IN 1977, THERE WAS A LONDON SUMMIT MEETING, PROBABLY THE FIRST TIME YOU'D HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE PRESIDENT CARTER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TOGETHER. WHAT WERE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THAT SUMMIT AND THEIR MEETING?

Well, the 1977 London summit was dominated by Helmut Schmidt and Giscard D'Estaing's dislike -- indeed loathing would probably be not too strong word of his, of what President Carter had said about civil nuclear power. And they felt that they were being forced out of the fast breeder reactor. That time, actually wrongly, there was a great panic that there wouldn't be enough uranium around. So the plutonium cycle for the fast breeder was thought to be essential for guaranteeing energy supplies in the Federal Republic of Germany and in France. And so they strongly resented Jimmy Carter's push against fast breeders, particularly the French because they were ahead in fast breeder reactors. They thought ...with the Americans way behind in fast breeders and sitting on great chunks of uranium. So that was the dominant factor. There was a secondary aspect that Carter, on coming into office, had been very critical about the German-Brazilian deal and it was felt, I think with some justice, that the Germans had given too much technology away which did allow the Brazilians if they wanted to, to enrich uranium. And this gave them the potential for getting a nuclear device. And Schmidt felt that the criticism that was coming from Carter was unfair, that the Germans had protected uh... the -- and kept to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which after all there are signatures. You've always got this German anxiety that anybody uh... showing any suspicion that they were almost somehow trying to get... to be a nuclear weapon state through the back door through any deals. And Helmut Schmidt himself always felt very strongly about that because he had taken a long-standing principle decision that Germany should not be a nuclear weapon state, and so his signatory, acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was total. So that was the background. The good thing that came out of the economic summit was that this whole issue of fast breeder reactors was kicked into touch in a working policy to look at the whole question of the uranium cycle. And it really in a way got Jimmy Carter off the hook of this particular policy. The other thing which was coinciding with the London summit was the meeting of heads of government level on NATO. It was the moment really when we made the decision to increase as a collective decision of NATO defense spending by three percent the to improve our conventional defense. And that was very much a Jimmy Carter initiative and a successful one.

DURING THAT SUMMIT WITH DETENTIONS THAT YOU WERE OBVIOUSLY THERE DID YOU FORESEE THAT THERE'D BE ANY PROBLEMS IN NATO?

Oh, Yes. I mean, I think that that was the time when Jimmy Carter really had to come to grips with the European leaders for the first time and did sense this hostility. I think looked to Jim Callaghan to try and smooth the relationship, which I think he did rather successfully. I think it was a case where actually throughout his premiership, Jim Callaghan often acted as interlocutor between Helmut Schmidt and to a lesser extent Giscard D'Estaing and Jimmy Carter. And that went on you know, right till the January 1979 Guadeloupe summit. And there was a good relationship between Jimmy Carter and Jim Callaghan and it did help soothe some of these difficulties. He came particularly up in the light of the decision by President Carter not to go ahead with the neutron bomb, which personally, I was strongly in favor of. There's no doubt they had gone so far that pulling back at that last stage was a very savage political upset of Helmut Schmidt who'd just gone and taken through the SPD caucus the need for the neutron bomb.

CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY ANECDOTES FROM THAT SUMMIT, ANY STORIES THAT MIGHT ILLUSTRATE THAT TENSION?

I don't think it was... came through that way. No, I can't remember.

[MISC., INAUDIBLE QUESTION]

Well on this whole business about fast breeder reactors, I mean, they stated it quite blankly. I mean, this... We were all in the dining room in number ten, very small. And you have three from each of the seven summit countries, plus in this case for the first time, the president of the commission and the vice-commissioner, vice-president. So you had 23 politicians,...officials around the table and just interpret it as behind screen so you — It was fairly intimate conversation. And uh...no holes were... no, no punches were pulled. Actually in the discussion about the right of France and Germany to have fast breeder reactors and their resentment to being told by the Americans that they shouldn't have it. Um. That was made pretty clear.

IN THE SAME YEAR, IN 1977, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT CAME TO BRITAIN TO THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AND IT HAS BECOME QUITE A FAMOUS SPEECH. EVERYBODY NOW SAYS THAT THAT WAS THE START OF...CALL FOURSOME RESPONSE TO THE SS-20S, BUT AT THE TIME WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT SPEECH AND WHAT DO YOU THINK REALLY WAS THE MOTIVATION BEHIND IT?

Well I disliked the speech. I did not believe in the Euro strategic balance. I'd always believed in the overall global balance was important. And that was the conventional wisdom. And by striking out in favor of a Euro strategic balance I think uh... Helmut was moving in a direction which I don't think even he realized its full significance. And famous to him, he was the first major politician at Harvard to sense the um, anxiety that was bound to build up with the SS-20s, Soviet buildup. But I don't think he had realized the implications of his speech and I think the fact that he talked about Euro strategic balance was then later used by officials within NATO to give it a credence that it certainly never obtained beforehand. Now, the Americans never believed it. Jimmy Carter went along with the decision to modernize, the Pershing missile and then to look at other options like cruise, largely to satisfy anxieties within Europe. I think this is often lost sight of. Americans were not gung-ho over cruise deployments and Pershing IIs. And I think that was the same really under the Reagan administration. It was an American response to European fears. But...these things they develop a momentum of their own. I mean, the decision was to set up a working group of officials and we looked at six options that the Pershing modernization, building a completely new missile, the three different bariums of the cruise, seaborne, airborne or land based mobile cruise. And there was another one. I can't think what that one was. Missile...I've forgotten. There's six anyway.

DON'T WORRY—

Then these officials went away and we used to have reports back from them from time to time. And I well remember towards the end of 1978 a report from the officials which rather poured scorn on the idea of land based cruise because attention was drawn to the fact that it would be politically very difficult to off-base them, to drive them out of the bases and that this would be the focus for political um, demonstrations in command. Very farsighted. You know what happened at Greenham. Certainly when we left office in May '79, if I'd have put my bet, was that we would have come to modernization. We came very close to ratifying the modernization decision at a meeting which Fred Mulley went to actually during the general election. We didn't finally authorize it until the end of the year. But the one I thought was most likely was airborne -- a mixture of airborne and seaborne launch cruise. I was surprised they ended up with land base cruise. But it was always assumed that Pershing I would be modernized.

[MISC.]

I remember holding a meeting in the Foreign Office and we were all actually pretty critical of the Euro strategic balance but I felt I couldn't say much because at that stage I was getting more worried about some of the lack of interest in disarmament and the MBFR, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, was becoming quite critical. But relations were very good and particularly between Helmut Schmidt and Jim Callaghan so it was very difficult for me to come out formally and criticize. The person who did was the French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud, and he and I discussed it. And I knew he was going to come out. He was actually critical of the concept of the Euro strategic balance in Schmidt's...lecture.

THAT, IN A SENSE THOUGH, THE PROCESS STARTED IN NATO WHICH YOU SET UP TO -- I MEAN, IT WON THEM AMONGST THE OFFICIALS. IT WAS DESIGNED TO SORT OF CREATE COHERENT STRUCTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN A COHERENT POSTURE IN NATO. BUT BY 1979, AN ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT HAD BEEN TAGGED TO IT WHICH EVENTUALLY RESULTED IN THE (?) decision of 1979. WHAT WAS THE ORIGIN OF THAT ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT TO THAT PROCESS? WHERE DID IT SPRING FROM?

I think it came from Britain. Certainly we were pushing it quite hard and I remember a group of ministers met under Jim Callaghan's chairmanship, before he went to Guadeloupe in December of '78, and he was certain, went to Guadeloupe on the basis that yes, we would agree to pursue modernization and we realized that meant some form of cruise and Pershing, but that that should be accompanied by a commitment to negotiate and the hope was that you would by deployment effectively bring about and negotiate to reduction or if not, withdrawal. So the concept of the linkage was a British one. And it was taken up by others. I think initially Helmut Schmidt wasn't terribly interested in it but when he got into problems politically in Germany, he became a very strong believer in the so-called two-track approach. So NATO really can't complain. Firstly, the Americans came in for modernization because of Europe's wish to do so. Then NATO did endorse collectively. The Europeans as well as Americans. The zero-zero option, most people I think endorsed it on the basis that it would not be negotiable. Most surprised that actually that's turned out to be the outcome. Many of us were very much in favor of the walk in the woods formulation which would have kept some American missiles in Europe and looked at one time to be easily the most hopeful negotiating strategy. But that was killed in both Washington and in Moscow, and not particularly liked at that stage by the Federal Republic either.

TO CONTINUE THAT PARTICULAR PERIOD OF HISTORY, AFTER TWO TRACK. AGAIN, YOU PROBABLY WOULDN'T DISAGREE THAT THE ORIGINS OF THAT MODERNIZATION PROCESS STARTED AMONGST A SMALL OF TACTICIANS AND MILITARY STRATEGISTS FROM THE VARIOUS NATO COUNTRIES. BUT HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE ACTUAL PRESENCE OF THE SS-20s. IMPORTANT TO THAT ORIGINAL DECISION?

I think that the theoreticians wanted a continuation of the American link which they saw as being essential and that link was conventional weaponry, but also to plant nuclear forces. And there was this sort of constant belief that there had to be a link to the United States at every level of deterrence and they saw the necessity therefore to replace Pershing. But there is a tendency for people to say, "Oh, well. This all went off into — wafted off into officials and the ministers never knew." That's absolute nonsense. The official working party were set up with ministerial authority. They reported back to ministerial authority and various meetings were held and we certainly... Jim Callaghan and myself as foreign secretary, David Healey as chancellor and Fred Mulley as secretary of state for defense, were given reports of what was happening, what were the latest options. We knew entirely what was on the score. And at any time we could have intervened to stop it if we wanted to. Well, the fact is we didn't. We thought it was necessary to have some continued modernization. And therefore when the decision came out at the end of 1979 in December the Labour Party was still not in, was not in government and was in opposition but Jim Callaghan and myself and others felt that we should go along with the decision. We would in effect, be parties to it. It was part of a continuity of defense policy.

BUT HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE SS-20S FOR JUSTIFYING THAT DECISION?

I think it was used...

[INTERRUPTION]

Sorry. SS-20. I think the SS-20. Sorry. The SS-20 deployment was used as a sort of legitimizing factor in the modernization of Pershing. In truth I think many people, not just officials, believe the Pershing ought to be modernized anyhow. But SS-20 got used in this argument, as did Euro strategic balance in my view, that rather foolishly.

THERE WAS ONE OTHER SORT OF MODERNIZATION DEBATE THAT YOU STARTED TO BE INVOLVED IN, THE MODERNIZATION OF POLARIS. THERE'S TWO THINGS I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT. FIRST, WHAT SORT OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE WERE YOU GETTING FROM THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE MODERNIZATION OF POLARIS AND...

Well, modernization of Polaris has a long history. It goes back to when I was uh... Minister of the Navy in 1969. It began to be discussed, the need to have some extra work done on the warheads to make them if not independently targetable, at least to give them some form of direction. And that was a project which was called Antelope. And then when Ted Heath came into government, there was considerable pressure in '71 for us to jump from Polaris into Poseidon. I was then on the select committee of... defense of foreign affairs, external affairs. It was the first time ever...our nuclear force suits. And we came out against Poseidon at much the same time as the Heath government also came out against Poseidon. But I, I don't know the truth about it because you never seethe papers of previous governments but I've always assumed that the price of not going ahead with the Poseidon was the decision to modernize the warhead of Polaris. And at that time, in '73, there was some logic to that because you didn't have the ABM Treaty. There were the galosh anti-ballistic missile Soviet defenses around Moscow. The odd decision really was after the '74 ABM Treaty to still carry on with the modernization of Polaris and the so-called...project. That...project actually did go to the Labour cabinet. You read Barbara Cassell's(?) memoir. She recalls in November '74, was obviously held back till after the second election. Uh, previously I think it probably had been discussed by a small group of ministers. We went to the cabinet. It was priced at 215 million pounds. As you know, it ended up like costing us a billion. And I first became aware of the existence of the...project — well, I was vaguely aware that there was some modernization. If you read through the public literatures, fairly well known that something was...when I became foreign secretary. Now, at that stage the cost of escalating up so that the current estimate then was seven hundred million. We did seriously consider canceling it. Now, many people have considered that discussion which was about cancellation as deciding to do it. That was not the case at all. As I say, it started by the Heath government in '73, continued by the Wilson administration. Callaghan administration only looked at it because of its cost escalation in '77. Now the reason that it was important, that decision, was that Denis Healey was pretty skeptical about it. As chancellor, he had to pay for it. Jim was probably in favor it, going ahead. But Fred Mulley didn't quite know which way I was going to go in the group of four ministers. And I did a fairly crude trade-off with him. I personally couldn't see much case for... and would like to believe — I'd been in '74, I've argued against it on ABM grounds, that the treaty no longer made it necessary. But I, I trade with him that we endorsed the continuation for broadly political reasons. But this cancellation in fact explains actually why we really wasted 700 million pounds. It wouldn't be very easy, particularly because I think the right wing would have fastened on it, and the military would — some of the military wouldn't have liked it. But in return we did not endorse the so-called Moscow criteria. And we put that, the right kicked into touch and examined it again. Now officials were very worried about this because the right ones thought I was after because I assumed that if you did not endorse the Moscow criteria you didn't thereby tie yourself into Trident. If you were still keen to have a Moscow criteria, frankly you didn't need the ballistic missile system, or the sophistication of Trident. And that turned out to be the next battle which sort of really came up in '78 when we had not endorsed the Moscow criteria. We looked at the Polaris --

So in 1978, when the...group of four ministers allowed...project to continue on the basis that it would cost us a million, which in fact it did then stick to its cost estimates. We did not endorse the Moscow criterion and we asked two officials, Sir Anthony Duff from the foreign office, and chief scientist Mason in the Ministry of Defense to produce a report for an incoming government as to what should be done about Polaris. And that was the decision. And I think what Jim Callaghan felt is that that would be report which would come after the election which everybody then was expecting in September '78. And he didn't want to prejudge the issue because of the Labour Party manifesto commitment in 1974 was against a second generation. It was perfectly obvious to all of us that Jim believed, as indeed I did, that we would have to continue with a deterrent. The argument, which then was sort of beneath the surface, although people knew my feeling, was whether it should be done by Trident system or whether it not it could be done with a non-ballistic cruise missile system. But you couldn't take out Moscow if you were abandoning a ballistic missile system. So it was quite a significant, if you like, opening decision. It didn't preempt any options for the replacement of Polaris.

[INAUDIBLE QUESTION]?

Well I, I, I don't think...It may have been that some Americans thought that in 1979 the arms control ingredient would turn out to be very small. I think that's probably true. In fact, I think some Europeans would take that view. But when it was first discussed, which I think at heads of government level was at Guadalupe, I think it was put forward as a serious option. Now, I think they're realists mind you. I don't think Helmut Schmidt or Jim Callaghan had much doubt. The Soviets wouldn't begin serious negotiations until there had been deployment. And that's why most of us who were involved back in '77 to '79 held firm that it was necessary to deploy cruise missiles all through the controversial years in the 1980s. And I have never had any doubt Soviet Union does not concede ground in negotiations unless they feel they have to. And that's one of the reasons why I believe it was necessary to deploy as an arms control leader. Well I would disagree with those Americans who were cynical about the arms control procedure all along is that I think I like to think at least I'd have always gone along with a zero option. I think that was worth having.

[MISC.]

Then Trident suddenly came up after Jim Callaghan decided not to have the autumn election and the Americans, Brzezinski in particular, were keen to get this summit and at that summit it was clear that there would be a discussion of strategic nuclear weapons. And within the the sort of Whitehall, I think particularly cabinet secretary, Sir John Hunt, a very wise old bird -- he saw great advantages in Jim Callaghan broaching the subject with Jimmy Carter. And if you like, trading their very close relationship on the basis of possibly getting another NASA. NASA, remember we got from Macmillan and Kennedy. A very good deal on Polaris. In many ways this is what did happen. I mean, Jim Callaghan has revealed quite a lot of it in his memoirs. I can speak more freely about it now. But I wasn't there but I know that he did raise it. He was always careful to protect the Labour Party's position. He made it quite clear he was not asking for Trident. What he was saying is if the British government came to you and asked for Trident would you in principle, if you had to make it available to us? And I think by implication, if I become Prime Minister of the next election, I might well come back to... also indicates that he probably would have done.

AND THERE WERE NO EXTRA STRINGS ATTACHED?

No, I think it was a purely an exploratory discussion but then when Mrs. Thatcher came into government, Jim Carnes revealed he thought that she should have all the information and made it clear that the memoir... the memos he'd sent and the letters he'd sent to Jimmy Carter on this issue should be given to her. So she was able to pick up the Duff-Mason Report, she was able to pick up the initial contacts that Jim Callaghan had made with Jimmy Carter and she was able to get out of Jimmy Carter — It was not Reagan, that was Jimmy Carter — a decision in principle to supply Trident that summer.

I'D LIKE TO GO ON TO THE PRESENT. YOU'VE WRITTEN RECENTLY THAT YOU THINK THE ANGLO-FRENCH COOPERATION, IS NOW BECOMING EVEN MORE ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP NATO'S DEFENSE. WHY?

Well when we came back, David Steele and I from meeting President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac and started to talk about Anglo-French nuclear cooperation in September 1986, that was considered almost a sin against the Holy Ghost and we were lampooned and the suggestion was derided. Now, a year later, it's uh...accepted wisdom. And in my judgment, as we go on into the 1990s, we will see more and more Anglo-French nuclear cooperation. Because it makes the utmost sense because both of us are trying to achieve minimum deterrence. Both of us are trying to achieve it really not just for ourselves but for Europe. And both of us are conscious of the fact that the Soviet and the United States has got a slightly different order of priorities. And post-Reykjavik, we now know that our fears of a US president doing a deal over our heads was well grounded. I mean, a fact at Reykjavik. President Reagan agreed with general secretary Gorbachev to eliminate all strategic ballistic missile systems, to negotiate in a way, without any reference to France or Britain... which is fairly monstrous quite honestly since that was our deterrent. I personally have no objection to it. I mean, I would prefer to rely on non-ballistic missile systems but I've always been skeptical about the case for ballistic missile system as the British deterrent, but we've got it now and therefore we are going to be the possessors of Trident into the next century as the French will. Their ballistic system, the M5. And therefore, France and Britain have a great deal in common now. And in my judgment, ought to insist that as the strategic reduction talks continue that the Soviet Union and the Americans agree with us, France and Britain, what is an acceptable minimum deterrent. Otherwise, we're going to find our own weapon systems discussed as third party systems in bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. I don't think that's in British interest, not French interest, not in European interest.

TO CONTINUE ABOUT REYKJAVIK, HOW WOULD YOU SUM UP EUROPEAN REACTIONS WHEN THE OUTCOME OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS WAS REVEALED?

Well I think it was certain a shock, and a feeling that uh... very far reaching arms control might have been agreed which could have damaged European interests. As I say, I'm not personally worried about some of the content of Rek... Reykjavik. What I am very worried about is the fact that it took place without any consultation. I think to some extent that is Europe's own fault. We have not insisted on our involvement in this arms control dialogue. And we have been too content to leave it just to the superpowers. I think there was a very important precedence established in 1977 by Jim Callaghan when he and I managed to get Britain involved in the comprehensive test ban negotiations as full partners with the Soviet Union and the United States. And I regret very much that Mrs. Thatcher pulled out of that tri-lateral dialogue. And I don't think it's healthy to allow the two superpowers to monopolize this dialogue. And I would like to see France and Britain participating in some aspects, particularly in any discussions which relate to our own nuclear systems.

ISN'T IT SOMEWHAT ENDEMIC TO THE ALLIANCE ANYWAY? THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HELMUT SCHMIDT WAS PROTESTING AGAINST IN 1977. IT'S HAPPENED AGAIN NOW TEN YEARS LATER DESPITE EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED IN BETWEEN. I MEAN, IS THERE REALLY A SOLUTION TO IT? ISN'T IT PART OF WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS?

Well the solution is that Europe should take a bigger share of its own security. And that means in conventional and also nuclear. And if we want the American nuclear guarantee to hold, then we've got to share some of the political burdens, military and the economic burdens, of nuclear deterrence. And we mustn't leave this entirely to the United States. So as events have turned out and as we've had the various um, flip-flops in American position, after all it should've taken place not just under President Reagan. They occurred on President Carter, not just the question of the neutron bomb, at one stage it got very close to making a no first-use declaration which Jim Callaghan and I got very anxious about. And under President Nixon there were various alarms about going off and making agreements which could have excluded developments which were in the interests of Europe. And if you want to go back in history, after all in 1945, most monstrous decision of all when the Americans pulled out of the allied cooperation on development of nuclear weapons all during the war and suddenly by act of Congress squeezed Britain out completely. Consequence was, Britain under Attlee developed our own nuclear weapon, and the French developed before DeGaulle, their nuclear weapon. So there's always been an area of suspicion but I think that's now ending because I think France and Britain are asserting their right as Europeans to have nuclear weapons as long as that other European power, the Soviet Union, has nuclear weapons. Now, the Soviet Union is of course a nation power as well, but we keep forgetting the Soviet Union is a European power and in the balance of forces there's a very serious decision for Europe to allow its nuclear deterrent strategy to be... completely monopolized by the United States. Nobody believes we are a superpower. Nobody wants Franco-British cooperation to develop as a sort of third force. But it's a fact of life that a minimum deterrent is necessary I think for Western Europe, just like China thinks it's necessary to have a minimum deterrent. It's not a super sophisticated deterrent. It hasn't gone down that route on the other Soviet border, the Asian border.

THE NEUTRON BOMB. WHAT'S YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THE AFFECT OF CARTER'S REVERSAL OF HIS DECISION? WHAT IMPACT DID IT HAVE ON THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE?

Well...there are two theories of politics. There's the conspiracy theory or the foul-up theory. I'm a strong advocate of the foul-up theory, practically always. Now, the conspirators believe that Jimmy Carter had been watching this negotiation all the way through and then suddenly decided to come in on it right near the end. I don't think that happened at all. I think he authorized the neutron bomb discussions to go ahead/ then probably sort of left it completely alone. Then was realizing that it was a divisive issue in south Europe, very late really. I think in preparing for the UN special session on disarmament in the early part of 1978 and suddenly finding that there was an argument in Europe with the... most of the European countries not prepared to take political odium of a decision on the neutron bomb, and wanting the Americans to make it. So he said to his advisers, well look here, I've been asked to say... we, we must have a neutron bomb. We don't need it. We're not totally in favor of this modernization anyhow. Uh, the Europeans clearly they want it. Why force it down their gullet? And of course, in a sense he was being too simplistic because Europe had got used to all the nasty, dirty decisions being taken by the Americans and then going around and saying that public opinion really disliked it. Well of course, it's not us. It's the Americans who made this decision. And that's been the danger in Europe. We have backed off, all of us politicians, right, left, and center in Europe for making some of the nasty decisions the Americans (?). We then turned around and blamed them when they've made these decisions. Well, Jimmy Carter called a stop to that. He said why the hell do we want it anyhow? I don't need it. I remember Cy Vance saying to me, "We want a neutron bomb like a hole in the head." The difference was that when it had gone so far down the track Jimmy Carter showed signs of canceling and Cy Vance, "No you can't because it will cause a crisis of political confidence in Europe." So he actually turned out to be against the neutron bomb, although very much earlier on when the decision had been taken he had wanted to go ahead with it. I was very pleased...I remember Jimmy Carter sent his personal messenger to Europe, Warren Christopher. He was the deputy secretary of state. He stepped off the plane one morning, came and had breakfast with me at the Carlton House. And I knew what he was coming to say so I said to him right from the start, I said, "What, who's reaction do you want? The British government or mine?" He said, "I think I'll enjoy yours more." And I said, "My own decision is that... my own view is the president has done right. And I'm glad he's cancelled the neutron bomb. The British government's furious. He's done wrong. He shouldn't have done it." I said, "Whatever our view is about the rights or wrong of it you're in for a hell of a time in the Federal Republic of Germany." And he was too. Helmut Schmidt gave him an absolute roasting.

Well, was it worth it? I mean, all the trauma and the political controversy, from 1977 to 1987? Yes, my answer. I think we did mean a, opening up a massive public debate. One time, in the early 1980s, it looked as if NATO's solidarity might crack and the unilateralists might triumph and taking the argument to the streets might've worked, but in, in fact, what's happened is we've shown that multi-lateral negotiations work; that if you do negotiate from strength with the Soviet Union, they do change their their position, and nobody's changed their position more than the Soviet Union; that you can get a real reduction, total withdrawal of all SS-20s, and for that the price of now being able to withdraw all Cruise and Pershings I think that is well worth it. I think it's a safer world. I also think it's a more realistic Europe.

[QUESTION INAUDIBLE]

Europe, I think, saw cruise missiles as a sort of rather secret technology which the United States were holding back on, and they thought, really, they ought to be part of the action at Vladivostok, when Kissinger formed that agreement and Ford was president. There was a feeling that maybe the Europeans were being squeezed out of every having access to Cruise technology, and that was certainly quite a big issue in the early part of the SALT II negotiations. I often made representation to Cyrus Vance and Jim Callaghan, and to Jimmy Carter, that we wanted to keep open the option of a European Cruise. So I think that when Helmut Schmidt made his speech on—to the ISS about Euro-strategic balance, his eye was on Cruise. I think he was conscious of the fact that the SS-20 Soviet deployment was taking place. I think he saw Cruise as a way of tying in the United States with a ground missile for the future.