If you, if you could just start by telling me what the impact of the bombing halt was on the military situation in Cambodia and start the question by, the answer, by giving me the question in the, by saying the, the effect of the military, of the bombing how it was, the, the...

Well, I was in uh New York at the United Nations on the, at that time when the bombing was halted on August 15...uh, that July 15? Cut that. (laughter)

Keep going, it’s okay.

I was in the United Nations at that time when the bombing was stopped. And, uh, we began to look into that and what we was saying to each other was that the halt of the US bombing give a lot of moral boost to the Cambodian soldiers in the field that was confirmed by the few units that we visit, uh, because from that time on the Cambodian soldiers felt that they are on their own.

So if you could just explain the field visits you made.

The halt of the US bombing in Cambodia in 1973 rather gave a moral boost to the Cambodian troops in the field because from that time on they felt that they had to be on their own, and there is no, air power to rely on. That has been con—that was confirmed by the few visit that we made to the units in the field, and that what we been saying to each other, ever since, but I just don’t know how representative that kind of statement could be in term of other units fighting the enemies in the field. It was sort of official version at the time.

What about the tactics, the change of tactics in the offensive in December ’74?

Well...previously the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese would attack and try to overrun a city from the weakest points, and if they could not do that they would withdraw and then attack from another point, or would withdraw together. But...from, during the last attack on Phnom Penh for instance the tactic was totally changed. And it was not relevant to a lot of people.

We knew that, but it was very difficult to convince the people cause from 1:20 in the morning of New Year 1975 on the Communists launched a very fierce attack from every point of the campus against Phnom Penh. They used first some eighty thousand troops which would increase as the attack progress. And they did not try attack our weak points but they try to overrun the strongest point possible, which they did three months later. And it was a simultaneous attack from every point of the compass- a very, very fierce and violent combination of artilleries, combination of rockets, and, and...rifles, and, ground assault.

Okay. Cut.

Well, was it any good, uh...?

Um, so just go on explaining how the tactics changed in ’75. What were the, uh, first indications you had that there was an offensive, your personal evidence? Did you have a report given to you or what?

Yes, we been very thorough with the intelligence report that the Khmer Rouge were building up around Phnom Penh. We was very aware of it, and intelligence report indicate around the time of the attack was 1:20 in the morning of the New Year, 1975. Uh, we know the tactics but it was very difficult time over there to coordinate our soldiers our troops, and it was already difficult in term of...logistic support and in term of ammunitions which already decrease.

Uh, so it went on for three months that our soldiers defended bravely the capital but...Khmer Rouge launched that attack from every point of the compass and...put all their best troops up Phnom Penh. And...was successful in overrunning the strongest position in the perimeter.

What did you, uh, at what point did you think this is the end we can’t go on we’re not going to come through, what was the point in that period you thought that the situation was was changed forever?

Well, we uh, we trying to reach out in particular to the West to ask for more help for...military assistance, and we knew that if we could just go through that period...then it would be easier in war effort in the future because we knew that the Khmer Rouge put all their best troops around Phnom Penh and we could only overrun them, decimate them at that time then they wouldn’t be much of the Khmer Rouge left after. Uh, we was continue, we continued to do that until the announcement of the cut in US aid to Cambodia. And that was the turning point.

What was your feeling at the time about the policy of the Lon Nol Government and the attitude of the American Government, what are your thoughts about it?

Well, looking back...on those days I think we all try the best we could and it’s just, it’s a matter of not much of a political affairs but it's a matter of carry the job through those difficult times. Uh, we felt that the Americans would stay through thick and thin with us...and nobody be—would believe that the American would withdraw. Now the American withdrawal from Cambodia either in term of assistance in terms of support was, was done...ir—irrelevant to, it is irrelevant to the Cambodian efforts.

We try so hard to, to, please the Americans...but I now looking back to that time I think we should not have done that much because the withdrawal of the American was decided upon with, without taking into consideration all the Cambodian affairs, without taking into consideration even of of the Ameri—of Cambodian lives, and aspiration of the people there. It’s a totally different thing. We should have be, we should have been all on our own more than relying on the Americans at that time.

What sort of reports were you getting from the various fronts around Phnom Penh in March ’75 about equipment and about uh supplies, did you have a lot of reports from the commanders saying they needed more supplies or that they were running short of men, or...?

Yes. They run out mostly short of supply.

Could you just say the army told me that?

And, the...I spoke to a lot of commanders...field commanders, and supply was very, very low. For instance, in 19— let’s say, 1974, they could use let’s say seven hundred, seven thousand rounds. At that time they could perhaps use only about forty rounds...ammunitions. Because very low on supplies already. And...the army was in such a difficult position to even convince our own troop to stay on and fight...cause there was not hope to continue on, there was no supply. And, uh, the only hope we entertained was to get the American military assistance to go through that period to the, uh, to, to the, uh, uhh, the season.

You were talking before about the, um, Khmer Rouge atrocities, can you tell me how you first heard about Khmer Rouge atrocities?

Well, when the war started in 1970 there was not much atrocity committed because at the time it was practically the Vietnamese who started the war and who, uh, fought the war for the Khmer Rouge. When the Khmer Rouge progressively develop, evolve from that and...took over all the war in 1972 that when the atrocities was committed more and more. We had documented several cases, around six, around five, and then closed the capital at Oudong.

We publicized that but at the time there was, th—th—our credibility was so low already that it was very difficult to convince the people that this is what happened, that the Khmer Rouge would commit a mass slaughter throughout the country once they took the power. It was difficult to convince anybody to believe such a thing, and it was my responsibi—responsibility to do that. And if you...

The atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge which became known to the world later were not were not a thing which occurred at random. It was a well planned policy. Ah. The Khmer Rouge can see that not just the soldiers or government officials but all the population who live under our government to be enemy and therefore the tactic will be to eliminate all, not just the soldiers and government officials, but the people along with, and we had several several documented cases of this policy, but we k—were our credibility was low enough...was too low to to make this known to the world, to make this known to our own people. Although I was a journalist myself my credibility was high but the story, but once it come from the government were not credible. And, that’s why a lot of people were caught by surprise when the Khmer Rouge took over in 1975 and slaughtered thousands of people on the same day.

Why do you think the Lon Nol Government’s credibility was so low and why did it keep sinking so low?

Well, we had to fight a very difficult war. We did not have that much experience and suddenly when the war exploded 1970 we had to expand the army overnight. We had to expand, expand the administration so there were weakness in the management of the government, of the country as a whole, and you know we had to fight against a very strong enemy, the Communists was supported by both the Chinese and the Russians and we did have some support from the Americans but everybody knows tha—that support would not last long enough to sustain us through the war, and because there was also some lack of professionalism among our leaders, we had to do a big job and we, we were not trained to do.

How corrupt was the Lon Nol government? Can you explain what it, what sort of corruption was a problem in government?

Well, there were corruption yes. There were corruption. It’s ah it because of the lack of professionalism, because of mismanagement, and therefore, some people are were corrupt more than the other, but there are many, there were many good men and good women, but despite the fact that some of our lives were corrupted we it was not the government who go and oppress the people. It we try our best to defend the people and eh we didn’t take the rice away from anybody and it was the only government which decently existed at the time. If if there was such a thing as corruption, it was just because some of the people sort of profited from the from the wartime, and there was a lot of power, there was a lot of money, there was a lot of influence and people were weak to that.

Ah. I think it would be wrong to blame the Cambodian alone for corruption. I think this thing has been documented in the west and the east. We corrupted some of some of us were corrupted but we didn’t go ahead and kill people. Ah. Now, you have the a government, a communist government which has got all the power to itself.

What was ahm you attitude towards Sihanouk while he was leader of the group? What do you think ah, do you think people had any faith in him to be able to moderate the Khmer Rouge?

The Sihanouk, Sihanouk has enjoyed a lot of charisma. Sihanouk, Prince Sihanouk was very popular among the Cambodian peasants. Among the people. It's not a question of having faith in him. It’s a question that a lot of people follow him and listen to him and like him. Ahhh ou—our leaders for instance we didn’t we didn’t think Sihanouk could moderate the Khmer Rouge. We know that he could not. There were instances that he admits so.

But, many, many people believe in him that he could master the situation. And when you have numbers of people who believe in Prince Sihanouk that he could do that you we had to operate against a very big odd. Prince Sihanouk enjoyed a lot of public support.

With the final campaign, getting back to the final offensive in ’75, ahm, do you think the Khmer Rouge had a plan to evacuate from Phnom Penh long time in advance or when do you think they decided to evacuate?

The Khmer Rouge had that all along. The Khmer Rouge...

Say what they had, they had the plan...

Ah. The Khmer Rouge had planned to evacuate Phnom Penh. And, all other major cities. Long, long time in advance. Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge leader, wrote that in his dissertation. It was even translated into English. Ah.

So, it’s a application of a well plan policy. It’s not just happened overnight. It was not just decided ah quickly to do but it was a well planned policy of by the Khmer Rouge leadership to abolish cities and and any other urban dwellings because they ah view that as a as a breeding place for corruption, as as as of exploitation of people by people and of a the bourgeois existence and in order to reach an egalitarian society, in order to to create an eg—a society in which everybody is equal to everybody else would be to them to abolish the cities and put everybody back to work in the field.

What attempts did you make to negotiate with Sihanouk when you were in the cabinet?

Ah. There was several attempts to by other friends to reach out for Sihanouk. When I took over, for instance, the ministry of information, we toned down the rhetoric against Sihanouk for the the for the last two years. Ah.

I personally believe that ah we should not be ah leading any campaign against a personality of the Prince Sihanouk and we should just win our own and try the best we could instead of being so stridently anti-Sihanouk. And, I personally wanted to reach out to him but I I could not do and I think other friends, foreign friends, attempted to do that. But, it was too late already.

How could the regime have survived without American assistance though at that point?

I think that without American assistance the regime could not survive. And, the last day for instance we ah send cable to Prince Sihanouk in Peking ah trying to get him back in power because you see many of us before with the war worked under Prince Sihanouk before, were hand picked by Prince Sihanouk too.

And, ah we believe that if Sihanouk could return and had a a government whatever name he choose it would be more neutral and independent government but Sihanouk at that time also lost all the control of the Khmer Rouge.

Ah. For the past two years the Khmer Rouge had already maneuvered the Prince out of position of leadership. They use his name, they use him only for foreign affairs and to ah and in propaganda to ah include people. But the Prince unfortunately lost control of the leadership too.

Without American aid at the time it will be impossible to exist as a free government. Ah. The only way that we could have exist would be to have a sort of coalition government ah to espouse again, once again the neutral, neutral policy that Prince Sihanouk pursued in the fifties. But then it was too late. It was 1975 not 1955. And...

Cut.