THE FIRST QUESTION I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU IS COULD YOU JUST DESCRIBE TO US WHAT THE UNITED STATES POLICY WAS TOWARDS YOU AT THE TIME YOU WERE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE.

At that time, the European Economic Community... it was still in its very early stages. There were three communities actually... the coal and steel community, the economic community, and Euratom, which was still in existence. And the three were not put together until a later date, as I recall. My interest because I had worked with Jean Monnet in the early days of the conception of a united Europe was that the United States government should encourage the idea of Europe coming together in some type of unity. It was obviously an evolutionary process and perhaps we had to go through economic unity or economic integration before any kind of political unity could be achieved. But this was the genius of the process that it would be taken in steps. And I think I've persuaded President Kennedy that this was a policy we should follow and, and we did indeed follow it. And the President himself was very careful to encourage the Europeans to go forward with their undertaking and also to encourage Britain to join. This was very important as far as I was concerned because when we had originally conceived the idea of the coal and steel community, Monnet had made a great effort to bring the British in. We all felt that a Europe based on simply a Franco-German rapprochement would not be adorable and not be sufficient that the British should be brought in as a party who would exercise a great divisive effect if it remained outside because it drew with unequal lines of force... it was a lodestar drawing with unequal lines of force on different aspects... different parts of Europe. But as a part of Europe it could bring the British pragmatic political genius to play and making this construct to work.

WITHIN THAT POLICY, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEFENSE POLICIES IN TERMS OF EUROPE?

Well, I had two concerns. One was NATO and defense policy with which the United States had to play an active role. The other was that Europe itself should develop a kind of unity which would enable it to play not merely a military role but a political role that with speaking with a single voice that the Europeans could have an influence which they could never have so long as they remained separate. And I thought that the... from the United States point of view it was extremely important to have a European voice which was... could be heard and was a strong element.

THE UNITED KINGDOM, SHORTLY AFTER YOU TOOK UP OFFICE, REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES IN MODERNIZING ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ASKED FOR THE...SYSTEM. WHAT WAS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THAT?

Well the... I was opposed to providing Polaris to the British for the simple reason that it would extend the life of the British deterrent far beyond what was useful... what was healthy. It seemed to me that no proliferation was very useful beyond the...of the weapon by the two great powers that in that way there was a possibility of working the thing out and finding some common management which would be difficult as long as the Britain end had its weapon and France had the force to... So I was hopeful, actually, that both would taper out over time because I didn't think they added anything essential. I was deeply concerned about the attitude of the Germans, that to have two of the major European powers possessing a force to...possessing a nuclear capability. And the Germans excluded that this would contribute to the redevelopment... all the forces of resentment and so on which had caused so much trouble in the past on the part of the Germans.

YOU ACTUALLY WERE AT THE MEETING AT NASSAU WHEN KENNEDY AND MACMILLAN ACTUALLY DID THE DEAL OVER THE POLARIS SYSTEM. COULD YOU DESCRIBE IT FOR US?

Well, what had happened was that in advance of that meeting which had been set for some time. Uh, the Americans had been more and more disenchanted with the idea of Skybolt because they thought that this was technically not a useful weapon. It was too inaccurate, and there was no way to get the kind of accuracy that was needed at long distance on a platform that was unstable as an airplane. So that McNamara was very much in favor of getting rid of it. But we had an agreement with the British that we would continue to develop it until there was consultation and a mutual decision to discontinue. McNamara, however, had... so firmly in his mind that this was not cost efficient and that was such a, a large element in his attitude towards many things that he was determined to stop the Skybolt program. And obviously something had to be given to Britain as a substitute. We didn't intend, really, to give them Polaris, at least I didn't intend that we would when we went to Nassau. And it was... although we'd had some intimations from Thorneycroft that this was what they wanted. But in any event we were... we had been there very long. Macmillan had put his case to Kennedy so persuasively, as one politician in trouble to another that Kennedy made up his mind. And so the deal was done.

WHAT WERE THE RELATIONS LIKE BETWEEN KENNEDY AND MACMILLAN?

I think that Macmillan was a kind of avuncular figure as far as Kennedy was concerned... You remember that Kennedy had known Macmillan when he was a young man at the time his father was Ambassador to (the Court of) St. James. And after... he had a deep affection for... and respect for Macmillan who seemed a much older figure to him.

I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THIS MEETING BECAUSE YOU WERE IN THE ROOM.

Yes, I was there all the time.

SUDDENLY THIS DEAL WAS GOING ON. YOU'D ACTUALLY NOT AGREED WITH THEM...YOU WOULD BE AN ADVISED KENNEDY AGAINST?

Well, I had advised Kennedy against it but actually on the plane flying down to Nassau, Kennedy had excused himself and gone back to his state room, taken off his clothes and put his pajamas on and was having a nap. And David Ormsby-Gore was the Lord Harlech now, who was in the... British ambassador...who was an old friend of Kennedy's had gone back to visit with him when I went back to join them. And at that time David was emphasizing to the President the political difficulties that Macmillan was having because the government was in some disarray. And there was a great feeling they had to bring something substantial back from the Nassau meeting or he would have real problems. And I think this made a deep impression on Kennedy. As I said, he was a politician looking at the plight of another politician whom he revered, and this had a deep effect. In the meeting my role which I've carved out for myself was to persuade Macmillan that even if he got the Polaris they should be committed to some kind of a common force. And this was a theme that I was urging very strongly. And he said to me, "You don't think that the art shops should share their grogs with a, with Turks do you?" And I said, "In my mind that...as I recall...that was exactly what happened on Nelson's flagship". But in any event he was quite disdainful of the idea of any kind of common management. So this was why he insisted in the agreement that Britain should have the right to withdraw the Polaris from NATO in the event of, I've forgotten the exact language, emergency or something of the sort.

I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU SEPARATELY ABOUT THAT ANYWAY. THE CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT SAYS THAT UNDER ITS OWN VOLITION. DOES THAT ESCAPE CLAUSE ACTUALLY MEAN ANYTHING IN TERMS OF THE POLARIS AGREEMENT DO YOU THINK?

Well, I think it meant everything. What the escape clause simply meant that there was no real commitment of the missiles to NATO, so they could be withdrawn as a whim of the British government which is exactly what Macmillan intended.

FOLLOWING ON FROM THAT, ASSOCIATED WITH THAT WHOLE POLICY. YOU WERE ACTUALLY ONE OF THE DRIVING FORCES OF SETTING THE IDEA OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE IN EUROPE. WHY WAS THE MLF CONSIDERED TO BE SO IMPORTANT?

Well my interest in the MLF was simply to... a matter of, of dealing with the problem of a German sensitivity. I regarded it not as a weapon... course it was an absurdity as a weapon to have all these hands, fingers on the trigger. But as a gesture to the Germans so that they could feel that they had some participation and management of a nuclear weapon. And obviously we weren't about to give them their own nuclear weapon or... sanction. I think in retrospect I overestimated the danger of the Germans developing this resentment. But this was my sole interest in it. I didn't see it as necessarily having any utility from a point of view of a little ship going around the world and being available to an emergency... there was something of that. But it would've been too difficult to manage. So that it was very hard to sell from a political point of view. People say this is an absurdity. And I couldn't say, "Well I agree it's an absurdity but politically it has utility." McNamara felt the same way and, and he and I supported it until fairly late in the day. But the... again the President... President Johnson had exactly the same problem that other people had. He didn't want to try to persuade this to the Congress. He didn't want to take it up there to the Hill, and he forbade us to discuss it on the Hill until he was ready. But he thought the only possibility of getting the Congress to agree was if there was an overwhelming demand from the Europeans which was basically forthcoming. The Germans were in favor but the British were always very lukewarm, and the French were... thought it was absurd.

COULD YOU EXPAND A BIT ON THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MLF? WHAT POSITIONS DID THEY TAKE AND WHAT DID THEY DO?

Well they were...the question of the British attitude toward the MLF... It was necessary from our point of view to evoke from the British, if not a request at least an assertion that the MLF would be a good thing and they were in favor of it. This was a matter of internal domestic politics. We couldn't persuade the Congress unless we could show that there was a large demand from Europe. And it was never forthcoming from the British. They didn't categorically denounce it but they never were able to give us the affirmative signal so that it didn't go ahead.

GENERAL NORSTAD ACTUALLY PROPOSED PERHAPS PARTLY ALONG THE SAME LINES AS YOU WERE PROPOSING THE MLF. BUT HIS IDEA WAS TO HAVE SOME MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES BASED ON LAND IN EUROPE. WHY DID YOU DISAGREE WITH THAT POLICY? WHY DIDN'T YOU FOLLOW THAT LINE?

Well actually what, what was, involved in Lauris Norstad's proposal was that these would be based on railroad cars or some moving platform so that they could be moved around rapidly. It seemed at that time why forsake the Polaris which was a really, really safe platform because the other side wouldn't know where it was.

THE DEBATES IN EUROPE ABOUT THE MLF CAUSED PERHAPS QUITE A BIT OF DISSENSION. WHY DID YOU PERSIST WITH THE STRATEGY FOR SO LONG?

Why did I persist so long in support of the MLF, it was simply a feeling I have which I think, in retrospect, was exaggerated. That we were going to have trouble with the Germans, and we were building a way for a period of German resentment which could, in light of history, prove very dangerous. So I continued to support this. It was a rather lonely task, I mean, McNamara and I were together but there were very few others. There were some technical people who were on our side but nobody on the political side who, who thought, took it as seriously as I did. And I... as I say in retrospect, I think I probably overstated it because actually along about that time or soon there afterwards we promoted the idea of the non-proliferation agreement, and which would've prevented the Germans from acquiring any kind of participation in nuclear weapons. And it caused no problems. I mean, there were... I got a lot of letters from Germans saying this is an outrage, I mean, don't do this to us. But nothing happened.

SOME PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE AND IN GERMANY HAVE SAID TO US THAT IN FACT THEIR VIEW OF THE MLF WAS THAT IT WAS ALWAYS JUST A PLOY TO OBFUSCATE THE DEBATE ABOUT WHOSE FINGER WAS REALLY GOING TO BE ON THE TRIGGER.

I don't think it was intended to obfuscate. It was intended to give them the satisfaction of being able to say, "Look, we are a participant in the management of a nuclear deterrent." It was a little contrived, I don't say otherwise.

LEADING ON TO THE FRENCH NOW. HOW ALARMED WERE YOU BY THEIR PLANS FOR THE (FORCE DE FRAPPE)?

Well, I... let me see. You asked me about the French plans for Force de Frappe. I had always thought that this was a very bad idea although I could understand that with the British having a nuclear weapon that the French would sooner or later want one too. This was simply a function of an old rivalry. That's why I was anxious to get the British to abandon the business then we would have some possibility of getting the French to do the same thing.

WHEN YOU FIRST CAME INTO YOUR JOB, WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF A FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE REALLY TAKEN THAT SERIOUSLY IN THE UNITED STATES?

Well, I took it seriously because I had been working with Monnet and the French government. And I knew when Félix Gaillard was Prime Minister I went in to see him one day and he said I have just approved the Force de Frappe. So I took it seriously from then on because I knew what the French were doing.

CAN YOU JUST DESCRIBE TO US THE NASSAU AGREEMENT AND WHAT AFFECT IT HAD ON EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS?

I think that if one wants to speculate that the...perhaps the major effect of the Nassau Conference was to... was the final nail in the firming up of de Gaulle's decision to exclude Britain from Europe... from the European Economic Community. We were aware, at least I was aware and one of my colleagues who was at Nassau was aware, that de Gaulle was likely to be deeply upset when it was determined... it was learned that the United States had given the British a whole generation of new life for its deterrent and that something had to be done to mitigate that... forestall it. So I persuaded the President, President Kennedy, to write a letter to General de Gaulle, and Macmillan wrote a letter also reporting on the Nassau Conference and Kennedy saying that he was prepared to make the same offer to the French that he had made to, to Harold Macmillan, well the reaction, as might've been anticipated to that was, on de Gaulle's part that the French were being given second class treatment and were being offered some second hand clothes. And he wasn't about to wear secondhand clothes. So it was January of the following year...well it was the next month...was the famous press conference in which he fired his thunderbolt from Mount Elysees with the result that Britain was excluded. I, I don't...I'm not suggesting that Nassau was the sole reason for it. But Nassau was provided a useful excuse for the general.

HOW SERIOUS WAS THE OFFER TO DE GAULLE?

Well it was the kind of offer that having been made, if de Gaulle had accepted it, we would have to follow through.

YOU VISITED DE GAULLE IN 1963. CAN YOU TELL US...?

Well, it was on that occasion that he told me... When I saw de Gaulle in 1963 he told me that why in his opinion and that of his government that they could no longer play host to NATO in France. And that while he remained fully committed to the North Atlantic, he did not feel that he should play a role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that therefore he could not have this...these competing generals or.... generals and military men from other countries on his and to my colleagues in Washington, and they greeted it with a considerable skepticism. They thought that this was just a ploy on the General's part that he had told me this. So when the decision was actually made and the axe fell in, in January, and that was followed by the announcement of the Franco-German rapprochement and the treaty that he had and Adenauer had worked out between them. There was very considerable dismay that they didn't know what this meant...this meant a Franco-German kind of...arrangement which would exclude the rest of the world and...possibly lead to a separate deal between the Germans and the, and the Soviet Union. And there was great discussion for a few days about this. Uh, I didn't put that kind of malign interpretation on it. But when the Germans responded by... at our...disenchantment by sending over a representative who was Karl Carstens who was a then into foreign office. We gave poor Carstens a very hard time. And the result was they put a preamble on the Franco-German Treaty which really meant that it, it had no real meaning, and de Gaulle was very annoyed about it. He made a speech in which he said something about, "Treaties are like girls. Their lips are, are, are..." -- I can't remember...I don't want to misquote him...but their lips are very enticing for a while, but it all passes.

WHY WAS IT, DO YOU THINK, THAT NOBODY ELSE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY TOOK DE GAULLE'S THREAT SERIOUSLY?

Well, I took it seriously and some of the people in the state department, particularly in the European bureau took it seriously. But there was just a feeling that de Gaulle was a difficult man, and that he was always posturing and that he wouldn't actually insist of throwing NATO out of France. I mean, this seemed too preposterous, and they couldn't, they couldn't understand the logic to why he arrived at that.

TO GO BACK TO THAT MEETING WITH DE GAULLE IN 1963, YOU SAID THAT HE'D EXPLAINED TO YOU THE REASONS WHY HE WAS GOING TO FRANCE WAS BUILDING ITS FORCE DE FRAPPE AND WHAT HIS INTENTIONS WERE?

No, we didn't discuss the Force de Frappe at that meeting. Uh, I was aware of the Force de Frappe, and...but he didn't try to justify his, his nuclear deterrent.

WAS THERE ANY PRESSURE ON DE GAULLE, AS FAR AS YOU KNOW, THAT CAME FROM THE UNITED STATES TO ACTUALLY DESIST FROM BUILDING IT?

I don't think so. I don't think that...while I think the...there was a general feeling that it was too bad that the French insisted on going ahead with the Force de Frappe I don't think we ever did anything to try to interrupt the process.

YOU'VE DESCRIBED TO US THE WAY THAT MACMILLAN AND KENNEDY ACTUALLY GOT ON.

I think that...How did Kennedy get along with de Gaulle, he had a great deal of respect for the General. He recognized him as a historic figure who had ...was a man of strong character. Uh, I think that I don't mean to suggest that he was afraid of him but I think that he, he treated him with a certain deference.

DURING THAT PERIOD...IT HAD STARTED BEFORE SORT OF '60-61 -- THERE WAS GROWING ANXIETY IN EUROPE ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US DETERRENT. DO YOU EVER FEEL IN RETROSPECT THAT, SORT OF, THE US DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AT THAT TIME HELPED TO FUEL SOME OF THOSE FEARS.

Oh I wouldn't... I think that the... that de Gaulle helped to fuel the, the dubiety as to whether the United States would actually live up to its commitment to use nuclear weapons in case of a conventional attack on Europe. But I don' think the American activity was responsible for that. I mean, it was simply...this was his feeling that France shouldn't be in the position of trusting anyone else...any other nations.

BY 1967 WHEN YOU...

...And I may say part of his feeling, that if he were in the United States' position, he wouldn't live up to a commitment like that any...either.

COULD YOU EXPAND A LITTLE ON THAT?

Well I mean...it, that de Gaulle was first and foremost a French nationalist, and he saw things from a very ethnocentric point of view. And he was always looking at any situation from the point of view of "What does it do for France?" And so if he had been in a position where if there had been an attack on an ally and the question was whether, whether France would risk starting a major nuclear exchange. I think that he had very grave doubts on his own part whether they would use their nuclear deterrent on anybody's half except directly on the French behalf.

BY 1967 YOU LEFT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IN A SENSE THE BRITISH DETERRENT HAD BEEN CONFIRMED AND PUT BACK INTO PLAY FOR ANOTHER TWENTY YEARS. THE FRENCH HAD LEFT NATO AND HAD THEIR OWN NUCLEAR FORCES AND BRITAIN WAS NOT ACTUALLY...THE EEC AT THAT TIME. DID YOU...HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT WHAT LOOKS LIKE A SIGNIFICANT FAILURE OF YOUR POLICY AS YOU JUST DESCRIBED IT?

Well that was...I necessarily look back with...not dismay but with a rather deep regret that the design...that grand design that we had visaged had not succeeded or it succeeded only in part. I don't think that what has been accomplished is negligible in any way. I, I often think to myself that suppose Europe were still in the position that it was in the twenties and thirties where each nation was trying to compete with the other and undercut the other. I think that the... what has been...what has been achieved by the whole European community is, is, very considerable. But it is far less that we had hoped for. We were thinking in terms of a gradual evolution toward a very considerable amount of unity...political unity.

WHY DO YOU THINK THAT WHAT WOULD YOU SAY WAS THE REASON WHY IT DIDN'T SUCCEED IN THE WAY YOU WANTED IT TO?

The reason it didn't succeed was simply implicit in the situation. The Europe was not like the American colonies...had been...where there was a good deal of common history and common interest. ...And they could be put together into a, a federation. I think that we had failed to appreciate fully the kind of continuity of national identify and national spirit that had grown up in Europe over the centuries and the, the mistrust of neighbors.

LET ME JUST ASK YOU A QUESTION I JUST THOUGHT OF NOW...SO IT MAY NOT MAKE SENSE. BUT YOU SAY THAT YOUR POLICY WAS TO SEE A EUROPE THAT WAS MORE UNITED AND THAT YOU COULD...THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DEAL WITH ON AN EQUAL BASIS. AND YET THE DEFENSE POLICY THAT WAS BEING FOLLOWED AT THE SAME TIME BY YOUR ADMINISTRATION WAS ACTUALLY TO TIE EUROPE VERY, VERY CLOSELY TO THE UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR AND WAR FIGHTING PLANS. DON'T YOU SEE IT AS A CONTRADICTION?

No, I don't see the contradiction at all between wanting to see a politically united Europe and wanting to see a common defense policy which...the whole of the Atlantic community. Of...I think it's...I think this was quite normal. In our judgment Europe could not safely defend itself...undertake to defend itself. By its own efforts it needed the United States with its...not only its nuclear power but its very substantial economic and conventional military power.

IS THERE ANYTHING YOU FEEL IS IMPORTANT THAT WE'VE LEFT OUT IN TERMS OF WHAT WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT?

No.

I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ANOTHER QUESTION THAT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU AGAIN AND THAT'S... IT GOT LOST IN THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION...AND I'D LIKE TO GET IT SET. I ASKED YOU ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ESCAPE CLAUSE OR THE SANITY CLAUSE IN THE POLARIS AGREEMENT. YOU SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT MEANT...MORE OR LESS. BUT THERE WAS ONE PARTICULAR PHRASE AT THE END OF THAT ANSWER...ONE FORMULATION THAT YOU CAME OUT WITH THAT MORE OR LESS SAID IT WAS...

What I said was that with that clause in the agreement there was no really serious firm commitment of the Polaris to NATO.

OKAY, THAT'S IT. I'D JUST LIKE TO GET YOU TO SAY THAT SEPARATELY.

IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES OVER NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY OR OVER NUCLEAR QUESTIONS WERE ACTUALLY A SYMBOL OF THAT NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN EUROPE. WOULD YOU SAY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ACTUALLY ACHIEVED AN IMPORTANCE THAT WAS MORE SYMBOLIC THAN REAL?

I think that for the European countries that nuclear weapons for Britain and for France, for example, gave them a kind of ultimate reassurance that it confirmed our own national masculinity, so to speak...virility legitimacy. Since they had nuclear weapons of their own they belonged to the club of the nations' that had them. This not only gave them a kind of respect in their own eyes and in that of other nations but it it also gave them a certain comfort that if the United States should ever actually withdraw its forces from Europe that there still was a fallback which could, if do nothing else, trigger an American intervention.

WHAT DO YOU SAY THEN THAT, IN FACT, ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU HAD WITH THE NASSAU AGREEMENT WAS THAT YOU DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT DETERRENT OF BRITISH PRIDE AND TO MACMILLAN'S...

Oh, I think I understood it. I think I understood the importance of the nuclear deterrent where British pride for French pride but that it seemed to me that we were in a world that was sufficiently dangerous that national pride was a...should be secondary and not primary. We had a problem of...a common problem of security.

MAY I ASK JUST ONE QUESTION. YOU TALKED ABOUT DE GAULLE'S PULL OUT OF FRANCE FROM NATO. WHAT WAS THE US ADMINISTRATION REACTION TO THAT?

On the question of de Gaulle's request that ...or in command that NATO removed from, from France... the response the American response...the response to the administration was one of considerable concern and dismay and we realized that it was going to cost a good deal of money and confusion. The idea was that we could go to Belgium and that this was all right but that well what we were... my colleagues were doing was looking for a larger motive...that this had a greater meaning than simply asking NATO to remove itself. And for that, they, they tended to look at the Franco-German rapprochement... that this was a substitute which de Gaulle was thinking about with Adenauer. This was a kind of love affair of two old men and that the result would be... might well be a... abandonment of a common policy toward NATO. It was hard to make a distinction and, and, of the American administration between adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty and rejection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.