BEFORE WE GET INTO TALKING ABOUT THE RELATIONS WITH THE UK, SINCE YOU SPENT SO MANY YEARS WORKING WITH GENERAL GROVES, I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU IF YOU COULD DESCRIBE HIM A LITTLE BIT FOR OUR AUDIENCE. WHAT QUALITIES DID HE HAVE THAT MADE HIM SEEM LIKE SUCH A PERFECT MAN TO RUN THE MANHATTAN PROJECT? IS THERE ANYTHING THAT REALLY, WHEN YOU THINK OF GENERAL GROVES WHAT ARE, WHAT ARE SOME OF THE ATTRIBUTES THAT YOU THINK ABOUT?

Well, he was decisive. He made decisions and moved on to something else. As a matter of fact, I learned one thing in my work with the General that I think is, stood me in good stead over the years and that was once you decide, move on to something else. Don't worry about it, don't lose any sleep over it. Get on with the next task. And he had a great knack for that. As you know he made some extraordinary decisions to build things that were not proven scientifically or technically,...

LET'S GET A SHOT. UHM, CAN YOU UH, DO YOU, I'VE CUT YOU OFF HERE, BUT COULD YOU GIVE SOME EXAMPLES OF HIS DECISIVENESS SOME OF THE, SOME OF THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS THAT HE MADE?

Well his decisions for example to go ahead with the gaseous diffusion plant this was a, this was a decision he made despite the fact that some of the experts at the time said it wouldn't, it couldn't be done. And it would not work. The estimated cost of the plant at that time was in the neighborhood of four hundred and fifty million dollars. And in 1943 that was a lot of money. And that's just an example of the kind of decision that he had to make. Had he not made that decision at the time he did, we probably would not have had the material available for the strike at Hiroshima.

YEAH, FOR A MILITARY PERSON UHM, I'VE HEARD PEOPLE SAY THAT, AND I THINK THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED TO SOME EXTENT IN GERMANY TOO, THEY RATHER INVEST THEIR TIME AND MONEY IN SOMETHING THEY KNOW WORKS.

Yes.

THAT GROVES REALLY TOOK A CHANCE...

He took many chances as you know he built the thermal diffusion plant and he built it because he thought it would help produce enriched 235 but that was a very iffy technical undertaking. But he decided to do it. And this was, this was typical of the kind of action he took to move the program along and you know, when one stops to consider what was done breaking ground in 1942, and having a bomb in 1945 was extraordinary.

DID YOU HAVE ANY DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM JOHN? UHM, JUST ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT GENERAL... DOES ANYTHING COME TO MIND UH, LIKE AN ANECDOTE THAT YOU MIGHT RELATE ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL INTERACTIONS WITH HIM?

Well my relationship with the General was everything anyone would want. And certainly more than I expected. I entered the project as a Private and I left as a Captain. I was on his staff all during that period and he was, he was very kind to me and very helpful. The General had one shortcoming. He had an ego that wouldn't quit. And this was very helpful to him during the program when he had to make these extraordinary decisions. And that ego I think, helped. But when the war ended the ego got in his way. And it affected his relations with a number of people, including the press. And one experience I remember was there was a program called Town Meeting of Year and he was asked to speak and he asked me to help draft something for him to say. Which I did. And in drafting a short speech for him, I did what I thought he would want me to do and that is give credit to the scientists and the industrial complex etcetera, and when he did redid the speech himself all the "we's" and the "they's" were gone and it was "I." And we had a very difficult time coming to an agreement on what he should say, or ought to say, but obviously it was his decision and he made it, and it all ended up with "I."

OKAY. THANK YOU. WELL, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU, WE STARTED TO TALK ABOUT IN THE OTHER ROOM... DURING THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM COLLABORATED ON THE MANHATTAN PROJECT AND THEN AFTER, THE QUEBEC AGREEMENT WAS REALLY BEFORE WARTIME COOPERATION...

Yes. Yes.

ONCE THE WAR WAS OVER THE BOMB BECAME, CAME INTO THE PUBLIC EYE. THEN THAT RELATIONSHIP STARTED TO CRUMBLE. WITHOUT BEING VERY SPECIFIC AT FIRST, COULD YOU JUST TALK ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED TO THE US-UK ATOMIC PARTNERSHIP AFTER THE WAR?

Well I think you described it. It crumbled. The ...

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU START OVER BECAUSE MY QUESTIONS WON'T BE HEARD...

Oh, I'm sorry.

SO IF YOU COULD START JUST BY SAYING AFTER THE WAR, THE US-UK...

Well after the war, the British attempted to bring about a peacetime understanding with our government on cooperation and collaboration in the field of atomic energy. And this met with a lot of opposition on the part of certain people in the government at the time. And perhaps the strongest opponent was General Groves. And I believe the General opposed it largely on grounds of security somewhat on grounds that the great effort that went into the development of the bomb and in the proving out of a reactor for power purposes was really an achievement of the United States and that this should not be shared with the with the British government. M, then there was a great deal of confusion over our relationship during that period of time- You may recall that Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister after the war visited Mr. Truman and they arranged an "aide mémoire" that was supposed to lay out the principles of cooperation. But that was never implemented because our representatives, particularly General Groves refused to take steps to carry it out.

YOU YOURSELF WORKED ON THAT IN NOVEMBER OF '45 YOU AND GORDON ARNESON, AND MACONS, AND RIGGET, FROM THE BRITISH SIDE ...

Yes, and Sir John Anderson.

I READ THAT YOU, IT WAS KIND OF A ROUGH SESSION THAT WENT LATE INTO THE EVENING TRYING TO REACH SOME KIND OF ACCORD?

Well it was very difficult because Mr. Attlee had persuaded Mr. Truman to agree to something that sounded like full and complete cooperation. But we as staff were under instructions not to, not to carry that out. And so it was, as I say, a very difficult situation....

YOU WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM WHOM?

General Groves, primarily.

I KNOW YOU TOUCHED ON THIS A MINUTE AGO, BUT I'M GOING TO ASK YOU AGAIN, UH, WHAT WAS GENERAL GROVES' MAIN CONCERN WITH POSTWAR COOPERATION? AFTER ALL DURING THE WAR THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WORKED TOGETHER. THE BRITISH SCIENTISTS HAD BEEN IN THE MANHATTAN PROJECT, THE MAUD COMMITTEE HAD GIVEN A GREAT IMPETUS TO THE WHOLE PROJECT AND CHURCHILL HAD BEEN ONE OF THE PROJECT'S BIGGEST...

Supporters.

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE WAR?

Well, I think, I think security played a big part in it. General Groves, had kind of an obsession about security. And during the war, one must remember that our cooperation with the British was really on our terms. We needed help at Los Alamos, and through the British we arranged to get some help. We needed some help in connection with the design and construction of the gaseous diffusion plant, and there were British scientists who could make a contribution to that, and so we got their help. But it was largely on our terms. We would seek out scientists from the Belgian scientific community who could make a contribution. And and that the limit of their involvement. In other words, they were not a part of the program in the sense that a, that an Oppenheimer was part of the program. There, each of these individuals that were brought to Los Alamos, or to Oak Ridge, or to Washington, was given a very specific thing to work on, and when that work was completed that was the end of his assignment. Now...

LET'S WAIT FOR THIS SIREN TO GO... OKAY DO YOU REMEMBER WHERE YOU WERE? YOU WERE EXPLAINING HOW THE...?

Yes, I was explaining the difference between the relationship that existed during the war. And the kind of relationship that the British were seeking. After the war was over. When the war ended the British wanted essentially full and complete cooperation. They wanted to be in a position where they could collaborate with the United States on advances that were planned in the weapons program they wanted full and complete information on the facilities that were constructed at Oak Ridge, the gaseous diffusion plant, the electromagnetic plant they wanted detailed information on the reactors that we built. At... and their operations in some of the problems associated with them. So the relationship they sought after the war was really very different. Then the relationship which had existed during the war. And having said that, I think it's fair to say, that the British perhaps were encouraged during the war to believe that once the war was over, that kind of full and complete collaboration and cooperation would exist between our, between our two governments.

AND WHAT STOOD IN THE WAY OF THAT? WAS THERE OTHER FACTORS BESIDES GENERAL GROVE'S CONCERN WITH SECURITY?

Yeah, one, would almost have to go back and look at the way in which the Manhattan District functioned, to understand what happened. General Groves not only managed and ran the program itself all of the scientific undertakings, the engineering and the construction and everything else, he ran his own state department. I don't know whether you're aware or not, but the State Department was totally in the dark about some of these activities that were undertaken. They were well, as a matter of fact, if you, I think I asked you earlier if you'd read Dean Acheson's book, (Present at the Creation), in which he made the point that when he assumed responsibility in the State Department after the war, he was astonished to learn about many of the things that been done during the war. About which the State Department was completely ignorant. And it took a long time for the State Department to catch up. And so for a period of time General Groves was, continued to function as the Manhattan District commanding officer and also his own State Department.

WELL WHAT ABOUT THE FACTOR OF UH, THAT SOME, GROVES AND OTHERS HAD MENTIONED ABOUT IF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES COLLABORATED TOO CLOSELY, THAT WOULD INHIBIT UH, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION VENTURES?

I always, I always, I always thought that was not a very persuasive argument. Because they had been our partner during the war, they had cooperated with us during the war, they were in a very special position. And I can't imagine that any other country would have reason to complain about a continuation of this special relationship.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU IF COULD SAY THAT AGAIN SO IT'S UNDERSTANDABLE WITHOUT HEARING MY QUESTION. FOR EXAMPLE YOU COULD SAY THAT SOME PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT UH, ONE OF THE REASONS THAT WHOLE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN WAS NOT ATTAINABLE WAS BECAUSE OF WITH INTERNATIONAL CONTROL THAT IT MIGHT UH, BE CONTRARY TO THE UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER...

You don't want that in the background?

I GUESS, I GUESS THAT'S IT...

Well I know, I know it has been suggested that to have a special relationship between the British and ourselves, might make it more difficult to bring about the kind of international cooperation and collaboration that our government would want to seek. At the end of the war. But the war was over, and frankly, I never quite understood why there needed to be any secrecy about this relationship between the British and ourselves. There's a certain amount of publicity setting forth the simple fact, that the British and the Canadians had participated with us in the development of the atomic bomb. And since that was in the public domain, letting it be known that the, what contribution the British had made and the fact that we felt or recognized that the British were entitled to continue in this kind of special role, it seems to me would have been a very plausible position for our government to take. But we didn't.

You no doubt realize that what I've been saying to you is that this period after the war, and it lasted for a number of years... was really in an extraordinarily difficult period in our relations with the British, I would go far as to say it was a doctorate in so far as atomic energy was concerned.

WHEN THE CAMERA WAS OFF YOU SAID IT SO WELL. I'M GOING TO ASK YOU IF YOU COULD SAY IT THAT WAY AGAIN.

What I have "been telling you about our relations with the British certainly makes clear that it was a very dark period in our... relationship with the British in the field of atomic energy.

[REPEATS QUESTION]

What I have been describing amounted to a very dark period in our relations with the British the British felt they had been betrayed. And in view of the relationship that existed during the war and I think their feeling; on the matter were certainly justified. We got into this difficult;... primarily because in the in the area of diplomacy and foreign relations we had a situation with respect to the atom where General Groves was both the commanding general of the Manhattan District and also his own Secretary of State. And these matters were not considered and resolved in a normal course of... the operations of the of the government. That is the State Department, Defense Department, and other agencies of the government. Indeed it was so bad that the special committee on atomic energy enacted legislation dealing with the control of the program completely in the dark with respect to any of these agreements that had been made during the war and their impact on relationships following the war. The committee was not aware of the Quebec Agreement. They were not aware of the combined development trust. They were not aware of the agreement we had entered into with the Belgians for the production of uranium form the Belgian Congo. And our commitment to the Belgians to share with them peace time uses of atomic energy. These were all matters that they were totally and completely unaware of. And so they passed an, a statute which had in it certain prohibitions that later created really devastating problems for the atomic energy commission.

I KNOW YOU WORKED ON THIS YOURSELF WITH A AND OTHERS TRYING TO WORK OUT WORDING FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH. DID YOU FIND YOURSELF FRUSTRATED THAT THIS WHOLE THING WAS HANDLED SO STRANGELY THAT THERE WAS NEVER AN AGREEMENT REACHED AND BY THE SPRING OF '46 THE COLLABORATION WAS REALLY OVER?

Collaboration was not only over. And I must say that it was not just a frustrating experience. At times it was almost humiliating. Humiliating in the sense that... at the highest levels of our government, namely the President of the United States and the Prime Minister, agreement had been reached that we would cooperate. And that at our level, we were forced to drag our feet on the subject. And in a sense really play games to mark time in which to avoid an agreement. And I must say I... at times I felt very uncomfortable in those meetings.

AND SO IT WAS JUST DRAGGING THE FEET LONG ENOUGH? THAT IT.

Once we had a statute, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it was then possible to say to the British, Sorry, but the law prohibits cooperation. And as a matter of fact I reflected on that some time later and I couldn't help but wonder whether or not our British friends weren't concerned over that very fact. In other words, that if they failed to obtain some form of agreement before the enactment of legislation, that congress would pass a law that would make it impossible.

IF YOU CAN JUST MAKE THAT POINT AGAIN...

Well, we were discussing here. We were discussing this matter of dragging our feet. And we were we were dragging our feet marking time pending the enactment of legislation. And once the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed, we were then in a position to say to the British cooperation is out of the question because the law prohibits it.

I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU A COUPLE OF THINGS ABOUT THE BARUCH PLAN UNLESS THERE'S SOMETHING ELSE THAT YOU'D LIKE TO SAY ABOUT COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH.

Well, I don't know whether you're familiar with the controversy that developed over this question. And the attempts that were made to... Are we on camera now?

WE ARE...

And the attempts that were made to try to resolve this issue. Are you familiar with the meeting that took place at Blair House with the President and General Eisenhower and members of congress to try and reach an understanding along the matter of cooperation with the British. this was a...

COULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT MEETING?

Yes after the after the McMahon Act... the British did not give up on the subject of cooperation. And they persisted in seeking some form of collaboration between our government and theirs. And by this time the civilian commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, was in command of the program. And members of that commission, including the chairman, David Lilienthal, had a very different view on this of this subject they felt that it was not only in the British interest, but in our interest as well that some form of cooperation take place. And but we were seeking a way of doing this that would that would be in keeping with the Atomic Energy Act and... As counsel to the commission, I developed a theory under the act which might be used to bring this about. And the theory was this: That though the atomic energy act said that we would not exchange information abroad it also had provisions mandating the atomic energy commission to carry out its responsibilities in a way that insured the common defense and security. And so together with some members of my staff, we developed a brief on the subject. And advised the commission that if a consensus could be developed between the executive and legislative branch of the government, that some form of cooperation would enhance our common defense and security. That this is a way that we could proceed. So we suggested that we ask the -- We suggested that the commission ask the President to convene the meeting at the Blair House with representatives of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. We also suggested that we needed persuasion from someone other than the Atomic Energy Commission that this form this cooperation with the British was in the interest of our common defense and security. And we recommended that General Eisenhower be asked to participate. He was then president of Columbia University. So a meeting was held at Blair House. And General Eisenhower was there. And members of the commission were there. The Secretary of State was there I attended with our chairman. And members of the joint committee were present. Not all, but certain members of the joint committee were present. And it was discussed in these terms, namely that there were many strong, persuasive reasons why we should have this cooperation with the British. General Eisenhower made a uh a very eloquent statement about the importance of our relationship with the British and the need for continued collaboration and with respect to all... forms of military activity. We then we then convened a meeting, an executive session of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy where the full committee could be present. Our hope was that the committee would agree with the commission and with the State Department who supported this view that cooperation was important to our national defense and security. Well, when the executive session opened it was almost a shambles. Senator Vandenberg, Senator Noland, and Senator Millikin started to pound the table and describe what was being proposed as outrageous and in clear violation of the Atomic Energy Act. And all of these very careful plans that we thought we had developed at Blair House fell apart. General Eisenhower was not so eloquent at that meeting. I think he saw the handwriting on the wall. And he retreated a bit, as did some of the others.

WHEN WAS THAT?

In 1948.

WHY DO YOU THINK BARUCH TAMPERED WITH THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL PROPOSAL?

Oh very simple as a matter of fact, he was outraged that it had been made public before he had a chance to get his hands on it. -- your question, again, was why Baruch...? OK.

WHY HE STARTED CHANGING THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL PROPOSAL.

The Acheson-Lilienthal proposal for international control over atomic energy. Unfortunately it was leaked before Mr. Baruch was selected by President Truman to head up the commission at the UN. And Mr. Baruch and his colleagues were furious over this. And I suspect that had it not been leaked, they would have attempted some changes because they didn't quite agree with some of the proposals that were made but since it had been leaked I think Mr. Baruch was very anxious to put his own stamp on it. He wanted this to be known as the Baruch Plan and not the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. And I think it was really that simple. There were numerous meetings between Baruch and his colleagues and the Acheson-Lilienthal board. And many of them were somewhat acrimonious. I think that his proposal to employ sanctions, and his proposal to do away with the veto, essentially told the Acheson-Lilienthal group that this plan was dead on arrival. Is that the expression that's used today with the budget? Well that was certainly true of the plan as it was revised by Mr. Baruch. There was no way... there was no way in which the Russians would ever accept what he had proposed. I'm not sure whether they would have accepted what the Acheson-Lilienthal people proposed, but the use of sanctions and the elimination of the veto certainly made it very clear that was not an acceptable proposal

The meetings that took place between Baruch and his associates and the Acheson-Lilienthal board were sometime quite stormy. And there were not only these differences of opinion with respect to the plan itself, but there were some very distinct personality clashes. I'm not letting anything out of the bag when I say that Dean Acheson was very upset over Mr. Truman's selection of Mr. Baruch. Dean Acheson states as much in his book, Present at the Creation, which really has a very good account of some of these discussions.

WHAT ELSE CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THOSE MEETINGS? WHAT WERE SOME OF THE...

Well the biggest the biggest arguments that took place were naturally over their suggestion to provide for sanctions and for an agreement to eliminate the veto. And other suggestions with respect to inspection. It was pretty obvious that the approach taken Mr. Baruch and his associates was to try to use international control of atomic energy to essentially open up the Soviet Union. Now when the Acheson-Lilienthal board was...... considering a plan for international control... they were not unmindful of the fact that the Soviet Union is a closed society... But... they attempted and thought they had devised a plan that would take that into account Mr. Baruch didn't agree with that. He felt that if there was to be international control of atomic energy, it would require not only sanctions, the elimination of the veto, but also a very detailed, thorough inspection system that would require the Soviet Union to open up its facilities to the US.

DID YOU FIND YOURSELF GETTING FRUSTRATED? DID YOU FIND YOURSELF GOING IN OPTIMISTIC AND THEN THINKING THERE'S NO WAY THIS IS GOING TO FLY?

Well, very frankly, I was never terribly — I was really never terribly optimistic that this was going anywhere one must remember that I was a very young man at the time and this was very... these were very heady days for me. And I was really taken up with the importance of the subject matter and the people I was dealing with rather than the success or a lack of success of what it is we were working on No. I don't think I don't think anyone was really optimistic. I don't think Oppenheimer was optimistic. I think everyone no doubt felt that it had to be done the United States had to take the lead in making a proposal for... international control of atomic energy. And this we did. And what was proposed, perhaps under other circumstances might have been a very acceptable and workable arrangement. But... considering the fact that the Soviet Union was then working on developing the bomb, they were not about to agree at that time to international control of atomic weapons, which is... which was the gut of the plan.