brought from Taiwan in a very short period of time.

Some of the planes were useful but most of the material couldn't be used because we didn't have the personnel to use it right away and we had to stock it separately and we had to earmark it and a lot of budget for the maintenance of these equipments.

So, strictly in terms of military value, the Enhance Plus Program was not much in the eyes of the South Vietnamese in spite of the fact that it was considered at that time as a kind of ah program just eh with the political value to try to convince Mr. Thieu that the Americans were completely behind him and that he could accept it safely the Paris Agreement in 1973.

Let's go right now to the final period now, April 1975. You're in Washington. Could you describe how you were lobbying with the Congress to get emergency American aid?

I would say that ah...by the time I came to Washington in ah mid March, 1975, after the fall of Ban Me Thuot I arrive here in Washington on the 23rd of March. The whole thing collapsed within matter of a week and ah, I try my best to knock at the door of the friends and to knock at the door of all those I knew before in Washington calling for help.

But, ah, it was too late. It was almost that I talk into deaf ears. Nobody listen to me anymore about eh ehhh the fate of the South Vietnamese and the fate of the South Vietnamese Republic. It looked to me by that time as if eh Vietnam, South Vietnam was completely condemned already.

Could you recall exactly something that you did? Certain senators that you talked to or Congressmen?

I don't remember exactly the names of Congressmen, of the senators and to whom I talked to but as I have mentioned earlier I would say that ehhhh in general terms they were sympathetic to our cause, but ah, as they stated that ah mmmm, they could do nothing more about South Vietnam.

Was there a, at any stage there in the last period in 1975 that you thought that the United States would come back and intervene or in the beginning of 1975 did you think it was all finished? Did you hope that the United States would come back in?

Personally, ehh, I thought that long before '75 and that the United States would not come back to help again South Vietnam. But, that is not the opinion of many of my countrymen in Saigon who until the last hours before the fall of Saigon continue to think in terms of ah having the American coming back at committed their air forces or even more than that to help the South Vietnamese because eh I am told by many of the military men in Saigon that before the fall of Saigon, they have their communications with Bangkok.

The military channel I suppose. And ah they believed in eh their American friends in the sense that ah perhaps the Americans would come back and bomb it again to help the South Vietnamese but the troops was not there, of course, and ah, the, the South Vietnamese and in South Vietnam believed it until the last minute that something could be done to help them. But, by the time they were awakened, it was too late.

Do you believe personally that South Vietnam, that you were betrayed by the United States?

It is a kind of hard question to put up to me in terms of ah having to characterize the Americans, of having betrayed the South Vietnamese. But, I would say that in the overall situation, the Americans committed a lot of mistakes.

In the eyes of the man in the street in Saigon...no matter the decision you have taken before in coming to help South Vietnam in committing your troops in 1965, rightly or wrongly, you have committed a decision to help South Vietnam already and ah they used to say that well you came into a house. You put the house in shambles. Now, you want to get out.

Well, if it is decent enough from the Americans to arrange the house so the South Vietnamese could have some good chance to live the uh decent life, that is all right. But you call it quits I the way you want it.

By 1965 you took the decision to come in and by 19—1972, you took the decision to get out without asking the opinion of all those SSS—South Vietnamese who have to suffer. And, so, I think that the South Vietnamese did not understand really why the Americans behaved this way.

And, as a man who stayed in Washington for long years and who understands the mentality of the, the Vietnamese being a Vietnamese, having the bloods of the Vietnamese, I think that ah the American did commit a lot of mistakes during the war. Of course, the South Vietnamese did commit their own mistakes too, and so it is a kind of mixed bucket of responsibilities.

One last question. Do you think it all could have been different looking back?

Yes.

Answer. Tell me about it.

It is quite difficult right now to talk in terms of conjectures with a lot of ifs, you see. But, ah, the way we look at the situation right now in Saigon with the coming of the Communists in South Vietnam, with ah all the South Vietnamese opening largely their eyes to see that the North Vietnamese, the Communists, I mean, are not ten feet tall, and ah, they are in many, many areas really, really backwarded, you see. We South Vietnamese we think that we could have a chance and if the situation was handled differently.

How?

First of all, talking about the Vietnamese, I repeat it again that the Vietnamese have their own mistakes because it is their country and ah if they losted their country, it is primarily their fault. They had to get together and ah put up more sacrifices. Lead some kind of less bourgeois life and ah to try to think more about the future of the country than about their own personal future. Perhaps the situation would be different.

But, in the same time, if we talk about the Americans and if the American could think of helping the South Vietnamese earlier in the Vietnamization program and being more steady in their help to the South Vietnamese, perhaps the situation would be different.

But, again, I repeat it, it is a matter of conjectures but I have my own convictions as a South Vietnamese, as a nationalist and I still think right now, that the situation could be different if less mistakes were committed by the Americans and less mistakes were committed by the South Vietnamese.

Let's get it ready. Go ahead.

Summing up the problem, I would say that in 1965 when the American came in South Vietnam and in 1972 by the time they lefted South Vietnam, it was mainly...through their own decisions and ah for their own reasons and ah very little had been in terms of ah well attention to the fate of the South Vietnamese had been paid to this problem.

Well, It depends on you to you to use it or not to use it. Yes.

Certainly a very good quote.