FIRST OF ALL, CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THE PLANS WERE WHICH LED TO THIS REQUEST FOR VERY LARGE NUMBERS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN THE VERY EARLY 1950s.

Well, after the crisis which took place in Europe in the, between the '47 and '49 with the events of Czechoslovakia, for instance the idea was to organize a system of defense of Western nations, which was a copy of the system of defense we had in 1939. It was a continuation of enough conventional forces going to the, toward the East to protect as far as is to possible Western nations. And to do that we need many, many divisions, some 90 divisions and some 20,000 air craft some coming from America, obviously from England. When such a plan was shown to the Minister of Finance in Lisbon, they said that Europe could not afford this. We were in a period of recovery we were entering a cold war, and it was impossible to support such a force for a very long period of time, probably. Then a new strategy had to be adopted. This is why General Norstad and General Gruenther, in charge of NATO, decide to set up a group of four colonels, which were the high colonels, with a British colonel, MacDonald, two Americans Goodpaster and Richardson, and the French -- I was the French -- to prepare a new strategy, which was, which was based on the following idea-

I WANT TO STOP YOU HERE SO I CAN USE THIS PIECE SEPARATELY. WHAT WAS THE NEW STRATEGY?

The new strategy was based on the following idea: (a) we were in a defense posture. Hence, we were occupying the territory, which wasn't the case of the other side. Consequently, we could equip the territory, and that territory in central Europe was Western Germany. We could install depots of ammunitions, depots of fuel; we could use the network of roads, of, to have strips for takeoff and landing of the aircraft; we could transform Germany, in a sort of large surface Siegfried-

I DON'T KNOW IF PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT.

Well, instead of having a line Siegfried, a line of fortress, we would equip all the German territory in such a way that we could maneuver very light forces without any supplies with them, because they would find the supplies buried in the ground. And such a strategy could be implemented with approximately one-tenth of the forces which were previously allocated to the first plan, purely conventional plan.

CAN I ASK YOU, I MEAN, SURELY THE BIG DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE SECOND PLAN RELIED MUCH MORE HEAVILY ON THE USE OF TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS.

Yes.

COULD YOU MAKE THAT CLEAR FOR US?

Yes, the idea was to have small units, each one of some 3,000 men in permanent mobility in Western Germany, and having short-range and medium-range atomic weapons. To strike at the enemy should the enemy start a breakthrough. With this system, we, the planning was that we could resist during... three days, no more, as an organized resistance. But at that time, we were hoping that the action of the American strategic forces, striking Russia at her very... heart, would stop their action in the front line. The idea was to develop a system not very costly with probably ten times more... ten times less men, aircraft and weapons, than the previous one, and capable to withstand the Russian attack, during three days.

SO THE PROPOSITION WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE A USE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE A VERY DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT, PARTICULARLY IN GERMANY, JUST FOR THE SAKE OF A THREE-DAY DEFENSE?

Yes we thought that such a system, which we could afford, financially speaking, would be sufficient to deter any aggression. Remember that at the same period, Mr. Foster Dulles' talk about the decide that in Europe atomic weapons would be used from the onset of any serious... attack. Then, our system was supposed to be a good deterrent for such a policy, which was a declaratory policy, but which belonged to the general policy of general deterrence.

WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF EUROPEAN POLITICIANS AND OTHER EUROPEAN MILITARY PEOPLE WHEN YOU SHOWED THE RESULTS OF THIS WORK?

We weren't, we were... General Norstad gave us its his C-54 aircraft engine, and we went to Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Greece, Germany, England Italy, to explain our strategy. We had some skepticism from the staff; the French were very pleased with such a system, because it seems to us that it was a practical and a rational one, taking into account the scarcity of our means. The Americans were pleased, except the American Navy. Because the navy said, if you have to resist for three days with the previous strategy we're supposed to be present, on the coast end of Europe, 30 days after the beginning of the fight. If you stop three days, what are we going to do? What will be our role? But these are minor incidents. Finally we carried the strategy in a very big book, which was SHAPE 345, full of information including the amount and number of weapons we would launched, but these books... were cosmic top-secret; every page was stamped. Hence I think that in many countries, they were so impressed by such a book, and by the ceremony of when we deliver it, that they put the book in a safe, without reading it. This is why... next year when we have the... general meeting of NATO nations in Paris, everybody... agrees. Everybody said that the strategy was a sound, was a good one. Except the Germans. The Germans, probably more serious than the others, read the book, and decide that the book was very bad for them, because it was transforming their country in a battlefield. And with atomic weapons. Then they began to oppose. They were just entering NATO. And their whole position was [mild] because they didn't dare to go too far. But we understood that such a concept was not pleasant to their eyes. And in 1960 –

LET ME STOP YOU THERE, BECAUSE THERE'S MANY YEARS IN BETWEEN 1960 AND 1956. THE GERMAN OBJECTIONS WERE OVERRULED, AND WITHIN A VERY FEW YEARS, THEY BECAME MORE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL, DID THEY NOT?

I would say that the Germans were never very pleased with such a concept, including when Strauss was in charge of Atomic Energy Commission, Germany, and when he became Minister of Defense. I must say that a new element was entering the picture. The Russians were deploying their first SS-4s, SS-5s. And to answer such a, such a new threat, Americans decided to install in Europe, in 1957, Thor and Jupiters. They were deployed in England, in Italy, and in Turkey. The Germans refused, and the French also. And that was an answer to the Russian deployment of SS-4, SS-5. And happily for us, Mr. Kennedy, after the crisis of Cuba, decided to withdraw those weapons. And because of this withdrawal, we had many years later, the Euromissile crisis.

WELL, AFTER ALL, THEY WERE VERY VULNERABLE, AND TOTALLY OBSOLETE...

No, they were not, no; all the weapons at that time were vulnerable. But, you see, the trick –

WELL, THAT ISN'T THE CASE.

The trick of the Americans were, the following was said: We would replace them by submarines at the Mediterranean, which are not so vulnerable. But the role of these weapons was to oblige the Russians to kill American soldiers that, by destroying these weapons. And that was deterrent in itself. On the contrary as they could not hit the submarines the Americans would have to start first, by launching atomic weapons to protect Turkey, for instance.

CAN I GO BACK? I THINK WE'RE JUMPING TOO FAR FORWARD. IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THAT THE GERMANS, UNDER STRAUSS AS DEFENSE MINISTER, BECAME MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN THE '60s?

Yes, the Germans was were confident on the Dulles doctrine, which was that Americans would use atomic weapons from the onset, and not delay their reaction. Hence, they were not so pleased with the concept of flexible response, although I would say that the military maybe the ground forces, were more interested by flexible response, because their role will be, would be increased. You have always to take into account the interest of the services.

AND THE ROLE OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE WAS –

The same. Their role was the German Air Force... was emphasized by flexible response, and the fact to rely more on conventional weapons and to use atomic weapons in the last extremity, as a sort of spasm. If we were unable to contain the Russian forces with purely conventional means.

LET ME GO BACK TO THIS PERIOD IN THE MIDDLE '50s... APART FROM YOUR WORK WITH SHAPE AND THE SHAPE PLANNING, YOU WERE ENGAGED IN A FAIRLY CONCENTRATED CAMPAIGN TO PERSUADE PEOPLE IN FRANCE THAT FRANCE NEEDED ITS OWN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES?

Yes, I began by campaigning, the beginning of the '50s. I was at that time assistant to Mr. Pleven, Minister of Defense, and it was not difficult to persuade him that we should do something in the field of having our own atomic weapons. The same campaign with Mr. Felix Gaillard was in charge of the Atomic Energy Commission. And all were in favor of doing something. But we had political problems, as you know; we are changing frequency of cabinets, every six months; so it was very difficult to have a an organized action. So in between 1950 and 1956, my role was to try to persuade the political figure of necessity to enter the atomic club. Which I did with several people like Pleven, like Mr. Kimolay, Mr. Pisanik, like Mr. Paliski...

LET ME ASK YOU FIRST, WHY DID YOU BELIEVE IT WAS SO NECESSARY FOR FRANCE TO HAVE ITS-

Oh, very simple. I was a witness of the collapse of France in 1940. I was a witness of the fact that during the Third Republic, our governments were there for a few weeks, a few weeks, a few months, sometimes a few days, and that instability of the government was something very dangerous. And also the collapse of France, the fact that in a hundred years, a hundred and thirty years, we were invaded for the fifth time, gave to some of us the idea of what we should exploit: all the capabilities of new technologies to give the French the capability to deter an enemy or to avoid to be, to enter a war, if we could. And to me... it was clear that few atomic weapons, few atomic weapons, that is something which would be at reach of the medium-size power, would be sufficient to deter a much stronger adversary. Because we would be capable to inflict upon him a quantity of damages which would exceed our own value., That was the idea of proportional deterrence, which was advocated already in the beginning of the '50s.

COULD YOU JUST EXPLAIN THAT IDEA A LITTLE BIT MORE?

Yes. We are a medium-sized power, not a great power, like America or Russia. Hence logically any enemy cannot take too many risks, to take over such a modest prey. Hence, if we are capable to inflict upon such an enemy enough damages, corresponding to the relatively small value that we may represent to his eyes, then we would be safe and he would do something else than attacking us, because the cost of such an attack would be excessive compared to the benefits of such an attack.

NOW, APART FROM THIS IDEA, OF COURSE YOU WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE GROWING LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN DETERRENCE, WERE YOU NOT? CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY THAT WAS?

Yes. That took place within SHAPE. In that, in 1955... I addressed myself to my boss, General Norstad, to tell him that for the time being, America was out of reach. No ballistic missile of great dis--, of great range, of long range were existing. Hence, sanguinity of America was total, and we were confident. But, I said to him, in the future, when the scientists are going to increase the range of the first ballistic missiles, then America will be on the front line, as we are ourselves. And then the strategy of America vis-a-vis Europe will change. We have to be cautious about that change, and we have to find a substitute to the fact that you are going to diminish your commitments in Europe because, for you, the dangers are going to be too great. And, I add to him that because of the damages which may be inflicted by an atomic war it is difficult for a country such as France to ask for protection. To beg for protection, because we would oblige the Americans to take too many risks. So we should find something ourselves. And I showed to him a chart. Which I have prepared for SHAPE. The aim of the chart was to explain to General Norstad –

SO YOU EXPLAINED THIS PROBLEM OF THE GROWING RISK...

Yes, in the, in the mid-'50s, I was concerned about the improvements of the first ballistic missiles. In the '50s, mid-'50s they could not reach America. But it was obvious that in a certain delay of, certain... many years these weapons would hit American soil. And then American strategy would change. And to explain my concern, I prepare a chart... which I showed to my boss, to General Norstad. This is a presentation of the chart. And my idea was to explain to him that the American risk was increasing with time. With the advent of new weapons, such, mainly, as long-range ballistic missiles, in the period which, at that time, I thought it was '65. We were in the -- '56. We had nine years to take... into account the consequence of the improvements. And my point was that as soon as America would be on the front line as we were already, they would change their strategy. Then, my country, and possibly other countries of Europe, had to find a substitute for a North American commitment The defense of Europe was non-conditional before, and they may be con-, conditional later.

WHAT YOU MEAN BY THAT IS–

... the fact that the American were fully committed, before '60.

TO USING THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR –

To, to use atomic weapons to protect Europe.

COULD YOU JUST SAY THAT AGAIN FOR US?

Before 1960, when the American were out of reach, of reach, we had no doubt in our minds that they would use atomic weapons from the onset of any serious attack against any country of Europe, because they were out of reach themselves. The risks were, risks were small, after all. But, it was easy to foresee that ten years later, the situation would change and that America being the first lines, in the same position vis-a-vis the enemy than Europe, they would change their strategy, and try to reduce the atomic commitments. Hence, we had to find a substitute, and General Norstad agrees. He said to me that was probably what was going to take place, and he said you should inform your government. This is why I ask the permission to take some charts from the safe home into the English one, and to go with such a chart and some others, to see my prime minister. It was a Socialist prime minister, Mr. Guy Mollet. I saw him between 11:00 in the night to 3:00 in the morning, and we had a long talk, during which I explained the changement of strategy which was likely to take place, and he said to me, he began... begin, the beginning was, he said to me the following sentence, which was very amusing: he said, "My last political campaign was on three topics: one the peace in Algeria; two, the reduction of taxes; and three, disarmament. I am making war in Algeria. To wage war in Algeria I have to increase the taxes, and you want that I give atomic weapons to the French armament -- the atomic weapons, the French weapons. And forget... my plea for disarmament." I said "Mr. President, you have fooled the French... on two points. The third one seems to be much more important." And then he said to me "Yes. It's not you.... which is going to face the electors.", Well, I said, "Mr. President I have not, I am a military man, but according to what you just said to me, I think that your political career is finished. Why not to do something very important for the future?" And he said to me, "You are right. We shall ring the Minister of Defense, Mr. Bourgès-Maunoury, and we are going to see him at once, to talk to him about your findings at SHAPE." Which I did. And in July '56, a council of defense took place, in which there, during three or four hours, I have the possibility to explain... with 20 or 40 charts all the new concepts which were studied at SHAPE. And the decision to announce to the public... that the French would develop their own atomic weapons was taken, and announced that very month of July. I must say that the... what took place in Egypt, over the canal, was a great help. Hence in December, '56 –

PERHAPS YOU COULD TELL US WHY.

Well, for the first time the American, uh—

LET'S START AGAIN...

Yes. You see that in 19 July '56 the Suez Canal was nationalized. An operation was organized –

WE CAN ASSUME THAT WE KNOW THAT – I'M INTERESTED IN THE REACTION OF THE FRENCH.

And during that expedition... we had a sort of common action between the Americans and the Soviets to prevent us to carry on our attack. And that had a very profound, very deep impact on the French mentality. For the first time, a crack in the alliance was visible, and we had also the feeling that the Soviets, helping the Egyptians, were turning NATO by the [thoughts]. And during the budgetary debates, in December, '56, the whole Assembly, excluding the communists were in favor of French having atomic weapons. Including the socialists. That was a great help for the future. And this is why, in March '57, the decision was taken to build a factory to separate isotopes of uranium, and to have enriched uranium to prepare a thermonuclear weapons. In '57.

SO YOU THINK THE FRENCH FELT VERY LET DOWN BY THE AMERICANS, THEY FELT BITTER.

The French were very bitter to see, very furious to see that the American naval forces tried to interrupt our action from Cyprus to coastline of Egypt. And if you add to that the [bullying] statements, telling us what would be your reaction if I was bombing London and Paris as you are bombing Suez or Port Said, we had the feeling that the two big nations were, had found a common aim against us.

NOW, YOU ALSO TALKED TO GENERAL DE GAULLE ABOUT THESE IDEAS OF YOURS. COULD YOU TELL US BRIEFLY ABOUT THAT MEETING?

A few, a few days later, General Norstad told me that I mean, three days later my interview my meeting with the Prime Minister, General Norstad told me that I should see General de Gaulle. I said, "General de Gaulle is not in power; I am not a politician, but I think he would never return to the, to power -- General de Gaulle is a man of tanks, and probably not ready to... accept such a strategy which is changing everything, so I may waste my time." And Norstad said, "No, you are completely wrong; I read the translation of his book; General de Gaulle is a great strategist, and you have to tell him what we are doing." So, I said, "Sir, alright; may I take from the safe home some charts?" He said so; I had, I got an MP to protect... this charts, and I went to see General de Gaulle to the Hotel [La Perousse], where every Wednesday evening he was receiving some friends. My appointment was at half-past nine, and I stayed with him until two or three o' clock in the morning. Showing... to him some 40 charts, and explaining the work we are doing at SHAPE by preparing a completely new strategy. And I was very surprised that after a few ... probably two hours of speech, General de Gaulle began to talk, finally to talk.... in a loud voice, thinking loudly, I would say; and he was understanding everything which was explained to him, and not only that, but he was using the same slang, the same language as, language that we were using... within our group of colonels, because when you have to prepare a new strategy, very revolutionary, you always invent new words. And General de Gaulle was very impressing, because he was using the same type of vo-, vocabulary. For instance, he said to me that it is not necessary to have the same number of weapons than the other side; what is mandatory is to be capable to "arrachet," he said –

TEAR OFF.

-- To "tear off" one arm. And we said that it was sufficient to cut one hand. Similar. Then after two o'clock in the morning he said to me that it was late and I should take some rest. And as we are both alone -- the MP was downstairs -- he took to me he.... he brought the charts, which were very heavy probably 40 pounds, to the lift with me. Happily he was told to lower my arms, so he opened the door of the lift -- it was a, an old lift -- and put my charts in, and he said to me, "Look Gallois, you should take some rest now; in the future, I shall take care of your career." So I went back home I said to my wife that I had just left Louis the 14th, and that I was written on his list.

SO YOU HAD SOME ADMIRATION FOR HIM AFTER THAT.

I always had a lot of admiration for him, because I was in England during the duration, in the war, already I was in the Royal Air Force, but General de Gaulle was in a way my boss; and I always had a great admiration for what he read what he wrote; I had all his books, and--

PERHAPS I COULD ASK YOU THIS: DO YOU THINK THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ATOMIC NUCLEAR FORCE WITHOUT DE GAULLE, AND WOULD IT HAVE BEEN THE SAME?

Yes, but a very different one... We may have had, without General de Gaulle, a very different atomic force. Because when I talked to Mr. Guy Mollet, the idea of the socialist prime minister, was to develop an atomic weapon in France, and to give such an atomic force to the pool of European nations. To increase the strengths of the European defense. Not at all on a national basis. General de Gaulle transformed it into the weapon of a nation, French nation, having in mind that these weapons of the effects of these weapons are so terrible, that you cannot share their use, and that only a nation may decide to use them, to use them, should this nation be in a very great danger. And... General de Gaulle and I support the idea; I think that, thought that atomic weapons could not be the weapons of a military alliance. But, just the weapon of a nation in a... desperate situation. Using such a weapon as a last spasm; accepting to die standing instead of, instead of dying laying. It was really a last resort weapon, and... you cannot, you cannot share such a weapon with another state.

NOW, THAT MAY BE TRUE OF THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS, BUT OF COURSE AT SHAPE THERE HAD BEEN FOR SOME YEARS A PHILOSOPHY THAT LOOKED ON MUCH SMALLER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WEAPONS LIKE ANY OTHER, FOR FIGHTING WARS.

The strategic weapons which we had in mind to develop in France were accompanied... I would say, I would say by a large number of so-called tactical weapons: shorter range, and sometimes smaller yield. These weapons were deployed by the Americans in Europe in great numbers, reaching, I think, the figure of 7,000. They were exceeding by far any military need, naturally. But I think that this deployment was to deter the Soviets from any military action, and also to discourage the Soviets by imitating the Americans. Such a last idea was hung. Because now –

I JUST WANT TO ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT THAT. DID NOT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE PLANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THESE LARGE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS WORRY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO SIMPLY IMITATE THEM AND WOULD CATCH UP AND DEPLOY THE SAME NUMBERS?

In the... end of the '60, in the end of the '50s, beginning of '60s, when these weapons were deployed... several ideas were in the mind of the responsible people. First it was... one way to reduce the strategic commitments of the Americans, and to replace it by a, an atomic force, used locally, without figuring an atomic exchange from Russia to America and America to Russia. Two, the idea was to give an insurance to the Allies, to the Allies because some were anxious about the consequences of the new strategy of flexible response. Delaying the moment where atomic weapons will be used, and three, the third idea was to discourage the Soviets, to imitate what the American might is capable to do, in the field of armament. We thought at that time that the ... economy of the Soviets was in such a situation that they could not afford to deploy as many weapons. And there is another idea which is also hung; it is that... reasoning by analogy with the past, we thought that the nation or the coalition having more weapons than the other one is by nature victorious. That was the sort of permanent souvenir of the last wars, where numbers were decisive sometimes. For all these reasons, we... deploy some 7,000 relatively low-yield and short-range atomic weapons, which are now withdrawn because obviously they exceed by far the targets which we, which would be destroyed in Western Europe or in Eastern Europe.

SO IF YOU COULD JUST EXPLAIN TO ME ONCE AGAIN THE IDEA THAT IT WAS NOT THOUGHT AT THAT TIME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE UNITED STATES. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT IDEA FOR ME AGAIN?

In the beginning of '60s the economy of the Soviets was a bad situation, as it is still now; and we thought that Russia could not follow the Americans on the deployment of a great number of sophisticated weapons. And consequently, we thought that by deploying 7,000 small... atomic weapons, short-range atomic weapons, we would discourage any attempt to follow to follow us in the same direction, and we would neutralize very easily their superiority in conventional forces. Then it was logical to do that. Today obviously we have realized that targets are not so numerous, and that we don't need so many weapons to deter. But this is why we have withdrawn. Some of these weapons are supposed to be obsolete or so. And they are certain...a number of them are replaced by Pershing II and cruise missiles, which are supposed to be more efficient.

DO YOU PERSONALLY THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY TIME THAT THESE WEAPONS, THE ARTILLERY SHELLS, THE SHORT-RANGE "HONEST JOHN" MISSILES FOR EXAMPLE, COULD BE USED ON A BATTLEFIELD WITHOUT THAT ESCALATING TO ATOMIC WARFARE OR STRATEGIC WARFARE?

I don't think so. I think they may be used in the battlefield, and they would their role was to prevent any enemy concentration. Because with conventional weapons, you can't at the same time reach a certain power of fire and be dispersed. If you are dispersed to avoid the "Honest John" weapons, for instance, your military strength is reduced. This is, that was the role of these weapons. But, obviously, we under-, we thought that should the Allies use these weapons, the Russians would retaliate in kind. Probably with strategic weapons against Europe then I don't think we could contain at a tactical level, an exchange of atomic weapons of that sort, except, if very few are used, and if because the panic of the population, the population are going to impose upon the governments an immediate negotiation, which is probably what would take place.

WHAT WAS THE REACTION, YOUR OWN REACTION, TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BY ROBERT MCNAMARA AND HIS PEOPLE?

Oh, I must say that I was –

COULD YOU LOOK AT ME A LITTLE BIT MORE?

I was against the formulation of the flexible-response strategy, from the very beginning, and I wrote books and papers, articles, delivering conferences against. To my mind, such a strategy was a strategy which was developed by economist, which... are now transformed, which are now in the strategic world, the strategic business, because they are, because of the luck of the situation, is their own discipline. But it's not a military strategy at all. Because such a strategy may work with the cooperation of the Russians. And in it's very difficult to ask a Russian to cooperate to their own defeat, then –

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

Well, it's very simple. Could you imagine the Soviets taking the enormous risk to start a war in Europe and accepting, by the same token, to lose such a war? If they start a war in Europe against industrialized countries, it will be to win. It will be after a proper preparation, and using all necessary weapons, to win. Should they meet some resistance of our conventional forces, they would pay the price to overcome such a resistance, and if such a price is not sufficient, they would use all the weapons they have, including the most terrible, to achieve victory. I can't imagine the Soviets starting something, and because... of our resistance turning back, and sending telegram of excuse, to the European capitals. I can't imagine that. This is the basis of the flexible-response strategy. This is why I am against... naturally General de Gaulle was opposed.

SO, DO YOU THINK THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING WAS THAT MCNAMARA, BECAUSE OF HIS FEAR OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES, WAS PUTTING TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE, ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER DETERRENCE FAILED, AND NOT ENOUGH ON MAKING SURE THAT DETERRENCE DID NOT FAIL?

The hope of Mr. McNamara when he adopted the flexible response concept was that we should defend Europe with conventional means, without the use of strategic atomic weapons, and even without the use of so-called tactical weapons, and that after a conventional exchange, the public opinion would impose upon the belligerents a negotiation. And then such a war would be terminated by a negotiation without escalating into a nuclear war. That concept may be wise, when you are 5,000 kilometers away. But when you are in Europe, you know very well that such a negotiation would be solved at our own expenses, and that we would lose something. This is why in Europe we could not accept such a concept. And this is why the French refused to accept flexible response, as long as they stayed in NATO. That is, until 1966.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE BIG DIFFERENCE IS THAT MCNAMARA WAS ALWAYS TALKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN AVOID A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ONCE A WAR STARTS, WHEREAS EUROPE WAS ALWAYS THINKING, HOW CAN WE STOP A WAR STARTING?

Europe... what would be safe for the European would be to deter the Soviets from any hostile action, from the very beginning and, to a certain extent, to refuse even the idea of a combat. While, in the American sense... the combat with the Soviets, to a certain level of violence, was acceptable, because it would wind up on a negotiation. This something we could not accept. And now, taking into account the asymmetry of situation, between the Soviet army and the Western armies, taking into account the asymmetry of the way of life of the two societies, I am more pessimistic than I was 20 years ago. I think that we cannot even accept idea of the war, because we would lack the warriors. So we need to possess enough... sophisticate weapons to intimidate the other side and to avoid any form of war with him. Because we would not have the possibility to fight such a war. On the level of conventional weapons as well as the level of atomic weapons.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OF A MULTILATERAL FORCE? YOU HAVE A STORY, I THINK, ABOUT DE GAULLE AND THAT, OR NORSTAD.

If you, as you know, in the beginning of '60s to avoid protests from the Europeans, which were not satisfied with the flexible response strategy the State Department decide to propose the Allies a sort of Allied combined force of submarines, in which the crews will be...multinationals. When the proposal was made my other boss, Field Marshall Montgomery, said to me, "Yes, Pete, it's a good idea. But, two conditions: the captain officer, on board of these ships, should be British, and the cook, French. Owing to this condition, I am for." A few days later, General Norstad told me, "Look, you should tell your government that this idea is stupid." And he used the following words, he said, "You should tell General de Gaulle that the multilateral force, it's, it's a multilateral farce." So I asked the permission to see General de Gaulle. Now, de Gaulle, I saw him, and I said, "On behalf of General Norstad, I must tell you, sir, that the multi-, multilateral force may be a multilateral farce." And he said to me, "Tell General Norstad that it is a... since many months I know it." And I said, "May I write this in the press, to help you?" He said, "You may." And two days later in the French La Transition, which was published at that time, there was a title on eight columns: "La Farce Multilateral." The multilateral farce. And the ideas were, the idea was rapidly buried. Forgotten.

THE AMERICANS WENT ON PUSHING THAT FOR NEARLY FIVE YEARS. WHY DO YOU THINK THEY PUSHED IT SO LONG, WHEN NO ONE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS A MILITARILY FEASIBLE IDEA?

I think that they were I think the Americans were trying to find a substitute to the fragility of the flexible response concept. And by allocating to the Europeans six certain submarines, with their know-how, with atomic weapons on board, and these ships being manned by the collectivity of NATO nations, they were giving a sort of reinsurance to the Europeans concerning their commitments. But naturally the captain of each ship was American, and was receiving orders only from the White House.

WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE FRENCH, IN WITHDRAWING FROM NATO IN THE MID-'60s, WERE ESSENTIALLY STILL RELIANT ON NATO AND THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, THAT WITHOUT UNITED STATES TROOPS IN GERMANY, FOR EXAMPLE, FRANCE WOULD BE MUCH MORE VULNERABLE. SO THEY WERE PROFITING FROM THE PROTECTION OF NATO, BUT THEY WERE NOT PAYING THE COST.

In the, in the beginning of '60s with General de Gaulle at the hem, at the helm, we had a sort of realpolitik. Even in military matters. We knew that we had [a glace] the German territory, and we knew that we had an atomic umbrella, with the American commitments, even if these commitments were fading. Fading. General de Gaulle decide to withdraw from NATO for several reasons. One was ... the fact that when he proposed, in September '58 –

I DON'T THINK WE'RE GOING TO HAVE ALL THOSE. WE'LL EXPLAIN THEM ELSEWHERE. BUT WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THOSE AMERICANS WHO SAY THAT BASICALLY THE FRENCH WERE PROFITING FROM OUR PROTECTION, THEY WERE PROFITING FROM THE EFFORTS OF THE GERMANS AND THE BRITISH AND THE DUTCH AND THE BELGIANS, BUT THEY WEREN'T PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING THEMSELVES?

The French were having a sort of realpolitik; they knew that they were protected by the [glace] of partners; but, they were made of the alliance, and they maintained conventional troops in Germany. Hence they were still fighting with the other men of the alliance, in case of danger. But, the French refused to be involved in an atomic conflict if they were not in involved in such a conflict by the action of the other side. In 1959, de Gaulle said that in the future, if we are to fight a war, it will be our war. It won't, it then we have to have the necessary weapons to deter a... stronger power to attack us and if we are ready to help our allies, it will be certain, within certain limits. Mainly conventional limits.

SO WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO THE CRITICISM? THE GERMANS CANNOT DO THE SAME. THEY CANNOT GIVE THEMSELVES NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FRANCE, AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES, WOULD OBJECT IF THEY DID.

That's true, the Germans cannot do the same, but their situation is not our situation. For instance, the couple Franco-German couple, has been advocated recently as a good deterrence. But such a couple is a... is not a real couple. Because should something happen in Europe, the punishment of the Germans may be occupation. But the punishment of the French, should the French use their atomic weapon for the benefit of Germany, would be complete destruction of France. Consequently, because of the two type of armaments, we have to have two different policies. And it is very difficult to make an amalgam, to put the German forces together, because the punishment, from the Soviet point of view, would be very different.

TALKING ABOUT THIS GROWTH OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN EUROPE OVER THIS PERIOD, WHAT WAS FUELING THAT? WHO WAS DECIDING HOW MANY WEAPONS SHOULD BE AND WHERE? WAS IT A PURELY MILITARY DECISION, OR PURELY TACTICAL, OR WERE THERE OTHER THINGS INVOLVED?

The deployment in Europe between 1957 and 1970, of a great number of tactical weapons was as far as I know at the request of SHAPE -- The deployment of so many tactical weapons in Europe between '57 and, say, 1970 was made at the request of SHAPE, the Allied pushing for such a deployment. They had in mind that the more atomic long-range atomic weapons we deployed in Europe, the less the Russians were inclined to use their conventional superiority, because after all these weapons are capable to neutralize any concentration. Then the Pentagon followed the request of NATO, of Brussels, and finally we end up with some 7,000 of these weapons, which is by far exceeding our real needs.

WERE THERE ANY OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED, FOR EXAMPLE, RIVALRY BETWEEN THE SERVICES, WAS THAT A FACTOR, DO YOU THINK?

I must say that was so; you, the army wants to play the role, the navy wants to play the role, the air force wants to drop atomic bombs, and any, all the services were keen on having atomic weapons of their own, naturally. That was a duplication or triplication of weapons, and possibly. The attack of the same targets by two or three different services -- that is that is true also.

BUT WERE PEOPLE IN SHAPE REALLY DRAWING UP WAR PLANS OR TACTICS FOR THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS WHICH JUSTIFIED THE NUMBERS THAT EXISTED?

The plans which were established at SHAPE at that time were taking into account the number of targets; for instance, in an area between the Iron Curtain and some edicts of some three hundred kilometers in Russian held territory some two thousand and seven hundred targets were identified in the beginning of '60s. If you allocate two weapons to each one of these targets, you end up with 5,000, 6,000 warheads. Then, there was a military base, not a philosophical or psychological one, because obviously personally I think that should the first weapon be launched, immediately something would take place. The population are not going to accept such an general atomization of their country without reaction. And the oldest weapon would not be used particularly.

DID ANYONE CALCULATE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FALLOUT THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE USE OF ALL THESE WEAPONS?

Yes, that was calculated, but you see we have a privilege that the earth is rotating from west to east, and... a majority of the fallout for ground burst goes to the East. For instance, the Union of the Concerned Scientists have studied the effect of the launching of 350 megatons by three hundred and fifty SS-4 and SS-5s. The result would be for eastern Europe and Russia, past... Stalingrad and Moscow, to receive a, an atomic shower of some 400 rems, which is a unit of radioactivity which is twice or three times the necessary amount to kill people. Then the victims of such a, an attack would be the Soviets themselves... much less the western world.

DO YOU THINK, LOOKING BACK ON IT, THAT DEPLOYMENT WAS JUSTIFIED?

It, well, it was. The deployment of so many weapons was probably justified on political grounds, to give an insurance to the Allies that whatever the condition of the fight, finally atomic weapons would be used, and the deterrent effect would be felt by the other side, and then stability without war would be achieved. Yes, I think that was a positive factor of such a high number. But militarily speaking there is little justification for such a great number of weapons.

CAN I JUST MOVE ON TO THE QUESTION OF PROLIFERATION? IN THE EARLY '60s, THERE WAS TALK ABOUT THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH FRANCE WAS ALWAYS RATHER HOSTILE TO. WHY WAS THAT?

It will be a very selfish position, then, to agree to such a treaty. Morally speaking to sign such a treaty is equivalent to say to the other camp... "Because of our technology, because of our money, we enjoy the capability to deter war. We are approximate-, well, very sure, we are sure to protect our territory, and to be out of the area of combat. But you, other nations we deny you the, such a privilege. We accept that you'll be the theater of next wars, and we on the, on the contrary, we French are going to be the spectators of a war in which you are going to be involved, and we are going to be only the witness of such a war." I think it is something a bit revolting such an attitude.

SO IN YOUR VIEW, THERE'S NOTHING WRONG WITH PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A certain proliferation, a certain proliferation. I would remind you what a wise Chinese said in 1958: Marshal Cheng-yi said that "If there is a certain proliferation, the area of forced peace -- on the, on the, on earth would will extend." And I believe he was right, because I see that aside from nuclear powers, since 1945, we have registered 140 wars, with the loss of some 30 million... 30 million people which have been killed. Then I don't think that a certain proliferation would be a great danger. But there are limits. Which are obvious. These limits are obvious because you can't at the same time be a very tough country without elites, without teachers, without professors, without an ethic, without a morale, and... have the capability to develop so sophisticated weapons. That at least was the case during the last... 30 years. Hence the proliferation is limited by nature.

SO LONG AS SOMEBODY DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE–

Because all the nation are, even if they want, are not capable to have a significant atomic weapon arsenal.

SO YOU'RE NOT CONCERNED BY THE IDEA OF AN IRRATIONAL LEADER–

I am, I am. This is why I said that certain proliferation. My point is that it is very difficult for an irrational leader to be irrational to the point to use these weapons, and to have a scientific community at the same time, entering his game, playing his game, and producing these weapons, which are to a certain extent sophisticated.

SO JUST TO REPEAT, FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW, CAN YOU GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF A WAR THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF THERE HAD BEEN GREATER PROLIFERATION THAN THERE HAS BEEN?

You have an example ready with the '73 war between Egypt and Israel. In 1972, I had here, in this room, a... an Egyptian minister, and he told me that he knew that Israel was a small atomic power. And he said that Egypt could not support any longer the situation which was created by the war of '67, and some bombings of the Israelis -- recently, at that time, a school was hit and some 35 schoolboys were killed -- and he said, "We must, we are going to start a new war. The... world community is ignoring our situation, we are going, we are going to repair it by ourselves. But it will be a limited war." I said, "Why?" He said, "Because we know that we cannot anymore throw the Israelis at sea. We have to respect their own territory. But we may recuperate the Sinai. Because they are not going to use the atomic weapons for a marginal territory." Well, already atomic weapons have played a role.

DO YOU THINK, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WOULD BE GOING ON IF ISRAEL HAD NOT BOMBED THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR?

Well, I think if Tammuz was not bombed, probably the Iranians would be already coming to terms with Iraq, yes.

OKAY.

And we may have saved some... million people which have been killed on such a... horrid war.

NOW WAS YOUR OPINION, AS TO THE IMMORALITY OF SIGNING THE NPT, WAS THAT THE FRENCH POSITION OR YOUR OWN?

It is my own position, and I think it was also the position of my government. The fact would deny the other nations the privilege of peace is not very moral, is too selfish.

AND THE GREAT CONCERN ABOUT PROLIFERATION BY THE UNITED STATES, BY THE SOVIET UNION, YOU DON'T THINK THAT IS A CONCERN FOR MORALITY?

Oh, it's a combination of morality and interest. As usual, as usual. I must say that should atomic weapons be banished two nations would be still the main military power of the world... the Russians and the Americans. What are the ingredients of force without atomic weapons? Population first, to raise heavy battalions. The Russians are well served. Two, the type of population --not too sophisticated, not too educated. They are in good position, with their minority mandate. Third, a large conventional heavy industry. They have it. Fourth, a large territory, to have time to lose terrain, to gain time, to maneuver. They have such a territory. And finally, atmospheric condition, general winter, which a great help for them. Hence the Russians have all the ingredients of military power, should atomic weapons be banished, and this explains to me the proposal of Mr. Gorbachev... last November and last July. The second nation in the same situation may be China. Should China have a strong... industry, which is not the case. And the third one may be the Americans. Because of their population and their heavy industry, with some problems with their moral and their determination to fight. But by far, the Russians would be the first nation, military nation of the world. And I don't think it is in the interest of smaller nations having a good way of life, enjoying life, giving up a price to human life to get rid of atomic weapons, and to return to the previous situation, where we had to send troops to the frontier, and to make a barrier with our chests. I don't think we would find, in the future, the necessary warriors to do so.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH. SO, IF YOU COULD JUST KEEP GOING, BUT DON'T USE THAT WORD ABOUT THE SIEGFRIED AREA -- I DON'T THINK PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND IT.

Yes. I remember that, when we had a briefing, explaining our new strategy to our own staff, at SHAPE, and at Fontainebleau... we noticed that the German officers, which who were just there since few months, were reluctant, they were opposed to the strategy. They were looking on our maps which, in which we transformed their... territory into a theater of operations. Instead of waging war outside, by an offensive movements toward the East, we were defending their territory by using it, and burying in their territory atomic weapons, transforming their city, transforming their roads into airfields and so on. And such a strategy was not, was not pleasant for them, obviously... and what is more, these officers were... involved in the war against Russia. And they were still dreaming of their Panzers going to the East and fighting in the Russian territory on Polish, Poland territory, not in the ho... in the homeland. For these reasons, they were against, and I understand why; it's obvious. So, you have to combine the fact that their territory was transformed into a theater of operations, a; and b, instead of doing what they did and what they knew from the last war we proposed to them a static defense -- atomic weapons being used on their own territory. We were launching from their own territory, but receiving on their own territory the Russian weapons. Well, they were opposed.

CAN YOU JUST TALK ABOUT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET REACTION? HOW DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD HAVE VIEWED GERMAN REARMAMENT, AND LATER, GERMAN POSSESSION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, HAD YOU BEEN A WARSAW PACT PLANNER?

Well, militarily speaking the German rearmament was something very serious, under Russian eyes, because for the first time since 1945 the alliance had a strong combination of conventional forces, which were which had been very good during the last war, the German forces, and the atomic, American atomic might. And if I were a Russian planner I would be against the armament of Germany, and I would have to reconsider all my planning, taking into account the future of a strong Germany, capable to raise 20, 25, 30 divisions first-line, and of great quality. The Russian... had paid a lot to know the value of the German military might. So they were scared of such a rearmament.

SO IT WASN'T PURE PROPAGANDA.

It was... I don't think it was pure propaganda; they exploited it, because it was normal to exploit it; but militarily speaking, a new era was created by the German rearmament, and the fact that NATO now had a very strong army, a potentially, a very strong army, which was a German army, yes.

CONVERSELY, DID YOU THINK AT ANY TIME, AND DID YOUR VIEWS CHANGE OVER TIME, THAT THERE WAS A REAL THREAT THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WOULD ACTUALLY TAKE A DECISION TO START AN AGGRESSIVE INVASION OF THE WEST? WAS THAT A REAL FEAR THAT YOU HAD?

Personally... I had not such a, not the fear of a Russian attack, at least as long as American troops are in Europe. Even when America could be hit on our territory, I think that the Russian are too wise too prudent, to too serious, to take the risk to spill American blood, and to attack Western Europe. Even if our armaments is much weaker than their armament, the fact of killing masses of American troops is something... as a value of deterrence. This is why, as long as American troops are there, I could, I can't imagine a Russian attack of Western nations. I was very concerned by the Mansfield proposal... remember, and the whole French position, to withdraw American troops from Europe.

BEFORE WE GO INTO THAT, IT WAS YOU, AFTER ALL, MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE, WHO WAS ARGUING THAT EVEN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE, YOU CAN NO LONGER RELY ON THE AMERICAN DETERRENT, AND YOU USED THAT VERY MUCH TO ARGUE FOR THE FRENCH FORCE, AND YOU SAY NOW THAT WAS UNNECESSARY?

It's completely logical, because the Germans, the Italian, the Dutch, and the Belgians have no atomic weapons of their own. The American troops there are replacing the atomic weapons that we have. Europe is cut in two -- atomic powers and the others. The other have no defense but themselves, by themselves, except the presence of American troops. Even I wrote a book in which I said that should American troops withdraw, the same security would be obtained if American college with American students were deployed along the Iron Curtain. The problem is the fact of having American people there. And because German, Dutch, and Benelux countries have no other solution than the presence of American troops, which is not the case of the French.

BUT IF YOU HAVE ANOTHER SOLUTION WE SHOULD TAKE IT, YOU'RE SAYING.

For the time being... there is no other solution than the continuous presence, in great numbers, of American troops in Europe. And when the Americans are writing that, in their papers, that Europe is composed of 300 million inhabitants, that the wealth of Europe is sufficient to raise enough troops to match the Russians, and that we don't need ... the presence of American troops, they forget [the limit]. The American them-, themselves, with the Treaty of Nonproliferation, have denied our allies the weapons which are in the possession of our common enemy. Then, the responsibility is to them, they have to stay there. If they had said to the German, the Dutch, and the, and the Italian "We give you the necessary atomic weapon to defend your- our-, yourselves, then they would withdraw. But as long that they deprive these people of the same weaponry which exists in great number in the other side, they have to stay. This is their whole policy.

AND YOU ALSO HAVE SOME IDEAS ABOUT THE URGING BY MCNAMARA AND HIS "WHIZ KIDS" TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

Oh, it's nonsense. Because if you want to make a race between the number of units we deploy in Europe, and the number of Russian warheads capable of destroying the units, you lose the choice. It's lost by advance. And, the more the accuracy of the weapons of today is increasing, the more their yield is reduced because of the increased accuracy.

BUT THEY WERE ASSUMING THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A NON-NUCLEAR ENGAGEMENT, AND THAT IF WE BUILT UP ENOUGH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, BUT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RESERVE TO DISCOURAGE THEIR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEN, IF WE CAN MATCH THEM CONVENTIONALLY –

Yes, but you are never sure that this reserve will be used, and what is more probable is that you may have a conventional fight lasting a few days, then the rest of the world in despair, and Europe in panic, would impose upon our democratic government a negotiation at any cost, and we would be the losers. And this is what we can't face.

WHAT DID YOU THINK, ACTUALLY, ABOUT THESE WHIZ KIDS? DID YOU REMEMBER THE BRIEFINGS THEY GAVE? WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

As I told you these people are economists. Having lost their job, and trying to find another job in strategy. They are not serious.

DID YOU FIND THAT WHAT THEY HAD TO TELL YOU WAS NEW, OR WAS IT THOUGHTS THAT YOU HADN'T HAD BEFORE YOURSELF?

I think the Whiz Kid... Whiz Kid, which were around Kennedy, were not very serious. I think the Kennedy era was a very bad era for Europe, and even for America. And they created a world which was not the real one. They were not pragmatic enough, and they did a lot of mistakes everywhere, not only in Europe. And you see the withdrawal of French, the withdrawal of ["Honest John"], and so, was a mistake. This is origin of the crisis of the Euromissiles. Because, if we had kept these weapons, they would have been modernized, the Russian would have accustomed to them, and we had no, we would have no problem with SS-20s and with the corresponding Pershings. All the... all the fuss of which took place in Europe because of the climate of Pershing, and Cruise missile, was created by the decision of 1962, to withdraw these type of weapons from Europe. And leaving Europe unprotected, during 20 years. From SS-4s and SS-5s.

BUT FRANCE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THOSE WEAPONS.

Because we have our own.

YOU DIDN'T HAVE YOUR OWN IN 1958.

We were working for our own, and –

FRANCE SURELY IT REFUSED TO ONCE AGAIN TO TAKE THE RISK REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE WEAPONS, ACCEPT THE RISK, AND LEFT IT BRITAIN, ITALY, AND TURKEY, TO PROTECT FRANCE FOR 10 YEARS.

No, we shared the same risk, because we have our own weapons.

NOT IN 1958.

It the weapons were in production... since 1956, as I told you. The program, the [Gerboise Bleue], was signed November 16, '56.

BUT GENERAL, NO SOLDIER RELIES FOR DETERRENCE ON A WEAPON WHICH IS NOT GOING TO BE CREATED FOR TEN YEARS.

Yes, it was...

WHAT WAS THE SUBSTITUTE IN YOUR TEN YEARS? IT WAS WEAPONS ELSEWHERE.

It was very difficult for us to accept the deployment of these weapons and then to ask their withdrawal, when we had our own weapons. It will be the proof of that we were very selfish. And that we were counting on such a prediction and then striving, fighting, to replace such a prediction by own, by our own. I think it was wiser, not to accept the deployment, and to work on the same time to have our own substitute, which we did.