We'll eventually give you a signal...

That's very hard to [laughter]. All right.

It's as if I'm unclear, and I'd say, such and such and so on, we have this interview that we've done, Mr. Dutton is going to so forth and so on, answer my question almost immediately. Now.

All right, there was an expansiveness, a sense of confidence and, and capability at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. I think it was very much the American spirit uh, in a historical sense; lots of innocence to it. Uh, they could do, they, they could do things domestically, they could turn the country around from what they thought was the, the sluggishness of the late ‘50's. They could have an impact on ah the world. The problem, I think, was that uh, within that, that public projection of, of great uh, possibilities uh, there was a certain uh, oh, tightness, really.

President Kennedy had been deeply impressed and set back, in a psychological sense, by the narrowness of his victory uh, against Nixon. Uh, he was, there was more insecurity behind sort of the handsomeness and the sense of self-confidence that I think projected to the public. Uh, his two first appointments, Allen Dulles in the CIA and J. Edgar Hoover to the FBI, reappointments, really suggested the need for continuity, the uh, the fear of too much change.

So what you had was, was an outer layer of great uh, oh, expansiveness, of will, really, and innocence, and at the same time, a, a uh, inner core of uh, anxiety, insecurity, not being sure. And there's the tension between those two that I think had so much effect on Kennedy policies.

Just a moment.

The mood in the beginning of the Kennedy Administration was one of expansiveness, of, of a sense of will, of, of competence and self-confidence that they uh, could have an effect, they could make a difference uh, they could turn the country around uh, they could stand up to the Soviets and, and bring both peace and strength at the same time.

It was one of uh, a lack of sense of limits, to a great extent, that they, they did not really realize, or, and I'm speaking intuitively, as well as consciously, of that there were limitations on, on what could be achieved. The presidency was uh, open-ended uh, all possibilities were "go", and uh, I think that was, was really the, the main dynamic uh, particularly as, as projected to the uh, oh, to the rest of the world, and to our own society.

Cut! [Sirens] That's not going to work.

The mood at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration was one that uh, there could be a difference, there could be effect uh, we, we could turn the country around uh, we could bring to bear uh, the new ideas, the, the uh, new, oh, resources of people uh, uh, the whole liturgy, really, of the New Frontier, and, and uh, there was just a, a lack of a sense of limits, it was, it was a, possibilities were, were open-ended and almost endless.

Kennedy was certainly concerned about Communism; he had been a politician through the Cold War period; he had been a young man in World War II; he thought military strength was important, standing up to first to Germany and later to the Soviet Union. At the same time, I personally believe that uh, by the late 1950s he was beginning to move to think there were, there were other problems, Third World problems uh, uh, the Algerian uh, situation that he'd gotten involved in had really been the first time he had uh, reached uh, wide attention in, on foreign policy field, was, was both uh, illustrative, and, and I think important in the development of his own thinking.

So yes, he was, he was terribly concerned about anti-communism, but there was also a belief that uh, uh, he could do things in the Third World, he could do things with developing nations, uh, and it was a, it was a marriage of, of both uh, anti-communism, standing up to the Soviets, and trying to, oh, be helpful to societies uh, the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, a new foreign aid program. And it was, it was the marriage of anti-communism and, let's say, more liberal impulses beyond that, that uh, I think really was, was what was the departure point of, of his administration in 1961.

And how, how do you reconcile that with your image of him as a, as a cautious, conservative man?

Well, he was, let's say he was a...as a strategist or a conceptualizer, he was a, he thought historically. He, I think he was, may have been the last president we've really had that uh, got into that, was concerned, was self-conscious even about it. At the same time, within the man, the politician, the fairly conventional person, a man much more conservative than uh, he's been looked at uh, in subsequent hears with the evolution of Robert Kennedy and the positions of his, of his brother in politics now, he was, he was, he was back there much more cautious, ideologically and temperamentally.

And uh, Kennedy would, would uh, have, let's say, a, a grand concept, expressed in, in his inaugural address or uh American University speech, but at the same time, he was a, he was a very wary tactician, he, he was, he was afraid of over-involvement, and it was, there was the tension, again, between the sort of the large ideas, the hopeful spirit, and this, this much more, almost crabbed, internal tactical sense that, that uh [cough] conflicted uh, in, in what he was trying to do.

I think, I'll say in terms of Southeast Asia, that uh, he thought we should do things there, and yet he, he uh, he approached it very warily, and he would, he would, he would step up the uh, the involvement uh, very gradually, even though it, it had tremendous consequences beyond the immediate number of people there.

A preliminary point is that foreign policy has to be put in the context of the priorities of a President; it's always secondary to uh, domestic policy. Kennedy always was saying, telling Kenny O'Donnell, his Appointments Secretary, I want to get all these foreign visits, and all this foreign stuff uh, off my calendar. I'm not spending enough time with the Congress, I'm not getting enough done there, I'm not getting out around the country enough.

And then what he would find in the new crisis uh, would, would impinge upon his time, and pretty soon he was back uh, really giving predominant time to foreign policy. So the, the, the, no, the struggle for a president's time between domestic and foreign ah things is an almost daily fight within the White House and among the personalities there.

Uh, within the foreign policy area, certainly Kennedy was primarily, uh, a Europeanist uh, I might even say a globalist uh, uh, with the nuclear period, he was oriented primarily towards the Soviet danger in relationship. Something like Southeast Asia uh, very peripheral, in fact, in 1961, Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, had far more uh, oh, importance in his mind and in the amount of time that he gave.

Uh, Southeast Asia, kept uh, had the Laotian crisis, the beginning of the uh, the trips uh, to Saigon, and yet it was always peripheral vision, I think, on his part. Uh, when he shook up the State Department at the end of November, he uh, brought Averell Harriman to take over the Near East ah area and he really thought that he was moving it off of his desk and out of his mind and, and, and it was a faraway remote, ah, comparatively unimportant place in his own priorities.

We'll have to do the second part again because you said "Near East."

Oh, ya, ya, I just (laughs). No, that's what's on my mind. (Voices in background) Ya, I thought I said...I was aware of that.

The White House the presidency is always preoccupied primarily with the domestic politics. That's where they gain strength and, and maintain themselves. Ah, Kennedy was always concerned about the extent to which foreign leaders would take up his time. Foreign crises would move in and ah preoccupy him. He kept telling Kenny O'Donnell his appointment secretary told me on the domestic side that he, he wanted to get the foreign matters ah cleared of his calendar much more than we were doing.

Ah, but, it was not possible. You'd always have something new developing. Ah, a leader either insisting he had to come and talk with the new president or some, some problem blowing up abroad. Within the foreign policy area, which sh—should have been a minority one in terms of time taken with it, but was not, Kennedy was first of all a Europeanist, ah, a globalist, ah preoccupied ah with the Soviet ah danger and relationship in the nuclear period.

Ah, the Alliance for Progress and the western hemisphere were of primary importance to him and he gave great attention to it. Southeast Asia was ah quite s—secondary. Even, even almost ah at a lower ah level than that. He ah tried to ah dispose of it, brush it off to Averell Harriman when he put him in, ah as assistant Secretary ah for Southeast Asia. He, he did not want to get involved. He kept pushing, for example, in the Saigon trip, it was Walt Rostow not McGeorge Bundy who went there.

This was always a matter which, which was going to get the, the, the secondary attention. I don't think that he focused on it. I don't think it was as well understood. Ah, the Laotian crisis more an attempt really to move the problem out of, of consideration rather than really to have a ah major regional effect.

Southeast Asia was far down President Kennedy's list of priorities. After the domestic things, after almost all other areas of the world that he had tried to ah, assign the responsibility to Averell Harriman whom he respected and known a long time, and really move it off of his desk and get it over in the State Department and let him get on to what he thought were far larger and fundamental problems ah before him.

Focusing primarily on Southeast Asia, on Vietnam, for example, takes the problem out of the context that is seen in the White House. There you're looking at a number of different problems, almost every couple of hours. There may be ah four or five parts of the world moving in with tough ta, cables from our embassies or the foreign ministries, and all of those matters get considered there in a, in a, oh, not off-hand way, but a, but a, intense, short focus.

And, then, any one of the problems - Vietnam - you move out and, and consider ah in its own terms, as though it really has global significance. It, it, it is quite different from how it's handled in the White House by those people there. And, how it's handled in the real world.

Ah, I think that, for example, a president is not a, cannot really be a deep man. He has to be a man ah whose intuitions are good, his basic value system is correct. He's prepared to take expert advice and relate it all the time to all these other problems. The extent of American commitments abroad, the extent of, th, that our economy can, can bear, the, the burden of a, an increased ah commitment to ah let's say to Southeast Asia.

And, and the need to, to keep these problems, I like to say, in context, or in relationship to each other is, is terribly important and ah a book, a film ah a, a, national debate on a given major problem as Vietnam has been, fails to, to see it in, in both in its international relationships and in just the way the White House psychologically deals with it.

Cut. Let's do it once more.

A book or film which focuses entirely on one subject - Vietnam, Southeast Asia - has to be very careful that it ah does not give a, a preeminent importance to, to the immediate subject ah, that isn't in the real world. Kennedy, for example, in 1961 as he began to, to come to grips ah with the problem ah he was dealing with so many other matters.

First of all, this was, this was very incidental to him and I think that ah to, to think that Vietnam was primary in his mind, that he really was deeply into it, ah, fails to reflect ah, quite frankly, the, the lack of real time given to it. Or, or the extent of serious important, intense conversations that may be ah s—sandwiched between the Bay of Pigs and his meeting with Khrushchev in, in Vienna. Or, or the military buildup which occurred that fall or what was happening to the, the economy.

There are other matters that were weighing on him more and while he, he would try to come to grips seriously with this, our presidents ah in a certain sense are more superficialists, whether we like to admit that or not.

Okay. Cut.

Kennedy used in, on, in his attention to Southeast Asia those people really who were available and free from other jobs — to be specific: McGeorge Bundy as Head of the National Security Council was ah primarily attending to the Soviet and the European problems. Ah, Rostow was available as number 2 man there ah to go over to Saigon. Ah, all through this problem, I think, you will find that ah the people who were available, who were, were not really handling the, what Kennedy considered the, the overwhelming world problems.

Ah, it's an example of how Vietnam was so far down in his priorities, how much less important. Whether the, let's say these people were the best and the brightest, they, as that phrase has come to be known in our public language now ah yes, they were. If, by best and brightest, means those ah most full of self-confidence about solving problems and doing things. Ah, if it meant people who really were experts ah regional ah historical authorities on, on Southeast Asia, no, they were not.

Ah, what Rostow had really been ah concerned with ah Third World economic development ah and a number of other problems. This was not his specialty. This was nothing that he had any particular expertise ah with. Maxwell Taylor ah the same thing. He had concern ah in, in his book "The Uncertain Trumpet" about trying ah to get into ah Third World military situations, but ah he had been retired. He was brought back. What I'm saying is that I really think that the, the people who were on the front line of appointments and responsibilities were not ah the ones that were used to begin with on Southeast Asia.

Cut, please.

Well, the people who were assigned to the Southeast Asia problem ah were those who were most available. Ah. Who could be put on this assignment. The primary ones with responsibility, McGeorge Bundy head of the National Security Council staff was ah looking at the Soviet problem, Europe. Ah, and all, all through government,ah, the, the primary ones were tied down with, with the, with what we consider our main problems in the world.

Therefore, the people who were available were sent ah, or sometimes ah they, they had an interest and would emerge themselves. A good example, when I was in the State Department was Roger Hilsman. Roger had an interest in Asia previously. He had parachuted in at the end of World War II, ah was terribly concerned about this problem and, and he, he pressed his way to, to a position of some prominence ah whereas normally a person who's head of ah intelligence ah office in ah the State Department would not be ah getting into White House Staff meetings with the president. Ah, he would be feeding up through the Secretary of State ah who then ah went up.

But, Roger, both with the president, and then in contacts ah with the Congress was, was, ah, very far forward, very much out in front, and he illustrates again the, the, ah, somewhat the randomness of, of who emerges in these problems, who's available, who really has the intense interest, that there may be great experts ah specialists who ah know the economy and the society and the history of the area ah deeper down in the State Department or the CIA or elsewhere and they really do not come to bear on the, the political policymakers who are really making the key decisions in ah the whole process.

Can you contrast this with later on with Harriman is brought in? Harriman has much more access to the president and so forth.

Well, ah, yes, R...Harriman he, to begin with, did not have a Southeast Asia background himself. He had been a Soviet expert. Our Ambassador there. Long history in European interest, but he was the man who could ah supposedly shake up State, bring the best ah available to it.

There were problems even there. He worked well with, ah, the White House staff. As is generally known, he and ah Secretary Rusk had their differences. Rusk had a ah China, India, Burma theater background from World War II, and, even with Harriman in charge, there was, there was, there was a certain ah oh a splintering, or fragmenting of the, of the policy recommending process.

That gives the president ah choices, but it, it also causes quite a bit of static in the process and that was just another of, of the many ah, oh slippages in, in the operating day-to-day difficulties in the early stages of the Vietnam problem.

But do you think that bringing Harriman in on the problem signals ah, changing over from the second team to the first?

Yes, I do. I think there was an attempt by the president to ah, to get someone who really would take charge of the area. I don't think it means that the president himself really wants it moved into, into the middle of his desk too prominently. The, the, it was more that Averell Harriman has got this problem he's a, he's a sturdy long-time policymaker, knows the political ah aspects of it and he will take this one over and handle it. Even with Harriman, however, the problem continued to, to grow and sort of ah, eat up everybody ah who got involved in it.

Can you just do that last bit again cause you didn't include my question. You could just say bringing Harriman on does signal a change.

All right. Well, all right, bringing Harriman, ah, into responsibility for Southeast Asia certainly gave it new importance. Ah, it gave it someone that the president personally had confidence in, someone who had the clout to have effect, whether talking with the Defense Department or the White House Staff or within the State Department. Ah, Harriman was, was, ah, a number one man in, in the view of the president and everyone else and ah when, when he was given responsibility for it, it certainly meant that ah it was, it was ah upgraded in importance.

Cut.

Well, in the first year of the Kennedy Administration there were a number of factors which were toughening his position. Ah, to begin with at the personal level, Senator Kennedy had a, or President Kennedy...Let's start over.

Start again.

(Chuckle) I was thinking back in the ‘50's. Ah...There were a number of factors in ah 1961 which were ah leading President Kennedy to toughen his positions ah internationally, with, with Southeast Asia, just one, one ah example of that. Ah, you had the Bay of Pigs failure in which he had to react and show strength. He was trying to prove that he was not a callow, inexperienced young president. You have the meeting that he had in Vienna with uh, Khrushchev, who lectured him as though he were a schoolboy. He immediately came back from that and called for a big military buildup ah in our own terms.

Ah. There was the development of the Green Beret ah exercise for counterinsurgency. Ah, you had a man here who ah had a certain inclination to, to macho ah to begin with, and everything in his first year of the presidency really ah told him to ah be bolder, ah be tougher. I, I think that's not just him. I think that's one of America's problems, if I can generalize is, is, is there's a need to be, to show we're tough whether it really is desirable or not.

In any event, ah that was certainly the profile that first year. How much that really ah affected what he did in Southeast Asia, I'm not sure of myself. I think that it ha, it had some effect but I, I am not sure that Southeast Asia at that stage was not considered too incidental. That's not an apology ah for the Kennedy period. I'm just suggesting that it ah, ah, it was ah, it was not really focused on. Th—The inattention, the, the inadequacy of real ah careful close intense prolonged scrutiny of a problem like Southeast Asia ah is what leads ah, what can really be a, a problem over and on, on the edge of a president's attention suddenly...coming in on him with far more importance that he ever realized cause he didn't see it until it was ah, until it had already grown into a very large and, and, and ah not terribly handleable problem.

Well, certainly one pressure operating on President Kennedy in this period was the need to prove that he was not soft on communism. This is always a pressure ah worse on Democratic administrations and ah particularly ah after the ah McCarthy period and the Cold War of the 1950's. I think by the early ‘60's that had ah was somewhat ah less intense and, as, as a pressure, but ah it certainly was there.

It was, you could see it in terms of Southeast Asia. You could see it in terms of ah the Soviet relationship, Castro in, in the Caribbean. Ah, there was need to prove that ah he was, he was standing up to communism wherever it came along, and that we were not going to lose a, another part of the world ah as we, supposedly, had lost China.

And, I, I think, that this, however, in my opinion, has an unfortunate constant in American politics. That ah, there, there are certain things that ah hedge politicians in, in certain things that ah hedge politicians in, in our society and one is they have to be tough and two, they have to be anti-communist, then they have to be idealistic, then they have to be pragmatic, and after you say those four things, you've got a lot of conflicts going.

Let's keep rolling. An easy question. What was the appeal of counterinsurgency to the Kennedys and also to the American people at this time?

Well, counterinsurgency and the Green Berets were, were a ah they made good television. Ah, they ah it was rather personalized, small enough scale to be understood. Ah, a lot of macho. Ah. It was a dramatization. Ah. It, it handled things both in the Kennedys' personality and it also handled things that, that we Americans, we're, I would say we're more engineers than scientists. We're more, we're good gimmickers rather than ah, oh historical conceptualists, and ah the Green Beret sort of fit in at, at the, the, the turning of the screw.

Well, I think there needs to be more recognition of, of the extent to which ah our politics and policy in the Kennedy period... Yeah.

The mike just a hair higher. The mike- higher.

There you go. Begin again.

Yeah. Well, I think there needs, it needs to be recognized that ah...politics and policymaking is, is so much adding on to what's already gone before. A president is really not that free of, of historical ah, continuity. Kennedy could not make too much of a break with Eisenhower, particularly in terms of the world where he had been only a senator. He was, ah, he, perceived as a young man. Eisenhower had been a world figure.

He, he, w—could make certain changes, but he, he felt that he was in more of a gradualism ah more of ah adding on ah, ah to what had gone before. And, that would particularly apply to what was perceived as a, a secondary ah problem, in an area like Southeast Asia.

I, to speak more broadly though, I just think that in terms of the Vietnam problem or ah most things that the president comes to bear on, ah the, the ah inattention, the, the, the limited ah views, the lack of the most informed people being there. These decisions which we think are so consequential we look on, read, read the newspapers, young men go out to die for, in Washington ah really are, are done ah with far less competence and insight than anybody begins to think and, and Vietnam is classic ah, example number one in the last twenty years on that.

Cut. Terrific. One more shot.

Why, why was Lodge chosen is the question...

The selection of...I'm sorry.

Well the selection of Lodge illustrates how presidential appoints are so often made. He was a Republican, he was already ah in a sense over the hill, politically or as a national figure, ah he was a safe appointment to make and at the same time ah, President Kennedy could look like he was being bipartisan picking an, an experienced older man.

Uh, Kennedy, it, it was a "Heads, he won, tails, he couldn't lose" that if the problem worked out, fine, the president of the United States could take credit for it, if the problem didn't work out right, well he turned to a distinguished member of the opposition party to go out there and, and handle it. Uh, it was a safe appointment even if not maybe a particularly brilliant one.

Cut, that is fine. Think we should shoot just run...

I gotta go.

You're right. Marilyn is sitting out there.