WHEN YOU HEARD THE SDI, THE REAGAN SDI SPEECH, YOUR INITIAL RESPONSE, NOT AS THE THINKING DEVELOPED, BOTH AS A SOVIET PERSON AND AS A SOVIET SCIENTIST, YOU HEAR THAT THE POSITION TO RENDER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE, TO SHARE TECHNOLOGY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING THEN?

You know, it's a very interesting question, because my personal memory, I think, I still remember every beat of the, of my first reaction. It happened so, that a group of Soviet scientists, my friends and I was also amongst this group, we were to Washington just a week before this famous Star Wars speech, on twenty-third of March of '83. We had a topical meeting with our American counterparts, with a group of American scientists from National Academy of Sciences. The group, which is called CISAC, abbreviation is CISAC, Committee on International Security and Arms Control. So we were just, just discussing the questions of strategic stability, space weaponization, ASATS: anti-satellite weaponry was the subject of conversation. And at that time, nobody, including our American colleagues, several of them in past rather key persons around science advisory group in White House, so quite knowledgeable people. Nothing could indicate that such a dramatic statement such dramatic speech could appear. So, and then we happily left Washington, we were sitting in Russian EO-62 plane, going back to Moscow, just the same day when Reagan issued this statement and we have learned about the statement, just reading fresh newspapers in Soviet plane. It was such a big surprise for all of us. We thought that it's kind of misunderstanding, some kind of you know...it's impossible to change mentality, the psychology of American strategic thinkers overnight. Since our...

YOU LEARNED ABOUT THE PROPOSAL ON THE FLIGHT BACK TO MOSCOW?

Yes.

WHAT WAS YOUR...

The first reaction was, since we were educated in the spirit of ABM Treaty, were used to that Treaty quite a few years before 1983, it was a very strong shock, it was against our culture. Everyone tried to explain what could happen, before this speech and the general impression, before we have learned about the details, that it was a kind of, of mystification, so someone probably influential could deliver such information, such wrong idea to the President. Indeed, very soon we have learned that it was Edward Teller who played a key role in persuading President Reagan, and it's interesting to note that recent scandal around Reagan, the scandal which was disclosed by Dr. Woodruff, who was administrative chief of this type of works at Livermore, he recently disclosed how several people, including Teller and... , essentially delivered such information which was artificially prepared, not based on serious scientific argument, and they were doing these type of things rather systematically. They, they were playing with the results of tests, of experiments, so I don't know what would be the future of this project. Probably it is very difficult now, for the President to change his opinion. There is certainly inertia, the momentum. He has built his mind during quite a few years already.

WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THE IDEA OF SHARING BOTH THE SCIENCE AND THE TECHNOLOGY WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

There are two aspects of this proposal, or I wouldn't even call it "proposal," it's a kind of you know, a kind of wishful thinking. One aspect is if it is realistic or not to share technology in such sensitive areas. If it would consider the evolution of secrecy, of embargo on different hardware, on scientific instrumentation, on industr—industrial tools, you would see that even very benign, completely platonic things are under embargo. You would not believe that such sensitive issues like military technology, dedicated for anti-ballistic missiles could be shared. It's unbelievable; I don't think it's... But, possibly, President Reagan sincerely believes that he could share technology for this particular thing, but I have heard remarks of, from American professional military politicians. They consider it is as extremely unrealistic, unlikely, on the basis that even if certain dedicated technology could be shared, very difficult to separate, to draw the line between SDI technology and other military applications. So, this is one aspect. The second aspect, which is much more profound and much more important, is, suppose this technology will be shared and, by some magic, in the end both sides would possess two completely identical space shields. Is it good or not? I con, I would consider this situation as extremely fragile and unstable. Even more, it's provoking to, to the crisis, to the instability, because, as a by-product, as imminent by-product, each of the shields would have a capability to kill instantly its vis-a-vis in space, and to do it it is not necessary to apply the full firepower accumulated in each of the space shields. You can use only a small fraction, maybe one percent, maybe even smaller, of firepower to kill vis-a-vis. And in order to, to understand why it is so easy, you have to consider that SDI asset of each of the sites, space-flying objects, they are flying along their orbits just like ICBMs or warheads would fly. The only difference is that the orbits of SDI spacecrafts of battle stations, of common satellites, their orbits would be known, much before the moment, much earlier than the moment when one of the sides would be tempted to kill the other. So it's much easier to target. Second, the number of SDI assets in space would be much smaller than the number of ICBMs or warheads, or decoys, maybe one, two hundred only. The third, it would be very difficult to protect them, physically. For, for example, warheads, they are protected very well, because they have to survive the re-entry to the atmosphere, so thermal protection, mechanical protection against, such sophisticated things like space mirrors for lasers, for example, sensors, very difficult to protect them. They are very sophisticated, very large, extended. So if you would bring together all these arguments, you can come to the numbers less than one percent. So that means that final configuration which is considered as a goal in SDI program is unstable.

IF WE COME BACK TO THE EARLIER THING, ASSUME YOU LAND IN MOSCOW AND ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS THAT'S HAPPENING IS THAT THE POLITICO OF THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS, WHAT DOES IT MEAN, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS. CAN YOU TELL ME HOW DID IT HAPPEN, WHO APPROACHED WHOM TO SAY?

You know, we were coming back to this, return trip from America. In the plane we had, essentially, critical mass of the people who could make assessment, who could produce recommendations to scientific community, to our government. So we decided that we should do this job, and essentially we were doing it during next few months, and the first draft assessment was produced by the summer of '83, and...

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE IT? WHAT WAS YOUR ASSESSMENT?

First of all, we tried to make a technological assessment, to describe different scenarios how the system could look like, on the basis of scientific knowledge which we had at that time. And then we tried to incorporate technological assessment with strategic analysis. So that was final result.

WHAT CONCLUSION DID YOU COME TO?

Our first conclusion was that technologically, it would be extremely difficult to produce system which could make nuclear arms obsolete and impotent. Especially if you would consider the level of overkill which exists nowadays. So you would need to, to produce almost impermeable shield, which is impossible. Impossible if you would take into account that your opponent would try to do everything to kill, or to circumvent this approach. Second, when we tried to consider strategic implications, we discovered all these strategic instabilities inherent to this new defense, versus defense type of configuration. Then we communicated it to scientific community, details were published and we approached our government.

WHAT DID YOU TELL YOUR OWN GOVERNMENT? WHAT DID YOU RECOMMEND?

We have ah specifically commanded. Not to accept, not to adopt a nearer strategy. Near...strategy. Not to develop the same type of ah field. But instead ah to be ready if ah it would be necessary. Ah to counter this approach if this would be accepted by our opponents. Ah to consider counter measures. Different type of counter measures. It's ah, there are passive counter measures. How to cheat SDI shields, SDI systems. How to circumvent it. Active counter measures including ah... ah as ah probably most efficient. Just direct attack against SDI assets in space.

WAS THE WHOLE SDI WAS IT PERCEIVED AS A CHALLENGE TO SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AUTHORITY?

It's a, it's different question, you know. It's ah a challenge ah... Not ah... ah specifically against ah Soviet science and technology. It's a challenge against attempts to... to stop nuclear arms race. It's challenged against ah new thinking.

BUT I THINK THAT AT LEAST ON PART OF AMERICAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, THERE WAS A SENSE THAT HERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLODE WITH THESE PROCEEDINGS, THE STATE OF THEM. AS AN AMERICAN EMBASS... TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE THAT THIS IS A PLACE WHERE THEY CAME ON FASTER. AND MY QUESTION TO YOU IS WHETHER THAT HERE IT WAS PERCEIVED AS SUCH. WHETHER IT WAS SEEN AS SUBSTANTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE?

Ah I would answer your question that it was, we considered it as an attempt to each strategic superiority. Ah in ah the arms race, doing the last forty years, we were able to restore strategic parity. After a while. We had to ah copy American moves. Ah these nuclear warheads. So rather every new ah technological invention, in offensive armaments, finally they are countered by us. So this time, this... this order. This is a new quali... qualitatively new move to reach strategic superiority. Ah very ah sensitive to science and technology. In this sense, of course it was a challenge to Soviet science and technology.

THERE WAS EVEN SUGGESTIONS THAT IT'S THE, OUTSPENDING SOVIET ECONOMY. THAT SUCH A CHALLENGE WOULD NOT ONLY PRODUCE A TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE, BUT IT WOULD PRODUCE AN ECONOMIC CHALLENGE.

It would be so ah if ah we would adopt a newer strategy. If also...

CAN YOU START THE SENTENCE FROM THE BEGINNING.

If ah... ah we would try to copy American approach, and if we would try to develop our own SDI program, eventually, if on both sides this SDI program ah from exploratory phase would enter into the phase. Development and deployment. Then of course I think economical ah competition, economical confrontation would be also very important.

WHAT COMPONENTS OF THE...SYSTEM, CAN YOU SORT OF DESCRIBE IT TO ME THAT THE SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS, AND BOTH THE KIND OF A CHALLENGE THAT THEY COULD... AND THE KIND OF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ...MEASURE THAT THEY PRESENT.

It's ahm very premature to discuss SDI and counter measures in such specific terms because ah there are no, ah...scenario for SDI. There are maybe half a dozen, half a dozen of scenarios. The scenario is based on traditional technology, on rocket technology. In this case ah...ah one particular realization of SDI system could ah be ah based on small rockets, mini rockets. Ah installed on large space stations, space platforms. Then in order to be able to intercept ICBMs, the very early phase ah on their ..., ah SDI systems should have ah rather huge number of such platforms, flying everywhere. You know just the whole new aerospace should be ah...ah filled with such platforms. So independently, there you are launching ICBMs. You should have nearby, and the distance of something like a thousand kilometers. You should have a platform. So it is a very ahm expensive approach. Because most of these platforms and rockets, ah would... would stay without any youth in... in the case of major conflict. Ah more sophisticated Russians, would be based, or could be based on new...newer technologies. On what is called now ah exotic technologies. Typical example of exotic technologies are ah very powerful lasers. Then you would need to have these lasers on the similar space platforms. Or you could have these lasers on ground. But ah to fly ah ..., ah on space platforms. So finally you will get laser beams from space against ICBMs. Instead of lasers, the very proposals to use ah particle beams which is...

WHAT WOULD BE A GOOD MODE OF COUNTER-MEASURE? OF LASER TECHNOLOGY?

Ah you can use any kind of ah...ah technology. Essentially the same type of technology could be used to kill ah space platforms. For example, you can use traditional rockets. You can use them ah in two types of mold. You can have ground based ah systems to hit these space platforms. These rockets. Or you can use ah space-based rockets to hit these platforms. Ah you can use also exotic technologies. Laser beams, to heat these platforms also. So essentially, technology for counter measures, for counter SDI is ah a kind of Siamese twin of ah SDI technology. But you don't need to fill the whole space with such active systems. These counter measures. You can use only finite number of... of such systems. Ground based or space based. This is why it's much cheaper.

IS THAT SORT OF THE NOTION OF THE MARGINAL, THE PRICE OF THE...OF THE DEFENSE IN THIS CASE BEING MUCH CHEAPER?

Yes, yes. So two,... great areas was incorporated into this analysis. Ah it's, these criterias are very far related by needs. They're not discovered by him. Just, from related in such a way which is considered as you know, a kind of, you know, accepted. Ah first criteria is that ah it is, there would be no sense to deploy SDI assets in space if there is no ah... ahm, if they are going to be vulnerable, easy targets for counter measures. And second, even if you would be able to produce invulnerable space assets, you have to count the money, the expenditures. They should be ah cheaper, cost efficient and the margin, compared to counter measures, or compared to very simple arithmetic ah, of offensive arms.

WHAT ABOUT AN ELECTRONIC OBSERVATION WHICH I THINK WERE SORT OF ..., STRENGTHENING THE SOVIET COMMITMENT. ARE THOSE... YOU?

Ahm ah in principle it's possible to consider them also. Because SDI system consisting of ah hundreds, or tens of...of battle stations surveillance satellites, sensors, common lines, common links. Ah this system is very critical ah in terms of overall management, middle management. Ah so any kind of electronic inter... interference would be for such systems. If ah... ah the opponent could produce such systems which could interfere, could break such a coherent bulk of global systems. So these matters also would be very efficient. But this technique is much more subtle than direct counter measures to kill or to deteriorate SDI.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT IT'S SETTLED? WORSE? OR BETTER?

I mean ah it would require ah no specific design, depending on ah configuration of ah middle management ah system. And ah in future, if such system, if ah... ah we are going to enter the SDI age, I'm sure such electronic counter measures also would appear.

EXPLAIN THEN IN A SIMPLE WAY THAT THE NOTION OF ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE AGAIN. YOU TALKED ABOUT IT BEFORE BUT THE LOGICAL ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE IS THAT WHAT?

The asymmetric response would be ah trying to produce a similar SDI system. SDI of the second side. So you will have two identical or roughly identical SDI systems. Asymmetric is if you are in, if you ah instead of ah... SDI system would produce counter measures. This is what we call asymmetric response.

SECRETARY GORBACHEV, IN HIS LAST INTERVIEW ON AMERICAN TELEVISION, HAS SAID THAT SOVIET SCIENTISTS WILL BE...WITH CONTINUING THE STUDY OF SDI, OR SOVIET SDI. WHAT DOES THESE TYPE OF STUDIES CONSIST OF?

He never said ah they would study Soviet SDI. He said they would study basic principles with carry fundamental research in technology. It is exactly the same technology which would be needed for counter measures.

CAN YOU PUT IT IN A SENTENCE?

In order to be able to create anti SDI system, you would have to consider which of the technologies is most efficient to kill or to deteriorate SDI. Same laser technologies they are candidates for ah... ah counter measures. They have to be studied. Traditional technologies, the small rockets. So essentially, technological ah variety of technologies is the same. But the scope of ah research is different.

SO THAT'S THE KIND OF RESEARCH THAT SECRETARY GORBACHEV WAS TALKING ABOUT?

Yes. He was talking about this

PEOPLE FAVOR SDI IN THE STATES ACCORDING TO THE NOTION THAT SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN SOME FORM OF AH SPACE WARFARE. THEY POINT TO THE TESTING OF THE SATELLITE...TO INCLUDING THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE... SYSTEM. SEVEN RADARS WHICH ARE GOING TO BE USEFUL IN MIDDLE MANAGEMENT. IS THAT THE SCENE BETWEEN THOSE THINGS AND THE REJECTION OF THE SPACE...?

Ah system is old fashioned ah point defense ABM system. It's not SDI. It's point defense which is allowed according to the old ABM treaty. Each side could have one defended sport. Ah even if there would be no need in modernization, for this old technology, it would require some replacements, you know. Ah personally, I... I don't think this is a very intelligent approach at all. But it reflects the inertia, the momentum which was accumulated during early years of ABM. But fortunately these momentum was contained and is contained within restrictions of ABM treaty. Ah there was, and there is visual thinking on American side, on the side of certain American ah... ah proponents of SDI. They ah certainly would be happy to see that Russians are doing the same thing. But there is ah no background behind this mutual thinking.

WHAT CAN IT SAY ABOUT THE SPACE...

WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE SPACE MINES?

Satellite killers or anti-satellites. It is an absolutely different type of development. The development started in maybe early sixties. Ah there... there are some American prototypes or systems of...anti-satellite systems. Ah it comes to the psychology of military. Military ah, militaries probably would consider that... that... Have to be able to kill everything. On earth and in space. So but ah quite a few years ago, I think, it was realized by professional military people that if both sites would have potential to kill their space assets, denying space assets like telecommunication systems. Reconnaissance satellites. Early warning systems. Then both sides ah could be blinded you know which is very dangerous in critical situations. This is why, I think, at least on our side, it was adopted as an official doctrine. And since August of '83, ah we declared unilateral moratorium on further development and testing of....

WHAT IS, IN SOVIET VIEW, THE OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL, AND HOW DOES ONE DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL TO THE SYSTEM?

You mean SDI system?

YES.

Ahm, there was a lot of discussion on ah offensive use of SDI systems to use them as a kind of first strike weapons. I already told you that the only dangerous development, the most dangerous development of SDI would be the use of SDI against SDI of the opponent. This is a major type of instability. If you would consider a different potential of SDI. The, you defeat against ah targets on ground. It's possible and technically. But I don't think it is very efficient. Ah to use SDI assets in space, against targets on ground, I think it is very dangerous for SDI itself. It's remind, it would remind me ah the ah situation. This famous proverb ah sitting in glass house. Better not to throw the stones.

DID YOU MAKE AN EVALUATION OF WHAT WOULD BE, IF THE SYSTEM WORKED, IT WILL BE USEFUL ONLY AGAINST..., OR WILL IT BE USEFUL AGAINST THE SOVIET....

Oh original idea was to use it against any kind of ah intercontinental. Long, or long range ballistic missiles. Ah independently if they were launched ah from solid earth or from the ocean. But ah, bombers are completely different. Bombers would not be ah covered by SDI system. Ah cruise missiles would not be covered. And even shorter range ah ballistic missiles, the missiles which would not ah escape from the atmosphere also would not be ah... ah intercepted by SDI system. This, by the way would provide ah a new ah channel for arms race. If ah such a dream would be close to fulfillment, and if counter measures would not be efficient. Which is not the case in reality. But suppose, let's consider such idealistic situation. Then arms race would be channeled along this new channel. Non-stop arms race in cruise missiles and bombers.

HAVE YOU FOLLOWED THE... AN EVOLUTION OF THINKING IN THE SOVIET...IN THE UNITED STATES AS TO WHAT SDI IS. INITIALLY IT WAS PRESENTED AS KIND OF A TOTAL ACHIEVEMENT. NOW IT'S BROKEN INTO COMPONENTS. DIFFERENT THINGS ARE GETTING DIFFERENT ATTENTION AND SO ON. WHAT DO YOU THINK... FROM POINT OF VIEW OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, AS YOU SEE, WHAT MIGHT BE THEN?

It's very difficult to predict.

IF YOU ELIMINATE FOR A SECOND THE POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH IS A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ONE. BUT IN TERMS OF, WHAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING IS OF WHAT WOULD BE SENSIBLE... IF IT'S ONLY A SCIENTIFIC PROJECT, SHOULD BE IMPORTANT, HOW MIGHT IT END?

There are different opinions. I know that some of my American colleagues, I... I would say ah... ah even star wars scientists would consider that ah on the level of research, with all these powerful lasers, all these technologies, it's okay. Ah it could continue for many years to come without dangerous impact on arms race. But I think ah in my view, it's dangerous. Because if you invest money even for ah basic techno... technological research, in such ah military areas, you would, from time to time, you would have some by-product. Which certainly could ah trigger the arms race. Such type of research, even scientific research in military area... areas. This is essentially a kind of ah qualitative arms race. So I would prefer a complete ban of any kind of activity related to SDI.

DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY?

I had ah a lot of discussions on that subject. On discussions with American, with our American counterparts. Mostly with scientists. Sometimes with politicians I had ah a chance to talk to senators, congressmen, who are involved in this. Who are really involved in the discussion or interpretation. And same on our side also. Ah everything started with a kind of voluntary statement from present American administration. That they can interpret it differently on the basis of so called broad interpretation. And ah I think now the situation is rather clear. The congress, senate, and house, they do not support broad interpretation. And ah I think several senators and congressmen made a very ahm deep analysis of the treaty, of the records. Of ABM treaty. So I think situation now is ah gradually improving.

YOU PARTICIPATED IN THE FIRST SUMMIT MEETING IN GENEVA?

I... I have been to Geneva as ah, as an expert of Soviet delegation.

AND THE SUBJECT OF SDI WAS AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT?

Oh yes, of course

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT TRANSPIRED ON THE SUBJECT OF SDI BETWEEN THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND THE AMERICAN DELEGATION. WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND THEN? WHAT DO AMERICANS WANT?

At that time, ah Americans wanted ah... ah to negotiate on offensive arms reduction. Without any restrictions on SDI activities. I think at the there was already some progress. Some slight change in American position.

STAY WITH ME IN GENEVA FOR A GOOD...

So ah in Geneva ah essential position of American delegation was no ah, don't touch SDI program.

AND WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET GROUP?

Ah Soviet position was based on the spirit of ABM treaty. In the...of ABM treaty. Ah it was stated that ah the limitation on anti-ballistic ah defense ah is essential, a key element in any kind of arms control and arms reduction process. So we said, we cannot negotiate offensive arms reduction. Ah without going back to strengthen the main idea in the ABM treaty. That was our position.

THIS POSITION WAS EVENTUALLY SEPARATED INTO DIFFERENT COMPONENTS?

Ah I think ah, it happened later. It happened after Reykjavik.

WHY DIDN'T IT HAPPEN BEFORE?

You know ah it is a very complicated, interactive process. The whole process of negotiations of talks is ah interactive. You have to express your first ah thoughts. Your principle thoughts. And then you have to listen what ah... ah your opponent would say. And then you would try to find ah a way to ah incorporate these two approaches, to one ah... ah which would fit somehow to the concept of both sides. So this is why I think different ahm doctrines, negotiating doctrines, are changing. In our position, in American position, it's natural.

I WAS TOLD THAT THERE IS SOME FRUSTRATION AMONG SOVIET NEGOTIATORS ABOUT THE IDEA OF SDI COMING FROM AMERICAN SIDES WITH DIFFERENT EMPATHIES AND DIFFERENT STRENGTHS, AND DIFFERENT

PREFERENCES. DO YOU HAVE TO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING? CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT WHY IT'S FRUSTRATING OR WHY?

Oh, I wouldn't ah use ah the term frustration. I would say that there is a difficulty because every time ah our negotiators meet American negotiators they always feel, you know, such insistence to keep SDI. Even now when we have, I would say, rather flexible approach on our side, ah we ah, if you are following what's going on, I think the main, the key element in our position is, okay, let's leave aside SDI. It's not necessary that it should be mentioned or prohibited in ah specific language of the treaty. It's ah sufficient for us just to stress that there is ABM treaty. That both sides ah... ah adhere to the treaty. That's all. But even such ah... ah simple and universal language which is based on existing ABM treaty. Sometimes we...we feel that American negotiators are trying to incorporate something on the top of this ABM treaty. Something which would ah give them... them a chance to fight against congress. The congress which essentially is trying to ah keep administration within the limits of narrow interpretation of ABM treaty.

DO YOU THINK THAT IF IT WERE GOING TO COME TO A HEAD EVENTUALLY, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. AND DO YOU THINK THAT THE SDI PROPOSAL AND THE POLITIC REDUCTION, CAN GO TOGETHER?

I think strategic reduction cannot go without ah ABM treaty. If you ah follow ABM treaty, it's your ah, your own language. What kind of, how you would call activity, research. From the basic research. Some tests within ABM treaty ahm... You can call them SDI or any kind of, another name. The treaty is what is most essential.

THE NOTION OF THE CONDITION OF MAD, OF MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION. AND THE VARIOUS ATTEMPTS OF VARIOUS... TO ESCAPE FROM IT, THE SOVIETS DID NOT LIKE THE NOTION OF MAD. BUT THEY

SEEM SORT OF TO MAINTAIN IT NOW.

You know ah...ah it's a question of, not so much question of ah if you like it or don't like it. It's reality, relief is... is this situation. Both sides are capable ah to kill each other. So it's...it's ah, it is essentially deterrence. Ah of course ah it makes both sides very unhappy. But we can not ah rid of this deterrent situation. And ah the idea ah to remove MAD or deterrence ah situation, of these kind of major shield. Ah it's ahm it's just a dream. It's nothing more. It is not based on real, scientific technological analysis. So there is another approach to decrease gradually the level of nuclear confrontation. That the number of warheads on both sides. This would be ah... ahm, much more realistic in my view. That would require only political view on both sides. And ah we can see how it could be done in such a way that on every level of nuclear ah we could still keep strategic stability. Up to the level of a few hundred warheads on both sides. Ah and fundamental problem is if it is possible from this level of what we call minimum deterrence, or ah reasonable sufficiency. How to move ah, to zero nuclear ah configuration. This is a very important question. This is a real challenge. And I think if this challenge should be...

...IN WASHINGTON NOW. AND WHAT IS YOUR READING ABOUT THE AMERICAN SIDE'S INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS SDI. AND I THINK YOU SUMMARIZED IT IN THE NOTION THAT...UNDER ABM. AM I CORRECT?

Yes.

OK. EXPLAIN THE NOTION OF SUFFICIENCY IN NUCLEAR METHOD.

If both sides would stay within nuclear deterrence, it is much safer to keep only a minimum number of nuclear warheads. Say, a few hundred on both sides. Which would be perfectly enough to deter the opponent. And we can find, I think, many different ways to reach this level, starting from what we have now. But the real challenge would be then to find the way to move from minimal deterrence, from those few hundred, to nuclear zero on both sides. I personally, do not see yet a specific scenario - how we could pro cede to this zero option. The obstacle are third parties. Even the terrorists, who could be able to produce maybe a few warheads. And then establish a terror in the world. To solve this question, probably it would require a kind of, you know, completely integrated international system of security. I think that it is a challenge to scientists, to strategist to think of this no-nuclear future. So, right now we are working on these issues.

YOUR LAST VISIT TO SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., IN YOUR ENCOUNTER WITH THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AND SO ON, WHAT DID THEY TELL YOU ABOUT THEIR FEELING ABOUT THEIR FEELING ABOUT THIS VIEW?

I had discussions with many different people, with some of American negotiators, with Senators, congressmen. It is very interesting, there is a kind of sophisticated interplay. Apparently, such a simple formula, which was suggested for a future strategic arms reduction treaty, for START, just to mention ABM treaty, as it was signed in '72 and follow it. Apparently this language, in my view, could satisfy Congress, Senate, I believe so, but the Administration, the officials in the American delegation - they would like to have something more, on the top of this formulation, because this simple formula would leave them alone against American legislators. So they would like to, in my view they would like to incorporate the language of the treaty, the future treaty something which would give them additional argument in their internal debates with Congress. Something which would hint that they can do something more than it would be deduced from narrow interpretation of the treaty.

STOP FOR A SECOND, LET ME... THERE IS PROBLEM TWO. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, THIS MIGHT BE, SDI PROGRAM MIGHT BE THE ONE BEFORE LAST, THIS IS ONLY THE SECOND SERIES... ESSENTIALLY WHAT ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOVIET DECISION TO MOVE FROM THE NUCLEAR TO THEMONUCLEAR WEAPONS?

It is very difficult to reconstruct what was going within Soviet leadership of that period. I can only speculate. I think, it was very deep mistrust among two great powers. On our side this mistrust certain was triggered very much after the Hiroshima atomic bomb. And probably no one had any doubt, that just nuclear bombs were discovered and produced in America, same would happen with the next step, with thermonuclear.

BUT AT WHAT STAGE, WAS THE SOVIET WORK ON THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS A CONTINUATION OF THE WORK ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR WAS IT A DISTINCTIVE STEP?

It is very difficult to answer this question. Essentially, I think, the same people were doing the job and we know now, that Andrei Sakharov was one of the key people in the program of thermonuclear bomb. But from organizational and financial point of view probably there was a kind of special decision, new program, new money. I do not know how it was done. Probably in future, I don't know when in future, we would have even some memoirs or books on this subject. Not yet now.

THERE IS NO VIEW, YOU CAN NOT TELL ME WHETHER IT WAS CONTINUATION, WHETHER IT WAS AFFECTED BY EVENTS...

I simply don't know. I was a young man at the time, I was a student in Moscow University.

BUT FROM WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT THE PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER OF KURCHATOV, OF HIS SCIENTIFIC THINKING - DO YOU THINK THAT FOR HIM IT WAS A DISTINCTIVE STEP OR IT WAS A CONTINUATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORK?

I think for him, when he abandoned his own scientific work in physics, I think it was in 1943 or 1944. Since that time he was completely dedicated, devoted to the problem of nuclear bomb and then thermonuclear bomb. We felt very vulnerable, inferior. And the very first nuclear bomb and its test took place in 1949. So you can consider these four years as extremely tense period in the history of our country.

BUT WHEN IN '49 THE ATOMIC BOMB WAS TESTED, DID KURCHATOV SAY, OK, THAT'S VERY GOOD, NOW LET'S GO BACK TO THE LABORATORIES?

You know, we had... I suppose, all these people, also the government on the top, saw that the United States and its allies wouldn't stop with the nuclear bomb, they would proceed further. So we have to be ready, we have to be in a hurry to do next step also.

DOES KURCHATOV HAVE A COUNTERPART IN THE STATES?

It is very difficult to say, you know. Probably, at the beginning it was Oppenheimer, but then the situation became rather different - not only from the point of view of personalities, but even organization basis was different. You had, Americans had two national labs eventually, not only Los Alamos, but at Livermore, with a competition between them and so on.

THE ONLY PERSON WHO IS TALKING ABOUT... NOBODY IS TALKING ABOUT THIS PERIOD YET IN THE SOVIET UNION, RIGHT? IT IS NOT YET A SUBJECT DISCUSSED BY THE PARTICIPANTS?

You know, there are some comments already. You can find these comments, they were given from time to time by Sakharov, for example, or other protagonist.

DID SAKHAROV TALK ABOUT HIS SCIENTIFIC WORK?

He made some comments recently, few weeks ago. There was a special program on our TV, "The History of Nuclear Bomb and Rockets". You know, just...

WHAT DID HE SAY?

He said, that... You can find it in "Moscow News" -a very long statement.