SO TWO GENERAL QUESTIONS FIRST. COULD YOU EXPLAIN... AH... REMEMBERING THAT THIS IS FOR A BRITISH AND AN AMERICAN AUDIENCE... WHY GENERAL DE GAULLE OPPOSED ALL ALONG...THE IDEA, OF AN INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND OF NATO, WHAT WERE HIS MAIN REASONS?

General de Gaulle’s primary reasons are... are well known and I will restate them simply for the record. The first... is that... General de Gaulle believed and always believed that... national independence...the independence of each country, of France but also of other countries...means controlling the command of its armed forces. And, consequently, General de Gaulle believed that an integrated system, an integrated command... uh...which, uh, as he saw it, is perfectly possible in wartime, but must not continue in peacetime because he couldn't imagine that France could be dragged into a war... uh, in some way by others’ will and, and against his will. Uh...he said this very often, but there was another reason, uh......which is very interesting and that wasn’t stated. General de Gaulle believed that...the only way to have a truly effective army...a well-commanded army was when...the general officers of that army were aware that they are responsible for the national defense. General de Gaulle believed that the major defect of an integrated command was that it removes a sense of responsibility from the military leaders. And, I would add, as a historical side point...that this argument, which General de Gaulle used on one occasion with General Norstad, with whom he maintained excellent relations, is an argument that appeared to be so convincing to General Norstad that Norstad himself answered that he had no response; he had no response to that argument.

GENERAL NORSTAD TOLD ME THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE IN A CONVERSATION WITH HIM SAID, I THINK IN ABOUT 1960, "UH GENERAL NORSTAD, DO YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION (TO WESTERN EUROPE)?" AND NORSTAD SAID, "I HAVE TO AGREE WITH THAT," AND DE GAULLE SAID, "IN THAT CASE, I MUST THINK FIRST OF THE RESTORATION OF FRENCH MORALE AND OF FRANCE...AND NOT OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE". DOES THAT...?

Yes... General Norstad’s comment accurately reflects General de Gaulle's opinion. And I would add that, with respect to the French nuclear force... General de Gaulle knew very well that it would take a very long time...that it would take at least ten years to build this nuclear force. And he was counting on, uh...those ten years of peace to build a significant force.

AND WHY DID THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT AN INDEPENDENT "FORCE DE FRAPPE" WAS SO ESSENTIAL FOR FRANCE?

First because...I would say... General de Gaulle had a grand idea of France and, in particular, a grand idea of the...of the French armed services since he himself had been an officer all his life. And he believed that since major countries like the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain had nuclear forces, there was no reason for France not to have nuclear arms as well. This is an idea that is more political, I would say, than military, but he had that idea, and I believe that it was his main idea. But there was another reason... General de Gaulle often said it...in particular to the war college officers, but also to the ministers...He said that, from the moment when ... the power of nuclear weapons and the ability to transport those weapons...on board planes and missiles...allowed France to be hit, from any point in the world...it was necessary for the security of France for the French army to be capable of responding and also hitting any... any place in the world.

BUT...WHAT WAS HIS REPLY TO THE...HIS OPPONENT WHO SAID "IT'S GOING TO "THE FRENCH FORCE DE FRAPPE IS A "BOMBINETTE" IT...IT CANNOT HAVE ENOUGH POWER TO DO ANYTHING?

Uh...that was, in effect, the argument. And it was particularly Mr. Mitterand’s argument at that time. I remember hearing Mr. Mitterand use this argument himself on the floor of the National Assembly. He has changed since then. But, uh, General de Gaulle's response was very simple. He said that...the French force...the French nuclear force was in fact weak at the beginning, but that...it would grow. It would grow to the point of becoming large enough, strong enough to...be able to discourage a...potential enemy from attacking France, and... General de Gaulle was right since now we have reached that capacity. No one in France, or even outside France, says today that French nuclear strength is a small bomb, uh, because...to the contrary, what some are trying, in particular what the Soviet Union is trying...is to get us not to develop it any more.

AND THE GROWTH OF...THE STRIKE FORCE, IT'S A THANKS TO...A LITTLE BIT, TO MITTERAND, ISN'T IT?

Uh...I would say...I would say that...the...the...the decision, that General de Gaulle had this idea with a future perspective ... because General de Gaulle always had a very historical view of events. His thinking about the present was supported by his knowledge of the past, but was...above all, projected toward the future...toward his concept of the future. And...what is true is that, after General de Gaulle, all the presidents of the Republic continued the same policy, with respect to defense, the defense policy. To the point that, today, there are no longer any opponents in France of the national defense policy implemented by the government. There is a kind of national unanimity which has been created about the French defense policy, which is also not without disadvantages.

CAN WE GO BACK NOW...TO THE YEAR 1958, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE...OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME AS DE GAULLE ATTAINED POWER...THE MCMAHON ACT, THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT IN THE UNITED STATES, WAS AMENDED, CLEARLY, IN FAVOR OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NOT FRANCE AT THAT TIME. WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF BOTH YOU AND THE GENERAL TO THAT?

Initially... General de Gaulle ...and ...I myself even more than General de Gaulle, because I was young and full of illusions, uh...we believed that this amendment would give France access to certain information from the United States. And very quickly we discovered and, in particular, I learned in my conversations with Robert McNamara, that this was an illusion. And that we could only count on our own, uh industrial, technical and scientific assets to build our nuclear power. We had, if you will, an illusion in this area. But this illusion was very short-lived. And, at the end of the day, I believe that it was better that France built its nuclear force by itself. That allows us to be completely independent today, first of all. And...second, it allows us to issue a systematic refusal to all those who would like to obtain information from us, uh...to create their own nuclear force...which is a current problem which all the major countries are cognizant of.

BUT WHAT WAS THE REACTION WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT GREAT BRITAIN WAS BEING TREATED DIFFERENTLY TO FRANCE...WAS THAT SOMETHING THAT IRRITATED THE...

I don't think so, no. There was no irritation...on our part. Because we knew very well that...there are very special ties between Great Britain and the United States... which are not only ties of language, but also of history...And they are ties of recent history, particularly the Second World War. And, as a result, we weren't irritated at all by...by...by this cooperation...which seemed a natural cooperation to us. I would say that General de Gaulle's irritation, reflected in his efforts to prevent Great Britain from entering Europe, had a different cause. In other words, General de Gaulle never believed in the sincerity of the British government which, on one hand,...uh...claimed that they wanted to join Europe while, on the other hand, they were cooperating closely with the United States on everything related to their defense. And I believe that this was the...real reason for General de Gaulle's refusal of Great Britain's request to enter the European Community.

AND THE ARRANGEMENT THAT WAS MADE AT NASSAU IN 19...IN DECEMBER OF 1962, MUST HAVE BEEN A PARTICULAR CASE OF THAT...

In effect...The Nassau arrangement was, in a way, the...recognition...the disagreeable recognition by General de Gaulle that Great Britain preferred its ties with the United States to...potential ties with Europe.

WHAT WAS HIS REACTION...PROBABLY YOU WERE THERE, WHEN GEORGE BALL CAME IN JANUARY OF 1963 TO MAKE THE SAME OFFER, OF THE POLARIS MISSILE TO FRANCE?

Yes...yes...yes, I was, I was minister at that time...and I remember very well... General de Gaulle didn't hesitate for one instant to refuse. And he did so for two reasons: the first reason was that ... it was decided in 1963 to build a completely independent French nuclear force, and naturally, the American proposals included a number of constraints...political and technical constraints...that General de Gaulle didn't want to accept. And, second, General de Gaulle believed that, if the French nuclear force wasn't a technically independent force...as well as politically, because one can say that the British were right to say that their nuclear force was politically independent... but it wasn't technically independent. And General de Gaulle believed that, if the French deterrent force wasn't technically and militarily independent, it would lose a large part of its value.

TO GO BACK A LITTLE BIT AGAIN...IN TIME, YOU WERE PRESENT AT THE FAMOUS ATHENS MEETING WHEN MR. MCNAMARA MADE HIS SPEECH WHICH SAID TWO THINGS. AND I'D LIKE YOUR COMMENTS ON BOTH...ONE, THAT INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES WERE INEFFICIENT, DANGEROUS, NOT CREDIBLE AND SO ON...AND SECONDLY, HE OUTLINED HIS IDEA OF A STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

My reaction...I'll mention it only in passing. I was the only minister to reply to Mr. McNamara. There wasn't a single NATO minister, at the time of that Athens meeting, who...responded to Mr. McNamara in the public session. In the wings, in individual conversations, of course, there were responses but, in the public session, there was only one response...and only one objection, which was mine. Uh, naturally, I had no answer to the observation that weak nuclear forces have a number of disadvantages...particularly in the eyes of the United States...because this was a statement that was absolutely true. My response could only be one answer, that...we were hoping that the French nuclear force would become strong. And...it subsequently did become strong. Even though Robert McNamara didn't believe that we would continue. Robert McNamara believed that, with General de Gaulle gone, France would abandon nuclear force. He still believed it at that time...I don't know if he still believes it today but, at the time, it was what he believed. Uh...and then, with respect to the "flexible response"..."riposte graduee" (progressive response) in French, we translate "flexible response" by réponse...uh...riposte graduee. The flexible response is a response that I find completely normal from the United States but...one that Europeans find it hard to accept. Uh... how do you think that the Germans, in their position, can appreciate a flexible response that would have the result of transforming all of West Germany into a battlefield. And we French, who are not that much farther than the Germans from the Iron Curtain...We can't see that the...the flexible response is a good response...And, uh... I would add that, at the time, the nuclear weapons we had were so weak...that we couldn't ... even technically envision...a flexible response... For us, it was really all or nothing. And this is why there was no question for us of accepting. Now we have more powerful weapons...and we can envisage...uh...in particular, using tactical nuclear weapons...a kind of gradation...in the response...in the counterattack. But it was completely impossible at that time.

MCNAMARA'S...

It was possible for the Americans; it wasn't possible for us.

MR. MCNAMARA'S POINT, OF COURSE, WAS THAT... THE COMPLETE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR ARMS...INCLUDING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS...AND THE... THE RELIANCE ON THE EARLY USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO, WAS VERY DANGEROUS BECAUSE EVEN A SMALL WAR MIGHT BECOME NUCLEAR. WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THAT?

My answer is that, in Europe, there can't be a small war. There can be peace, there can be tension... there can be a major war...There can't be a small war in Europe, because Europe is too small, with too many people, for there to be a small war. A small war in Europe is quickly transformed into a large war. In other words, I think that Mr. McNamara's analysis is not accurate for Europe. For other areas of the world, for other regions of the world, I believe he is right...but not in Europe.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE ATTITUDE OF MR. MCNAMARA AND THE SO CALLED "WIZ KIDS" OF THAT PERIOD? WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THAT?

Uh...I...I always considered McNamara to be a man...with an excellent ability for...for management. I believe that McNamara was a very great Secretary of Defense because he was able to truly control a gigantic system, the military apparatus of the United States, in an era when the United States was engaged in war in the Far East...the war in Vietnam. Uh...and from that point of view, McNamara was truly an example for all ministers because he showed that a minister... had the ability...thanks to highly developed resources...particularly thanks to computers, to electronics, that a minister had the ability to control gigantic...uh...I can tell you that, from that standpoint, he gave me excellent lessons. But, uh...I believe that...Robert McNamara made two serious mistakes...which were political errors...

SO YOU WERE SAYING, "BUT MCNAMARA MADE TWO ERRORS..." THE ONE TO DO WITH EUROPE IS THE MOST INTERESTING...

Yes...the other was Vietnam...with respect to Europe, I believe that...Robert McNamara’s mistake was to think that the American strategy...which is good for the United States...(and I don't dispute the American strategy in Europe in McNamara's era)...his error was to believe that this strategy was good and acceptable to the Europeans. Now, I don't think so because...the dimensions of Europe and...and the challenge that Europe represents for Europeans... is such...are such that we don't have the possibility of using...not only a flexible response, true, I would say... a maneuver to retreat, which would quickly bring us to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. We can't do that. And I'd add that...with modern equipment...modern weapons...even the British can no longer do it. And... we therefore thought that...the...the ideas that McNamara espoused, McNamara’s ideas about the strategy to be followed in Europe, were not good for the Europeans. They were perhaps good for the United States...but not for us.

BUT MOST OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES ACCEPTED THAT STRATEGY IN THE END.

Yes...they accepted it because they couldn't do anything else. Uh...that was...that's the main reason. Don’t think that the other countries accepted McNamara's strategy because they thought it was right... uh...I very often had discussions with European colleagues whose positions weren't far from what I thought, nor from what I’m saying today. But they didn't have a choice; it was particularly vital for West Germany to obtain... uh...from...from the United States a guarantee through the physical presence of American troops on the ground in West Germany, and they could only get this by aligning with the American strategy, uh even though they did so reluctantly. We the French were not obliged to do so.

ON THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE SOIL OF GERMANY, WOULD YOU AGREE THAT FRANCE'S SECURITY WOULD BE VERY MUCH LESS SURE...IF THERE WERE NOT THOSE AMERICAN TROOPS ON GERMAN SOIL? BEFORE HER...AND IF YOU AGREE WITH THAT, WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THOSE WHO SAY THAT IN EXPELLING AMERICAN TROOPS FROM FRENCH SOIL FRANCE RECEIVES THE BENEFIT OF AMERICAN PROTECTION WITHOUT PAYING THE PRICE?

On the first point, I say yes. I believe that the security of France was...and still is today, significantly strengthened by the presence of American forces in Germany. I believe it deeply, and I also believe that General de Gaulle had exactly the same idea. But...with respect to the presence of American forces uh...in France...uh, I don't have the same analysis. I am convinced...that, uh...the fact that the Americans, uh...the American rush as it was present in France at that time, meaning only with communication lines, only with logistics, and not...uh... except with the "Air Force", and not combat units, I believe that this stressed, uh, I would say, the American presence, without giving the impression of effectiveness...and I believe that, ultimately, uh, the...the departure of the Americans after France left the NATO integrated command, I believe that the departure of the American forces ultimately had a healthy effect, for the French and for the Americans. I believe that if, for example, there was no pacifist movement in France...as there was in Great Britain, it was first of all because the pacifist movements in France couldn't hook their demands to the presence of foreign troops on French soil. There was no possibility for them to have demonstrations, as they did in Great Britain or in Germany around American bases. For the very simple reason that there were none in France. And I believe that, finally, this decision by General de Gaulle was beneficial for the entire Alliance. Not only for France, but for the entire Alliance, since...we see it today, the only major country in Europe where there were no pacifist movements... was France.

WHY DO YOU THINK THAT NO OTHER COUNTRY, AND ESPECIALLY GREAT BRITAIN, HAS TAKEN THE SAME ROUTE AS FRANCE?

I can answer that from the viewpoint of a Frenchman. A Frenchman who has lived in Great Britain, who served in the British Army...uh...in the French forces with the British Army during the war, and therefore a man who loves Great Britain, but who is not English. Of course, uh...I think that the main reason that Great Britain has not followed the same path is its historic ties with the United States, I believe.

BUT DO YOU BELIEVE...THAT...GREAT BRITAIN HAS SUFFERED FROM THAT, IN ITS OWN INDEPENDENCE?

Uh...I’ll answer your question indirectly: in the long term, the long term, Great Britain will have to choose... between... between its special ties with the United States and its membership in Europe, and I believe that...geography will win the day.

OKAY, LET ME GO BACK AGAIN TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 1960s. AT THAT TIME THERE WAS A PROPOSAL BY THE...NO, I'LL GO BACK EARLIER STILL. WHEN GENERAL DE GAULLE CAME TO POWER THERE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A YEAR OR TWO BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE AND PARTICULARLY DEFENSE MINISTER FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS HAD BEEN TALKING TO HIS FRENCH OPPOSITE NUMBERS ABOUT COOPERATION ON MANUFACTURE OF MODERN WEAPONS AND PERHAPS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS YOUR BELIEF THAT HIS IDEAS, AMBITIONS WERE AT THAT TIME?

I believe that, at that time, from the French side, uh...the end of the Fourth Republic, which was, ah...a weakened France... weakened by war, the Second World War...Weakened by the colonial conflicts in Indochina and Algeria, uh...That path was taken as a way to obtain resources, uh...financial resources to finance a very important and very costly program, which we knew would be very costly. I would say that it was a policy of easing that effort from the French side ... from the French Government of that era. From the standpoint of the German government, particularly Minister Strauss, I had the impression that it was a kind of dream. It wasn't really a well-designed project, not one that gave us impression that we could bring it to fruition. But that it was a kind of dream. And that explains, uh...Mr. Strauss’ fairly sad reactions when his dream was shattered. But I don’t believe that he could have transformed this dream into a reality. I don't think so. And he himself, uh...may have had some doubts about it.

AH, BUT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE PUT A VERY QUICK STOP TO...

Yes...

THOSE NEGOTIATIONS...

Uh, General de Gaulle cut them off immediately and abruptly. Not just quickly, but brutally. Uh... and he did it for two reasons. I would say that one reason was...the view General de Gaulle had about nuclear weapons... believed...he believed that we couldn't share them (the...the power in this area)...but, there was another reason which was foreign policy. General de Gaulle believed that...at that time, uh...the...the nuclear armament of the Federal Republic represented a great risk of war because...on this point, we knew uh...what the Soviet Union’s opinion was and even what it desired. The Soviet Union wasn't hiding the fact that it considered the nuclear arming of the Federal Republic a casus belli. And General de Gaulle didn't want to be an accomplice to such an affair.

NOW VERY EARLY IN HIS TIME, GENERAL DE GAULLE WROTE A FAMOUS LETTER TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WHICH SUGGESTED AN ENTENTE...

A kind of board... I would say. This was one...this also was an old dream for General de Gaulle. He had already had this dream during the War...with Churchill. I believe that, from this standpoint, he was quite close to Churchill. Like all great political leaders, there is in political action, particularly in tragic periods, uh, a way to escape from the tension. It's to dream of a better future. And I believe that General de Gaulle, like Churchill also...had this dream... of a kind of board of the great powers, uh... into which General de Gaulle had an ambition to bring France, uh, toward a kind of...moral judiciary uh...in the world...and from this standpoint, General de Gaulle considered that what was most useful in the organization of the United Nations, for example, was the Security Council. He never... General de Gaulle never changed on this point. He was, you know, very severe with the United Nations, since he called it the "machine." But there was one...one body, which he believed deserved real consideration. That was the Security Council and, in particular, the permanent members, the five permanent members of the Security Council. It was the same idea...but, in my opinion, uh... it was completely illusory to think that a...a kind of board of this type could constitute such a body ... and even it had been constituted as General de Gaulle proposed to General Eisenhower, it wouldn't have lasted very long...therefore, we mustn't have regrets.

BUT, HE DID ACTUALLY PROPOSE THAT HE... FRANCE SHOULD HAVE A VETO OVER THE USE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DID HE NOT? WHICH WAS A...

Yes...and... and...in effect. And after that, the fact that he ran up against a refusal was for him...a reason. In reality, a pretext...to build an independent French nuclear force. But, uh...I think that we can't have any regrets about that either, because I don't imagine that the United States could accept a right to inspect its nuclear weapons. That's not possible.

SO IT WASN'T A...IN A SENSE HE DIDN'T EXPECT THAT TO BE ACCEPTED.

I think that...he couldn't have believed that it would be accepted. But he certainly thought it was his duty to propose it.

THE LAST AREA THAT I WANT TO LOOK AT IS THE PROPOSITION OF THE MLF BY THE AMERICANS. IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION...WAS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THEN THAT THAT SCHEME WAS AIMED PRIMARILY AT DISCOURAGING THE FRENCH "FORCE DE FRAPPE"? OR AS, FOR EXAMPLE, ROBERT BOWIE HAS SAID TO ME, THAT IT WAS AIMED PRIMARILY AT STOPPING GERMAN AMBITIONS...OR CONTAINING GERMAN AMBITIONS.

I believe that...this idea...of the multi-lateral force...is technically a very bad idea......besides, it has never been implemented, which shows that it wasn't a good idea. I believe that the idea represented a dual political objective. First...to satisfy this German dream, which I was talking about a little while ago, to reach out uh...to nuclear detente and, at the same time...to discourage the...the development of the French strike force. I believe that there were in this project...both objectives...and, uh, from this point of view, it was a project that was politically very interesting to the United States. But technically, it was project that was absolutely unachievable, uh, and it must be said that it wasn't serious at all.

WERE YOU SURPRISED THAT PEOPLE LIKE GEORGE BALL KEPT PUSHING THIS THING FOR SO MANY YEARS?

Yes. I was a little surprised. I was a little surprised that...men as serious...as competent, were working for a project that, uh...technically, wouldn't work, and couldn't work. I was really very surprised because normally, uh...American political leaders are very realistic men, very pragmatic, as we say in France. And, uh, it's not like them to hang on to projects that aren’t realistic. I was quite amazed that American policy was focused so long on the project. And I believe that American policy was attached to it for so long because the Americans didn't have an alternative.

DO YOU THINK THAT FOREMOST IN THE GENERAL'S MIND, WHEN HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE "FORCE DE FRAPPE" AND ABOUT FRENCH PRESTIGE, WAS A SENSE OF A REAL DANGER FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR WAS IT MORE A GENERAL SENSE OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR...

My answer is that the second assumption is correct.... General de Gaulle believed there was no immediate threat from the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Moreover, that is what has been verified. But he believed that the history of France would not stop in the 1960s and that it would last a long time. And therefore, to deal with all the eventualities, all the dramas of history, because General de Gaulle had a tragic view of history...to him, as to most statesmen, history is tragic. And so,... General de Gaulle believed that, to get through this tragedy without succumbing, uh... France had to have all possible resources.... And one of those resources, one of the most powerful resources, was clearly a nuclear force.

OF COURSE YOU WERE PRESENT AT THE, THE FIRST TEST OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN THE SAHARA. WHAT WERE YOUR OWN...

No. I...I wasn't, uh...I was already Minister, but I wasn't present at the first test.

BUT...

I was present at several tests after that in the Sahara, and in particular at a three-day test before the Athens conference which you were discussing earlier. But I was then present at the first thermo test...a thermonuclear test, with General de Gaulle...in the Pacific. Uh...I attended a thermonuclear explosion along with General de Gaulle on board a warship...uh...off the coast of Mururoa.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION, AND WHAT WAS HIS REACTION...JUST TO THE SIGHT OF THAT?

Uh...the... General de Gaulle’s reaction... uh...which... uh... evolved about this affair, the...his first reaction on seeing that...mushroom cloud rise very high into the atmosphere, his first reaction—he said: "it's magnificent!" In reality, what he found magnificent was the success and it was...the...if I may say, the symbol of French military power that he saw. In actual fact, General de Gaulle always had a well thought out judgment about nuclear weapons...much more...much more pessimistic. General de Gaulle thought...always believed that nuclear weapons threatened the very existence of the world. And he even wrote this in his memoires for the period following the Hiroshima explosion. Uh, for me, my work as Minister was to give the greatest power, uh, nuclear power possible to France and...the more I... I achieved things in this area, the more content... and proud I was.

SO WHAT WERE...DID THE AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE GENERAL'S ATTITUDE TO NATO AND TO THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE?

I don't think so...I don't think so, I believe that...the American reaction, which was well expressed at that time by the American press... was to attribute these...this crisis, to... General de Gaulle’s bad temper, to his nationalism...but not to profound reasons. And it was very difficult for the Americans to understand, because...uh...the Americans had the impression that they had created a military system in NATO that worked well...military leaders love things that are well organized hierarchically, with someone at the top of the pyramid and lots of people at the bottom. And, uh...whoever, American or non-American, and here was France, because of General de Gaulle’s desire, breaking this good organization. Truly, the Americans, and I would even say very sincerely...uh...did not understand what was happening... and...and they never managed to grasp that there were reasons, and very strong reasons, for France to act that way. I would add that it was a kind of...of...of setback for American policy, because you have to know that it was a kind of failure in the eyes of the Americans...a failure of their policy in Europe. As a result, they couldn't accept it willingly. I believe that they didn't understand.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATION THAT YOU HAD WITH MCNAMARA, FOR INSTANCE?

Uh...Yes, with McNamara. Also with... General Norstad. And...clearly uh...they...they didn't understand the deep underlying reasons. They attributed this rupture on apparent reasons, meaning, General de Gaulle’s character and, uh...his taste for French nationalism. But, uh...it wasn't that. Of course, a man with less character than General de Gaulle would not have acted as he did. But, what shows that there was a serious reason... is the fact that never, since that period, has a single government in France considered moving backward, never. This is indeed the proof that there were deep reasons, deep national reasons.

LAST QUESTION. DO YOU THINK THAT AT THE TIME, IN THE FIFTIES AND THE 1960s, THAT THE QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE WERE PRIMARILY QUESTIONS OF SECURITY, OF THE SECURITY OF THE WEST VIS A VIS THE EAST..OR... WHICH IS THE WAY THAT AMERICANS ALWAYS TEND TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM, OR WERE THEY REALLY A QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE, OF SYMBOLS OF...OF NATIONALITY?

I would say that it was both...both answers are true. First, it was a...a security problem, that's certain. Security, perhaps more long-term than short-term. But, undeniably, the security problem seemed...easier to resolve thanks to nuclear weapons...than without nuclear weapons. But also, and we shouldn't hide it, it was a question of political prestige...and it wasn't by chance that the permanent members of the Security Council were also the first to acquire nuclear capability. There was, therefore, a conjunction between nuclear power and political prestige.