Major Malins, would you describe the events of Saigon when you first arrived?

Well when we first arrived, my...first sight of Saigon, was the, um, airport, and as we came in over the airport, uh, there, it looked like uh, a great motor rally, [incomprehensible] in this country. We had apparently asked for somebody on our, on our behalf had asked for all motor vehicles, cars, trucks and so on to be assembled on the, on the aerodrome.

And, um, we landed, we were met, as far as I recall, by the Japanese. I was the brigade supply and transport officer, um, attached to Brigadier Taunton who was to be the first commander, British commander entrenching to China, pending the arrival of General Gracey. And I do not particularly recall the Japanese reception of us.

My great impression was of the immense selection of very large American automobiles, uh, DeSotos, Cadillacs and all the rest of it, and uh, we were able to, more or less choose whichever vehicle we liked, but we were met by this reception party and we were driven into the center of Saigon, and my impression as we drove along was that um, there were banners out saying welcome to the Allied commission, in English.

I also had the strange impression that the street names, or some of the street names, had recently been changed. We were watched by, um, all sorts of people, Europeans, uh, local people, the Annamites, as we knew them. I had a feeling that we were received with um, curiosity, um, welcoming in a sense, a friendly way, possibly a slight feeling of apprehension.

And when we arrived in the center of the town, uh, my memory there is I think of going to um, I can't remember the name of the hotel, um, right in the center, uh, we had drinks. I remember that the bread uh, was absolutely appalling, they'd had no wheat flour for a very long period. Uh, that was my main initial impression.

But, we had come out of Burma, and it was literally like going into a beautiful slice of Paris. It was a wonderful experience after what we had been through and I think that we had no feeling of apprehension uh, we had not been warned that there was a political situation, a potential political situation on our hands, and I can't remember then exactly what I did in the center, but after that my responsibility was to, first responsibility to help repatriate our own prisoners of war and so I put myself out on the airport from which our people were being flown back on every incoming plane, to see that they were properly fed.

What was the law and order situation?

The law and order situation, um, when we arrived, was apparently normal. Uh, I had no feeling whatever of, as I say, of apprehension or tension. Uh, we had, uh, explicit, uh, instructions, um, my briefing was to the effect that we, the 20th Indian division, were going to French Indochina pending the arrival of a French division or French troops, because the French at that stage had no troops on that side of the world who would be able to take over and that we would be there for a very temporary period.

And our, um, brief was to repatriate our own prisoners of war, to in turn repatriate the Japanese and to maintain law and order. And, uh, when we arrived, ostensibly it was a peaceful scene. But, um, it didn't, um, it didn't stay like that.

...put in another way...

Right.

As the weeks went by, how did the general law and order situation change? How were relations between Westerners and the Annamites?

Well, I think the way it changed, I, during those...

A general statement.

A general statement, all right. During those first few days I drove around Saigon and all the outskirts without an escort, without a driver, feeling perfectly happy and in no way apprehensive.

Sorry I think you’ll have to start that again...language...

Once again.

Right. For, what what was the point there on the language reel?

It'd be impossible to edit, uh, the words were run on together.

Oh, they were too rapid.

No, just that you said "general statement" and you, you didn't have a beginning to it.

Right. Okay, Jack, ask me the question again.

What was the general situation as the days and weeks went by?

It, it slowly deteriorated.

Stop please. Uh, a sentence with a beginning, a middle and an end.

I beg your pardon. Uh, when we arrived the situation was, um, apparently completely peaceful. I drove round Saigon, the outskirts of Saigon, without an escort, without any problems whatever.

Then, the local people, who we came to know as the Annamites, uh, started digging up the road at night, so one would, if you went carefully you would drive over a small bridge over a culvert and on the blind side they had dug a ditch and you would nose dive into the ditch.

They also had the habit of, you'd be driving along and suddenly a tree would drop in front of you. Uh, and you would go to reverse out and a tree would then be dropped behind you. But, uh, there were no problems, I, uh, just got out of my, uh, vehicle, rounded up a few local Annamites, dragged, they dragged the tree away and I carried on. So, there were these first signs of trouble.

Then, we were beginning to find, um, Annamites with wooden made guns, rifles, uh, very much like a game of boy scouts, in its way. Uh, but it went on from there, to the point that, um, it was quite obvious that one had to take precautions, and it moved on from there to a situation where there was a lot of incendiarism at night and we were rushing troops from one point to another, uh, becoming a more difficult situation.

And um, we were having problems in flying troops in, the weather was extremely bad, and, uh, at a certain point, I suppose even after about ten days, my impression was that perhaps we had no more than three hundred infantry on the ground. So it was a deteriorating situation.

General Gracey's criticized as the wrong man for the job, who had old fashioned colonialist ideas and beliefs and that led him to ignore the Annamites political claims to power. Pointing in particular to the snub of the Viet Minh delegation at the airport. Could you describe that, uh, that situation and comment on the criticism?

I of course wasn't present when Gracey arrived, and I am not even aware of the, um, the alleged snub. So far as I'm concerned, Gracey was absolutely the right man for the job. I cannot think that any better man could have been picked.

Uh, Gracey was a man who had, um, long experience in the Indian army, knew of Indian aspirations for independence, he loved his men, his men loved him. Um, it is, um, very significant that Gracey, of all the commands in the Second World War, Gracey was the only man who commanded his division, who formed his division, commanded it right the way through, and disbanded it, after something like four and a half years.

And was immediately promoted from the rank of Major General to full General. And who later, uh, later became the first commander in chief of the Pakistan army. And nobody is going to suggest to me that a man looked up, looked on like that, by the Pakistanis, in effect was an old colonialist who was absolutely against independence and all the rest of it.

Gracey was there to do his job in accordance with the orders which he received from above. He was not in a position to hand over French Indochina on his own personal whim because he believed or didn't believe in independence for the Annamites. He had to obey the instructions of his superiors.

And the fact is that I went back to India in 1979 where his name is dearly loved among the Indians, particularly those who served under him, in spite of the fact that he was a commander in chief of Pakistan. And he is believed in India to have averted war between India and Pakistan. The Indian military advisor only the other day made this comment to me at Sandhurst.

What kind of a man was Gracey?

He was, I'm six foot two...sorry, I beg your pardon...Gracey was a relatively small man to me. I am six foot two. He was certainly very much the general, a man...

Would you describe General Gracey? What kind of a person was he?

I think the first thing to say about General Gracey was that he was an intensely humane man. Uh, he was, for me, as a younger officer, um, very much of a father figure, a wonderful man to serve under, uh, totally competent, from our point of view, despite the fact that he was an infantry man, he had a total understanding of what we call the services side.

He understood how important it was that the food, the ammunition and all the rest of it were in the right place at the right time. And, uh, some infantry commanders would not always understand that. They're more concerned with the fighting troops.

He had a long experience of serving with Indian troops. He absolutely loved them. They loved him. He was the only, divisional commander, so far as I know, in the Second World War, who raised his division, who commanded it throughout its, its period of existence, for a period of something like four and a half years, and who disbanded it and who refused promotion, because he did not wish to leave his division.

And the moment that his division was disbanded, he was promoted to the rank of full general, that's two jumps up. He later became the first commander in chief of Pakistan, the Pakistan army. Despite the fact that he was a Gurkha officer, um, which is, of course, the Hindu, um, uuum, the former Hindus. Um...

What about his politics? A lot of people say he was the wrong man at the wrong time.

His politics would not, in any way, influence him. He was the kind of man who would totally and loyally carry out the instructions which were given to him. And it would seem that he was given very close instructions as to what he had to do.

What about the, um, decision to rearm the Japanese, stage the coup d'etat, pave the way for the French taking over? Why couldn't he have seen the nationalist ambitions of the Vietnamese?

I think that...

A complete statement, please.

Sorry. General Gracey was in a situation of having directions from higher command. There is absolutely nothing anywhere, so far as I know, which said, in fact there were explicit instructions that he would negotiate, negotiate with the French, and the French only.

He had absolutely no mandate whatever, to uh start talking about handing over, um, French Indochina to anybody other than the French. He had his straight strict instructions that French Indochina, in brief, that we were going in, as a temporary measure, pending the arrival of French troops and a French administration. He was instructed to work totally through the French administration.

So he was not in a position to make, uh, any form of political judgment, uh, in terms of um, whether he approved or disapproved, that he never ever had an occasion to make any comment to me, uh, or publicly about what he thought of, um, the independence movement.

What he did know, was that our own Indian troops were very keenly seeking their independence. And so he would know, as well as anybody would know, how the local Asian population were likely to feel. Uh, so any suggestion that he was, uh, an imperialist or anything like that, nothing could be further from the truth.

He, I think was the kind of man, because I was a young man, I was only twenty-six when these things happened, uh, he would probably be forty-nine or fifty, and of course at that particular time of life I wanted the world changed in five minutes. Uh, he, obviously, with much vaster greater experience, uh, I think would have said, that when change comes, it has to be properly arranged, planned, and all the rest of it. Uh, but he was in no way in a situation either to make a political judgment or to take a political ax, um, which would be outside the instructions which he was given from the higher command.

Would you tell us about your efforts, as transport officer, to get food shipped north, to North Vietnam?

Well, it was, my job was something more than transport officer.

Statement please.

My, my job, I was, um, because of the economic blockade of Saigon, food supplies became extremely short. And I took initial action to insure that there was sufficient food of course for our own people, um, then for the French civil population, when it became increasingly difficult for the civil organization to function.

Uh, it expanded into a very considerable organization, so that we were, uh, feeding the French population, we were feeding the Chinese population, and I attempted whenever possible to feed anybody who needed food. When I say I attempted to feed them I mean that it was necessary to bring in food, to arrange for convoys of food, uh this was done as far as we could through the merchants, through the distributions was made through the French civil administration.

Uh, in so far as the North is concerned, which of course we were only responsible for French Indochina, south of latitude sixteen degrees north. The northern part was in the hands of Chinese. And we heard that there was intense famine in [unidentifiable] in the Tonkin area.

And, uh, I received a request for food supplies to be shipped north. It was a cur—one of the requests was extremely curious, because we were told that, uh, all food supplies, every crate, every sack, uh, should be stenciled with the stars and stripes. That, it would not be admitted, in spite of the fact that people alleged to be starving. And uh, that really raised our eyebrows, but, people were starving, we didn't raise any questions, we got on with it. An enormous job, stenciling thousands of sacks and boxes and all the rest of it.

And first of all there were twelve junks sailed north to Hai Phong and shipping, at that time, seagoing shipping was in extremely short supply. Uh, all that I had available to me was, uh, a tank landing ship, which carried about two thousand tons. And, uh, that, that first voyage, um, that took two thousand tons, uh, into Hai Phong. But we were also involved, not only with, uh, Saigon, but, um, besieged European populations in places like Nha Trang and Hue and, uh, Vinh, which was over the, um, over the frontier. Uh, but we still tried to help everybody who we knew to be starving.

What were some of the problems in that period in dealing with the Annamites? In getting food to the population?

The, uh, problems were, that um, the Annamites were burning, uh, French property, they were burning all factories, all warehouses, mills, uh, everything that they could, um...really take out of the economy to impose a total blockade. And it wasn't just a question of um, for example, burning um a mill, burning a rice mill, it, I would have great problems in, in getting, um, for example, rice milled. We were eventually down to only one rice mill.

Uh, we had great problems with, I was bringing convoys down the Mekong from bringing food down from Cambodia, which was peaceful. Big river convoys with gunboats. And we'd bring down about fifteen hundred head of cattle, plus hundreds of pigs, vast quantity of fresh fruit and all the rest of it. When they arrived in Saigon they had to be slaughtered very rapidly.

Um, the Chinese slaughtermen struck because the Annamites beheaded one of the Chinese slaughtermen. I had to make arrangements from, um, to to replace the slaughterman. I think we used, actually, Dutch, ex-prisoner of war, volunteer slaughterers.

All the time, one was having to, uh, to get through with, um, one problem after another, but, by and large, these problems we were able to deal with them. The, um, type of problem that you cannot effectually deal with, I didn't know enough about at the time. I had advice from the medical services, but when a certain mill - I think it was [unidentifiable] mill - was destroyed, we were no longer able to grind baby food, and so there was a temporary crisis on baby food. We had to fly stuff in from Calcutta.

Tell us about your efforts, briefly please, to arrange for an open market, uh, that would allow anyone to buy food and how that you saw that as a lost opportunity.

I, from, almost the beginning of the operation of the Civil Food Control Organization, I had contact, he used to come in and see me, with, uh, an Annamite.

Could you start again?

Sorry. Let us see how we can start this. The Civil Food Control Organization was an ad hoc body set up to, um, in the first stage, to feed the French, then it fed the Chinese, and then the effect of the Annamite blockade on, on the Saigon Cho Lon area was resulting in many Annamites being desperately short of food.

And, uh, an Annamite, who spoke excellent English, in an American way, who I imagine possibly had been, uh, perhaps to university in the states, he used to come in and see me, and we were on extremely good talking terms and as the situation deteriorated, he put a proposition to me that, um, we might declare certain, what we would call open areas, into which the Annamites would agree not to send troops, and which we would agree not to send troops, into which food could come, and be distributed to, uh, anybody, the Annamites particularly included, and this suggestion I thought was an excellent suggestion.

Uh, we were not there to fight the Annamites. Uh, we were there, fundamentally to keep law and order. Uh, and so I put the suggestion, I carefully thought the suggestion out, and I put the suggestion up to, uh, the general, Douglas Gracey, and unfortunately, and I put it in writing to him, and unfortunately, Douglas Gracey happened to be out of Saigon at that moment, and my, um, suggestion went to Brigadier Jack Hurst, who in fact was, commanding 20 Indian division, while the General was commanding the control commission, Jack Hurst reporting to Douglas Gracey, the general.

And I had a very curt reply, uh, from him, saying we will not, repeat, not negotiate with the enemy. The Annamite came back to see me and unfortunately, there'd been an incident in Cho Lon where some houses had been burnt down. He accused me personally of having been involved in this, uh, he left and uh, and that was the end of what I thought was a lost opportunity. A great lost opportunity, because, it meant that if we could get food supplies flowing again, uh, not only could we feed Saigon, Cho Lon, we might be able to help all sorts of starving people elsewhere, in fact outside French Indochina as well.

Very good.

Okay, we're just going to change, uh, change film.

Right.

Major Malins, tell us, uh, briefly about your conversations with one of the Annamites about food supplies.

I had a, a, a very good contact, uh, by the Annamites, who used to come in and see me very frequently. He kept me informed of the position of the, the food position in relation to the, um, Annamite population near Saigon Cho Lon. He put a proposition to me, that um, we might declare open areas into food that would be allowed to pass by the Annamites, and into which there would be, there would be no Annamite troops, or no, um, none of our troops.

And I put this proposition, I thought this was an extremely good idea, I put this proposition, um, to the um, commander at that time, uh, Douglas Gracey being out of Saigon, and I received an almost instantaneous, uh, brief, quick reply to the effect that we will not, repeat, not, negotiate with the enemy and that word enemy was used. I do understand actually, why, uh, long after that it was necessary for it to say that, because they had instructions that under no circumstances were we to negotiate with anybody other than the French.

And what happened?

Um, what happened, um. I came back, uh, with a feeling that um when General Gracey, do I when General Gracey returns to Saigon, put this thing up to him, he may, um, well say yes to it. Uh, unfortunately, before I could do that, this Annamite returned to see me to find out what the decision was and, um, he was in an absolutely flaring temper, alleging that I had personally given instructions for houses to be burnt down in Cho Lon.

It was absolutely completely untrue and before I could say anything, even before I could deny it, he, um, he rushed out and left the room, and that was the last I ever saw of him, and in my view, it was a terrible lost opportunity, because had we been able to, um, arrange these open areas, then there might have been a much greater free movement of food, which would have enabled us to feed not only the Annamites in the area, but for food to become available maybe on, even on an exportable basis, because, the whole of the Far East was starving at that time. It was particularly the people up in Tonkin, the northern part of French Indochina.

Could you tell us, very briefly, about your convoy to [unidentifiable] How did it feel to be an allied officer, commanding armed Japanese troops in action, only a little more than a month after the Japanese surrender? Did you get any sense of irony, uh, to be commanding Gurkhas and uh, side by side with Japanese troops?

No, none whatever, it was a perfectly normal...

A statement.

I beg your pardon. I was asked to take out a convoy, um, of thirteen vehicles. We scraped together eighteen, I think it was eighteen Gurkhas. I had twelve Dutch POW volunteers, and a platoon of Japanese soldiers, about thirteen. Uh, with a Japanese Lieutenant Commander, a Japanese interpreter. And, um, the object of the exercise was to bring in, um, a thousand rifles, a hundred machine guns, and ammunition.

And, um, this was a time of great crisis in Saigon. And, uh, when I was sent out on that mission, if I'd had Russians or Americans or ape, it did not matter one little tiny bit. We were concerned with saving people from being killed in Saigon.

And, uh, so I, of course afterwards I feel, uh, that it's rather interesting that I should actually have commanded having fought against the Japanese, having been nearly killed by the Japanese, that I should in turn be privileged to command Japanese infantry. I may say, that, uh, it was a very interesting experience, because whereas we fought them to the last man, in Burma, they did not allow themselves normally to be captured. These chaps were deadly scared. Uh, they were no longer fighting for the, for the Emperor.

And, uh, no it was a perfectly logical thing to do, and uh, had we not done that, in fact, uh, when we faced very heavy opposition, I found it necessary, I couldn't return to Saigon that night, I knew that we were going to be very heavily ambushed and attacked the following day, and I arranged for two further platoons of uh, Japanese and I arrived back in Saigon, I've forgotten what the casual, total casualties were, I think I had five or six Gurkhas killed, and uh, four or five Dutch POW's, a terrible irony for them to volunteer for this and be killed, after the end of the war, but uh, no, it was perfectly logical, and um, I do not consider anything unusual in it at all.

Did you see any irony in the convoy itself, in bringing arms, uh, surrendered by the Japanese to give to the French to help them re establish?

Totally logical. Totally logical. French Indochina was, uh, French Indochina belonged to...Sorry. Um, it was quite logical, uh, for me to collect these arms. I did not know at the time, I was not told they were to rearm the French. In fact I do not even know what happened to them afterwards. I just brouht them into Saigon.

But if they were given to the French, and it was extremely probable that they were, it was a totally logical thing for this to happen. Uh, if one had not rearmed the French, then, uh, killing would have gone on, uh, the French had to defend themselves. And uh, they don't defend themselves with broom straws.

Uh, Gracey would have been heavily censored. In fact, I think it was Brigadier Taunton who said, he may not remember, I can't remember, that that was the case. Had we not done our absolute utmost, including the bringing of these arms people would sell afterwards, they were a pack of idiots. There was a huge pile of arms, only thirteen miles from Saigon. They allowed themselves to be, um, uh, totally overrun. That never happened.

One thing you have to remember about General Gracey, we were only in French Indochina for five months. We interned, we repatriated seventy-nine thousand Japanese. Uh, we repatriated our own prisoners of war, we were never bogged down, as unfortunately the French were later on, the Americans were bogged down later on, we left Saigon, we left French Indochina in totally good order, with minimal casualties to ourselves. Um, and having inflicted the minimal casualties on the Annamites in the process of trying to keep law and order.

Very good. Major Malins, thank you very much.