Wait a second. As soon as he tells me to go, and then go.

Okay.

As the ah situation ah with the French in Indochina military situation deteriorated and ah with the ah Indochina conference coming up at Geneva, the French, of course, were putting ah additional pressure on the United States to ah give them assistance. Ah. They were not looking for United States direct intervention but they were hoping that by bombing air raids or other other means that we could assist them.

The ah, the decision was made by the president and ah by the ah by Secretary Dulles in consultation with the ah with the Congress that ah we could not and we would not ah assist the French directly militarily in Indochina except in the context of ah collective action, that is, having other countries associated with us.

Ah. Therefore, Foster Dulles, ah Secretary Dulles, undertook in the spring of 1954 before the conference to explore the possibility of obtaining agreement on collective action. He, of course, had in mind the president had in mind the fact that we had had collective action in Korea under the United Nations we'd had some fifteen other countries associated with us there, and, he undertook to explore what could be done to assist the French and that that in that regard in Indo, Indochina.

Ah. He ah explored the possibility of some kind of a ah pact or an agreement that would ah make it clear to the Communists that, if they continued to push forward and push their military advantage against the French in Indochina that they could be faced with a ah with collective action by other countries intervening, there, to assist the French. And, ah, he at one time thought that he had arrived at ah sufficient agreement on this with the British who were ke...who were the key, key actors, of course, to be considered in any such, in any such action that it would be possible to go ahead to form a ah an agreement on this.

And, ah, he made a trip to London ah in which he discussed this with who was then Foreign Minister, Eden...Anthony Eden. And, ah felt sufficiently confident ah from his visit there and his visit to France with ah talking to Bidault and Laniel in in Paris that he thought he could ah go ahead with this and ah he called a meeting in Washington ah of those who he felt had agreed to this ah in order to begin preliminary discussions.

And, ah, it was a great shock to him and a great shock to his relations with Anthony Eden when the British Ambassador informed him just a day or two before the meeting was to be held that he was under instructions not to attend. Ah. He felt that he had ah been misled by Eden. He felt that he had been betrayed by him and ah this led to that ah I'd say antipathy and ah friction between himself and Eden ah that continued as long as both of them were in office.

Good, perfect. What—let's go on to the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. Ah. Discuss the fact that you were playing it by ear, that you didn't have any instructions and as we discussed at lunch that really the main arena back in Washington was Europe and less Asia than Europe.

Yes. As you know, the ah ah the ah Indochina Conference was coincidental with the Korean Conference. We haven't discussed the Korean Conference, and so the Korean phase of the conference was was started before the Indochina phase. Ah. There was still great uncertainty at that time as to ah what the French intentions were going to be.

There was still some uncertainty as to whether or not it would be possible to obtain any agreement on collective action ah which I, I have described, and ah in any event, as far as Washington’s concerns were con...we involv...were con...were involved, Washington had its eyes fixed upon primarily upon Europe. Our concern at that time was the viability of th—ah of the French government ah the viability of ah NATO which had just been aaaaaa shortly established before that and ah our our concern as to where Germany was going to fit in with France and that an whether or not it was going to be possible to build a coalition in Europe that would defend western Europe. Western Europe was a primary focus of attention.

And ah, as far as Vietnam was concerned it was, it was secondary as far as our our ah our interests were concerned, although we recognized the importance of it as far as Asia and ah, thus, the focus and the scene of action on Indochina was not in Geneva ah and and around the Geneva Conference ah but rather in our relations with ah with Europe at tha...at that at that time.

Could you again talk about, somehow convey that that atmosphere at Geneva where you have a French government being so weak and tottering and at the same time the Communists, although they haven't defeated the French yet at Dien Bien Phu, again from a military situation it looks bad, could you convey somewhat that sense of anguish or desperation that existed in the American delegation at Geneva?

Our delegation in in Geneva ah were under no instructions. Ah. Except to listen and to talk and get as much information as we could because the the decisions that were being made with regard to Vietnam were not being made by the French delegation or our delegation at Geneva. They were being made in Europe and in Paris and in Washington.

And, as far as the Vietnamese situation is concerned itself, ah, we could see the daily deterioration in the situation. Ah, the French were at sea on what ah they were going to do about it or even could do about it, and ah we could see the situation gradually deteriorating. We could see that the French had no clear policy for dealing with it, or capability even of dealing with it.

You gotta remember that ah the French were not using their conscripts ah army in Viet in ah Vietnam. The army that they were using in Vietnam was composed of the Foreign Legion, some Vietnamese forces, some Montagnard forces, some French volunteers. It was a a more less motley military ah collection. And, ah. there was nothing really more to add to it. Unless they could add a significant military element to it, it was quite clear that they were not going to be able to prevail militarily, and it wasn't clear...and it was clear that the Laniel government in France politically incapable of adding that additional military element to it.

Of course ah, our situation...

Just a minute. Okay.

Oh, sorry.

Okay.

Of course, our situation in Vietnam was a very fluid one, and of course, we were also not the primary actor with respect to Vietnam at ah at Geneva. The French were the...the French and the Viet Minh and the Communist side were the were the two two parties that were the primary actors and ah what all we could do in in in was to try to strengthen the resolve of the French, persuade them not to give the ah the show of the way, ah discuss with them ah the ah various possibilities in the situation.

Remember that ah Secretary Dulles was there, Anthony...Sec...Foreign Minister Eden was there, Molotov was there, Zhou Enlai was there. So, the, the principles from the governments ah were in Geneva, and they were, obviously, discussing ah the situation. Not in a conference framework, but in their bilateral and multilateral and trilateral relations with each other.

So, there was a lot of negotiating, negotiating going on, but not as as as Geneva Conference negotia...negotiating. It was preliminary to the convening you might say of the of the conference, and in fact, the Geneva phase, the Vietnamese phase of the Geneva Conference was not convened until the day that Dien Bien Phu fell, which was the ah collapse you might say of the of the French resistance.

What was the American attitude towards China which was a participant at the conference?

Well, we had accepted the participation of China in the Korean ah phase of the conference and ah we were reconciled of course, to the fact that China was a factor in the Vietnamese ah phase of it, and ah, we accepted the fact that China was there. We accepted the fact that ah China had to be involved in the ah agreement that was ah that was reached.

We accepted the fact that China, undoubtedly, had along with the Soviet Union influence upon the Vietname...North Vietnamese that...and so we accepted the fact that we were there, but ah we held ah no direct ah conversations with them on ah on Vietnamese affairs. We were at that time still ah very, very stoutly resisting the efforts of China to receive international recognition ah status as one of the ah Big Five or the Big Four, Big Five powers. And, ah...

Peking ah in the person of Zhou Enlai was a very, very able and sophisticated diplomat was, of course, striving in every possible way to achieve...

Start again.

I'm sorry, could you start, we had that screeching of breaks out there. Exactly the way you started just before...

I can't do things over.

Peking in the person of...

Ah...all right? Of course, ah, Peking, the Peking government in the person of Zhou Enlai who was an exceptionally capable and sophisticated diplomat was trying in every possible way to obtain recognition as a big power on the part of the Big Five and evidence that the United States in spite of its policy of official non-recognition, recognized them as such.

Ah, for example, the story is often told of ah Foster Dulles refusing to shake hands with Zhou Enlai. As a matter of fact, ah, this was a very, very carefully calculated move on the part of Zhou Enlai, and ah not some innocent action on his part. At our first ah meeting in which we had the meeting in the hall, we went out to the ah parlor for for tea ah I was walking along with ah Foster and ah we walked into the room and I saw Zhou Enlai and his party over in one corner of the room.

And, then when I, I looked around I saw Zhou ah, Zhou ah moving towards ah towards ah Foster Dulles who had his back to him. I also saw ah as Foster Dulles saw all the cameras lined up in front of him, and ah it was only when I nudged ah Foster and pointed out that Enlai was coming up that Zhou Enlai was very, very close to him at that time, and Zhou had his eyes on the camera very, very, very clearly and reached out his hand and ah, Dulles was faced with an immediate dilemma, did he have a picture taken shaking hands with Zhou Enlai that would ah be flashed on, in every newspaper around the world including newspapers in the United States as a "recognition of ah reconciliation between Zhou and Dulles and a recognition of China as a big power."

Although it was contrary to his nature, Foster Dulles was really a very kindly, kindly man and it was contra...contrary to his natural instincts of courtesy. He had no choice but to either accept ah Zhou’s hand or to turn his back on him so that ah the picture could not be taken. Foster chose, I think understandably in my view, the ah, to turn his back on him. And, the, the people back here in opposition to Dulles back here in administration were not given an ah opportunity to attack him.

Ah, Zhou Enlai was not given the opportunity to ah circulate around the world ah a picture showing that he's now accepted by ah Foster Dulles and, therefore, it was all right for others to accept him. Ah, but ahm, with an air of injured innocence Zhou Enlai, of course, continued to tell this story to his visitors over the years when they visited Peking as a ah as an example of the ah of the rudeness and crudeness of the Americans, and particularly, of Foster Dulles.

I'm afraid...But it's a terrific story. and I'm afraid I'm going to be finding myself in the cutting room and it's going to be too long. Can you tell it a little faster?

Sorry.

All right.

I'm sorry. I'm, I thought it was terrific and if I can I will keep this...

[Laughs].

Of course, ah at ah Geneva ah the Peking government represented by the very able and very sophisticated diplomat and politician, Zhou Enlai strove in every possible way to establish that they were a part of the Big Five and were there on the basis of equality with the Big Five.

As a ah part of that that effort on their part at the first reception or ah ah I shouldn't say reception of the first break we had in the conference in which delegates go out and have a cup of tea or ah "tea" the ah Zhou Enlai was over one side of the room when Foster Dulles walked in.

When ah Zhou spotted Dulles he very purposefully made his way towards him. Ah, Dulles had his back to Zhou and was facing a whole battery of cameras. Ah, obviously, Zhou was hoping to have his picture taken with ah with Dulles and ah obviously he hoped to have his ah tha...his tha...this picture be taken with shaking hands and ah as Foster turned around, Dulles put his hand out, ah Zhou Enlai put his hand out to ahm get get the have the photographers get the picture of his shaking hands with Dulles.

Thus, achieving that recognition which he was seeking. Obviously, Foster was not innocent either and ah he could see...he did not want to have his picture taken shaking hands circulated all over the United States and all over the world and ah he turned and refused to shake hands with ah with ah with Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai in later years used to tell this story with injured innocence of the rudeness on the part of Foster Dulles. In fact, it was very, very calculated on Zhou Enlai's part and Zhou and Foster Dulles' refusal was very, very calculated and very understandable in the light of the situation at the time.

Would you ah tell the story, the incident which you have in your memoirs about the Soviet pressure on Pham Van Dong to moderate the Viet Minh demands. And, what do you think, what strategy do you think that the Russians were using with Viet Minh and why?

My own ah feeling is that after the, the victory at Dien Bien Phu that the ah, Viet Minh were flush ah with victory and hoped and expected to have all of Vietnam, if not all of Indochina, that is, Laos and Cambodia as well ah fall into their hands, and they were very impatient to ah to achieve this.

The ah Soviet motives, on the other hand, ah I feel were centered on on Europe as...more than they were on Vietnam, and their concern ah over ah over so humiliating the French that the French would ah agree to the ah agree to the formation of the European Defense Community the so-called EDC which was our number one priority in Europe at that ah at that time.

And ah my feeling was that ah in order to...they, the Soviets felt that they needed to try to restrain the Vietnamese, Viet Minh from ah humiliating the French ah to the point ah to the point that the this had come to pass and they felt that they ah needed to persuade the Vietnamese to let the Mendès France who was then in office save some face so that in the hope that, if he could save some face in Vietnam, then he would be in the position to defeat the EDC which he was against in in Europe and, thus, accomplish the Sovi...Soviets objective.

Thus, I think that the Soviets did try to exercise a restraining influence on the Viet...on the Viet Minh there and ah persuaded the Viet Minh to take a half a loaf, that is, the ah so-called elections taken in two stages. The so-called elections, and ah give the French ah a a a way out that would still keep Mendès France in office and defeat the the EDC in Europe. Ah. I don't think that's very good. That's not...

Go ahead.

As a ah example of ah this Soviet effort to moderate get the Viet Minh to moderate their demands on the French, ah I well remember a meeting one day...well, in fact, it happened twice ah in which ah...well, I should say that ah it at our meetings I ah sat opposite, it was a hollow table, I sat opposite from Pham Van Dong the North Vietnamese representative.

He would ah...the table was open. Pham Van Dong would normally sit there ah with his legs crossed ah gently shaking his his foot. As ah the situation would get tighter and tighter over some particular ques...problem or question, ah his foot would shake in a wider and wider arc until it was ah going ah really ah almost out horizontally.

And, I could see that he was under, under great nervous strain. When it got to the point to which his foot was ah going going in a wide ah wide arc, Molotov called a ah, he was in the chair, Molotov called a ah a ah a recess and ah he and ah Zhou Enlai ah took or went accompanied Pham Van Dong out into the hall and ah when ah they came back Pham Van Dong's position...

Sorry.

Ah. We're going to have start again, it ran out. Oh...

What? Run out of film?

Okay.

Ready?

Okay.

As an example of what I felt was the Soviet effort to restrain and the more moderate some of the more extreme Viet Minh demands, I remember an incident at a meeting one day. At our meetings I sat directly opposite Pham Van Dong the North Vietnamese representative around a what was the hollow table ah with ah the tables were open also so you could see the people's feet and legs. During the course of the meeting Pham Van Dong usually sat there with his ah one leg crossed over the other and ah gently rocking his foot.

As the subject matter became more difficult, more heated, more volatile his foot would ah describe a wider and wider arc and ah when it became ah real ah real volatile why ah his foot was almost hitting the top of the the underside of the ah of the ah table. I remember one day when this was ah...when he was going through this ah and he had been making some fairly extreme ah extreme demands, Molotov who was in the chair, called a recess and he and Zhou Enlai accompanied ah I could say or or took Pham Van Dong out into the hall.

And ah after ten, fifteen minutes they came back. The meeting was resumed and the Pham Van Dong very materially modified the position he had, therefore...he had ah he had previously been taking during the course of the meeting. Now, ah, I don't know what happened in the hall, but ha ha ha, I ah I drew my own conclusions.

Could you go on a bit discussing the effectiveness of this on the American policy of of being there as observers but not making any commitments ah and as part of that the whole question of of the discussion with Mendès France at a time when Dulles was thinking of...?

Now, wait, now, I'm not...

Well, actually, we want to talk about the...not only about meetings and things, but remember Mendès France's argument that the American presence would discourage the communists...

Now, we're going to jump to Mendès France...

Okay.

After ah Foster Dulles left and then Bedell Smith came and then Bedell Smith left, I was left as acting head of the ah of the delegation for a period of well over a month as I recall it. Ah, my instructions were to ah go to the meetings. Ah, to not participate in them and ah not to agree to anything but to ah be there and sit at the table.

And, ah, I found that a a very difficult job to sit at a table at which people were making discussions and and some conclusions were being arrived at ah without ah agreeing to them and situations in which silence ah itself ah tends to give assent. I can tell you that I was very, very unhappy and perspired very, very freely and ah was ah found it very, very hard to ah carry out my instructions but apparently I did so to the satisfaction of ah of Washington.

What was the purpose of that? Being present without participating?

The ah my instructions were very understandable in light of the ah situation at the time. Ah, Washington was not at all clear as to what kind of an agreement Mendès France was proposing to make or what type agreement he would make and ah if the agreement was was going to be something with which we could possibly live or acquiesce or whether or not we were going to have to denounce it, and in effect, walk out walk out walk out of the conference. And, Washington was, obviously, wanting to keep its options open, if you will, at that time, and I was the agent of keeping the options open until they decided which way they were going to go.

Discussions between Mendès and Dulles.

Go ahead.

After Mendès France came into office he...

A truck went by.

Glad it's not the fire engines up at the corner.

We'll get that too. All right, let's go.

After Mendès France came into office ah he made ah a very strenuous efforts for to have Foster Dulles return to the conference. Ah. The position that Foster, Foster took was that ah unless he knew and was sure of what ah France was going to agree to, it was better for us to maintain our flexibility with the position that I was taking so that he would not be in the position of having to embarrass France by walking out of the conference to which he found that he could not associate himself in any way.

On the other Mendès France made the argument that with the presence at a higher level of the United States there, it would strengthen his hand ah in ah making a a a better agreement than he could make ah would be able to make in the absence of the United States. This...all right...you want to go to the...this resulted...There were many exchanges back and forth forth on this. Ah, I was the agent for for some of those in ah in ah Geneva with Mendès France and ah with Eden.

And ah eventually it was agreed that Foster would meet Mendès France in Paris ah and they would discuss the situation there. I ah accompanied...this was shortly before the end of the conference...I accompanied Mendès France to Paris and we had some thirty-six hours of very, very intense, intense meetings there during which Mendès France repeated his argument to Dulles that he could make a better agreement if the United States was present and assured Dulles that he was not going to make any agreement ah which we would feel, to which we would feel it necessary to walk out.

Foster eventually after all this discussion, argument, agreed that he himself would not return to Geneva, but that he would send Bedell Smith who was still deputy secretary back for the close of the conference and he also made it clear at that time that whereas we would not associate ourselves directly or agree to what the French were agreeing to there, we would make it clear that we would not use force to overthrow the ah the ah agreements and that was wha...and that was what was eventually done.

Mendès France accepted that and ah and fi...Bedell Smith did come back for the final two days of the conference and made the declaration ah of which you are awa...are you aware...you are aware. Yes.

Excuse me, we want to go back to that again, I think...

Just a moment. Go.

Okay.

Even more than most conferences, the real business to this conference ah was not in the formal meeting. The real business was in lunches and bilateral meetings between the Viet Minh with French and ah the Soviets with the ah ah French and the Chinese and so on.

And, ah, at the final, finally the issue came down in the conference to where the line was going to be drawn between the North and the South. It started with the ah Viet Minh insisting that it be drawn just north of Saigon and ah with the French insisting it be drawn just north, south of Hanoi and the ah final final agreement was that it would be brought, drawn at the ah 17th parallel, which very importantly left the main east west road between Vietnam and Laos leading over to the ah Vietname...to the Thai border, left that road in ah the Vie...French and South Vietnamese hands.

Stop please, I think we probably have another change.

Right, go ahead.

I do not necessarily ah feel ah that there was ah an explicit agreement between Mendès France and ah and ah Molotov that Mendès France would defeat the EDC ah in Europe, but ah I think it was inherent in the situation and inherent in Ma...ah in Mendès France's views that ah Molotov could have an expectation that if he remained in office the EDC would be ah defeated.

And in fact, ah, whatever the facts may be, in fact, ah, the ED...he did defeat the EDC in the, that, in the French Parliament and ah Molotov's ah, Molotov's objectives were accomplished. Hmm. Hmm.

People often talk about the "Geneva Agreement" as if there were some piece of paper that were signed at Geneva. In fact, there was no Geneva Agreement or single Geneva Agreement. The Geneva Agreement, so-called, was the complex of many agreements.

Ah, the principle ones were the armistice agreements between the Viet Minh forces and the French commands assigned by the military commanders on both sides, also military arms disagreements in Cambodia and also in Laos.

Then, there were uni...so called unilateral declarations ahh by the government of Laos and by the government of ah Cambodia. And, ah, ah, well, there was a number of other unilateral statements of th...that kind. The ah final, final piece of paper was ah a so-called Declaration of Geneva which ah which the participants of the conference took note was the usual term that was used of so and so. It said so and so had said so and so and so.

But that was not any, that was not any piece of paper that was signed by anybody even. It was a a the parties at the, at the conference made their own statements with respect to that final declaration. They didn't sign it. Ah, some of them said they agreed to it. Some of them, like the South Vietnamese said, they wouldn't agree to any part of it. Ah, like ourselves ah, we said that we did not ah, agree with it, but that we would not use force ah, to ah, to to upset the ah, upset the agreements and in effect expected the other side not to use force to violate the agreements. But, there is no single agreement, of yet, agreement ah coming out of Geneva. This is also very pertinent to this whole question of elections and whether we violated the agreement by not holding elections in ah tha...the elections not being held two years after the agreement went into effect.

In fact, at the Geneva meeting the South Vietnamese delegation made it very clear and very explicit that they were not agreeing to the ah wha...the elections after two years, and we made it very clear that we did not agree to the ah election provisions that were embodied in the final declaration because we felt that any elections under these circumstances should be under UN supervision and the final statement did not provide for UN supervision. Thus, there's nothing that either we nor the South Vietnamese "violated" after "signing" the agreements because we didn't sign them and, therefore, we didn't violate anything.

I just want to go on, just if you, just pick up one point. Just why did we say we would not use force to disrupt the agreements. This whole point that we wanted to leave a degree of uncertainty ah as what we might do as a way of sort of [inaudible]...

Well, in the back, we said that we would not use force because in the background of the Geneva Conference was the question of whether or not ah we were going to use force to expel the Communists from North Vietnam. One of the, one of the great concerns of the administration was that we were would that we not do anything that would recognize an increase of the Communist boundaries ah ah after China and after what had gone on in Eastern Europe and what we were making very explicit to there was that was that we were not going to use force to try to overthrow ah the North Vietnamese regime.

Stop.

Go ahead.

In fact, I do not believe that there were very many in Geneva at that time that ah felt that the ah the ah ah proba...felt that there was ah no probability that this that the North would be able to take over the South in two bites as they thought.

Start again...and start.

Let me start that over again. I'm not...In fact, I think that most people at Geneva felt that there was a good probability that the ah North would be able to take over the South in ah, in in in a two bites ah because there were not many there who felt that the South had much chance of surviving. Ah, the fact of the matter was that the South did survive in spite of expectations of most people there and in spite of the expectations of the of the North Vietnamese.

And, it survived because of the ah personality, the stubbornness ah and ah persistence, if you will, of one man, Ngo Dinh Diem, who came to be reviled and hated and I think very, very wrongly so. He held that country together by sheer force of will and ah they when the communists didn't get it in the elections in 1960 they made the decision that they were going to have to use force to get it. At that time they recognized...up to that time they had hopes they were going to, it was going to collapse, and that it would fall into their hands. In 1960 they made the decision that ah that ah that...

Way too far...won't be able to go that far, but it's all right.

You're getting out of our, off our watch. But I just would like, what I would...Can you recall your own feeling at the time. You'd just gone through several months of negotiations. This is the way you come out of it. How did you feel? Did you think that you bought some time for the south? I mean if you don't think you can recall that feeling, ah, Alex, did you...

Okay.

My own feeling at the end of the conference was that ah we had probably obtained just about all co...that could be obtained in the light of the situation on the ground. I don't, I don't think we could have obtained much more. But, I must say that very honestly I didn't have not have much optimism that South Vietnam was going to be able to ah survive, but ah because the odds seemed so heavily against them at that time.

Stop.

Just a moment. Okay.

I think that the Viet Minh accepted the concept of taking the area in two bite because they were self-confident themselves that they could handle the south and the south itself didn’t have ah viability and ah, therefore, it was a fairly good, good bet. Also, of course, they were being ah pressured by the Soviet Union to take it the two bites so as to save Mendès France a face on it.

And thirdly, I ah have a feeling that ah all the things we were doing and all the things we were discussing and so on gave them a somewhat uneasy feeling that if they tried to take it all in one bite that ah we might ah take actions that they that they would not like. That is, it's hard to anticipate whether the United States would sit still while they're taking it all in one bite at that time. Mm hm.

Stop please.