CAN YOU TELL ME, PLEASE, WHAT WAS YOUR OFFICIAL TITLE DURING THE WAR? DURING 1940, 1941?

I was... I was a member of the staff of the War Cabinet; I was a member of the War Cabinet Secretariat, that's until... that's from the beginning of the war until the end of forty-.... two. In '43 and '44 I was principal private secretary to the Minister of War Production, which was Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, afterwards Lord Chandos. And from for three months, in the beginning of 1945, I was Special Assistant to the British ambassador in Washington on this topic, and then I went back to London and became personal assistant to Sir John Anderson, who was the minister in charge of the British work on what we called by the code name, "Tube Alloys." In 1947, I left the office and went to the treasury, but so I didn't have anything more to do with this... Better?

SO, LET'S START... YOU WERE ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE MAUD REPORT IN 1941. WHAT DID YOUR COMMITTEE CONCLUDE ABOUT THAT REPORT?

In September, 1941, I was a member of the staff of the, War Cabinet offices...

WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO STOP. YOU'RE GETTING A MICROPHONE SHADOW ON YOUR FOREHEAD.

Ah...

SO ONCE MORE, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE...

... In September, 1941 I was a member of the staff of the offices of the War Cabinet, and one of my duties was to act as Secretary to the Scientific Advisory Committee, of the Cabinet, of which Lord Hankey was chairman. And Lord Hankey's committee was asked to carry out a broad, general view of a technical report produced by a committee known as the MAUD Committee — a very distinguished body who produced a remarkable document. The Henry committee was, didn't attempt to cover the whole matter in detail, but to concentrate... on the, important issues of policy the conclusions are set out in Mrs. Margaret Gowing's History of the British Atomic Energy Project, but, summarizing very briefly, we concluded — we heard evidence from a number of expert witnesses; we took evidence for five days — and the conclusions that we reached,... would say that in the first place we concluded that the project of making an atomic bomb... was technically feasible. We also concluded that it could be completed in a time scale of say, two to five years — I think the committee said that two years was probably too little, and five years perhaps too much — but that the project should be treated as one of the very highest priority. The, the most important question was, if we were to carry this project forward, should we try to do it in the United Kingdom, or should we send the scientists working in Britain, which, who included distinguished refugee scientists, should we send them to the United States, to take part in the Manhattan Project that was then beginning to get under way. We did — the committee decided that the latter was the right course partly because it was thought that the construction of a... plant, of an, of a... diffusion plant, such as was built in America at Oak Ridge, would be, would put far too great a strain on our war production capacity, and... because of the risk of... bombing, to say nothing of the possible risk of invasion, it was much too dangerous to try to carry it out in the United Kingdom. And that was the decision that the government took, and from that point on, our principal scientists went and worked in America. I think when they first joined the Americans, they were probably ahead, in the sense that they had done more work than had been done there, but there was no doubt at all that if we hadn't sent them that the... American scientists would have been perfectly capable of doing this work for themselves. But we saved them time, and in time of war, especially as the great fear was that the Germans might be working also on this project, time was of the essence.

LET'S STOP FOR A SECOND. DO YOU WANT A DRINK OF WATER? THE MAUD REPORT, AS YOU WERE TELLING US EARLIER... WHEN YOU FIRST READ IT, HOW DID YOU RESPOND?

The, the MAUD report was a highly technical document, and I certainly tried — didn't try to grasp all the scientific detail in the report, but the conclusion that emerged was quite clear, which was that it should be possible to construct a bomb, which would have a power equivalent to 70,000 tons of TNT. And my first reaction... was, If this is really true and this can be done, it will make war impossible.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AGAIN? WE HAD CARS GOING BY...

Well, the committee had heard evidence, and had decided that the conclusions of the MAUD report, as to the feasibility of the project, were fully justified. The question then arose in that event should the United Kingdom try to develop this weapon themselves, and if so, should they try to do it in England, or, as had been suggested, should they try to do it in Canada; or, thirdly, should they send top scientists, who included distinguished refugee scientists, to the United States, to work with the United States team on this project. We decided the committee decided, against they decided to recommend against trying to do it in England, partly because it would only strain the resources of our war production industry, particularly in resources of skilled labor and some materials. And also because of the vulnerability of the United Kingdom obviously, to bombing, and a diffusion plant would have stretched over a very wide area, and it would have been extremely vulnerable to enemy air attacks.

COULD YOU TELL ME WHAT THE ESSENCE OF THE QUEBEC TREATY WAS, THE PACT THAT IT WAS A SECRET AGREEMENT AND SO ON?

Well, it's the...The Quebec Agreement was not a formal document drafted by lawyers; it was a very informal record of a discussion which had taken place in time of war between the President and the Prime Minister. And its very existence was known to very few people. The, it therefore couldn't be said to have the status of a formally binding, understanding. Nevertheless the... British government did place considerable reliance on it. If you... I could summarize the content of the document by saying first of all that the parties that undertook never to use this weapon against each other; secondly, that they undertook never to use it against any other... power without, not merely without consultation, but without the agreement of the other, and that there should be full and effective cooperation between the two countries, though, during, while the war lasted obviously the highest priority attached to the carrying to a successful conclusion of the project in the United States. This all is going to be some interruption; however, I am quite happy to do it again if you want to.

(BACKGROUND TECHNICAL DISCUSSION)

I'll try and make it more succinct, if that's, that's what we're after, yes.

IF YOU COULD MENTION AGAIN THE FACT THAT IT WAS AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT...

Well, the Quebec Agreement was initialed by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in August, 1943; it was... not a document drafted by lawyers; it was an informal record of a discussion that they had had together; it had a number of provisions, that neither side would ever use this... "agency," it was called, against the other, that neither side would ever use it against another country without the agreement of the other; that there should be full and effective cooperation between the two countries, but that during the war the highest priority would clearly be to bring to a successful conclusion the work being done in the United States.

LET'S GO BACK TO A POINT YOU MADE EARLIER: THAT WHEN YOU READ THE MAUD REPORT AND REALIZED THAT IT WAS TELLING YOU ABOUT A NEW WEAPON WITH ALL THIS GREAT FORCE, DID YOU REALLY FEEL THAT IT WOULD SOMEHOW MAKE WAR IMPOSSIBLE?

The MAUD Report was a highly technical document, but the conclusion that emerged from it quite clearly was that it should be possible to construct a bomb with a power equivalent to 70,000 tons of TNT. And my first reaction to that, perhaps without giving it a great deal of thought, was, If this is so, it will make war impossible.

IN HINDSIGHT, HOW DO YOU LOOK UPON THE WAY YOU FELT THEN?

Well I suppose, in modern parlance, we are talking about the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and obviously the deterrent effect is quite different if both sides have them, if both... possible sides, to a future war. In that event, the main deterrent effect, in the first instant, at any rate, is that neither side is likely to use them against the other. M, if that were all, you would be back to a war fought with conventional mean. But there is always the possibility that in an all-out war, between two... powers, who both possess this weapon, that the power facing imminent defeat would use it, without regard to the effect that they would invite immediate retaliation. So that, to that extent, one can't say, with certainty, that there will never be any first use of nuclear weapons. And that has a deterrent effect on the likelihood of war.

WERE YOU THINKING, EVEN BACK IN 1941, THAT THIS NEW WEAPON WOULD FUNCTION AS A DETERRENT RATHER THAN SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE USED?

I simply said without too much reflection, what I said to you a moment ago, that the existence of these weapons would raise the stakes of war to a point where war...was no longer worth anybody's while to go to war. That's quite a different atmosphere from, say, before 1914, when it was taken for granted that war is a continuation of policy by other means, in the words of Clausewitz.

COULD YOU TELL ME ABOUT NIELS BOHR NOW? YOU MET HIM WHEN YOU WERE IN WASHINGTON. COULD YOU JUST TELL US WHAT HE WAS LIKE AND THE KIND OF IDEAS HE WAS ESPOUSING?

I met Niels Bohr when he came to Washington in early 1945 and he was staying with his son at the Danish embassy for quite a while. And I saw him on a number of occasions. He was tremendously obsessed. I grant one would say, with the not... perhaps that's not quite the right word. He was preoccupied with the appalling nature of this weapon which he and his scientific colleagues had helped to develop and he wanted to find the... some means of mitigating its harm -- what might well be its harmful consequences for the future. His ideas were not very clearly expressed and his English was very difficult to follow. And he also talked at very great length too. But put rather boldly it seemed of a mind to say that the Americans and ourselves and Canadians should get together with the Russians and tell them everything we know about atomic energy. And that this will have... will produce such a revolution in... international relations that it will have a very beneficial effect for the future. That... those were his ideas. He... spelled them out at some length in two articles in the Times soon after the bomb was dropped.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO TELL ME THAT AGAIN A LITTLE MORE CONCISELY.

Yes. I met Niels Bohr in Washington in the spring of 1945. He stayed at the Danish embassy for several months.

[REPEATS QUESTION] — COULD YOU LOOK AT ME?

Sorry. I met Niels Bohr...I met Niels Bohr in Washington in the spring of 1945 when he was staying for several weeks at the Danish embassy and I was working in the British embassy. He talked to me and to others at great length about the effect of the discovery of atomic... of atomic weapons on international relations. His view of the matter was that the right course was to make the fullest possible disclosure to the Russians of all that we had discovered about atomic weapons and that this would bring about such a revolutionary change in international relations as to remove a large part of the danger that he saw in this discovery.

AND WHEN HE CAME TO LONDON TO VISIT WITH CHURCHILL WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT?

Well, I think that all I need say is that the ideas that I mentioned a moment ago that Bohr had about the right way of handling the international aspects of atomic energy was so diametrically opposed to anything the British government,

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ABOUT PHRASING]

Bohr came to London in 1945, no in — I'm sorry. Start again.. Prime... Churchill was still prime minister. Bohr came to London towards the end of the war...

I'M GOING TO START YOU AGAIN. LOOK AT ME.

Niels Bohr came to London towards the end of the war and was taken to see Mr. Churchill by Sir John Anderson, I think. Bohr's ideas about the right way to handle the future policy on atomic weapons was that the three powers who knew something about it should make the fullest possible disclosure to the Russians and that this would completely revolutionize the relations between Russia and the allies. This was so completely diametrically opposed to anything that either the British the government or especially Mr. Churchill held that it was not surprising that there was no meeting of minds between them.

WHAT WAS THE PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO BOHR AND HIS IDEAS?

Well, I think I've covered that haven't I?

I'M JUST ASKING AGAIN FOR A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SHOT HERE.

Yes. I mean, you want me to repeat what I just said or only part of it?

JUST THE PART TO ANSWER THE QUESTION WHAT CHURCHILL'S REACTION WAS TO BOHR'S IDEAS.

Niels Bohr came to London when Mr. Churchill was prime minister and expounded his ideas of complete disclosure to the Russians of the secrets of the atomic weapon. And he thought that this would completely revolutionize international relations. This was very far removed from anything that Mr. Churchill believed and it's not surprising that there was no meeting of minds between them.

WHY WAS THIS SO FAR REMOVED FROM THE WAY CHURCHILL THOUGHT ABOUT THINGS? HOW DID CHURCHILL VIEW THE RUSSIANS OR IDEAS OF SHARING THIS KNOWLEDGE WITH THE RUSSIANS?

Churchill, and I think his friends in the United States regarded the atomic weapon as being the most highly secret development in the war. Something of immense power and importance. And they did not realize perhaps to the full the extent to which the Russians were capable of making such a weapon for themselves -- within a matter of a few years. And therefore, the policy on it was to confine the knowledge of it to the smallest number of persons who in all three of the countries concerned, the United States, the United Kingdom, and even Canada -- and that we should go voluntary to the Russians and tell them about it — something that only happened when unfortunately some scientists were guilty of treason. It would have seemed to them totally unrealistic.

COULD YOU REPEAT THAT LAST PART WITHOUT THE ASIDE OF THE ESPIONAGE NOTION...

Yes. Niels Bohr came to London in the closing months, I think, of Mr. Churchill's prime minister ship and was taken to see him at 10 Downing St. The ideas which Bohr held about the right way to handle this matter was so completely different from those which anybody held in the British government of the American government, least of all, Mr. Churchill, that it's not surprising that there was no meeting of minds between them. Quite apart from the fact that Niels Bohr's English was very difficult to follow.

WHEN THE BOMB WAS USED, ACCORDING TO THE QUEBEC AGREEMENT, TRUMAN NEEDED CHURCHILL'S CONSENT TO USE THE BOMB ON JAPAN. WHAT IS YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF CHURCHILL'S CONSENT — ABOUT HE FELT ABOUT USING IT MILITARILY AGAINST JAPAN?

Well, as a practical matter, I think he thought it was inconceivable that we could seek to withhold consent from the American decision on the project into which they had poured 6 billion dollars, I think it was, which at that time was a great deal of money. And furthermore which seemed likely to shorten the Japanese war with saving countless American lives. I think if the decision had been his alone, he might have thought of dropping a bomb in some comparatively uninhabited place and say, There! Look what we can do to you to you if you don't surrender. But that was not a policy that he pressed on the Americans at all. Where I think he took it for granted that we must accept their decision. It was their decision.

COULD YOU REPEAT THAT?

The Quebec Agreement provided that neither party would use this agency against another country without consent of its partner. Therefore, Mr. Churchill was asked whether he agreed to the dropping of bombs on Japan. As a practical matter, he thought it inconceivable that he should seek to withhold his consent. If the decision had been his alone, I think it is possible that he might have suggested that... the bomb should be dropped in some relatively uninhabited area as a threat to the Japanese as to what might follow. That perhaps didn't take account of the fact that there were only two bombs in existence at that time.

HOW DO YOU THINK CHURCHILL PERCEIVED THE BOMB? DO YOU THINK HE SAW IT AS SOMETHING NEW AND REVOLUTIONARY OR JUST THE EXTENSION OF TRADITIONAL WEAPONS?

Churchill had a great sense of humor even in his official minutes. And he wrote a minute to the chiefs of staff committee saying, "Although I am myself quite content with the existing explosives, I wouldn't wish to stand in the way of progress. And therefore this project should be pursued as a matter of the highest priority."

DO YOU THINK HE HAD THE SAME KIND OF SENSE THAT YOU SAID YOU DID ON READING THE MAUD REPORT THAT THIS COULD REVOLUTIONIZE THE WAY WAR COULD BE CONDUCTED?

I don't know what his in thoughts were about the coming of this weapon. I think he just felt that it... that there was a great risk the Germans might get it first and that if we had it would be a war winning device. The damage done by the two bombs dropped on Japan was, in terms of area devastated and lives destroyed, was in fact less than the damage done by a conventional — by 500 bomber raids over Tokyo. Though they did not of course produce radiation effects, but they produced a firestorm. So, I mean — I... as I say, I think that he regarded it as a war winning device which was an extension of existing methods of conducting war.

AFTER THE WAR ENDED, IN THE FALL OF 1945, THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE UNITED STATES HAD SOME KIND OF NATIONAL POLICY ON ATOMIC ENERGY, WAS TRYING TO PRESS PRESIDENT TRUMAN FOR SOME KIND OF STATEMENT OF POLICY AND HE MADE THAT SPEECH IN WHICH HE CALLED THE BOMB THE SACRED TRUST OF THE UNITED STATES. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH REACTION TO THAT NOTION?

Well, Mr. Attlee went to Washington--

[START OVER]

Mr. Attlee went to Washington in November of 1945 for talks with President Truman and Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian prime minister. The British had two preoccupations. The first was to make a further attempt to get the United States to agree to full and effective exchange of information including exchange of information about the building of large-scale plants. But they were also concerned with the proper handling of what had become known as the Acheson-Lilienthal report which advocated a scheme of international control of atomic energy by placing all construction of atomic weapons in the hands of... in the ownership of an international agency. We wanted therefore — He, Mr. Attlee wanted to discuss that matter with the President and with Mr. King.

WAS MR. ATTLEE CONCERNED AT THAT TIME THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS TRYING TO CUT OUT GREAT BRITAIN FROM FUTURE ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT? WAS THERE SOME SENSE OF URGENCY WHEN HE CAME OVER HERE?

There had been a considerable stalling on any exchange of information about the construction of large-scale plants. In fact, in the following year, the... McMahon Act was passed which made any such course illegal. We perhaps, I shouldn't... I think that the British government may not have realized the extent to which the Quebec Agreement was a highly secret agreement which had been kept completely secret from Congress and couldn't be implemented could not be treated as an executive agreement, we say, something within the power of the President without reference to Congress. And it became abundantly clear that Congress would not agree to any such matter. Nevertheless the British government wanted to press the matter as far as was practicable.

WHEN YOU CAME OVER WITH MR. ATTLEE IN THE FALL OF 1945, AND THEIR MEETINGS WHICH ENSUED WITH GENERAL GROVES AND OTHERS, WHAT WAS THE UNITED KINGDOM AFTER AT THAT TIME, AND WHAT WAS THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WHAT DID THEY WANT TO COME OUT OF THE TALKS WITH THE UNTIED STATES?

The United Kingdom point of view was that in the Quebec Agreement, they had been given to understand that there would be full and effective cooperation between the two countries. Though there would not be exchange of information on the construction of large-scale plants while the war lasted and they were anxious to see what they had imagined to be a pledge fulfilled. I'll put it more simply they just wanted to press the American government to go as far as was politically possible in the exchange of information.

DID THEY HAVE A SENSE OF THAT TIME THAT WASN'T HAPPENING, WAS THERE SOME KIND OF FEAR ON THEIR PART THAT THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO SHUT THEM OUT?

Well, the Americans certainly had not given them any information on the know how of building a large-scale plant.

HAD THERE BEEN ANY EVENT THAT PRECIPITATED ATTLEE'S TRIP OVER?

I don't quite remember what was the--what triggered off Attlee's visit. Whether it was a desire to raise the question of exchange of information or whether it was also alternatively the necessity for formulating a position on the question of the international control of atomic energy. Those were the two topics that were discussed at the meeting the latter particularly in private conversations between the three heads of government. I mean... President, the Prime Minister and Mr. Mackenzie King.

THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT ANY KIND OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND UK WOULD INTERFERE WITH EFFORTS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. GENERAL GROVES THOUGHT THIS WAY AS DID SOME OTHERS. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING AND WHAT WAS ATTLEE'S FEELING ABOUT THAT?

I think the British side felt that this was certainly an argum—an arguable point of view. It was difficult to refute it. But, one might say that there wasn't a fundamental difference between moving from a position in which the United States possessed a monopoly of knowledge of atomic weapons to a position in which there was a wider system of international control that as compared with that--to move from a position where the three governments who had cooperated on this matter during the war to a wider system of control that there wasn't a fundamental distinction. However, I very much doubt whether they expected the United States to accept that it was perhaps a rather logical rather than practical.

I'D LIKE TO RESPOND TO THAT AGAIN AND TELL ME FIRST WHAT GROVES' NOTION WAS. JUST TO SORT OF STATE THE CASE FIRST FOR HIS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS MIGHT GET IN THE WAY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THEN GO ONTO SAY THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UK DIDN'T THINK THAT WAS REALLY THE CASE.

Not only General Groves but I think Mr. Secretary Burns both thought that there would be an inconsistency which would be—

(INTERRUPTION)