THE CHANGE IN SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL THINKING VERSUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND NOW.

Substantive changes took place, and not just because of the change in leadership in our governmental party apparatus. I would say that these changes in the attitude towards war, the structure of the military, doctrine and its evolution towards peace, all happened in response to the following: 1) nuclear arms can't serve political aims well, nor will they play a role in any future wars. In his time, Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and the most aggressive Marshal who provided us with many outstanding victories during the Great Fatherland War, or World War II. Somewhere at the end of the 1950s said that nuclear weapons are an extremely dangerous form of arms. They are dangerous not only for the attackees, but equally so for the attackers. That was the first such pronouncement. Looking at scientists, Einstein warned about it. Politicians warned about it. Even Eisenhower at the end of his presidency said that the solution of political problems using nuclear weapons is a risky operation. We came to the conclusion that nuclear weapons in future wars are not going to play a political role. But then, what role did nuclear weapons play? I understand it like this first, they act as a deterrent. They kept the Cold War from becoming a Hot war in the '50s and '60s. In the '70s, there was some lessening of tension. However, that role became increasingly immoral. How? Because we came to the conclusion that any use of nuclear weapons, even in a limited conflict, leads to a spontaneous reaction, simply because nuclear weapons were used in that conflict. This will lead to a massive nuclear war. Any variant will lead to the unleashing of nuclear war. A little use of nuclear weapons in war is already a catastrophe, not only for the people they were used against, but also for those who used them. In other words, the global character of its effect on our civilization, our atmosphere, on our planet, leads us to believe that nuclear weapons should not be used. Our deeds and tasks, which we arrived at together with the U.S. and the West, in the period when an energetic and charming leader has appeared in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, who saw the task through to the end... In general, the difference was that we put forth a lot of interesting initiatives, but didn't see them through to the end. That is, in doing a specific assignment...radically, where nuclear arms could be reduced, where could you get verification, how we could provide ourselves with real measures, that's what was missing before. It's basically closing off the difference between words and actions.

STOP FOR A SECOND... I ASSUME THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S PD-59, WHICH ESSENTIALLY PRESUPPOSES THE NOTION OF FIGHTING A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. WAS THERE A SOVIET COUNTERPART TO THIS?

I understand that we are talking about Carter's 59th Directive. If you're talking about before Carter's Presidential Directive-59, of course, in Soviet strategic and operative/tactical views there was a... We didn't arrive at the conclusion of a limited nuclear war right away, effectively limited war will become generalized just like a world war. Nuclear arms are such that even a prior-used part of a nuclear arsenal, at least, could destroy a large part of civilization. So we didn't refute it right away, but after we had an understanding of the physical parameters of destruction which nuclear arms embrace. There was no analogy in the period of the appearance of Directive-59. We knew that limited nuclear war was by nature impossible. The use of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict is, for the other side, irrelevant. Whether 10, 20, or 30 warheads fall on it makes little difference. It will answer with more strategic/operative arms, and here, a spontaneous, uncontrollable outburst of huge proportions will occur. We didn't think that from the very beginning; we thought war could be limited to a local area. Take the 1962 crisis, it showed us that it is impossible, even in such a local, limited political area, to control. Impossible. Because both sides are in the same position. They mutually destroy each other and they always have enough spare nuclear arms to destroy each other once again. Why destroy twice, three times, or five times when even a small amount is enough to destroy the enemy? The understanding that nuclear arms cannot be limited to a certain area or limited quantitatively was apparent already to the political leadership, and to the military, from the mid-1970s. So when Carter was promulgating Directive-59, we already knew that no military realization of the plan, with political aims of one kind or another, was possible. We went ahead, earlier than Carter, we knew that, or maybe now, [President Reagan] also knows that there can be no nuclear war between us, neither large nor limited.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

TODAY, DOES EVERYBODY IN THE SOVIET ROCKET FORCE AGREE WITH YOU, OR IS THERE A DISCUSSION?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

In the Soviet missile forces command, as in any other group, as in society, and I have not only Soviet society in mind, but any society, we are conducting a discussion, as are all, to what extent should we reduce the missile forces? It is the same as the discussion of the American military specialists, everyone has his opinion. The main opinion is this: we have to get nuclear weapon out of our arsenals, to get to, or to return to a pre-nuclear situation. In other words, the situation that existed before 1945. To go back to the situation where neither side had a nuclear weapon in its arsenal. That's the general understanding. I would say that that is what the military, political, and social organization have in their heads. But there are different opinions about how we should de-nuclearize. Some say we should stop, in other words, get rid of a system, just as we did with RSDR, short-range missiles. Then stop look around, and think: how can we compensate for this? God forbid if it's a nuclear compensation. In Russian, we say, ["shylo na mylo"] in other words we eliminate one nuclear weapon, and introduce a new one. That's neither elimination, nor progress in disarmament. But it's another thing to substitute offensive weapons, because we wouldn't call it a nuclear weapon, we'd say that it is being used for defensive purposes, in case of a reply attack, but it carries offense connotation by its very nature. Because it destroys everything indiscriminately; military targets, or military-administrative targets, civilian targets, in short, the entire potentiality of what is called modern society. Therefore, compensation can be used only with reasonable political...

LET ME ASK THE QUESTION ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN A REAL WAR.

Well, there is, in general, there is. That is why I have started, as a matter of fact, by saying that in every human society, by which I mean, that controversies divide people not only in different states, within a given political system or a given state system. Controversies exist also between different states, different political systems. This is reflected in our own country, in the Soviet society. The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the General Staff receive many letters, especially from the veterans. Well, what is their major concern? They are concerned about our defense capabilities, whether there is a danger of losing our defense capabilities as a result of scrapping certain missile systems. We are talking here about removing from our arsenal of the very systems which we have always touted as a guarantee of a balance of forces between the East and the West, which keep a potential adversary from blackmailing us using a nuclear threat. Finally, those systems are capable of solving, this is of course purely hypothetical and exists only in the form of concepts and plans, future and again purely hypothetical military problems. Well, take, for instance, the military doctrine of NATO, the interaction and the opposition of the two military pacts NATO adheres to the doctrine of flexible response, we have proclaimed a defensive doctrine not so very long ago. But the question persists: what is the next step after lowering of the nuclear threshold? So the veterans are concerned whether it is an advisable thing to do, or whether we shouldn't go through with it. Some say in their letters, that we need to preserve a "couple hundred" of missiles, in order to keep the potential adversary from the possible attack of our country. So these misgivings persist. The military also have these apprehensions. I am going to tell you what is the crux of the matter here. As I understand it, over the forty years of standing in opposition to each other we have created in each other's "sketchbooks" by that I mean military plans a certain image of an enemy. Speaking about myself, for instance, I don't have some kind of abstract opponent in the West, with whom I can discuss how do we live together in peace or whether we pursue the path towards confrontation. I regard him as someone who is constantly sharpening his sword; this sword is constantly being sharpened, it glitters all the time. It is out of its sheath all the time. I am afraid, that at some point a blow can be dealt with this sword. I am talking, of course, about the nuclear sword. So we have created this image. The same is probably true for Western people. When I talk to Western generals, they usually tell me: "But your side is the aggressor. You can launch a massive attack at any time. In that case, how do we defend ourselves? By using nuclear arms." We reply: "No, it is you who is the aggressor. You can launch a strategic bomber attack at any time, you have a superiority in those. And you are capable of using nuclear weapons." And by saying this to each other, we are thrown back to the stereotypes of the '40s, when Hitler was plotting his aggressive acts, when the world was really divided into two huge alliances, which were intrinsically incapable of co-existing with each other. I mean the alliance of the free democratic countries and those countries, that were the victim of Hitler's aggression, e.g. France, Poland, etc. The Soviet Union, The United States, Great Britain and France, still unconquered at the time, were moving closer and closer towards pooling of their efforts in reaching the common goals, destruction of German fascism as a state system that enslaves people. When I look at our relations in the light of that historical period, I revert to old stereotypes. But the Americans are not totally blameless either. They have started the Cold War, they have started a veritable Devil's Sabbath with all kinds of regional conflicts take, for instance, Korea, increasing tensions in Europe, provoking the building of the Berlin Wall, creation of an aggressive NATO pact. So the historical aspect contributed to a large extent to this negative image. But at the time we were co-existing not in the times of peace, but in the times of Cold War. Today the world is rapidly changing and people's psychology changes. We have come to realize that every state has its concerns and interests. Concerns about its security. But if we combine these concerns, it will translate into a common interest of our mutual security. Security first and foremost from the point of view of prevention of the most horrible thing that could happen the nuclear war. I have stopped to project a negative image on my opponent across the border, I am looking at the possibility of establishing contacts with him, i.e. I am trying to explain to him my position and to understand his. In this process my opponent starts to lose his enemy image in my eyes. The same process is probably taking place in the minds of Western military statesmen. But first and foremost, a deep psychological change has taken place in our societies. Approaching the problem from this side, I would like to say, that this changed public conscience, which understands the universal threat of nuclear war or even a conventional confrontation has contributed to a significant change of attitudes. If I look at the problems facing us from this particular angle, I start to discern to solution to this immensely complex situation, that we find ourselves in. Some Soviet officers tell me, that we will not be able to withstand the onslaught of the imperialism without the nuclear weapons. I tell them, that this is rubbish. Because there is no such irresistible onslaught on the part of imperialism, save, probably, in the economic sphere. And as concerns the economic side of things, we must actively participate in the competition with the West. We are a very powerful state am we can make our economy strong. In the address, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev said, that above all we must be competitive and prove the superiority of our system through the economic competition with the West. In fact, it was Lenin, who put forward this concept and Gorbachev has just quoted him. So we must compete in the economic sphere, but not in the military one, not through the build-up of nuclear arsenals and not in our military ambitions. I realize, that the psychology of the Soviet military is now on the brink of a radical change, but it still has not changed. The militaristic way of thinking, which is always based on arms and deludes itself into believing that arms can influence political processes, this way of thinking is still pretty much on, but it loses ground fast. In spite of the fact, that I am myself one of the military and wear epaulettes, in my understanding, we are on the verge of major political events, on the verge of major changes in the minds of our leaders, leaders of public organizations and the military. This change will result in the development of a sense of priority of political thinking over the military. We are in transition to a period, when all arguments will be settled by purely political means. And as experience has shown, these methods work pretty well. If there were no political desire to solve the problem of elimination of intermediate missiles no amount of the military technical considerations would have permitted to solve these problems. Such things as who is stronger, why one side makes more extensive cuts that the other, why one side puts thirty observers in a certain plant to monitor production, why one side has 120 sites to monitor, and the other, only 30, why we are destroying 1,200 missiles, I am sorry, 1,700, when United States scraps only 850 such arithmetics, which used to be solely in the domain of the military, are no longer all-important. The all-important thing now is the political agreement, the gradual disappearance of prejudices towards our opponents. We do not see an enemy in him any longer, but, at present stage, an opponent. In future we hope to see in him a collaborator, and by that I mean someone who works side by side with us towards a common goal. This common goal is the reduction of the military threat. I have said a lot of things and have sort of dumped them in one pile, but you can pick out parts that interest you.

ELABORATE A BIT ON THE SAME THING. YOU SAID... WHEN HE STATES IT, I THINK IT'S VERY POWERFUL AND IT IS VERY OBVIOUS. WHY DON'T THE GERMANS, FOR EXAMPLE, OR THE FRENCH, AS WE KNOW NOW, AGREE WITH THIS THINKING?

Is he asking about France?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, he is right about the French, but not about the Germans. Germans, by comparison with the French, are much closer to solving the problems on the basis that I have just outlined. I would say that today the French psychology resembles very much the Chinese. It boils down to this let the superpowers sort out their differences. Indeed, the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have about 98 percent, some say 97 percent, of nuclear armaments in their combined arsenals. The French are trying to provide for their national defense. Do you remember their doctrine of defense on all azimuths? This doctrine resembles very much the old doctrine of the Soviet Union. We were also building our defense on all azimuths, because we had the enemy in the West, the enemy in the East, the situation in the South was also tense at times. It is quite understandable from the historical point of view. Russia has been invaded many times. Our history has preserved memories of three major invasions: first, the Tartars, then the Poles, the French. Germans have invaded our country twice. Up until 1941, or even 1945 we were the only Socialist country in the world that had to survive in a hostile environment. So our military doctrine was based on our worst fears: that we can expect to be attacked from all sides, from right and from left, from the North and from the South. Historically this doctrine was justified, as was shown by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1941. It represents the expansion of Hitler's aggression into a world war, when the Soviet Union became involved. 1941 was a terribly difficult year for our country. But it proved that it wasn't in vain that we were preparing our defenses, though ultimately we were not so very well prepared, as it turned out. But times change, international relations change. The economic integration, development of interrelated economic and social structures, when interests of different countries are so closely interlinked, that they can no longer be separated from each other, the integration of our Socialist market into the world market and these processes are happening right now, all these changes have created a new international situation, and a new military situation. Despite the fact that there are still many, too many regional conflicts on our planet, our approaches to them start to converge. Take, for instance, the closeness of Western and Soviet views on the settlement of the Middle Eastern Crisis, on the ending of the Iran-Iraq war, on the South African problem, on the future peaceful co-existence in the Pacific Ocean region we are trying to involve ASEAN, Japan and the People's Republic of China in resolution of this particular problem of stabilization in Asia and the Pacific region, etc. Do not misunderstand me, not all problems have been worked out. But there is something new afoot the desire to create a universal system of security under the aegis of the United Nations, guaranteed by the expansion of its mandate to regulate international relations, making the United Nations architect of international relations. Another new thing is that the dominating place is occupied more and more by our common social, socio-economic and political interests and the imperative to solve common problems, which are put before us irrespective of the social nature of our countries. This becomes more and more important. I think, that this process will accelerate in future. And this is despite the fact, that we will follow different paths of economic development. On the other hand, these paths are parallel, as every economic system relates in a certain way to man. Economics is the product of man's activity. Through economics man tries to build a better future for himself, as he sees it. If I didn't believe in that, I would have been pessimistic about civilization's future. But I believe in progressive development of civilization, in the progressive increment of its productivity for the good of humanity. We consider a man to be a representative of his civilization, which he in fact builds by his own hands. At first glance, these philosophical postulates are far removed from military problems, but they greatly influence the thinking of the military. We wouldn't even dream to change the defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact military alliance. We have always held, that our military doctrine is defensive, aimed at preserving peace. But we had to come up with something new and to prove it. The Warsaw Pact military doctrine, as well as the military doctrine of the Soviet Union is not only defensive in nature but is directed at establishing such a military structure in the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact that would completely and entirely eliminate the possibility of an accidental and unpremeditated aggressive act on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries or their military machine. We are totally eliminating this possibility. We will restructure our army, our regulations and field manuals, the mentality of army personnel, the ideology of the military, with emphasis from now on, on defensive actions, defensive structures. A major element of this restructuring is the elimination of offensive weapons, elimination of capabilities to mount large-scale offensive operations. Our main go will be to stop the aggressor. A question arises, whether we should punish the aggressor, or not? By punishment I mean the annexation of the aggressor's territory and the destruction of his political system. We will not attempt to do that. We will not punish the aggressor. Our goal would be to stop the aggressor at our borders and to meet him with a shattering rebuff, without transferring military operations to...

...And their position resembles the Chinese Position, who think, well, let the two giants first deal with each other. There was a French doctrine of defense on all azimuths, and that resembles some of the... At that time it was justified, but now it is getting increasingly unjustified, because the world is becoming more interdependent, economically, culturally and socially, etc., etc. So he departed into philosophy of interdependence, and then he said that in fact this may sound rather well, abstract and far from the military thinking, but it does have an implication for the military thinking, because that's...from this philosophy the change in military doctrine was carried out... Traditionally, we proclaimed that the doctrine is peaceful but now the task is not only to proclaim it's peaceful, but to create such a structure of military forces, which will make it impossible to, even accidental aggressive war... We can only repel the aggressor. And then in case of an aggression, the problem arises ok, we repelled the attack, what do we do next? What about the Punishment? Traditionally, the punishment would be to attack the territory, to destroy the political structure of the other... We will only repel the attack and no further advancement. That is the basic way of the military construction in the future. So the arms will be built with this, and instructions and manuals for the fighting... Sort of, education of the army will be directed towards this goal. That was a very excellent exposition of the new military doctrine.

ALONG THE SAME LINE. THE AMERICAN MILITARY, THE AMERICAN STRATEGISTS MAINTAIN THAT EVEN DETERRENCE FORCES, THAT THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE IS A DYNAMIC ONE AND THAT IS WHY THE NEW WEAPONS, DIFFERENT WEAPONS, ARE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE. ARE THERE SIMILAR PRESSURES IN THE SOVIET MILITARY?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, of course, the mission of the part of the doctrine dealing with military technology, is to provide for the armed forces, for the state some means of defense, similar to that at the disposal of the adversary. We have several different points of view on how to provide for this deterrence, how to deal with the dynamics of development of armaments, but the general consensus is that we must find the most important thing in this dynamics. We think that this dynamics should not encompass the nuclear arms, introduction of nuclear arms into outer space, creation and development of destabilizing systems. I mean the destabilizing systems that upset the balance between the offensive and the defensive forces of both sides. First and foremost, we should eliminate the offensive first-strike potential and build into our military structures and new systems of armaments exclusively defensive characteristics. So that implies development of what kind of systems? What do our military and those, who direct the technological equipment of our armed forces have in mind? First of all, development of new systems of arms that provide for defense but lack the capability of counter-offensive actions. This is a very complex problem, as every system of arms can be regarded as defensive or offensive, depending on how you look at it. Take, for instance, my favorite branch of armed forces, the artillery. Artillery is broken into several classes. There is for example, fortification artillery, which is usually installed in specially fortified sites and generally lacks mobility. The only maneuver that is available to it is the maneuver of the trajectory, as we call it. By changing angle of elevation of the barrel we determine where the shell will fall. So the maneuverability is determined not by the actual movement of the cannon, but by the angle of elevation of the barrel. As I understand it, the same principle that distinguishes between offensive and defensive artillery systems and which is pretty well known since the Second World War, will be developed in modern circumstances. It will be applicable to all military technology. The task for the military, involved in development of military technology, is based on the new military doctrine and is tied to its political implications. This task involves development and production of purely defensive arms systems. I don't think, that I have mentioned it answering the previous question and so would like to emphasize now, that our military doctrine has two major objectives, prevention of war, which is a political objective. This objective is shared, I believe, by the American military, who talk about the necessity to constantly and dynamically develop arms, that would deter the potential aggressor, i.e. the deterrence characteristics of arms must be increased. The general orientation should be the one expressed by Madame Thatcher. When she was here in Moscow, she was quite candid about and said that so far it is impossible to solve the problem of deterrence without nuclear weapons. We understand it perfectly well. It is true that in the past the problem of deterrence couldn't be solved without nuclear arms. But these times have passed. At present time the military technology, and what is most important, the military thinking, military philosophy have made it possible to develop a system of defense without nuclear arms, based on the latest technologies furnished by the scientific and technological progress. It is possible to create purely defensive systems. The major component would be a good communications system as well as efficient national intelligence service. If you remember, when we were negotiating the treaty on intermediate range missiles, both sides recognized, that on-site verifications and inspections were good in of themselves but the national technical means of verification, i.e. intelligence services, must play a definite role in the treaty. The second point is that we must provide as complete and as accurate information on our respective military structures as possible. We must fully inform each other on new arms systems, on the prevailing military doctrines. If we superimpose our military doctrines, we'll be able to discern their asymmetries, same as we can see asymmetries in our arsenals. These asymmetries, which represent deviations towards aggression must be summarily discarded. We can get rid of them only through increased mutual contacts. It is important not only for the politicians to meet, it is also important for the military order to discuss our military doctrines. By the way we have submitted such a proposal. The Warsaw pact countries have made such a proposal to NATO. It would enable the military and military strategists, as I understand it, to sit down and to discuss our respective military doctrines. It would help alleviate mutual suspicions which stem from potentially aggressive implications of our doctrines. If we take, for instance, the NATO doctrine of flexible response, it would seem to me that the aggressive implication of it lies in the emphasis on nuclear arms, on the possibility of early use of nuclear arms. This formula has not appeared there by chance. The doctrine of flexible response states, that if the offensive of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces will be successful the only possible means of deterrence will be the use of nuclear arms. This doctrine is based on the premise, that we have superior conventional forces; more tanks, artillery, personnel. One other thing that NATO is concerned about is that our forces remain essentially in the same positions, that they have occupied at the end of World War II, with the cutting edge, so to say, directed towards Western Europe and the possibility of a sudden massive thrust in the Western direction. This serves as a justification for the possible use of nuclear arms in the doctrine of flexible response. We realize, that NATO is apprehensive about such a possibility. The present situation creates an illusion, that we can suddenly attack NATO forces, mount a major offensive operation. All right, let's reduce these forces, le us eliminate these asymmetries, these threatening formations, aggressive structures. Let's do that. Let us also give up the nuclear emphasis is our doctrines. This is a very complex problem, I grant you. But this problem is on our agenda now. My opinion, and I know the problem well, is that it will be solved. Solution of this problem serves the interests both East and West. Such a solution will remove the prejudices which exist in the West to our military machine. And we will be spared the burden, which we frankly speaking, dislike very much. It is very unpleasant, when they call you an aggressor, especially, when you know very well the predominant attitudes in our army, when you know very well the contents of our military planning, etc. It is very unpleasant to be labeled an aggressor, a potential enemy, that can deal a blow at any time. But I am not like that. But I have to prove that to my opponent, to talk with him, to show to him exactly what we have say, such and such number of tanks, artillery and to point out how it compares to what he has, say point out that he has a 1,000 planes more in such and such region; and the opponent will counter, for example, that we have more fighters-interceptors, and I will answer, that he has more anti-tank missiles. Only through such a dialogue can we reach the solution of this problem. I am in the missile branch of our armed forces, but our approach in the recent negotiations with the Americans was totally novel, it has astounded me. We were very bold in the recent negotiations on intermediate-range missiles. The treaty, as you know, was signed on December 8th. By the way, I was in Washington for this occasion. This treaty, signed on December 8th, has eliminated to all intents and purposes two classes of intermediate missiles. You probably know how deeply we feel for the SS-20 missile. This is a very modern and a very powerful missile. Americans must also feel deeply for their Pershing missile, which was developed by the leading firms. The Pentagon was also very attached to this missile. And all of a sudden we part company with these missiles. And as far as I understand, for good. So we have done away with two classes of missiles, but there is a total of 10 classes, some are already commissioned for service, some are being tested. What has contributed to this new bold approach? To my mind, frank and forthright exchanges among the politicians, our Foreign Office and the State Department, who solved technical problems, and among the military. And it is not a coincidence, that Marshal Akhromeyev was constantly included in working groups, who negotiated the treaty. So it helped very much when the military were participating at this high level. Marshal Akhromeyev represents a whole army of scientists, engineers, people who develop all these new arms. When all these people showed a will to come to an agreement, there were immediate tangible results. The same type of treaty should be worked out for conventional arms. The dynamics of their development is influenced by latest advances in military technology, but the trend of their development should be towards predominantly defensive functions. They should repulse the aggressor without the transfer of the military action to the territory of the aggressor. But this brings up a thorny problem, well, we have repulsed the aggressor but how do we make him see that aggression does not pay and costs more to the aggressor in the long run? That is a controversial problem. Here we have to rely primarily on political solutions. So the punishment of the aggressor should be done by political means, but the repulsion carried out by military means. I do not know whether this point is clear, but it is extremely important. Because in the past... Let's record it as it is...

...only defensive capabilities. There is a problem, because it is very hard to distinguish, but he says that his favorite artillery, for instance, such thing as, well, fortress artillery, stationary, artillery which is only maneuverable in terms of trajectory, it can not move, so this is the classic example of defensive things and so that the task to enhance security is, well, compare doctrines and for the military to get together, to have more openness, to understand the other side point of view. For instance, he said that the aggressive part of the flexible response doctrine, said, early use of nuclear weapons, but you have to understand that this is the reaction to the Soviet tanks and prevalence in conventional forces. So the two sides have to get together and to talk to each other and to find the imbalances. They will find imbalances and asymmetries in nuclear doctrines and also in armaments and in plans. So the task is to, while comparing, to do it with a way of abolishing offensive weapons and things which might be thought to be aggressive by the other side... Connected with the missiles, the strategic forces, he said that he was really impressed how far they got, that the SS-20s which are very powerful and good weapons will be will be dismantled and the same thing happens to the American very modern Pershings. But this is the result of...

UNDERSTANDING THE PROGRAM THAT DEALS WITH MX AND MIDGETMAN. AND IF HE CAN ADDRESS THE THINKING ON FIRST-STRIKE. BUT TO ADDRESS IT HISTORICALLY, AS IT BECAME AN IDEAL FIRST-STRIKE OF A SECOND RETALIATORY FORCE AND SO ON. HOW DID THIS EVOLUTION TAKE PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION? BUT LET HIM DWELL ON THE PAST, BEFORE YOU COME TO THE PRESENT. I THINK I UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT. CAN WE DO THAT? SO IT IS THE SOVIET EVOLUTION OF THE THINKING OF FIRST-STRIKE, RETALIATORY FORCES AND SO ON.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, historically...of course. From the historical point of view, the notions of first-strike and of the second retaliatory strike were not defined overnight. I would say, that historically there was a watershed event. Prior to 1962 both sides were preparing both for the first and for the second strikes. The military and technological strategies, that were adopted both in the West and in the East, and we are talking about the central strategic systems of the United States and the USSR, were calling for the increases in destructive potential, improvements in accuracy to guarantee the efficacy of the counterforce strike, which is the first strike. The counterforce does not play such a role in the reciprocal strike, the retaliatory strike, as it does in the first-strike. The following evolution has taken place in this matter. By slow stages we have arrived at the conclusion, that however hard we tried to increase the power and the accuracy, the efficiency and rapidity of response, the situation spells out, that even a few missiles which will be inevitably left will be quite enough to punish the aggressor, i.e. the reciprocal strike can be mounted with only several dozen or maybe a hundred missiles. New capabilities were being developed...mobile missiles appeared, I mean the time when the strategic missiles became sea-based and the so-called nuclear missile-carrying submarine first, I suppose, in the United States, then in the Soviet Union. So generally speaking, the interest in creating and developing means of counterforce wane on both sides. By the way, it was fairly obvious in 1962, during the Cuban crisis, and I return once again to this crisis, which took place in October of 1962, and in spite of the dramatic situation, has shown, that... in every situation both countries, despite the fact, that according to my calculations, the United States had twenty times more nuclear arms, twenty times... I mean those systems, that are capable to reach the territory of the adversary. At that time we didn't have long-range missiles, but we had bombers and the missiles, that we had installed in Cuba. Well, then there was a period when the nuclear technology and the computer technology have suddenly opened up a possibility of developing very accurate systems... very accurate guidance systems..., i.e. if we keep track of all the deviations in the course of the missile, we can correct them and develop such a system, which could...well, first of all, the system of delivery, which could deliver the nuclear charge right on top of the protecting shield of the missile well, which is rather well protected, because at the time technology of protection of missile wells was also improving. The missile in the well was protected against the effects of the nuclear blast and then against the fiery ball, which can leak in all the hollows of the surface and can dislodge the missile, damage it and so on and so forth. But at the same time the system of guidance gave us still other possibilities, I mean computer systems. They permitted early-on intelligence gathering, which enabled us to see what the adversary was doing in terms of preparing for the first-strike. That's a dialectic contradiction for you: on one hand I increase the accuracy and powerfulness of my offensive weapons, but on the other hand, my possible adversary develops a system, that accurately pinpoints my capability of delivering a surprise first blow, i.e. I lose the element of surprise, I can not deliver a strike which would not be detected early-on. And the adversary accordingly, being aware that I am preparing a first blow, removes the missiles from their wells, so both strikes turned out to be counter-strikes. And the missiles would meet and pass each other on the last stretch of their trajectories, near the target. So why deliver the counterforce first-strike, if both us and the adversary would remove missiles in anticipation of the attack? So the military thought, getting this feedback, arrived at the conclusion, that we do not need the first-strike systems, we need arms systems for solving our political problems, first of all the problem of deterrence. Or for punishing the aggressor. But what is deterrence per se? Deterrence means to always have enough means, even in the most unfavorable circumstances, in order to punish the aggressor who dared to deliver the first-strike. All this has happened in the '70s. So in the '70s we were solving three problems...first of all the '70s were significant from the point of view of the SALT I treaty, which was signed in 1972. It sort of gave us a hint that there was no sense in the further quantitative build-up of nuclear arms, but it did not impose qualitative limitations. At about that time multiple warheads were developed, when one delivery vehicle could deliver, well, today already fourteen warheads, but for the most part ten. This is the optimal number. First the Soviet Union and then the United States came to the conclusion that we actually did not need multiple warheads, as we were effectively increasing the danger of total nuclear war breaking out, increasing the potential, or, if I can put it this way, the ballast of superfluous nuclear burden... And all that to provide for deterrence. But this realization, by the way, was not enough to hold back a single politician. Multiple warheads still appeared in nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their numbers also started to grow. So we have arrived at solving the problem, the problem of... oh, yes, and the anti-missile defense treaty was developed at the time also. Which means that we have realized that no system of anti-missile defense is possible, it only complicates the situation. It makes the other side continue the build up, the adversary then starts to increase defenses as well as strategic forces. And so the system of anti-missile defense per se, ceases to play a military role, but serves as a stimulant for further arms race. To put it simply, it makes us move by inertia towards further build-up of nuclear arsenals. In 1979 the SALT II treaty gave us the first qualitative limitations. For instance, it imposed limits on multiple warheads, called for limitations in other areas. Well but I wouldn't go so far as to say that in 1979 the sides completely renounced attempts to improve the accuracy of their systems to such an extent that would make the first-strike possible. Military thinking has taken a radical turn in the '80s. When Carter's Directive-59 appeared, we reacted negatively to it. First of all we were accusing the American side of trying to shift major military targets, the magnet for our missiles, so to say, from the American territory to Western Europe. Directive-59 contributed in a way, ideologically, to the installation... to the double decision of NATO on installation of the U.S. medium-range missiles on the European continent. It provided for the installation ideologically. These missiles were specifically made for this particular military theater. But we were also building up our SS-20 missiles. So we had to solve the problem whether to make those missiles highly accurate or very powerful. The psychological atmosphere which reigned in this military theatre pushed us towards making these missiles highly accurate. Why? Because the Europeans were told that this would not "be a total war, but selective strikes against those military targets, which would first of all impair the ability of the adversary to command and direct its armed forces. But what does it mean, to take away the capability of operative command, it means, that you should deliver the first strike. So the understanding, or better, the hope, that the problem of the first-strike could be solved was built in the ideology of developing and deploying the medium-range missiles Pershing II. This was worrying us. And, naturally, at the time the Soviet military were against the double decision, as they realized that the shortening of time needed to reach a target on our territory to 8-10 minutes, took away any hope of our mounting a retaliatory strike. That is what our adversary was up to. And what were we doing at the time? We also were not losing time and were perfecting the accuracy of our SS-20 missile. So we have moved away from the conclusions of the '60s and the '70s. In the '80s we started to think once again, that the first-strike possible. So we have sort of repudiated the experience of the previous twenty years and started once again to follow the lead of our respective military-industrial complexes. I mean the military-industrial complex of the United States, but we also have military industry, which was influencing our decisions. But the military felt that there was a trick here. That nuclear weapons...here we are again approaching the philosophy problem whether it is possible to use nuclear arms for military purposes. In 1983 the Soviet General Staff took the initiative and came up with the proposal to make the situation more benign in the respect of... to make an obligation of not being the first to use nuclear arms. By this we were saying that we were removing such a possibility from our military doctrine and were offering to the United States to make a similar obligation, to follow our example. And so, as you know it very well, in 1983 we have publicly announced that we have decided to remove from our doctrine completely and from our military plans the possibility of being the first to use nuclear arms, both in the military and in the political sense. This was indicative of the fact, that we were telling our military-industrial complex, that we did not need the systems which cost a great deal of money and are primarily first-strike weapons. We do not need them, because we have given up this possibility politically. Have the United States given this possibility? Unfortunately, at the time they did not. Why? Because the entire ideology of developing the MX missile, that you have mentioned, and especially the Midgetman at first... at present, I think, a reappraisal of the situation is taking place in the United States, maybe it is already even completed.

INCLUDE IN YOUR EXPOSITION ALSO THE SS-18 AND SS-19.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, yes... Let me say, that SS-18 and SS-19 were not developed as the first-strike systems, they just could not be used for this purpose at that time. The thing is, that these missiles are very powerful, they carry a very large nuclear load but their accuracy was very poor. As a missile man, I can tell you that their accuracy was one order lower than that of the American missiles. This was forcing us to solve the problem of their military efficiency not by increasing their accuracy, spending a lot of money on it... the ratio of cost-efficiency was such that each increase in accuracy of, say, ten meters was costing us millions... it was still a bargain if it were millions the increase in accuracy of ten meters could have cost us a billion in technological research and design. So what is the simplest way out? Making the warhead larger and increasing its nuclear load. That is what led to the development of these heavy missiles. They were not the product of the desire to create a first-strike potential but the need to reduce costs, taking into account our poor technology... well, I would not call it poor, but insufficient... well, for instance, as a military man I was not satisfied by our accuracy. But it was too expensive I would say to improve accuracy, whereas it was much easier to increase the nuclear load, the explosive power of the nuclear charge delivered by the missile. Because by that time we have built very large missiles, good boosters but the guidance system, its accuracy left much to be desired, i.e. it was insufficient. But, naturally, the process of refining new computer technology was taking place. Multi-element more accurate basis has been created, mathematical models have appeared. So when more sophisticated guidance systems were installed on SS-18, we have discovered to our surprise, and to the consternation of the Americans, that this new system could be used to deliver the first-strike. This happened prior to 1983. I grant you, that when our opponents tell us that this system is capable of delivering the first-strike, i.e. destroy the nuclear missile wells of the opposing side and prevent those missiles from being launched or destroy them, deliver the counterforce strike, well, it really can. We acknowledge that. But the first-strike is not the cornerstone of our policy or our military doctrines which command our missile potential. Well, although you want to hear from me the historical background, let me use history as the springing board and tell you, that if there were no understanding, i.e. understanding of United States apprehensions vis-a-vis this missile, we would have, when signing the joint statement...which was signed by Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachev] and Ronald Reagan on December 8th and which addresses the perspective of...

...DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WERE YOU ON A ROCKET STAND-BY?

At the time I was with a missile regiment. During the Cuban missile crisis I was stationed with my missile regiment in the vicinity of Moscow. And well, I would like to say, that... well, quite surprisingly our armed forces, although they were at a higher level of preparedness for action, but... this period should be looked upon as a period of extensive build-up. For instance, I was with my missile regiment, but we were building a missile base, if I may use the modern term. I took part in the construction, took delivery of missiles, put them on round-the-clock duty, conducted inspections. But later, when I have read everything about the Caribbean crisis I was surprised by the tranquility which reigned at the time on our missile base despite the extremely tense situation. When I looked back on those events later on, on the history of that crisis, I was horrified by that quiet and tranquility. Although, we were, naturally on a stand-by, every officer with his regiment as it happens when, well... At the time I was an officer, a senior officer, I was a Lieutenant Colonel and in my regiment... but unfortunately I did not understand the political implications of the situation. We were told, that something was happening, that we should read newspapers, explain the situation to the enlisted men, that we should be vigilant and more demanding towards enlisted men. Well, usually I would get such orders all the time and in the absence of any crisis. But even when I was reading the papers I did not see anything particularly dramatic happening. And this was despite the fact that I was a battle officer on active duty with my regiment, in fact commanding a regiment. I did not know, that at this very moment my comrades, with some of whom I had studies together, were crossing the ocean and deploying launchers, almost like mine, but smaller... I was with the intercontinental missiles regiment and they were installing medium-range missiles on the Cuban soil, on the island of Cuba, I was not aware of this. Well, I knew that the international situation was worsening, but in those times it happened very often. Especially when Cuba became... starting with January 1, 1959, when Fidel entered Havana, this happened especially often. So to us it was not surprising, that there were political attacks against Cuba and military operations. We were not surprised, because we knew how unpleasant was the appearance of new Cuba to those who felt themselves masters of the Americas. So that is how it was at the time.

...SOME ASPECT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER THAT --

...surprised at the reaction to the deployment of SS-20s?

YES. ANYTHING ELSE?

All that...on SDI...

SDI, WE COVERED IT SO WELL WITH OTHERS AND I WONDER WHETHER WE SHOULD DUPLICATE IT. OK, LET'S, LET'S...ASK THE GENERAL TO BE SORT OF MORE COMPACT. HE GIVES US VERY GOOD ANSWERS, BUT I AM JUST AFRAID ABOUT OUR TIME. THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHAT WAS THE FUNCTION OF THE SS-20 IN EUROPE, AND WAS THE MILITARY SURPRISED BY THE RESPONSE FROM THE EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS... NATO?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, the Soviet military... those that knew, of course, about the deployment... you know, how it is in the military everyone has his task and minds his own business. For example, tank officers were undisturbed by this, but as concerns those of us in the missile forces, who were planning the development of our missile potential, they felt that SS-20 was not the ideal replacement for the aging SS-4 and SS-5. First of all because of its mobility, secondly because of its range...But again, a mercantile aspect, I call it, interfered here, an aspect tied to the fact that, as a rule engineers design and offer us a choice of several missiles, right? Those missiles are developed in the industry... And so a group of officers, well, I do not have in mind any particular group, I am just telling you how the process of selection is set up. Suppose this group saw among the missiles offered one, that could serve both, as a medium-range missile and, with appropriate design changes and factory alterations, also could serve as an intercontinental missile. So irrespective of where I place it on my territory, even if I put it, say, in the region of the city of Chita, or, say, in the Altai region in the vicinity of the cities of Barnaul and Biysk, I still could solve the problem of counterbalancing the nuclear arms stationed in Europe, where there is quite a lot of them, as you well know. Well, what kind of European nuclear arms we had in mind? First of all, the front-line American missiles, the French nuclear forces, the British nuclear forces, the most mobile forces... for instance, it is rather unpleasant to me, as a military man, the appearance on the aircraft carriers of... isn't it true that an entire wing of aircraft, quite a formidable force, is based on each vessel. This wing is armed, well, as far as I know, by about two hundred nuclear warheads. Two hundred nuclear warheads to arm just one wing of aircraft, primarily attack planes. But returning to our missile, even though we were coming to the conclusion, that it was a good missile, we should not forget the question of our territory. Our country is positioned like this, right? So from the Western border to the Eastern border the distance is 10,000 kilometers, or thereabouts, maybe a little less. So the maneuverability of the missile became an important factor. I am a military man, an artillery officer, it is important to me that all the necessary maneuvers can be carried out on our own territory. So I am being offered such a magnificent missile, it is maneuverable, I can move it here or there at will. So the factors of military technology were the most important here. And as it was a new missile, it had a new design, carried three warhead that could be targeted individually. Now, moving along, the new missile had a fair guidance system. And though my understanding now is that this guidance system belongs to the epoch of the past decade. Yes, of the '70s, because such an enormous progress has been made since then, that if we undertook the same problem once again, God forbid, of course, we could have designed a less cumbersome missile, with a much better guidance system, but it is better not to think about it now, because it is prohibited by the treaty. The reaction in Western Europe and in the United States at the time is quite understandable, there were valid reasons for this reaction. If at that time we had the same level of political and military thinking as we have today, we should have started back in 1979...the missile itself we have introduced in 1977, as you know... so we should have solved the problem of this missile back in 1979. I mean the deployment of SS-20s by us and the American missiles in Europe, Pershings and others. Because it is easier to prevent some development, dangerous to the world community, then to try and cut back when everything has already been deployed... and a lot of intellectual energy of scientists, military, designer has been invested, not to mention a great deal of money. Well, I am not sure how the Americans manage to make a profit on all their military contracts. Frankly speaking, I do not understand those economics although I study it...I wonder, why is it that we are suffering huge losses on military contracts, and at the same time the economists tell us, that the military-industrial complex of the United States makes huge profits? In our country nobody makes a profit on those contracts, on the contrary we have to sell the last pair of pants to foot the bill... Though mine are fortunately with stripes, so...

I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND A LITTLE...

...reaction of the west European countries. He thinks, that if we had the level of political thinking at that time as we do now, we would have to do this in 1979. Because now the intellectual resources are being invested in the economic and things like that... He said that he can't understand, really, the difference between...because in the United States people in the military production, they gain profit from it, while we virtually have to undress ourselves. There is no profit, it is a drain on resources. So he doesn't understand how it works that way...but that's the fact then.

LET ME ASK HIM THE LAST QUESTION, WHICH IS... WHAT IS THE... A PERSONAL STATEMENT, IT IS NOT A, WHAT IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR ABOUT?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

I think that the root of contradictions between our two countries, two superpowers, our countries are big, and contradictions will inevitably exist. But the major contradiction is the total difference of our economic systems, or, as politologists would say of socio-economic systems. And this contradiction will exist in the future as well. It is a fundamental contradiction we would not be able to ever get rid it. The fact is, that we believe in our system, while the United States, and not only the United States, an entire part of the world, adhere to a different system. The same is true for the Soviet Union and the part of the world that constitutes the socialist system. But I do not consider the military and political contradictions to be all-important. Those contradictions in our foreign policy courses and our military policies... because foreign policy is a part of military policy... these contradictions will not necessarily disappear with time, it will take a long historical development for them to smooth over... this process will be influenced by the development of our civilization, progress of science and technology, cultural and economic development and so on... so those differences will smooth over in the face of common military threats, which will always lie in wait for both of our countries, together. What do I mean by the military threat? It is not that we will pose a military threat for the United States, or the United States will threaten us. I understand the military threat as a possibility of emergence in our country or in the United States of a certain group of military or political leaders, who will try to use the technological progress in their own egotistical interests. It is quite obvious, that the advances in science and technology all the time produce along with better and better implements and instruments, illusions that these advances can be exploited to resolve military problems. What kind of problems? Well, for example, I could solve a certain economic problem in ten years time. But if I utilize part of the funds needed for this problem into the military sector, I will be able to resolve this economic problem in five years time, despite the fact that I have diverted part of the funding. And, mind you, this is done egotistically, using not mine resources but resources borrowed from a neighbor. Such groups of politicians will emerge all the time. The further the progress goes, the more opportunities it will furnish for the emergence of such groups. But this is on the one hand. On the other hand, the further the technological progress and the economic development of our countries go, the more our economies become interdependent, the less opportunities will be left to those groups to use military technology for their mercenary motives. And also to furnish or to sell ideas of purely military applications to the politicians, economists and so on. So I believe that there is one contradiction. It will remain with us. The antagonisms, based on this major contradiction, will also remain, but we must never let them grow to the proportions of a military conflict. This is the contradiction between two different socio-economic systems. Everything else, all the other contradictions associated with a confrontation, with a possibility of a confrontation, you know, contradictions lead to a confrontation but they are not of major dimensions, are not decisive and by no means can contribute in the present conditions...we are on the threshold of the 21st century and probably on the verge yet another spurt of technological progress, yet another scientific and technological revolution. And these are very real, and I probably should not even tell you what we project to be the major directions. But in general terms, it will first of all be biology, secondly, energetics, i.e. we will be free from concerns about energy which are rapidly approaching because of...in energetics it will be resolution of the so far unsolved problem of the limitless, or the unlimited possibility... or, let's call it infinite... everything is finite in the world, but the reaction of thermonuclear fusion will be an infinite source of energy.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

CAN YOU EXPLAIN?

Yes, we have. I had to talk about it, these are military people who have a part in the decision making process in the military-technical area, but aren't now... In our military-technical sphere of scientists, the military, people who work things out, not... Then some decisions are being offered against which we are already protesting, and, strictly speaking, and Mikhail Sergeevich had an interesting thought, Mikhail in the Politburo, and Alexander Yakovlev. Mikhail Sergeevich had an interesting thought, ah, who was it in the Politburo, Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev in a speech during the 70th anniversary of the Revolution. He said that if you look historically at the Motherland's path, at the distinguished moment when we achieved military-strategic parity with the US, if we had taken the same path again, we could have done many things differently. In other words, this is how we did things: something came up in the military area of technological development and progress, and we tried to make our own mirror image of it. Later, of course someone or other took the lead. But where did the idea of an arms race come from? That's where the attempt to catch up with each other, to do the same thing as the adversary, came from. Such is all of military history. Gunpowder was invented, it was discovered not only by Friar Schwarz, but also by our skilled Russian craftsmen too. I've forgotten his name, but gunpowder-making started here in Moscow, and in general, we had bullets, there and here, tanks, there and here, dirigibles, there, dirigibles disappeared there and here, and so on. So, from the point of view of today's understanding of what anti-missile Star Wars defense is, and what arms in the cosmos are, the adequateness and the solution of the problem put forth by President Reagan, who was briefed, as I understand it, he didn't decide by himself, on the entire complex of problems connected with SDI by an array of specialists with rather big names. Let's take Edward Taylor. Our Sakharov also was, he offered. By the way, he was protesting against SDI. About that kind of picture. This group offers, let's try it, we'll make something similar to the American SDI, they study the American technology, and we do it. The matter is that the most powerful and influential group stands against it, and offers completely different solutions. But, of course, there are masses of methods, ten or twenty, and you can find scientists from the Committee of Scientists who found 100 ways to neutralize this program. The... is not, I would say, of its neutralization. The thing is that I, already in my second field of expertise, the first as a gunner and the second as a missile expert, being familiar with this problem, I want to say that this task, the creation of a reliable SDI system completely void of any destabilizing factors, cannot be solved. Although technology decided almost everything, in this case, it doesn't work out that way. Why? Because not a single military system exists in isolation. It exists in opposition to other military systems or to others at whom the system is directed. I'm not saying the system is packed with aggressive, unpleasant moments. But one moment understood by everyone and which... Well, look, we're sitting here together, peacefully conversing in front of the camera, suppose there is even an American military man with us, but there is a constant feeling that for a long time, there is a weapons system hanging over us, directed not against me, but against my missile, but there is no missile. There is no missile. When then, one asks, directed against whom, one asks? And that is very important to me, militarily, politically, or historically. Just this would shake up any military person, but especially an American. I'm also talking, let's put up a satellite that will be in in constant orbit above a given country, I'll put it up and say it isn't a communications (or link?) system, with no translator (transmitter?), and that it has one, only one, magnetic high-angle gun that could shoot down your satellite. That shocks any military person, why have that satellite overhead, especially someone else's, that can look straight through me and oppress me (lit. my self-love?) and which has the physical capacity to inflict material damage? To speak frankly and lay my cards the table, I want to say this: that the cosmos will be used for military purposes, I know it will be mastered. People are people. Until man bids farewell to the weapons he has put on the land and in the sea why wouldn't he carry his weapons into space? He will. But what kind? That's the question. We're approaching the conclusion that Man shouldn't put weapons on earth or on the ocean floor. We're beginning to believe that the fewer weapons, the better, that we should especially try to eliminate nuclear weapons. 90 percent of humanity believes this, 10 percent doesn't. Why, when we are going into space, should I take with me some ancient instruments, elucidation of relations between governments and peoples? But, unfortunately, the SDI program went far. It has taken so much, not only from the military-industrial complex, and scientific...of the U.S., but has also attracted Western Europe, Japan, and Israel. Therefore, this is what I think: that from the point of view of a system... from the point of view of military's role in the cosmos, from the point of view of a system of control, everything is decided. Because the U.S. and USSR both already have a system of space control. We're not going to discuss that question. But from the standpoint of arms in space, one can experiment. In other words, without going into space, one can make a model, the energetics of which we can study, we can study the possibility of the energetics of the materials we put into space, they will provide us with the opportunity to study everything that goes into the research process, all the wares, the apparatuses, to verify the possibilities, the effectiveness, the creation of this or that component, which system I want to check scientifically in the cosmos, without soiling outer space with arms. This could be a rather complicated philosophy, but I want to emphasize once again, of course, the view that the Soviet Union has, of course, people who offer the creation of defensive anti-missile missiles in space as the solution to this problem. There are people who back the localization of U.S. missiles in space, but most people are for exactly what Mikhail Sergeevich is for: in other words, to begin fundamental research into all directions or aspects of the American work in that area, but without developing the system and without manufacturing the anti-missile defense. This would lead us away from the solution of the cardinal question: the liberation of the planet from nuclear arms. It is a very important topic which, naturally, I think, being aware of technical and military questions, I study these things, I want to say that we will carry on outrageously for a while, then there will come a time when, just as it did for the land-based systems, that they aren't needed. Not only will Soviet specialists say this, and not only American specialist, who basically have already said that they aren't needed. The people will weigh it who have studied it in earnest, and are now its ideologues.