"Two-first"

The ouster of Prince Sihanouk

Interviewer:
Would you talk about what it was like when the Khmer Rouge took over? Please give an account starting with the overthrow of Sihanouk.
Chhit Do:
When Sihanouk was overthrown, the idea was to create a republic throughout the country. When this happened, there was propaganda made saying that the overthrow and expulsion of Sihanouk had been carried out in order to make a country a republic of the type existing in other countries, because, they said, at that time there weren't that many monarchical countries left in the world, that, internally, a monarchy was not progressive...
"Two second"
Interviewer:
What year was it that you met Pol Pot?
Chhit Do:
In 1977, March 1977.
Interviewer:
What kind of a meeting was it?
Chhit Do:
It was a meeting about purification of the power structure in Kampuchea.
Interviewer:
And did Pol Pot seem like a nice guy?
Chhit Do:
He seemed like a nice guy when he talked, but what happened afterwards was not nice.
Interviewer:
Now jet's talk about the Khmer Rouge and the Yuon at the time of the overthrow of Sihanouk. What did the Khmer Rouge do? Were the ordinary folks pleased or displeased, or what?
Chhit Do:
On this matter of the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk, well, when Sihanouk was overthrown, the ordinary folks were not pleased. Those under Lon Nol were not pleased and neither were those under the Khmer Rouge. In short, nobody was pleased when Sihanouk was initially overthrown.
This was the beginning of it all and when demonstrations were carried out, with a procession reaching all the way to the Chroy Changvar bridge. I didn't go see this myself, but I heard others talking about it, about how they got together and demonstrated all the way to Kampong Cham.
Interviewer:
Yes, but what kind of propaganda did the Khmer Rouge make about Sihanouk?
Chhit Do:
Their propaganda about Sihanouk said... You know, at that time, they weren't yet doing any anti-Sihanouk propaganda, but internally, among themselves, and this is what they told me, they were in cahoots with the government soldiers to overthrow Sihanouk. They could do this because they were doing work with schoolteachers, with school directors, and the like, a lot of work.
The Khmer Rouge for the most part worked in, I don't know what exactly the French term is, the "civil" sector. Among the civil servants there were a lot of Khmer Rouge, a lot in the Khmer Rouge party. They were schoolteachers, chiefs of high school teaching staffs, in the schools, working in the provincial treasury offices. There were a lot of them in places like these.
Interviewer:
Who took over after Sihanouk had been overthrown?
Chhit Do:
After Sihanouk had been overthrown, Lon Nol took over.

The alliance between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese communists

Interviewer:
What about where you yourself were?
Chhit Do:
Well, after Sihanouk had been overthrown, we still had the same old provincial governor, his name was...
Interviewer:
No, but didn't the Yuon come in and take over?
Chhit Do:
It was same time after Sihanouk had been overthrown that the Yuon arrived. Lon Nol had been in power less than a year when the Yuon came, maybe about three months. In the district where I was living, the Yuon came right into the district administrative seat.
Interviewer:
And did the Yuon and the Khmer Rouge get along with each other or what?
Chhit Do:
After the Yuon arrived, they were there with the Khmer Rouge, and the two of them got along with each other for a period of about two or three months or so.
Interviewer:
And what was going on then?
Chhit Do:
They were in consultation with each other and were working with each other. The Yuon were responsible for fighting with the enemy soldiers, and the Khmer Rouge were responsible for political education among the people, teaching them to hate Lon Nol and to fight the government soldiers... but they didn't really say anything about fighting the government soldiers. They said we were fighting with American imperialism.
If it had been a matter of fighting with Lon Nol, the Khmers wouldn't have had the heart to do it, because they felt that if it was a war between Khmers, they wouldn't fight. This was because back then, the Khmers still loved one another. In 1970, if called upon to fight Lon Nol, they wouldn't have fought.
So they said, "If you don't fight Lon Nol, then Lon Nol will go over to the Americans. It's necessary to get some guns and get together an army to make war on Lon Nol. Even though those soldiers carrying guns for Lon Nol are Khmer flesh and blood, if you don't go and fight them, if you don't have the guts to shoot them, these guys will certainly go over to the Americans, and in the days to come the Americans will rule over our entire country." This was the education they gave.
Interviewer:
Was it the Khmer Rouge or the Yuon who talked this way?
Chhit Do:
It was the Khmer Rouge who said this.

The power struggle and schism in Communist groups

Interviewer:
And in what year did the split between the Khmer Rouge and the Yuon come?
Chhit Do:
Well, subsequently, after they had been together with each other for some time, after the Khmer Rouge had been with the Yuon for some time, the Yuon set up a power structure throughout the country. It had been set up by 1971. There were sub-district chairmen, district governors, provincial governors and so on, all just exactly like in the old days, except that every last one of them was a Yuon.
All the deputy chairmen and vice governors were Khmer. The Khmer Rouge were not satisfied with things being this way, didn't trust this power structure, and so they asked the Yuon to withdraw their troops, but the Yuon did not do so.
And when the Yuon did not withdraw their troops, the Khmer Rouge then said, "Don't you respect Khmer sovereignty and territorial integrity? You have come here as enemies, not as friends. You've violated our territory and then even set up a structure of power. Back at the time of the Indochinese Summit Conference you agreed with five principles, that you wouldn't do anything to adversely affect the Khmer people, that you wouldn't set up a power structure over the Khmer people, and that you didn't have the right to do anything at all on your own, that you came as a full fledged friend, not as an enemy. If you come and set up a power structure, the country and the Khmer people cannot but be displeased."
Interviewer:
Was there fighting between the two?
Chhit Do:
Yes, there was fighting, afterwards, when the Yuon refused to withdraw their troops.
Interviewer:
Please tell us what happened at Angkor.
Chhit Do:
They still refused to withdraw, even after the two sides talked it over. So then the Yuon threw the accusation back at the Khmer Rouge, saying that these Khmer Rouge were not really the unallied Khmer Communists, that they were Khmers who had rather all come from the Americans, from Lon Nol - infiltrators who had come to carry out a campaign against them. Having said this, the Yuon sent troops to encircle Angkor. There were Yuon troops everywhere, completely surrounding Angkor, all along the temple walls.
And then they opened fire, shooting into the place where the Khmer Rouge stayed. The Khmer Rouge ran for it. Some got away. Some were killed. And as some had been killed, the Khmer Rouge withdrew their troops. The Khmer Rouge didn't have any troops left. They were all withdrawn and retreated to Chikreng. Only a few were left. Then, after a period lasting about a week or maybe a little bit longer...
Interviewer:
Yes, but did the Khmer Rouge kill any Yuon?
Chhit Do:
Later, they killed some.
Interviewer:
Why?
Chhit Do:
They killed some because these Yuon, some of these Yuon, were, well, you know, they weren't perfect, either, you know. Sometimes, they ran out of things. They had a proper educational code. And when they first arrived, they tried really hard to do things right, but after some time had passed, they didn't have anything to eat, or anything to trade for food, and they would steal chickens and so on, and so they were hated.
The Khmer Rouge never killed any Yuon themselves. The people would kill them in anger. These killings occurred in 1972, and quite a good number were killed, killed in the paddy fields while walking alone. The people who were displeased with them would kill them.
The people knew by then that this was really a Yuon army, not a Sihanouk army. At first, the Yuon troops had said that they were Sihanouk troops, that they were Sihanouk's 'offspring,' that Sihanouk had sent them to fight. But when the people realized that they weren't really Sihanouk troops and after they had been stealing chickens and so on, the people hated them and when they were walking alone along the paddy dikes, they would be killed. The thing that was wrong with these Yuon was that they were stealing.
Interviewer:
And so the peasants hated the Yuon, but did they love the Khmer Rouge?
Chhit Do:
Back then, they loved the Khmer Rouge. But the Khmer Rouge were also saying at that time that they were Sihanouk's 'offspring.'
Interviewer:
And why was it that the people loved the Khmer Rouge?
Chhit Do:
They said that Sihanouk was the chairman of their Front. They realized, that in fact he was the monarch, but in their education they said that when the liberation movement had been launched, he had been a monarch, but now that there was going to be a republic, he would be considered the unique Chairman of the Front. He unified the nation.
He could not join in making revolution like everybody else because he was the Chairman of the Front, the unifier of the nation, who was to educate and instruct any part of society that could to join its forces with the revolution. And because, unlike everybody else, he didn't know how to plant vegetables or plow fields. But he had educated people to believe in the revolution, to go ahead and go on over to the revolution, because the revolution would make for national process in this way or that way. This is how the Khmer Rouge educated the people.
And at the same time this education prevented complications with the intellectuals among the cadres on the issue of making communism but bringing the monarch into the communist state power, you know, because some of the big shots were perplexed. They asked, "We say we hate the monarchy and we want to dissolve the monarchy. So what are we doing making the monarch the Chairman of our Front?"
So the answer would be that the Khmer Front was very big and very broad, and that no matter what kind of force was involved, we had to bring it in to work with us, as long as it was making revolution and no matter what power structure that force or that person had previously been a part of. When that power structure was dissolved and abandoned, when there was a new leader, it wouldn't matter what someone had done in the old days, even if that person had been a cabinet minister, or whatever, as long as they agreed to work in the fields, they could also stay on as part of the new structure of power.
Interviewer:
And when did the split between the Khmer Rouge and the people occur?
Chhit Do:
The peasants and the Khmer Rouge split in the latter half of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, because the peasants began to see that they didn't have any faith in the Khmer Rouge any more, the Khmer Rouge lost credibility. They said that if things went on like they were the people wouldn't get anything out of it. All they were getting was death, the deaths of their children, who were going off to war, going off to the battlefield and all getting killed.
What's more it wasn't any Americans that they were fighting. It was other Khmers just like themselves. There weren't any Americans to be seen among the troops on the Lon Nol side. There were just the government troops themselves, and so they saw that we were fighting among ourselves.
Meanwhile, there wasn't any rice, there wasn't anything to eat. Out there in the countryside there wasn't any salt, there was nothing to wear, there wasn't anything at all. The longer we fought the poorer we got, and so the people lost faith and started going over to the Lon Nol side whole villages at a time and...
[Beeps]

Sihanouk's return from exile

Interviewer:
Did the Khmer Rouge kill ordinary people at this time? Here we are talking about the year 1973 when Sihanouk arrived at Angkor. Did you meet with him? Please clearly describe the Sihanouk force.
Chhit Do:
When the Sihanouk force arriced at Angkor, I went to meet him, I went to welcome him to the Kulen Mountain. I went for ten days. We packed rice and carried it up the mountain for ten days [inaudible], and just one day after Sihanouk left the mountain, B-52s dropped bombs where we had been. If Sihanouk had stayed just one more day on the Kulen Mountain, the B-52s would have dropped bombs on him. The bombs were dropped all over the area and felled many trees which blocked the road.
Interviewer:
What was it like when you saw Sihanouk arrive? Did you get to shake his hand?
Chhit Do:
I did not shake his hand, I went... this is the way the Khmer Rouge handled his arrival: they mandated that no one was to order others around and made everyone obey. They wanted an orderly manner - in French it meant "serious" - as soon as Sihanouk arrived, because he has this characteristic... Socialist, no, not socialist, his character was that of a capitalist, it did not fit in the communist ideology, so the communists mandated that no one was to order others around, but to act properly.
Everyone was aware of the strict rule, so each one stayed still, nobody moved around. We were told we must not shake hands with Sihanouk, not greet Sihanouk, no matter how the high ranking officials acted toward him. We just stood still to welcome them normally.
Sihanouk went up to the stage. Frankly speaking, when he went up to the stage to speak, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim appeared to introduce themselves. He said, this is Hou Yuon and this is Hu Nim and this is Khieu Samphan, this is Khieu Ponnary. They introduced themselves, but only Hou Yuon, Hu Nim, Khieu Ponnary, and Khieu Samphan only, at the time they did not show Pol Pot. Nobody knew who Pol Pot was, none of the revolutionaries knew that Pol Pot was the president of the communist party, they did not know that at all.
Interviewer:
Did the villagers welcome him and shake his hand? How was that?
Chhit Do:
The villagers also welcomed him, but the Khmer Rouge did not allow anyone to act submissively. They did not allow bowing out of respect, so this made people scared to welcome him.
Some of them who knew the laws said, "It took this kind of revolution to make all of us humans equal. The king looks like normal citizen and the citizens look like the king. It's better this way, because before we had to kneel, and now when Sihanouk comes we do not have to kneel, we can just shake hands and speak to each other normally. So just clap hands to celebrate and that is enough, no need to kneel or bow, making things complicated like before, no more."
Interviewer:
Did Sihanouk give a speech or not?
Chhit Do:
Sihanouk gave a speech, but a speech that was coerced. It was not a speech from his own mind, because they did not allow him to speak as he wanted. In the Khmer Rouge term it is called a path, and everyone must follow the path and only talk about our theories never about capitalism. They only allowed talk about the ideology, the liberation front ideology.
Interviewer:
Later on, before Sihanouk arrived, or after Sihanouk arrived, did they change the propaganda about Sihanouk or was it the same propaganda?
Chhit Do:
After Sihanouk arrived, they escalated the propaganda and began using the word communist openly. Sihanouk had returned and the Khmer Rouge had made it clear that they not only wanted Sihanouk to return to the country, but they had brought him here. At the time they only had support from half the country. The Khmer Rouge were trying to persuade the people, and I was also involved with persuading the people.
The people had not completely believed in the Khmer Rouge, and if they had not brought Sihanouk to show to the people they would have joined the Lon Nol side. And then the American would make contact with Sihanouk, got rid of Lon Nol and made Sihanouk commander in chief to replace him. That meant this war would return Sihanouk back to monarchy like before.
Therefore they took him from China so that the Americans would not try to make contact with him and brought him back to let the people see him inside Cambodia in 1973. That was their political strategy, it was like that. They took him out of China. If he stayed in China at that time, the foreign minister and he were to go to Beijing, so they had to take him out of China.
It is clear that this was the plan of the Khmer Rouge. They had major meetings which they called "secret committee meetings" to discuss bringing Sihanouk back to the country. Not so people would bow in front of him, it was not for that. However we welcomed Sihanouk so that he would not be disappointed. If he had been disappointed he may have returned to China, and if he then sided with the Americans then we would not win the war.
Interviewer:
But afterward did they began to criticize Sihanouk or not?
Chhit Do:
They criticized him. They considered Sihanouk... as the leaders of the Communist Party said, people still believe more in Sihanouk. But as for us, we do not believe in Sihanouk, and whoever is pledged to be a member of the party must not believe in his authority.
Starting from the lowest members of the party they were persuaded not to believe, but as for the people, they still allowed it and even wanted them to believe. Secret meetings were held among the elected committee members in which they said, "If in your head you still believe Sihanouk, you are not a part of the revolution." In the secret meetings they said Sihanouk is the enemy of the revolution.

Indoctrination methods of the Khmer Rouge

Interviewer:
As a member of the committee, what were you taught?
Chhit Do:
I was taught about politics.
Interviewer:
How was it taught?
Chhit Do:
I was sent to study political documents. One of documents they made me study was about the ideology, about the current situation.
Interviewer:
You studied only this one area?
Chhit Do:
Yes, about the concept of the current situation, and their ideology, and materialism.
Interviewer:
How did you study, was there a school for you to go to...
Chhit Do:
There was a school, in fact a huge school.
Interviewer:
Where did you go to school?
Chhit Do:
I studied at... at first I enrolled at labor center. The class was held in a huge forest. That school was built to teach the high ranking members of the committee. I went to school, one week at a time, to study politics. Only politics for one week.
We were closely watched by security guards. We learned about making conversation, asking and answering questions, and took notes of the questions. We took notes of the questions that we wanted to ask, wanted to pose and answer, to solve the riddles. This is how politics was taught: to pose riddles to each other back and forth. But we were not angry at one another, even though I made accusations against them.
They wanted us to accuse each other about such and such, like treason. They wanted to know our feeling, do we got mad if they accused us, or this comrade was seen in an act of treachery the other day, such and such. We would not have gotten mad, we replied that on that day. We did this and that. To think about it, that political school was solely about accusing each other, and that also includes the high ranking officers.
If the accusation involved the highest ranking officers, they would remove the weapons in case someone got mad and to prevent anyone from using weapons. Because at that political school there was once a quarrel - a quarrel but not angry at each other, they just acted normal as if nothing had happened. In this communist regime, they argued really seriously, one must strongly defend his position.
If we want to find out who has the best arguing skills and who is good at solving problems, the only way to find out was to talk with each other. They removed the weapons, and if someone refused to accept the accusation, they said were told they had to accept no matter what. Whatever the accusation, we had to accept it.

The struggle to survive in a civil war

Interviewer:
Regarding the daily living, were there bombs dropping and a lack of food, and so on? Please describe the daily life during the Khmer Rouge era before 1975, life from the start of the war.
Chhit Do:
It was in 1970 and the purchasing of goods was not difficult, but starting from '72 it was not easy at all. Life was very difficult.
Interviewer:
Please describe the difficulties.
Chhit Do:
People's life was difficult. First, there was the lack of clothing, second was the lack of food. There was not enough, that was a summary of life on the Khmer Rouge side. If it was not for their belief in Sihanouk, nobody would have stayed, they would have deserted because it was very hard. It was hard in every possible way.
Interviewer:
Was it hard because of the lack of supplies or of the bombings?
Chhit Do:
The hardship was also because of the bombings and not being able to farm. People were busy fighting the war, all the young labor force went to war. There were only the elders left, not many crops were produced.
Therefore there was nothing to eat, and so where did the Khmer Rouge get the rice? It was from the elders who produced it. And with the Khmer Rouge it was not like they were buying. They ordered people to give, to make donation, and they were ordered to support them.
Interviewer:
And this support was required?
Chhit Do:
At the beginning they required that such and such village must provide this much and that much. Therefore it was a requirement and no matter how scarce, the villagers must absolutely have supplies for them. There were few people who worked and the food was scarce. Food supplies were very, very scarce.
Interviewer:
But was there a fear of bomb drops, were there people killed by bombs?
Chhit Do:
There was. There were some who got killed by the bombs, there were some deaths. Khmer Rouge soldiers also got killed along with the villagers.

The propaganda value of American bombs

Interviewer:
Did the Khmer Rouge use the bombings in order to incite anger against the Americans?
Chhit Do:
Yes they did. They accused them for the bombings. They said, "We must remember this and get revenge on the Americans." And "That was the savagery of the Americans, because we the people never instigated a war with America at all. But the Americans brought in the airplanes. Cambodia never had airplanes, only Americans did, and they used the airplane to drop bombs on people's heads! Therefore we should feel resentful and we must fight. America is far away but it got itself involved here."
Interviewer:
I wanted to ask once again about the bomb drops, how did they politicize the bomb drops? How did they create propaganda about the bombings?
Chhit Do:
On the Khmer Rouge side?
Interviewer:
That's correct.
Chhit Do:
They made propaganda that the government forces had already sold their land to America because Lon Nol wanted power. He wanted to become the president, and if America did not help and support Lon Nol, he would lose the war against Sihanouk. Lon Nol therefore had no choice but to join the Americans and asked the Americans to drop bombs and kill the entire population. Then the Americans would come in and easily take control of Cambodia just like the French did before.
They said it like that, but they added that when the French came and took control of Cambodia it was not as bad because their physical size is not as big as Americans. The Khmer Rouge said that an American is two to three times bigger than a Frenchman! Therefore they would have tremendous strength to use against the Khmer people, and burden us very heavily, not like when the French were here. When the French were here, it was bearable because they are not as big as Americans. That was what they said would happen - it won't be like it was before.
The law in the country was very strict back then. They called it, or used the word authority. I do not know how to say "authority" in French. It’s a non-cultural word I do not know the meaning of it. Fascist authority.
Interviewer:
About the bombings, did the people demonstrate and protest against the Americans?
Chhit Do:
They did demonstrate and protest against the Americans, and the Khmer Rouge told them to go look at the bomb sites. There are deep huge trenches.
They used the sites of the bombings, the sizes of the trenches made by the bombs, the shrapnel of the bombs that were left behind to show the villagers and said, "Look at the size of the shrapnel! The size of a man! And they use the bombs the size of a rice bag to drop on us like that, to destroy, to flatten everything. To destroy the country, not just to defeat its enemy, but so there won't be anyone left to rebuild the country! Because the way they dropped the bombs was to kill everyone, but because we know where to hide that's why we are still alive!"
They used the bombs and the bomb trenches and the shrapnel to brainwash people, to spawn anger at the Americans. They said it was not like that with the Japanese, when Americans dropped the atomic bomb during World War II. They said, "We must not let go of our anger at the Americans from now on, never let go until we all die, we must never surrender. For as long as we are alive we will keep on fighting!" That was how they persuaded the people.
Interviewer:
[inaudible] the villagers, were they pleased with the bombings or did they hate American?
Chhit Do:
During that time the villagers were scared of the airplanes, scared of the guns and whenever they heard an airplane coming... it's normal, in a war, those who have never experienced war do not know, sometimes you wet your pants whenever the bombs are dropped.
They would fire huge amounts of rockets on us, each time about two hundred rockets and up to almost four hundred rockets. The tremendous explosions made it so we could not hear anything at all for two or three days. If someone was mentally weak he would go crazy during silence. Until we were able to hear and speak again we lost our minds, lost our senses for a while. People were scared and ready to believe anything they were told.
What the Khmer Rouge said was credible because there were just so many huge bombs dropped. That's was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over. And the shelling from the Lon Nol side was no little thing, either. It was massive. It came four hundred shells at a time. They would always use 105mm howitzers, four at a time.
But as for me, after I had been in the war for a long time, by 1973, I never got down when I heard the whine of the shell. I didn't get down and that's what made the combatants dare to go forward. They said I was really fearless. They talked about me among themselves and had faith in me. But it was only because I knew that if I heard the sound of the shell, it had already gone past and so I didn't need to get down.
Interviewer:
So there weren't any local people who were happy about the bombing?
Chhit Do:
No, there weren't any local people who were happy about the bombing. It was because of their dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating with the Khmer Rouge, joining up with the Khmer Rouge, sending their children off to go with them, to join the Khmer Rouge.
Interviewer:
So the bombing made the people happy with the Khmer Rouge?
Chhit Do:
Yes, the people were willing to go along with the Khmer Rouge because of Khmer Rouge use of the bombing as a point in their political education. No matter what the Khmer Rouge did, they referred to this bombing.

Execution protocols for the Khmer Rouge

Interviewer:
So the American bombing was a kind of help to the Khmer Rouge?
Chhit Do:
Yes, that's right. It was a kind of help. It helped to get them to come over to the Khmer Rouge and help, because the people saw, well, sometimes, the bombs fell and hit little children, and after that their fathers would all join the Khmer Rouge. There was a lot of bombing over a long period so naturally people were being killed. And when people were killed, this would become a point in political education.
They would make a big point out of even a single death. But if the Khmer Rouge killed somebody, in contrast, they would try to make points in their political education to keep people from being scared, but of course the people were scared nevertheless. Everybody they killed had "betrayed the nation," "gotten in league with the Americans" or "was getting ready to completely destroy the nation" and so forth.
By 1971 and 1972, when someone was executed, they would first hold a meeting. They would hold the meeting in order to get the people to believe that the person to be killed was in league with the Americans, was an American spy and that this had been clearly proven with no doubt, that he had been seen carrying out a campaign against the nation in this manner or that manner, that he had called in the planes to bomb this place and that place.
And so people would say, "Yeah, I can believe that. It's true." But in fact I know, as I had an important position, I know that despite all the appearances, the Khmer Rouge still were doing things wrong. They did not recognize the worth of human beings. Because if they wanted to kill somebody they would just accuse the poor guy of all these things.
The truth was that some people really had done the things they were accused of whereas others had not. Anyway, back in 1971-72, the people were supposed to raise their hands if they thought someone was really guilty. And then they would ask whether someone who was in league with the Americans should be allowed to live or should be killed. The people were supposed to deliver the sentence.
Interviewer:
Did the Khmer Rouge kill a lot of villagers back in that period?
Chhit Do:
Back in that period there had to be a mass meeting if there was going to be an execution. And there were quite a few executions. But without a meeting there couldn't be an execution, except in the case of government soldiers who had been captured. Captured government soldiers could be killed without mass meetings.
From 1971 through 1973, the sub-district committee had the right to carry out an execution. At that time, however, I wasn't yet at the sub-district committee level. I was a cadre. When I was promoted to be the chairman for political affairs of the sub-district committee, by which time it was already the end of 1973, the decision had to be made at the sector level. Those at lower levels could not carry out an execution on their own. If they did, they would be punished. Things had been made more strict.