PRESIDENT REAGAN, BEGINNING WITH HIS PRESIDENCY, THE SPEECHES PORTRAYED TO THE SOVIET UNION AS AN EVIL EMPIRE IS SOMETHING TO BE... YOU, HOW DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

I understand that as a sort of a counter-reformation. You know there was in '70s a serious attempt to break out of...of the you know, chains of cold war, of the ice of cold war. And to make a new start in Soviet-American relations. And our attitude towards ah military force, military mind, and nuclear weapons. And of course it made quite a number of people in the United States not very happy. And I think this gathered not only because of Soviet and American relations in detente. Because there was also a process of evolution under way in the United States. Of liberal reforms at home. Of also changes of the situation of the United States and the world arena. The time has ended when the United States was undisputed leader. Now it had challenges from all of the sides. In military field from us; we got the parity. And from Japan and Western Europe economic challenge etc., etc. And Americans you know, many Americans deep in their heart they...they believe that the situation as it was after the second world war, it was something that belonged to them by birth right. They have it forever, they have deserved it. I remind you what the situation was. Monopoly, and military, nuclear weapons. Overwhelming, nobody else had it. In the economic field, all possible competitors absolutely in shambles, you know, destroyed. We also very weak after the war, after such blood shedding, etc. And the American century was beginning. That old dream of the shining city of... on the hills. Now it can, you know, become really the leader of the world. Undisputed leader of the world. And they had that there. And the seventies was awakening to the realism in your time after Vietnam... Vietnam, Watergate, many other things. After Iran. But many Americans were not at ease. Not, couldn't conclude peace in this new situation in which they were. And so it was an attempt of counter-reformation to bring, to go forward into the past. To return to this golden times for America. And he not only told Americans, President Reagan, that if you don't, do want to feel happy, feel happy. He also made, you know, made them feel happy by economic reforms. Not I think, and not letting people know just for a time that all of it was borrowed. From their children, and great grandchildren, and also from other countries. And but you know, I think it was to some degree, it was maybe historically for, somewhere in the future maybe his students will think about it, as about a very productive period in American history. And maybe world history. Because this attempt failed completely. You know, on all points. If you take all the... the whole platform... electoral platform of 1980. Point by point you see that it is wrong. He promised less government. Americans have more government. Less government of expenditure. They have more. No debt, they have it out of the greatest...greatest debt. No negotiations of the Soviet Union in absence of position of power. They have entered the position of parity. All the agreements have, were fatally flawed. Now the major goal is to conclude new agreements. And limited gross in military expenditures now it has stopped and will decrease because of physical impossibility to go on like this. And I think it also has awakened a lot of people to the real dangers of the world. That agenda has changed. It's not Soviet threat that threatens the United States. It's no clear threat. It is threat of...of arms race. It's that of economic destabilization. And this threat of ecological catastrophes. And you had such an...of the beginning; 1981, '82, already... of peace movement and not only movements. I think there was major influx of new ideas, you know, that medical doctors which have shown that you cannot wage a nuclear war. Medicine will be helpless before it. Then the effect of nuclear winter... commission reports. Many other things. So intellectually, mankind has grown. It is those who participate in policy making. So that Reagan had to sign, you know a declaration already in Geneva that it is impossible to win a nuclear war. And you... you shouldn't fight it, a nuclear war, under any circumstances. And then to the end of his career it has become maybe the biggest task which he had before himself. New... a couple of new meetings with Soviet leader. And to new agreements which can really put him on that very good place, and the records of history. And this is... people say Reagan has changed. Yes Reagan has changed maybe. He...he's able to learn, but I think the historic... People say sometimes that Reagan has changed. He has changed already because he... he also can learn or he would never have become a political leader in the United States... would be, he'd be unable to learn. But I think it is also what is even more apt to the subject that the conditions have changed. It repeats like new Nixon. You remember. Nixon who started the detente and prior to this was a McCarthy-ist, you know. Anti-Communist, had kitchen debate, etc. It's not by a chance, you know. In one situation are politicians in pursuit of success. Has to play the card of anti-Communism and anti-Sovietist. And then the situation changes and he sees that the only way to political success is normalization of relations. Arms control and disarmament. And you know, attempts to quiet down the whole, you know, upheaval and emergency.

SOME SIMILAR PROCESS ONE BELIEVES HAS ON THIS SIDE, THE POLICIES BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND GORBACHEV HAS CHANGED. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THIS.

Yes. Well you know of course I...I would say that it would be stupid to think that all the fault was on one side and all the virtues on the other side. And we had this unhappy period when there was really stagnations, stagnation of not only in economy, but stagnation in political thinking. And new ideas of... leaders. And it also influenced our foreign policy of course. And you know I wouldn't say that we changed completely. You would never find such discrepancies as between the 1980 platform of Republican party and what really is happening today, and what people say today. You... cannot find Brezhnev, in general, was for the time he started it together with Nixon. But then everything became very passive, you know. No initiatives and what we call now is a, you know, counterpart of new political thinking. The prevailed old political thinking. And one of the examples could be suspended. Now by old political rules, old political thinking, deployment of SS-20 was a very correct move. Because we had SS-4, SS-5 in Europe. Europeans and Americans never objected to this. Then this is for, was part of the general balance. SS-4, and SS-5 became obsolete. They had to be replaced. They were replaced with SS-20. But by new political thinking, when you have already come to a conclusion, that you cannot wage nuclear war. You cannot be in a nuclear war. We have too much nuclear weapons. It shouldn't be done. And therefore, it's not that we now, you know, the Americans sometimes try to depict it in such way that they have forced this... policy of force, military force, increase in military spending has helped. That's nonsense. What helped is really evolution development of political process, of political thought of this country. When we came to new conclusions about the whole issue of security that... your security is not a military problem. It is a military problem which can be solved by political means. You cannot have security to the detriment or on the costs of the other side. You can have it only together. And you have to really build a new system of international security. You... cannot achieve anything with weapons, with military force. And this made us very flexible. I And I would say this also embarrassed Americans on many issues, you know. INF could be served as one of the examples, you know. Mr. Perov, for instance. It was his proposal. Zero Option.

START FROM THE SAME PLACE, BUT INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER WHETHER YOU AS A SOVIET, OR WHETHER SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRUSTED THE PROPOSAL.

Well you know it's... when we started negotiations on INF weapons, and we... we, of course I... I'm not ready to analyze all the details of our position, American position at this time. But I feel that we cling to... the past balance of power. We did want superiority or to win better position, but we wanted to sustain the previous position as it was at this moment. And considered changes to be an attempt to undermine our security. And the Americans actually, they didn't lend SS, and NATO in general, but American suspicion, they didn't lend Pershings and cruise missiles as an answer to SS-20. It is not true. Then the public relations machine was very clever to...to bring these two weapons together. But then it counteracted because...because also you see the public has bought it. And public in Europe and the United States understood it in this way. That Pershing IIs and cruise missiles are there only because SS-20s are there. But actually it was a part of their new strategic concepts. Extend the deterrence, unlimited nuclear warfare in Europe. And... but they were so sure about us, our inflexibility. The third proposed, contrary to this "Walk in the Woods", partial proposal. To make another proposal. Zero, which sounded great from public relations point of degree. And he was absolutely sure that it will never be accepted by Soviet Union. Then when it was accepted, the public everywhere didn't know that these weapons are only because of SS-20. Now it has become politically impossible for west European allies. And also for Americans not to accept. They were absolutely sure, you know, for instance Manfred Wörner, who was, who is now general secretary of NATO. At the time was minister of defense in West Germany, he made even a bet that he will, I think, on his knees and elbows creep for 160 miles if there will be no INF weapons in Europe. Now I wait this great expectancy to this time and then I will ask for a tip somewhere...where he has to start and then to finish this great, you know, feat of his. 160 miles is quite something. From Brussels it will go up to, no I think it is 260 miles. It's up to the Polish border.

THERE IS ALSO A SENSE THAT WHEN THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE HAD STARTED GAINING MOMENTUM, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS HOPING THAT IT WOULD DO THE JOB AND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS THERE WERE NOT CONDUCTED IN THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY—

Well, you know, it is a usual attempt to ascribe to us some diabolical, you know, calculations. I don't think the decision makers at this time analyzed seriously what the movement could do, and it was not the number one, neither number two or three consideration in their plans. I think it was just calculated on old rules of military balance, including Great Britain, France, they had nuclear deterrents and American airplanes with bombs which could reach Soviet Union, etcetera, etcetera. And their naval forces, which are in Mediterranean, very close and so something like this...it, it was as simple as that. It doesn't mean that we didn't welcome this peace movement; we welcomed it very much, it was and is a sincere movement, and I think it played a serious role now, I think. Now it makes much more difficult to say no to zero-zero option, because, the heads of people, it remains, you know, now.

LET ME SWITCH TO YOUR PARTICIPATION IN VARIOUS MEETINGS. FIRST, AT GENEVA. CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE OF WHAT WAS ACHIEVED THERE? AND ALSO HOW EFFECTIVE.

I think that the greatest achievement of Geneva was that it didn't end like Vienna, between Kennedy and Khrushchev. It did end with an agreement, without very substantial talks, first meeting, and I don't think that the president of the United States was very well prepared for detailed discussion on treaties and such. I would say that also well, of course, Gorbachev had his plans but he, he was also at the initial stage when he looked at the opening, at what should be done, you know. Only two months before Geneva, no it was more than two months before Geneva, Geneva was... yes, two months before Geneva, Geneva was '85, yes? Two months before Geneva, his book, or one month before Geneva, his book in Paris, before the members of Parliament, and he said there that the perception of human beings have a sad capacity, you know, of lagging behind, with quickly developing realities of time. And that we in Soviet Union are committed to bring up our perceptions, including our perceptions of military and foreign policy issues, in accordance with the realities of our time. And I think in this sense, Geneva was very important for him and so, very short time after Geneva, he put forward this plan to do away with all nuclear weapons, toward the... end of the century. And in this sense, I think what was achieved there that they got to know each other. I don't think they produced very much, so to say in... in very concrete terms, but there were some principal agreements on a few very important issues, one of them that you cannot win a nuclear war and you shouldn't fight a nuclear war. And they agreed to meet again, and this already puts in you know, a shadow itinerary in Soviet-American relations and with it, it also started to induce political pressure. And I think this, in this sense, taking everything into account, I think Geneva was a necessary beginning of a process.

CAN YOU GIVE ME SOME SENSE OF YOUR EXPERIENCE THERE, IN THESE TERMS? HAVE YOU TALKED TO GORBACHEV BEFORE OR AFTER?

I can tell you, Gorbachev was ready for any outcome, he had no... he was absolutely not sure how it will end, what will be the final result, and I think he, when it ended, he was satisfied. He was satisfied, because you must understand Regan had drawn himself as a representative of an extreme right of American political spectrum, very outspoken, as you mentioned, about you know, in terms of anti-Sovietism, of militarism, of all of this. So there were no over-expectations about it and though the result, if we compare it with Washington, were modest, they were satisfactory, and I think they were necessary results... I don't think it could start. You have to take it as a, you know, part of a whole, now, all three summits together.

...WHEN YOU WERE GOING THERE, WHAT WAS YOUR JOB? AND WHAT WERE YOUR EXPECTATIONS?

I was there as an expert and I also took part in this night of discussion between two groups of experts, one headed by Akhromeyev, Marshal Akhromeyev, on our side, and by Paul Nitze on American side. I must tell you that, in general, after Geneva the situation developed not in a very good direction, and I think here you have to be just to Soviet leadership. It made everything it could, really, to... to start this, not to let this small flame die, which was lit in Geneva, of hope and of dialogue on highest level. And we made those... you know, and trying to somehow to change the way of thinking of people. We changed our thinking, we tried to make it, not only by words and by lectures. We made some risky one—unilateral moves, like this unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which lasted for a year and a half. We... introduced this... program of doing away with nuclear weapons till the end of the century. There were many... a review of many parts of our previous position and we made quite a number of concessions, not because we yielded before pressure, but just somebody has to be reasonable and you had to compare this minuscule, you know, profit which you can get from having a little bit more of this weapon or that weapon with the great loss which you have having nuclear arms race that increases nuclear danger. And therefore, it didn't die away, but Gorbachev was... really our entire leadership before very difficult choice in beginning of fall. The situation deteriorates, the talks are not moving, the end of the year is coming closer. It was agreed that there will be next summit in Moscow. What to do? And therefore, he proposed such a transitional working... you know, arrangements to meet half-way, London or Reykjavik. Reagan preferred closer to him, Reykjavik. And we went there, and the rest you know. With expectations, I think, psychologically... this is my guess, I never asked Gorbachev and had no chance to ask him in such a way, you know, what he really wanted at the bottom of his heart, what did he want... but I think that the main goal was to shake up the whole situation, to, to really get out of this, you know, absolutely fruitless discussions and negotiations which led nowhere, which were sham negotiations sometimes. They were just a facade, you know, an instrument to mask and facilitate the, the arms race. And to make a stop and to start real, really serious discussion, because if we have agreed on one major point, that you cannot fight nuclear war, you cannot win nuclear war, then you have logically to make the next step: why should you have more and more nuclear armaments? Why should you have so many nuclear weapons? And therefore, his proposals was, was very concrete, very practical, but caught Americans with their pants off... so we came to Reykjavik with simple and very concrete proposals; they were two pages and a half, and were titled under a title "Directives to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Union and Secretary of State of the United States," and were composed, actually, of ideas which were already discussed and on which there was quite reasonable agreement or mutual understanding at least, but this caught the Americans with their pants off and I have my ideas why it happened this way, but, anyway they complained that they were unprepared and even maybe we misled them and et cetera.

WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

I think they... they really were victims of their own propaganda. They have spoken so much about difficulties, alleged difficulties which Gorbachev has with our militaries, that they couldn't expect serious proposals on disarmament from him. They thought that it will be some, you know, middle-of-the-road, very modest, cosmetical proposal on INF, and when he came there, came with the chief of general staff, Marshal Akhromeyev and proposed very far-reaching proposals and then when Reagan has given ground to it, went even further and agreed to do with all nuclear weapons in ten years, they were absolutely unprepared to... to deal with it. But, it played also, you know, it was the worst... frustration on both sides, because it... it looked so that... that world is so close, you just can grasp it. Some, something, a little bit of something has... from it, which is not correct, I think. Not correct, participants were carried away a little bit with the momentums of those days because would they conclude an agreement, I am sure that in Washington it would be dismantled very soon by all the internal forces which are around Reagan and in the Congress and everywhere. But I think it was a... watershed to some degree. It was very important, because it... it really somehow, it left behind the old, old kind of negotiations when for months and years people can struggle about something, well,... of something which doesn't have any importance, you know, like in Vienna, the stocks; where... whose... it's the same whose proposals you take, the western or eastern. It will mean less than half or less than one percent... a cut of less than one percent of the forces in central Europe, what is the difference? And they discuss for fourteen years. You know, so... so it... Gorbachev called it "mothball trash" which filled up the negotiation tables, and we swept it away from the tables and started and now we have some modest but very good achievements already.

CAN YOU GIVE A SENSE OF YOUR FEELINGS WHEN GORBACHEV CAME BACK FROM THE MEETING? OR WERE YOU AT THE MEETING?

No, I, I was at the meeting of experts and then I...

WHEN GORBACHEV CAME BACK FROM THE MEETING, THE LAST MEETING WITH REAGAN, WHAT DID HE TELL YOU AND HOW DID HE SAY IT?

Well, you know, he was of course, disappointed. He was, he, directly from there he came to the press conference, and he was disappointed, you could see it even at the press conference, but it was just because it looked, at the moment... I think, in a day or two, he understood it already in different way, but at this moment it looked to him that they were actually one step from each other, in concluding historical treaty of greatest importance, of doing away with all nuclear weapons in ten years. Which was not our proposal, initially. It was again Reagan, maybe on the advice of somebody, proposed something which... which may... I, I don't think the President understood himself, but some of his advisers understood, would be unacceptable to Soviet Union, to do away with all nuclear missiles, with all missiles, strategic missiles, at INF, and here, of course, American, then American cruise missiles and American strategic bombers would play a tremendous role, and Gorbachev proposed then, why not with all nuclear weapons? He said, okay, with all nuclear weapons. But at this moment, already everybody around Reagan felt very uneasy and they would have destroyed it anyway, and I think it was understood afterward, they were not prepared to... to do it. Neither are they now. It's, it's too far reaching, it's still impossible for Americans. We hope that in the process of negotiations we can cut by fifty percent and then we cut by fifty percent again and it will mean that we'll have three thousand warheads each, it's also many times more than it's necessary to destroy the whole world. Then we can cut it again by fifty percent, it will be still much more than we had during Cuban missile crisis, you know. But in this process, if we're really aware of the major importance of Washington, it's really for the first fruitful step in the process of destruction of nuclear weapons. If you start that, then you... you ignite a lot of fuses; one of them is the crises of nuclear weapons, another, you get rid of nuclear weapons not in order to... to make more important chemical weapons, you have to, to do away with chemical weapons. You do both of these not in order to return to the arms race and... and conventional field, then you start very serious negotiations on conventional weapons. If you have all of them, one of the major reasons of distrust is a fear that you can easier solve the regional problems, can start better bilateral relations, and then, you know, in fifteen years of such developments we will look around and maybe more ready for some very radical solutions.

But this is unashamed optimistic scenario of the future. I... I would like it to develop in such direction, but, maybe it will be more difficult. But I, I think it has to develop this way, we have no options. It will develop either one way, which will be deadly for all of us, or it has to develop this way. We have no alternatives.

THERE WERE SOME FAILURES IN SOVIET POLICY AND SOME MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN DEALINGS WITH THE AMERICANS. WHAT DO YOU THINK...CAN DO NOW?

Well, he has to explain it himself, you know, because I...

IF YOU WERE TO LOOK AT SOVIET POLICY DURING THE LAST...WERE THERE THINGS THAT YOU WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE AMERICANS MORE EFFICIENTLY?

Well, everybody having lived over such experience could do better than he could have done it without such experience. But I think that we have withdrawn from the negotiations not in the most elegant way and have returned to the negotiations also not in most elegant way; it could be done differently and should have been done differently, you know. I think we were too defensive on some of the points, we made the life easier for Americans on some of the points. We could explain ourselves much better. We are lousy, up till now in public relations and propaganda, but we are learning the first lessons, you know. And, for instance...

For instance, there's whole story with Korean airplane. It was used as a major, as a major... you know, issue against Soviet Union, a hysterical issue, though the Americans, and now you have some already positive... positive evidences of them, that the Americans were sure that our people were thinking when they fired at the plane that it was an American military plane. And you know, we could, I think it could be explained better, the reaction could be better, etcetera, and that is true for many things, like with this, you know, so-called Bulgaria, Bulgarian, how do they call it? Bulgarian Connection, yes, when the... assassination attempt on Pope. It was, just a psych-war operation devised by Americans, made by them, and they, they played it according to their need. They failed, and we were not able to show from the beginning in more persuasive way what it is, and up till now I think there was a very, very vague decision of the court in Italy and the truth will come out, I, I am sure it... the CIA, Mr. Casey's, late Mr. Casey's operation, a very typical one for him, like this "yellow rain" story, which turned out to be, actually, excrements of beasts and not biological or chemical agents which were used by Soviet Union or use of you know, gas... of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. There were a lot of, it was a very active period, you know. I think that CIA, after it was brought to some responsibility in seventies, under Mr. Casey, which led to Iran-gate, also, started to work in old Cold War fashion with all the dirty tricks possible and, now it will come out, I think, bit by bit.

SO ESSENTIALLY, NOTHING OF THAT SERVES AS MISSED OPPORTUNITIES...

I am sure that in '82 and '83 and maybe '84... '84 for sure... Reagan was not ready and the administration of the United States not ready for serious steps in disarmament and improvement of relations with Soviet Union. I think that maybe beginning from '85, the situation was more ripe for it. They had to go their way; it was quite a way. You take the distance they, they passed through from 1980 till 1988, it is quite a distance. You know...

--DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP...

Yes, yes. We also, we also went a long way. There were changes, that was a very unhappy period in Soviet Union. I remember it very, vividly and it was a very difficult period for us and of course, with a sick leader it is difficult to have very innovative foreign policy and there's not very well-working mechanisms, because this, you know, period of stagnation has not contributed to working out, really, mechanisms which could work even in absence of very strong leadership.

WHAT IS THE CONFLICT WITH USSR AND US ABOUT?

If you considered national interests, there is no place for conflict, real national interest. I think that, we have nothing to... to, you know, to struggle about...

Yes, we... if you, if you take the real national interest, we have really no reason for conflict, we have nothing, nothing to struggle about, we have no territorial conflicts... at least we sold Alaska, though we sold very cheap, but we don't return to this question. You know, we have no economic difficulties and problems, we are supplementing even each other, helping American farmers by buying soybeans and corn from them, etcetera. We are not competing with America. Politically, I think that, if we understand, really, on both sides, since we have understood it very good so it's for Americans to understand, the Third World will develop neither for United States nor for Soviet Union. It will develop for itself, and what we can do and is in our interests is not to interfere and, if possible, to assist them in their normal development and solution of their overwhelmingly difficult problems. And we, with Americans, are only ten per cent of the population and we have to understand that. So really, our future, for us and also for... for other nations because they have... they have become hostages of this nuclear competition between Soviet Union and United States, without any agreement on their side. So it would be in everybody's interest if we stop this absolutely useless military competition, demilitarize our relations and start cooperating in solution of at least the most sensitive, you know, problems which are in the world. You have a lot of them, ecologically, you can have a merciful quick death through nuclear war; you can have a long and very painful death through ecological crises, just by neglect, if you behave like you behave now for another hundred years. And you have economically, it's impossible, it has become, the answers have become such a burden, which is paid partially not by Americans or the Soviets, it's paid by third countries.

WHAT DOES SOVIET UNION PROPOSE TO DO WITH RELATIONS VERSUS ...FOR INSTANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT ANSWER?

Well we, we thought that now, when we, together with Americans, have more than ninety percent of all nuclear weapons, it would be not fair to demand from them, from other nuclear powers, to participate in this reductions. But we expect from them and some of them have committed themselves after we cut by fifty percent, to join the negotiations and participate in further cuts. And I think at some time it will become necessary, the more Soviet Union and America have cut, the more important becomes, the work on the arsenal which other countries have.