... that doesn't mean that one has to try and seek superiority in the military area. Quite the contrary, but I think that one has to... have equivalence in the military area. One has to recognize that... as they have their deep concerns, so we have our deep concerns. And one has to recognize that in negotiating with the Soviets, or indeed any other country. And, what one is seeking out of negotiations with the Soviet Union is to produce greater stability, and to preserve a world in which we and others are free to make decisions about how they want to live, and what kind of a system they want to live under. We have very different... views with respect to... society, with respect to... economic and social systems, and differences on many moral issues. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't try to find a way to live in the same world with them, in a peaceful way, so that we don't end up by blowing each other up, and the world along with it. It is not easy to do, but it's something that we have to pursue, and we have to do it with consistency. One of the biggest problems is that we have... gone from peaks to hollows... and unfortunately it seems to occur with changing administrations. And this kind of inconsistency is very damaging in trying to find a way to... coexist in the world with the Soviet Union, without giving up what we fundamentally believe in, and which we are going to support, plus making sure that our security is fully protected.

LET'S GO BACK TO THE EARLY WEEKS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. WHAT WAS THE DEBATE THAT RESULTED IN THE PROPOSAL THAT YOU TOOK TO MOSCOW IN MARCH OF '77? WHO WAS ON WHAT SIDE?

Prior to the Carter Administration... taking over in January of 1977, we had... discussed what the principal issues were going to be, and very high on our list was U.S.-Soviet relations. And at the heart of that was arms negotiations — that had always been a bell-cow in U.S.-Soviet relationships. So we decided that we would set up an inter-agency study to take a look at what our options were, and where we should go. Basically, there were two fundamental options: one was to build on the Vladivostok accords, which had been worked out by President Ford and Brezhnev, at Vladivostok. There, as you may remember, agreement had been reached on aggregate numbers of missile launchers, both in the aggregate for all missiles, and in terms of MIRV missiles. And, those numbers were 2,400 on the aggregate overall, and 1,320, as I recall it, on the MIRVed missiles. The other... bone of contention that remained after Vladivostok was what to do about cruise missiles, and what to do about the Backfire bomber. The first alternative was to say, "Let's build on that. Accept the aggregate numbers, not try to get back in and re-argue with the Soviets, What would be included in the aggregates, how many heavy missiles, and that kind of thing. And to see if there wasn't some simple way to have a loose kind of agreement with respect to cruise missiles, which preserved our options, and try and reach some kind of loose agreement with respect to the Backfire, on the issue of the Backfire bomber. The other alternative was to go for deep cuts, to say, "What has been agreed to at Vladivostok is simply not acceptable. We have to really make a major leap forward, and we have to do that by going into deep cuts. And the deep cuts have to be not only in numbers of missiles, but we also have to find ways to limit qualitative improvements on missiles.

WHO LED THAT CHARGE?

... Warnke and I were on the other side.

WHO WAS THE CHIEF ADVOCATE IN THE MEETING, TO HAVE THE DEEP CUTS PROPOSAL?

Harold Brown, I think, among the advisers, was probably the strongest proponent of that. And I think basically the President leaned towards deep cuts. He felt... strongly that the time had come when if possible we ought to try and make a... major step, and the only way to do that was to take the deep-cut route. On the other side, the principal proponents of trying to move forward to a quick agreement, based essentially on Vladivostok... were Paul Warnke and myself. We didn't disagree in principle that someday we ought to have deep cuts; we felt that this should come in SALT III, and the best thing to do was to build on the momentum that any incoming administration has, and the strength which a new administration has, and with the honeymoon that a new administration always has with the Congress. To go forward and get a quick agreement, and then to try and take the major step, in SALT III, we argued that we thought that you could get an agreement really quite soon, in two or three months, if we tried the, build-on-Vladivostok route. And that it would be a long and difficult negotiation, if we tried to take the other route. And there were very, strong arguments, and discussions about these two alternatives, and finally the President made his decision. And that was to go the deep-cut route. I my I felt that... this was a mistake, and said so. But, I understood the logic, and I understood the desire of the President to try this bolder step, of deep cuts, and I said I would do my very best if that was his decision, to try and make it work. And I did.

BUT YOU WEREN'T SURPRISED IN MOSCOW WHEN GROMYKO SAID NO?

Well, I'm surprised at the way that they responded so negatively across the board. Because I also had indicated that there was an alternative, which was not really Vladivostok but was based in part on Vladivostok, and they just turned everything down out of hand, flatly. And, that was both surprising and irritating, and a great mistake on their part, which they have since acknowledged.

WHO HAD TO GIVE WHAT IN ORDER FOR THINGS TO GET BACK ON TRACK? YOU MET WITH GROMYKO IN MAY IN GENEVA, AND HE CAME TO WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER OF 1977.

Yeah, what happened after Moscow, when we came back to the United States, and decided that what we had to do was to try, by repackaging to see whether or not we couldn't find a basis for going forward with negotiations, essentially along the deep-cut line... and as a result of that we put together a tripartite form of... a framework, which consisted of a treaty, which would run until 1985, an interim agreement to take care of missiles and Backfires, which would be a two-year agreement, and which would be much more loosely written, and then thirdly a declaration of principles, which would state what we were prepared to deal with in terms of, of really deep cuts, and qualitative limitations, in SALT III. And that was the framework which we took to Geneva in May; it was, I put it on the table; it was accepted quite rapidly; we finally changed the interim agreement into a protocol but other than that, it was basically the agreement that or the framework that we brought to Geneva.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE HORN OF AFRICA. DID YOU VIEW THE SOVIET, CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AS PRIMARILY A LOCAL AFRICAN PROBLEM, OR PRIMARILY A U.S.-SOVIET PROBLEM?

Primarily a local problem, and I think that was demonstrated by the fact that after the invasion of Ethiopia from, their neighbors to the east, and there was a response by the Ethiopians, supported by Soviet arms... which led to a movement very close to the border we went to the Soviets, and I told Anatoly Dobrynin that this must be contained, it should not be permitted to spill across the border, and that the Soviets... must exercise their influence to make sure that didn't happen. I was supported in this position by other allied nations, who expressed that view to the ambassadors in their countries, and as a result of that there was no invasion, of the neighboring countries. So that it was, in my judgment, a local conflict, and... it is one which was contained.

DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT BRZEZINSKI RECOMMENDED?

Yes, at that point he wanted to bring in the, a large segment of our carrier groups, who were out in the Indian Ocean at that time, and he wanted to have a show of force.

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THAT?

I argued that... if you're going to have a show of force, then you've got to be prepared to use that force. A big country can't bluff, unless it's prepared to carry out its bluff. So in a sense, it's not a bluff. And I said, "Unless you're prepared to use your forces, you shouldn't do it." And I was backed in this by Harold Brown. The decision was made that we would not take that action.

BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT IT DOESN'T MEAN YOU HAVE TO USE IT, JUST BECAUSE IT'S THERE, BUT IT COULD COMPLICATE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. IT WOULD HAVE MADE THEM CAUTIOUS.

I would respond to that by saying we had already told them that we viewed with great seriousness what was happening here, and that they must not cross over into the neighboring countries, and that, so that they were on notice that we did consider this to be a serious matter. But when you bring carriers in, and you get them off-shore, I think that you've got to be prepared to use them. And as I gathered, Zbig wasn't prepared to use them.

ISN'T PROJECTION OF POWER SOMETIMES A NECESSARY COMPONENT OF DIPLOMACY?

Yes, but under the circumstances that exist in a particular area at a particular time, and I didn't think they existed.

THIS WASN'T SERIOUS ENOUGH.

No.

SO YOU WON THAT ROUND?

Well, it wasn't done. I don't want to talk who won or lost.

BUT THE PRESIDENT...

Decided with me.

KISSINGER WAS SAYING AT THAT TIME -- THE ARCHITECT OF DÉTENTE -- THAT WE SHOULD LINK SALT TALKS TO SOVIET BEHAVIOR. YOU DIDN'T AGREE WITH THAT?

No. I have been one who... feels very strongly that arms negotiations should stand on their own feet, that... you're not rewarding the other country for good behavior. What you are trying to do is to negotiate an agreement which is going to produce greater stability, and is in our national interest because it gives us greater security. And therefore, we shouldn't complicate it with other collateral issues, which might mean that there would be no agreement, if you insisted upon the linkage. Now if the agreement is good enough so that we want it, then we ought to pursue it. Go ahead.

BRZEZINSKI'S NEW BOOK, GAME PLAN, MAKES IT VERY CLEAR THAT HE BELIEVES IN LINKAGE, ALTHOUGH POWER IN PRINCIPLE SUGGESTS THAT HE BACKED YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. WAS IT YOUR PERCEPTION AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS FOR LINKAGE?

I thought basically he was for non-linkage at that time.

IN OUR INTERVIEW, HE SEEMED QUITE CLEAR THAT HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT.

I think that may have developed later on.

HE MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON MARCH 1ST, 1978, ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN ETHIOPIA AND SALT. WHAT WAS THAT MESSAGE?

I don't remember the exact words, but, uh...

YOU WROTE IN YOUR BOOK THAT YOU THOUGHT THAT HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD DELIBERATELY SLOW DOWN SALT TALKS, WHEREAS THE PRESIDENT SOMETIME LATER TALKED ABOUT WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND ON THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. IN ONE YOU TALKED ABOUT A POLICY, AND IN THE OTHER SAID HE WAS SIMPLY DESCRIBING POLITICAL REALITY.

Yeah, I think he was, yeah. There is the fact that in terms of political reality, the atmosphere in which you are negotiating makes a difference as to what the Congress is not, or is prepared to do, not going to do or is prepared to do. And I think that's what the President was saying in that particular statement which you've referred to...

A POLICY OF NO LINKAGE PRESUMABLY MEANS THAT YOU DEAL WITH SALT ON ITS OWN TERMS, AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS ON THEIR OWN TERMS. WARNKE AGREES WITH THAT.

No reason in the world why you can't.

DO YOU FEEL YOU DID?

I feel we did.

AND BRZEZINSKI SAYS THAT ANYBODY WHO'D SAY THAT COULD NEVER EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH GEOPOLITICAL KINDS OF PROBLEMS.

That's his view.

YOU FEEL THAT YOU…

I do.

IF YOU FACED A CHOICE OF EFFECTIVELY COUNTERING A MOVE ON THE GEOPOLITICAL CHESSBOARD, WHICH MIGHT HURT SALT, OR PROTECTING SALT BY SOFTENING YOUR STAND ON GEOPOLITICAL TERMS, WHERE WOULD YOU STAND?

Well, supposing that you had a very serious invasion or intrusion, into the Persian Gulf, which jeopardized the oil supplies. In a situation like that, obviously it would be of such importance that it would... clearly... affect further negotiations.

BUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, YOU DIDN'T SEE AS A…

I thought it was of minor importance.

YOU DIDN'T SEE IT AS THREATENING?

No.

WERE THEY THREATENED?

They were threatened, but I thought that we could persuade the Soviets to use restraint, which they did. I think... the proof of the pudding is in what happened.

THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING IS IN WHAT HAPPENED, WHAT HAPPENED?

They did not invade. They, the Soviets, did not invade.

HOW DO YOU VIEW SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFRICA? RICHARD PIPES AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER SUPPORT THE "GRAND DESIGN" THEORY FOR WORLD HEGEMONY. MARSHALL SHULMAN, YOUR COLLEAGUE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, SAID THE SOVIETS ARE MOTIVATED BY "STRATEGIC OPPORTUNISM."

Yeah, I would think it's more targets of opportunity than it is a grand design. There... are those, like Pipes, who believe in the grand design, but I think when you examine Soviet actions, in a place like Africa, you don't find the... the common threads which show the grand design. But... it is much more a seizing of opportunities as they arise, and basically... the Soviets have been fairly cautious, in most of the things that they have done... in Africa, and in the recent past.

WHAT WAS THE DEBATE OVER THE TERMS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA?

There was first agreement, and the basic agreement was, the time was long overdue that we should establish normal relationships with the People's Republic of China, with the largest population, by far, of any nation in the world, and that therefore, we should find a way to complete... the work which had been started under Nixon and Henry Kissinger, and to bring that to fruition. There really was not much debate, quite frankly, between all of us, as to normalization of relations with China. The debates really came later on, when we were talking about, should we or should we not provide military equipment and arms to the Chinese? I think basically as we went into the negotiations and all the way through the negotiations, we felt unanimously within the executive branch, that by bringing China back into the outside world, that... we would be enhancing not only our own security, but would be producing greater stability in the region. And this was an acceptable outcome for all of us, Zbig as well as myself and others.

THE ISSUE OF ALLIED ARMS SALES, WHETHER THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE ALLIED ARMS SALES... HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

Well, I always felt that we should not try to, play games between the Chinese and the Soviets. That we ought to develop the relationship with the Chinese because it was important in and of itself, and we ought to at the same time... preserve a decent relationship with the Soviet Union, and that one of the most sensitive things in maintaining that sort of balance that we had between ourselves and the Chinese on the one hand, and ourselves and the Soviets on the other, was not to provide arms to either of them, and therefore I opposed, and... I believe it was correct in hindsight, the supply of military equipment, and particularly offensive weapons, to the People's Republic of China.

DID THAT GO FOR THE DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY...?

Uh... yes... it, it really does, although that's a tougher case to deal with.

WAS THE ALLIED ARMS SALE A DEBATE YOU HAD BEFORE, OR AFTER, NORMALIZATION?

After normalization.

WHAT ABOUT THE TIMING OF NORMALIZATION AND DENG XIAOPING'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON? WARNKE SAYS IT WAS AN "UNFORTUNATE..." --

Yeah, it was unfortunate. I think we had all hoped that, we could have the critical meetings with the Soviet Union before, on the SALT negotiations, which were scheduled for the end of December. Prior to the time that we were going to announce normalization of relations with China. I was in the Middle East at that time, as I recall, and I got a call from the President, saying that things had proceeded very fast, and that he wanted to announce the normalization of relations with China immediately, which would put it before the meeting that I was going to be having with Gromyko in Geneva. I said I hoped that this... would be... not done, because I thought it would have adverse effects. He said he felt it absolutely essential that it be done, and that he planned to go ahead, and could I come back and be present? And I said yes, I would, and I cut short my trip in the Middle East and came back and was present at the announcement on normalization of relations... with China. I still believe it would have been better to have postponed it; I doubt that anything would have leaked in that period of time, and I do think that having the announcement, plus the indication that Deng would be coming to the United States in the near future hurt, the negotiations which I subsequently had on SALT in Geneva.

YOU SAW GROMYKO... WAS HE ANNOYED?

Very. He didn't take it out so much on the China thing, but it was obviously that something had radically changed since we last met. And I think all of the people in our negotiating team could feel right from the moment that we sat down and began to talk, that... things had changed, and that the opportunity of perhaps making major steps, in that SALT discussion were in jeopardy.

BUT ISN'T THAT KIND OF A REVERSE LINKAGE, RELATIONS WITH CHINA WITH SALT?

Well, if you're asking the question, should we have done it? I would have said we should have deferred it, and announced the Chinese things after the negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva.

BUT ISN'T THAT A LINKAGE OF SORTS?

No, because I felt that the SALT negotiation was of paramount importance, and therefore we ought to proceed with that as we were planning to, and that we could go forward with the other without jeopardizing the agreement which we had reached with the Chinese if we did it later.

DO YOU THINK IN THE LONG RUN IT SLOWED DOWN SALT?

Yes.

ZBIG THOUGHT YOU MIGHT HAVE USED IT TO GET CONCESSIONS.

I don't think so; I think it dragged 'em out.

IN THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE, THE WORD "HEGEMONY" APPEARS. THE CHINESE WANTED IT; IT WOULD HAVE OFFENDED THE SOVIETS. DID YOU TAKE A STAND ON THAT?

I can't remember whether I did or not. I might have, because... I don't see any usefulness in using words like "hegemony," which just raise red flags.

DO YOU REMEMBER IF THE PRESIDENT WAS…

I really don't remember.

WAS THE SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA FLAP A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE OR A BUREAUCRATIC FOUL UP?

I think it was basically a failure of intelligence. We pressed the intelligence community to tell us whether this was new, or whether it was, what was... a brigade that had been there and had now resurfaced... maybe a bit stronger than it was, and we were told this was new; it suddenly, subsequently turned out that that was wrong, and...basically it was a failure of intelligence.

WHAT DO YOU THINK KILLED SALT? THE SOVIET BRIGADE? WAS IT BURIED IN THE SANDS OF THE OGADEN? --

No, neither of those.

-- INFLATION? THE HOSTAGE CRISIS? SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN?

I think, probably more than anything else, the invasion of Afghanistan. That had a profound effect in the Congress. And... that is what caused the President to decide to shelve, for the time being, the SALT II treaty, and not pressing its ratification. But I don't think that, what happened in the Ogaden really made much difference at all.

WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? YOUR POLICY WORKED IN THE HORN, BUT TIME MAGAZINE CAME OUT AT THAT TIME WITH THE GREAT PINCER -- "THE ARC OF CRISIS" -- YOU HAD THE SOVIETS IN THE HORN, AND THEN IN AFGHANISTAN AND POINTING AT THE PERSIAN GULF... DID THAT LOOK LIKE THE GRAND DESIGN AT WORK?

No, again, I think that was a target of, not opportunity, of necessity, as they saw it, at that particular point in time. Actually it was a combination of both. They were deeply concerned, the Soviets were deeply concerned, that... the stirring of the fundamentalist forces was... going to be an increasing problem from... for them. They, in addition, were... concerned that the leadership in Afghanistan was not reliable, and therefore... the debate in the Soviet Union led to the decision that they were going to go in, do away with the existing leadership and put their own people in charge and also put a military force in there, to make sure that what they did stuck. In addition, I think, in weighing what the reactions might be, they were persuaded by the fact that we were deeply concerned with the problem of the hostages, and that led them to believe that we would not react, and that made it another argument in favor of those who were arguing in the Politburo that they should move into Afghanistan. I think in hindsight there'd be an awful lot of Soviets saying that it was a mistake, and they wish that they hadn't made the move.

DID YOU AGREE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH?

I thought at that point with that massive invasion and the brutal nature, way in which it took place, that you had to react, and react very strongly, and therefore I fully supported what he did.

IN THE SALT RATIFICATION TALKS, WHAT DID YOU MAKE OF NITZE'S OPPOSITION? IT SEEMED TO BE BASED ON HIS FEELING THAT SALT PRECLUDED THE MX AND THE BASING MODE THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING AT THAT TIME. DID YOU HAVE ANY FEELING WHETHER IT DID WHEN YOU WERE IN VIENNA?

I think it was clear that we were keeping all of our options open; that we probably would build an MX-type missile, and there was little doubt in their mind that this was what was going to happen. I have found it really very hard to understand Paul's position on SALT II. Paul is a very intelligent individual, and I think he genuinely was convinced that the treaty was not in our national interest; I think he did not analyze through the problem correctly; and this became a, a real cause for him. But it was genuine; Paul really believed in what he was saying. And it was very damaging. I think probably the most damaging thing that happened in raising opposition to going forward with ratification of the treaty. I think it was a great mistake that the treaty was not ratified, and we've paid a heavy price for it.

THERE ARE TWO IRONIES: ONE IS THAT THE SOVIETS... ADHERED TO IT LONGER THAN ITS LIFE WAS DESIGNED TO BE; THE OTHER IRONY IS THAT FOR ALL THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY, NITZE AND THE REPUBLICANS... DON'T PUT IT IN MOBILE MISSILES. WHAT HAPPENED TO THAT?

Well, I think they finally came to the conclusion that really it was very doubtful that there was a window of vulnerability. A lot of us believed that the whole argument about window of vulnerability was way overdone. But the thought of being able to launch a single massive strike and pre-empt was pretty much of a pipe dream. The complexity of launching such an attack is immense, and people like Jim Schlesinger have made very clear that they... do not support that thesis -- they think it's wrong, it's flawed -- I happen to... be one who believes that. So I think that the window of vulnerability was way overplayed, in the same way the missile gap was overplayed in the earlier years, at the time of the Kennedy Administration coming to power.

YOU REMEMBER SCOOP JACKSON'S SPEECH TO THE COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY ABOUT APPEASEMENT JUST BEFORE YOU WENT TO VIENNA?

No, I don't remember that.

DO YOU REMEMBER THE PRESIDENT EVER SAYING, "I'D RATHER DROWN THAN CARRY AN UMBRELLA?"

No.

WERE YOU PRIVY TO HIS COMMENTS ON THE NEUTRON BOMB?

Oh, yes. You're talking about the President. Yes, very much so. I've written about it at length.

WHAT DID HE SAY? DID HE SAY, "I DON'T WANT TO BE AN OGRE"? HE WROTE THAT ON A MEMO TO ZBIG, I THINK.

The neutron bomb was a very complicated matter. The negotiations went on for many weeks, leading up to a point where a decision had to be made as to whether or not we would or would not go ahead, manufacture and deploy a neutron bomb. All of the indications on the various papers that went to the President along the way had indicated that he was prepared to go forward, and to deploy the neutron bomb. When it came to the final day, when the meeting was going to be held in NATO two days later, and the ultimate memorandum which said, "This is the final sign-off," he came to the conclusion that he was not prepared to do that. Zbig and I and Harold Brown all thought that this was a mistake and we would pay a very heavy price, in our relationship with our allies, yet he followed that course of action. But he felt very, very deeply that in the end, this was something that he was simply not prepared to do, and he decided against doing it. And that's the way it took place.

WERE YOU THERE WHEN HE SAID THOSE WORDS "I DON'T WANT TO BE AN OGRE"?

I don't remember words to that effect; it could have happened — I don't remember.

DID YOU CHANGE YOUR FEELINGS DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR TIME IN WASHINGTON, ABOUT THE SOVIETS AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM?

No, my feeling has always been that you have to deal with the Soviets from a position of strength, and it has to be strength from multiple sources, not only strength from a military standpoint, but economic strength, political strength, and ideological and moral strength. And you have got to be prepared to be tough and strong in your negotiations. But you don't have to go around seeking to provoke a conflict with them. What you're trying to do is to reach... the achievement of your objectives. And that means, in almost any negotiations, there has to be give, some give and take, so therefore, you have to be able to give at the same time that you are taking, as long as what you are giving does not damage your national interests, and in the overall, strikes a balance that is fair and one that you can live up to and be... happy that you signed.