American forces started landing in Vietnam.

Well, when the Americans started landing in Vietnam I was then director of the pacification in Saigon and by that time I did have the opportunity to go to Da Nang to observe the landing and also I had the opportunity during this time, chat time, that period of time, exchanging ideas and views with ah many of my American friends and Vietnamese of responsible position in Saigon. And, one of the thing came up to my mind during that period of time was that first we were we felt more or less relaxed.

The reason because if you remember after the fall of President Diem and the successive regime that followed, we ran into the most troubled period of time in our war. The Communists were getting stronger than before, and we were practically under the the threat of losing the war. So, I say that we felt relaxed because with the American troops coming in it first of all created a good feelings among us as well among the those who opposed to the Communists throughout the country.

But, then with months, the months that to come we realize that there was a problem with the involvement of the American, the military. Then I recall what President Diem told me and told many other Vietnamese when he was in power back in the 1960-62. President Diem used to say that the American ah the only friend that we can rely on in our struggle against the Communists and the American are the only country that can afford to help us with all kind of assistance necessary for the effort of the war against the Communists as well as for the effort of building up the country, developing the country and helping the people in the country.

But he said that the we the Vietnamese are the only one who had that who must have and who can have the initiative and determination in this struggle. The American cannot have such initiative and such determination because the he explain to us that it the day we lost we Vietnamese lose our initiative and determination in our struggle against the Communists then the American won't be able to do anything.

Let's stop there a second.

By that time I was ah provincial governor of Dinh Wahn in the delta in the province where the Communists ah ah a few years where the Communists had originated.

Start again where the Communists...

Well, at that time I was provincial governor of Dinh Wahn one of the biggest, largest province in the delta where the Communists originated the war against us a few years before, and also by that time the American began putting in the province the advisors. Ah. These advisors, these first American who were assigned to the province as individual they were good person, good professional soldier, but they had to learn more than they could tell us what to do decide how to maintain the weapons, how to get the supply.

So, one day President Diem ask me about the American performance, abilities in the province. I explain to him the real situation, and he said that the provinceship and any Vietnamese official, in particular in the administrative and political position must maintain the the full predominance over the American. The reason he explain were that he asks us not to let the peasant, the people in the province, look at the American with the preminiscence of the French. So, we had the difficult time to get the American behind because they they didn't understand the situation.

For example, my counterpart, they always ask to accompany me during my visit, which is... the idea is not small for their for them to perform their duties. But it is ah difficult for me as a Vietnamese to reflect the our president consent of governing the country, of representing ourself to the people in the countryside as the Vietnamese, and the American as just as supporting the the friendly supporting element. But, believe me in most of the provinces, most of the province chief, they're not concerned with their counterpart on that sensitive problem or appearance.

So, in a way that you could see the province chief must be dressed as a military officer. Every place they went out to meet the people they had the American officer who usually ah taller than the Vietnamese beside him, and the impact, the psychological impact on the people is in contradiction to what President Diem expected to see. Well, I refer to that period of time to President Diem consent to explain to bring out the point that with the the landing of the American troops in the country, the image of the Vietnamese in leadership order in the mind or most... first of all of our own government...

Sound. Camera Roll 758. You were talking about the image of the Vietnamese government in the minds of the people. Begin that part again after the Americans landed.

So, referring...

Excuse me for a second. Just start again.

So, referring to President Diem remarks, we realize that many of the Vietnamese ah realize that the image, I mean the national, the nationalistic image orders in the the average Vietnamese...

Start again. Okay.

So referring to President Diem remarks we could see with the landing of ah mass American troops on our soil the image of the Vietnamese leadership begun altering in the mind of the average Vietnamese. To begin with first among the civil servants and the troops, the Vietnamese troops, because the arrival of the American at the time that Vietnamese felt the heavy pressure of the Communist they all look back to the American as the savior, saviors, and they begun feeling that the American are their guarantee for their survival first and for the victory next. So, they began losing their own confidence and then determination at President Diem remarks a few years before. And, with that the initiative...

Just a second. Beep, beep. Okay.

Much more important was the impact as a result of the American mass landing in Vietnam was on the responsible people like the generals, the colonels, the city servants and even the politicians and the religious leaders in the country because...

Sorry again. Camera Roll 759. Beep.

With the American mass landing in Vietnam the most damage damaging impact...

Start again, sorry.

With the American mass landing in Vietnam the most damaging impact was on the high level Vietnamese. I mean, the military leaders, the ah high civil servants, the Vietnamese politicians, and even the religious leader in the country, because the American came at the time that Vietnam was in the eh the most threatening period of time. Threatened by the communist victory. They all, these people all look at the American presence, the American, the troops, as their saviors. And, this is natural.

And, with the, with the relying, by relying to the American as their savior they began to look to the American for ah to oppose to the Communist as a main force to oppose to the Communist, and the begun losing their own initiative and with that the determination now came to the American general side. So, with the mass American involvement, the general, the American general and American officer, they naturally for them, they felt that they had to get the control over these Vietnamese official, and this was the beginning of the growing influence of the American over the Vietnamese leadership.

And, with that, now, I refer to President Diem's remarks, with that we Vietnamese leadership began losing our initiative and with that the determination, and the more the American troops landed in Vietnam, the more the American high level people; their general, ambassador and ah others began taking more initiative and influence over the Vietnamese mili... military leadership who had really the real control over the country under the American control.

And, these general, Vietnamese general by that time, we must say that there are some good, real good honest general but there are other who try to go after the American general and ambassador to seek for power. And, that was one of the reason that make the American feel, the American general and ambassador feel that they had to maintain and to ah il... to ah ah strengthen their control. Now...

Beep. Beep. Okay.

So, it was during that period of time that you that we could see ah the some of the very ah exceptional even in the country like ah group of general called in by Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and ah eh just to blame them. I say I say exceptional because such a thing cannot happen to any other country that the ah I want how to say that. I want to go back to that.

Camera Roll 759. Beep. Okay.

So, with the mass American landing at the time ah when the country was ah in even in danger of being overrun by the Communists, the political leaders, the military leaders, the religious leader in the country look at the American as their savior, and the American look at the the the the Vietnamese counterpart seeing that attitude begun to behave in the way as their protectors.

So, you could see ah one of the most ah token events by that time was the one in which General Taylor as Ambassador call in a group general, Vietnamese general just to blame them, and dictate them to do the things ah to his desire, and the country with that image, the people in the country from the civil servant to the military down to the people in the in the place where they can listen to the radio, or can read the newspaper, can hear the rumor, they started believing that their own country or their leadership was now in the hands of the Americans and with that they all now look at the Americans as the guarantee for the fight against, the struggle against the Communist and the consequences were that in the years, many, many years later until the end of the war...

Just start, and the consequences start there again.

And, the consequences of such an image were in years later that President Nixon had to declare that he had to Vietnamize the war. It was a fact to recognize that that before that the war they all admitted were Americanized. We can stop there for...

Okay.

With the mass American landing in Vietnam at the time when Vietnam was in real and imminent danger of being overrun by the Communists, most of the Vietnamese military leaders, political politicians and religious leaders and people...

With the, with the mass American landing in Vietnam at the time when Vietnam was in imminent danger of being overrun by the Communists, the leaders; military, political, religious most of them look at the American as their savior. This is normal. And, with that feelings, thankful feelings they behave naturally more or less as under the protection of Americans. This si... that situation create, created among the American high level people personnel the feeling that they had to act as a protector and by doing that began to grip on the power of influencing the general, the Vietnamese general, who were the one who really had the power over the country beside the American.

Stop a second.

So, now we can say that with the land, the first landing of the first American troops in Vietnam, it was also the beginning of the growth of the influence of the American over the Vietnamese leadership and also the begi... the the beginning of the ah on the Vietnamese leadership part of losing their initiative and determination.

One of the ah most illustrated example of that situation was a a meeting set up by Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in which he called in the Vietnamese general in power and blamed them for some action and dictated them to do things to his, General Maxwell Taylor, desire. As the consequences of that evolution, the people, the Vietnamese people began looking at the American as the real rulers of the country and from then to 1975 you could see how much initiative and determination the Vietnamese leaders lost and the American leaders in Vietnam increased.

Okay.

About the who ruined the country during the war after the fall of President Diem, the Vietnamese general or American general. What makes the difference? And what make it importance. I discuss that subject with a friend of mine who was at one time the ah minister of information in Saigon he he said that well between the Vietnamese general and the American general we better let the general, the American general, run the thing because they ah were certainly ah more educated, more professional, more professionally trained than our general.

Well, I felt so much ah depress when I listen to something like that spoken out from a minister of ah ah information of ah, but then I re... recall the remark made by President Diem. He said that the American are powerful. They could do anything except conducting the war against the Communist and in Vietnam. Only, and he emphasized that only the Vietnamese could do that. The American were good only to supporting, to support the war, but not to conduct the war. So, that was the time I began losing my confidence, losing my confidence in the way that our leaders conducted the war.

President Diem idea and many Vietnamese believe that that that image of Vietnamese leadership in the mind of the people were essential for the effort of the war against the Communist, and during his time, his a time, he was very reluctant to accept the American predominant presence in any area. I remember that I was his a representative the provinceship in Bien Hoa and with the group of a the first group of American advisors send out there we discuss about first about the title given to the American. The Ameri...

Okay.

Now, we can see the sequence of the mass American mass landing in Vietnam. The Vietnamese leaders losing their initiative and confidence. The American leaders, American general ah ah precisely taking over the control in Vietnam and the people, the Vietnamese people with that fact begun losing their own confidence. Now, do we blame the American general for ah captivating the leadership of the Vietnamese or do we have to blame the Vietnamese general to let the American capture the leadership.

We must he objective in that ah estimate appreciation. We have to look at the nature of both the Vietnamese general and the American general before we make any blame. Well, as we know, the American general, and I had the opportunity to work and talk with them many times, privately. General Westmoreland, General Nguyen included and I realize that they are the best general in the world, but not for this kind of war in Vietnam. They are trained to handle the fire power and after the fire power the manpower to exploit the success of the fire power. This kind of war they had no doubt they would win in any war.

But, in Vietnam such a fire power usually did not hit the right target, the enemy. They hit the ground, the forest, if not to say the people or the houses where in which the people live. So, they could not use the right manpower to go exploiting the success of the fire power. How could we ask the American general who live with the American culture in the American comfort to understand the poor peasant in this remote, remote country. So, we cannot blame them.

They come there with so much force, with the determination to win the war and the day that they realize that their counterpart, the general counterpart had the same feelings had the same to say more or less the same training they had, they feel that they are superior to their counterpart, and it was not in their ambition or in their personal ambition or desire to take over, but it was in the their honest conscience trying to take over the command, first of the unit and then of the army and then of the country, with the expectation to win the war.

So, now do we have to blame the Vietnamese general. Same way, with the sane periscope we must look at the Vietnamese general nature during that period of time. They, to say most of them are sincere and honest in admitting the leadership of the American general because they had no choice. They had no one behind their backs to argue with the Americans. They had to refer to the influence of the American to stay in power.

Wait a second.

So, these Vietnamese general they sincerely believe that the American are the savior, were the savior of the situation at least, if not to save the country, and the American with their troops commitment, with their money had the power in the country, and they look at the American general, ambassador for their support to stay in power. Some, maybe for personal ambition, but I know many... some others, if not to say many others, general, Vietnamese generals believe that they should stay in power for their personal ability to win the war.

So, they in... with that situation lasting the influence of the American over the Vietnamese leadership became more and more apparent to the people in the country. And, that was the cause off so many so much misery among the other Vietnamese. Many of the Vietnamese intelligentor, and some of the Vietnamese general and officers did not believe that was the way that the Vietnamese leadership should behave, and it was the cause for dissention in our society, dissention because they didn't believe anymore that the Vietnamese rule the Vietnamese country, and they didn't believe that with the American influence such American influence we could not win the war because they they believe in the way that President Diem believe.

That the war in Vietnam was basically fundamentally political a political war and the military were good only to support that political struggle. The war with the peasant, the war with the poor people. So, now people can refer back to Vietnam in that period of time with the mass American troops landing in Vietnam. We had so much struggle. The Buddhist uprising. The the ah Coup, the coup after coup, the tentative coup after coup among the military generals. All this because they lose the confidence in their own leadership. Can we stop a little.

So referring back to the Vietnamese general who really...

Start again. Okay.

So, referring back to the Vietnamese general who really were the leaders who conducted the war under the American leadership after the the fall of the President Diem regime until '75. We must look at their true nature to understand why the American general could capture the Vietnamese leadership from the Vietnamese general and why the Vietnamese general yield to the American for the leadership. The most of the Vietnamese general they are all anti communist. That is for sure. But they are they are trained they were trained...

Most of the Vietnamese general come from ah...

Most of the ah Vietnamese general come from well well to do family which represent the highest class in our society and ah some do not come from these ah family but once they become officer they grew up in a milieu that can be considered as detached from the majority of the Vietnamese people. And, some of the example we can say were some loonan Vietnamese ah some Vietnamese...

Start again. As an example...

As an example I would cite one or two illustrations. Ah. At least half of the number of the general officers serving in the Vietnamese army were educated in the French school. Some of them were even French citizens from birth and trained as an officer in the French army became loonan some captain loonan. And, then with the creation of the Vietnamese army back in the years of 1950 transfer to the Vietnamese army as a colonel and since then live and grow up in that high milieu and later with the arrival of the American they were trained to live and work for general star training.

Most of them... In the in this circle of ah in this limited circle of senior officer they live detached from the majority of the people in the country, and they became accustomed to the American comfort that they had the opportunity to enjoy in America or to see their American counterpart enjoying it. So, during that time as ah the tension of the war increased we could see that phenomenon ah see in the first Vietnamese general with the American living standard adopted in their own home. This explain how they live detached from the war and from the people, their own people suffering from the war. But they do have one thing that was admitted by their American counterpart.

They spoke English, good English, they spoke good English and they spoke the same military fundamental that they learned from American and from the French in the past. And, when they talk about professional matters as a military operation concerned they certainly, we cannot blame them. They certainly felt inferior to their American counterpart. The same way the American general when talking about the professional problems felt far much superior to their Vietnamese counterpart. And, that was the root of the that was the reason why in one side the American taking over the Vietnamese leadership and in on the other side the Vietnamese taking over losing the leadership, their own leadership.

Okay.

Well, some people ask me the question then in contrast to the Vietnamese side. How the Communist side could succeed. My explanation can be summed up like this. That the Communist success come out of our own failure. I would explain more in details. The communist their main weapon in... fighting the war was propaganda. They use the propaganda to recruit people, to lead them to the war and for that purpose they had some advantages, such as, the Communist cadres or officers they had no choice but to live with their own men under the same physical and material condition. They had no quarters for officers.

They had, even if they wanted, they could not afford. So, the officer had to live with the troops and to stay twenty four hours a day and they could not stay in one place because they would be attacked. They had to move from place to place to be able to move from place to place they had to accommodate with the people, the local people. For them to get the protection, the supply, the information. Under such conditions you can see a better mutual comprehension between the officer the officer, the troops and the local people. Well, the Communist used to take that fact to boost their ah their political way of handling the people.

What were the political and economic issues that they exploited?

Well, as I say, the success of the Communist come out from out of our failure I mean that ah ah politically, for example, our election. The people who went to vote were the first who knew their power in using their ah votes. And, they all knew that in ninety percent of the vote, well they all understand that. Their vote were only a an apparent protection for the government action and the gover... they all knew that the government actions were the ones that influence the outcome of the vote of the election.

In Vietnam, in South Vietnam, during all these different elections, even to start with under President Diem, ninety percent of the election were maneuver by the government official stopping at the village and district level and all that under the central government directives. So, the people who went to vote knew that these elections had no value for them to influence the government and the Communists knew that. They took advantage from that fact and make it a propaganda to the people. That is on the political consideration. Now, you go to the economic consideration.

At almost at all level of the government in South Vietnam, corruption was a fact, was a fact everywhere in most of the case. Aah, take an example. The aid, I mean the what they called the by the US, aahum Agency for National aah International Development, American personnel were present at the ceremony, the Vietnamese official giving out the picks, the donation which the US made aah labor and these donations went to the individual Vietnamese in the hamlet, in the village, but they wait ten days later. The same Vietnamese official came back to some of these aah family and asked and usually got some other things in compensation of what they gave out.

Yes, they asked...

Oh yeah. Aah, take an example. In South Vietnam during the pacification period I mean in a village where we consider the military consider as a pacify is usually they set up a ceremony having the villagers grouped together, having the local Vietnamese official there with the presence sometimes of the US to present the things from the uhm US agency in Saigon as a witnesses and they gave out they handed out the donations such as picks, uhm milk and other donations to the villagers. Not all the villagers, but a number of a selected villagers. Well , I was proven, I served as a as a Province Chief for over three and a half years.

I had the opportunity to follow up the action and one of the lesson come back to me was that quite a number of these people who came there to receive the gifts, the donation. They are related, they were relative of this local official. The other related directly or indirectly to them, to these local official and if they are not related too... a, week or ten week after the donation given out they might be asked by the local official for some compensation, in money, in chickens, or in picks, or in rice.

Well, this is known in the area, it might not be known at the MAC headquarters of the aah aah US ambassador or even at the Vietnamese president. But in the within the village, I mean the lowest level in the country, everybody knows, but the thing is that they knew they dare not complain for their own sake, for their own safety. And the Communist took that fact as in the advantage. They make it a propaganda.

What other economic or political questions did they exploit in the countryside?

Well, there are several but I would say another illustrated example was the the aah relation of the rent from the farmers, from the tenants. Is that the tenants? Well, the landlord, well we say the landlord for some might have maybe ten or twenty or aah thirty acres of land. They let the farmers, the tenant using uhm the the land and they had some some arrangement a with the local official, the villageship, the hamletship aah for them to collect the rent for the landowner who usually live in a very secure area, such as or Saigon.

Aah, these aah tenants had to had to aah aah pay the rent at the required rate made by the landowners because those who go out to collect , go outside aah, a another example... that clearly happened in my province. Aah, before I came to the province as a Province Chief , in the province of the the provincial government discover ability to fight against us. In most of the case when they...Q ...The Communists don't have didn't have the ability to fight the war in South Vietnam. And they didn't have the ability to attract the people and to win the war finally.

If we make only one third of the mistake in our time, I admit it we should have made mistake but just only if we make only on our side one third of all the mistake we make, thc Communists could not have won the war. This is so this is aah why we say a political war. A war in Asia was a political war, and military then are only to support the war. Not to lead the war as under aah as in during the war in Vietnam. He knew that...

For now, give us that anyway, just very simply, just as you said that you can expand on it later. Deal with that simple we will use that phrase. That's important, OK?

Well, aah, after the war in 1975, the Communists posted their ability but we as the Vietnamese fighting this war the whole, the war for thirty years. We all know that the Communist success in Vietnam come out from, come out of our failure. And I will say that if we in the Vietnamese side and the American wealth, if we could make only one third of the amount of the mistake in during the war the Communists would not have won the war. So, as I mentioned earlier, the main duh the real weapon the main weapon of the Communist were propaganda. And their propaganda was a efficient because they used the mistake made by our side to work on the minds of the people and that was the way how they could get the recruit, the supply and the other element to fight the war...Well, after the war, in 1975...

Start with the mistakes... if we only...

If we could afford to make only one third of the amount of the mistakes, the Communists could not have won the war.

.

Well, with the overwhelming presence of Americans in the country, at the capitol level, city level, as well as at the bureau level, the Vietnamese people began to lose their Vietnamese identity among the Vietnamese leadership. They look at everything as American and the aah every Vietnamese leader as under the aah the American...Well, the there's aah there's a reason for aah the fact that aah the Vietnamese people...There's aah there's a reason for the Vietnamese aah to lose their confidence in the Vietnamese leadership. And refer to the American for aah every everything.

I cite some of the example. I was aah a Province Chief in a a provinceship, and during my time I refuse to have the office of my advisor, my counterpart my American counterpart... by my side. But then, two year later, I mean by 1967 or '68, I return to the province as a visitor and I saw side to side with the provinceship office was a office of the American advisor and this is aah so the people there, the Vietnamese people there could see the difference. How American become influent even if the American who occupy the office didn't play his influence but they look at the fact, the look at the physical appearance to make the judgment. Now another example in 1966...

Another example aah by the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966, I was assigned as a director of a country pacification cadres. Then, I went to Vung Tau where we had a training center for the cadres. The training was initially formed by organized by an American team. So by the time I took over the command the training center turned to was aah turned to the Vietnamese as aah a Vietnamese training center. But the American advisor plus my advisory personnel still remained there its ok.

But when I visited the center, and as I I enter into the camp, had to go first and every visitor or every personnel who went to the center about that time had to go first through the office of the senior advisor, and not only the senior advisor but his own also with him his own advisory group including clerks and everything before they can get to the office of the Vietnamese commandant of the camp. Which is a smaller in size than the office of the aah the advisor and this sort of thing look very minimal of minimal significance to the aah to American.

But to the Vietnamese it has a very profound impact on the mentality. So I argue with the American aah advisor for many days about that particular thing and I took it back to higher American level, and they didn't seem to understand the problem. For me, for them this is a very minimal thing. But for me and for other Vietnamese this is a very a very important psychologica1ly important thing. It mean that the leadership of Vietnamese are American resides there. Now another example.

Aah, during that period of time the pacification cadre throughout the country were paid by an American agency and under the pretext of controlling the recruits, the personnel, and avoiding the corruption the American agency assigned their American representatives the pay to the cadre. Well, technically speaking, this is a good way to do the operation, but in Vietnam by that time it was a matter of everything had to be connected with political consideration.

And how the cadre, who got paid under and by the Americans present there and they all knew that American money relate to them. And the villagers who look and who know about that happening they felt about what the pacification cadre meant. Well, years later they changed the system and they come back to the Vietnamese side. But it was late...

is simple.

These are pretty aah simple. Aah, among the thousand now example. These are three examples. Among the thousand are similar, aaah example? Created a bad image of the Vietnamese aah leadership among the Vietnamese people. In a way, that the Communists took benefit from that and turn it into their own prop aaah aah and aah make it a propaganda claiming that we Vietnamese, ah these Vietnamese are the aah American lackeys...That what I want to finish...