SEVERAL PEOPLE HAVE COMMENTED, AND HAVE WRITTEN THAT IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRST BERLIN CRISIS AND THE BERLIN BLOCKADE IN 1948-1949, THAT THE ALLIES TOOK A SERIES OF STEPS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THAT WERE ALMOST QUITE FORCEFULLY DELIBERATELY GOING TO CREATE A DIVIDED GERMANY. DO YOU THINK THAT'S A FAIR COMMENT ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH WERE PREPARED TO DO IN CREATING BIZONIA? DO YOU THINK THEY WERE TO SOME EXTENT RECKLESS OF THE SOVIET RESPONSES?

I think it would be fair to say that at that given time it was correct from the Western side to assume that the Eastern side, the Soviets so to say, made an independent policy against the German occupied Soviet zone. And I think even at that time it was my opinion I still have, it was a correct reaction to act concentrating on developing the three Western occupied zones. So it was unavoidable I think. This was the beginning of the split by the way. But it was a reaction on what has been done by the Soviet side.

THERE WAS A GREAT PLAY AFTER THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF 1948. THERE WAS A GREAT EMPHASIS TO SOME EXTENT THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE 1945 ON THE INCREASING THREAT TO EUROPE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT THREAT. FIRSTLY, DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS ANY EXAGGERATION TO THAT THREAT? SECONDLY, DO YOU THINK THE THREAT WAS AN OVERTLY MILITARY THREAT OR DO YOU THINK IT WAS SOMETHING ELSE?

I had been in Berlin at that time in '48 and '49. So, I felt at that time, really felt, undoubtedly, the Eastern side has tried to overwhelm the whole city of Berlin and so we feel really threatened. And I will never forget it in my life. When they started the blockade we felt it necessary to defend ourselves, without knowing what will happen. So we were aware. It could have been also that in case of a Western withdrawal, we would be part of the Soviet occupied territory. So Mayor Reuter at that time went to General Clay and told him the very interesting words, "Don't be worried. We, the Berliners, will stand fast, firm at your side." So we felt really threatened, undoubtedly.

THAT'S SPEAKING AS A BERLINER, BUT DO YOU THINK THAT THAT SENSE OF THREAT COULD HAVE BEEN TRANSLATED INTO A MORE GENERAL MILITARY THREAT AGAINST EUROPE AS A WHOLE?

I think you have to compare with the global situation at that time. And I'm still convinced there was no military danger. It was on the Soviet side, that tried how firm will the West react. But I don't think that there was the danger of a military conflict at all.

SO HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE THREAT? SEPARATELY FROM BERLIN, WAS IT A POLITICAL ONE —

No. After, after it was clear that they had introduced the communist Polish government, had introduced the communist Czech government. Why then not to introduce a communist government for the whole of Berlin and maybe from that point to start for the whole of Germany. It was a political try... to try also to extend political pressure on the Western side. And to see and to watch how their reaction will be. At that time, the Soviets were engaged in the Chinese struggle of Mao Zedong. And they were very happy I think that especially the United States concentrated so much of planes for the airlift, which they hadn't available in the East Asia. This was absolutely sufficient from the Soviet point of view and the Soviet interest at that time. But altogether, this leads me to the result there was no military threat.

IN A SENSE YOU PAINT A VERY BLEAK PICTURE, BECAUSE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS THAT THERE WAS AN INTRANSIGENT SIDE TO THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS BERLIN AND TOWARDS — AS YOU SAY THEY WERE TESTING THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. HOW DOES THAT SQUARE WITH THE VIEWS THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE SPD HAD AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME, THAT UNITED GERMANY WAS POSSIBLE, AND THAT MORE POLITICAL EFFORT SHOULD BE PUT INTO A UNITED GERMANY?

I think you have to compare between the situation as it existed in the times of the airlift and let me say, four or five years later, after we started the Federal Republic. Until '49 we had nearly no expressed German political will. It was impossible to imagine in the times of the airlift that united Germany is ahead. On the other hand, it was impossible to imagine at that time that the split of Germany will stay rather for a long time. So the fathers of our constitution, our basic law, were unable to imagine that, let me say, the split could continue for another forty years. If one would have told this to these people at that time, they would have said, "You are crazy." But if this would happen, then nobody will speak any longer about German unity. So both judgments at that time were wrong. But the fathers of our constitution argued and formulated explicitly in the constitution for the...limited time in which we are not united. We do not make the constitution. We have only a basic law. So it was quite clear that the direction from all the parts of the political scenery were concentrated on German unity. And some years later, when the Federal Republic of Germany started, brought out...we had a debate in Bonn, "Where should the capital be situated? Berlin or Bonn?" And it was highly interesting that the first draft which was brought into the new federal parliament came from the communists. And they asked to move the capital from Bonn to Berlin. I think they would not be likely — they would not like to be remembered in this. But, it was refused at that time from all democratic parties because it was common conviction. It would not be advisable to have a federal government and the federal parliament under possible Soviet pressure in Berlin. So it was quite clear it was a provisionary capital and sometimes the French are right to say... Some years later when we were asked to participate in NATO, then the whole debate came up again. And then we had the first real split in the political life because my friends at that time had the opinion, if we share NATO — If we start rearmament, then it will be the end for German unity for a long time. We didn't know at that time what I know by now. NATO membership and German unity are impossible to reach at the same time. NATO membership exclude German unity. We need NATO for our Federal Republic security, undoubtedly. But at that time, the SPD took the position; it would be irresponsible in the interest of German unity not to sound out, to try. If reunification would be possible before entering NATO, and we were defeated by majority. Uh, unfortunately I have to say we were right. So, up to now more than 30 years later, discussions still going on in the Federal Republic, was it a mistake? Was it a mistake not to sound out Stalin's offer which he has made on the 10th of March in '52, offering free elections and unification. And Adenauer refused it immediately. He had the impression he would be endangered in his intentions to anchor with the Federal Republic into NATO. But nevertheless, this is history. If we have made a mistake, missed a chance at that time. It's still going on as a debate here.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID TO US THAT IN FACT, EVEN AT THAT TIME, THAT THE CONCEPT OF A UNITED GERMANY WAS REALLY A PIPE DREAM, THAT A COUNTRY AS LARGE AND AS POWERFUL AS UNITED GERMANY COULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN EUROPE. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT? WAS THAT A FAIR ANALYSIS OF THAT DEBATE AT THAT TIME?

You know... the, the question if German unity would have been a dream even in the... early '50s belongs to the questions which I cannot answer. Because it was not found out. It was before we entered NATO. I could very well imagine, for example, that a neutral united Germany would have meant that the Soviet divisions would be stationed in Poland and not in this situation or in this position in which they are by now. I could very well take the position that in such a case, France would never have left NATO Integrational Command. So, and even now I'm not sure if it would have been in the interest of the best to have such a solution. But this is history, and you cannot go back to these decisions. We have based our policy on the facts. And the facts are we have entered NATO, and my party has drawn the conclusion in um, '59 and '60 we have to base our policy on the treaties which are legal and which are decisions.

LATER ON, OR SHORTLY AFTER THAT PERIOD WHEN GERMANY HAD JOINED NATO IN FACT, OR THE AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE IN 1954 NOT TO MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AND ATOMIC WEAPONS, THERE WAS AN EXERCISE THAT NATO CARRIED OUT CALLED "CARTE BLANCHE," WHICH WAS AN EXERCISE WHICH WORKED OUT THE IMPACT OF USING LARGE NUMBERS — USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER A SOVIET INVASION OF EUROPE. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT? IT CAUSED A CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AND PRESS OUTCRY WHEN THE RESULTS OF THAT EXERCISE WERE KNOWN. IT POSITED, I THINK, THAT 300 NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN DROPPED OVER WESTERN GERMANY. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT DEBATE? AND COULD YOU JUST DESCRIBE THE MOOD AT THE TIME. I MEAN, YOU WERE A JOURNALIST. PRESUMABLY YOU WERE WRITING ABOUT THIS OR KNEW COLLEAGUES WHO WERE WRITING ABOUT IT. CAN YOU JUST DESCRIBE FOR US THE FEELING THAT THE NEWS OF THAT EXERCISE ENGENDERED?

It was a crucial debate before the decision was accepted to join NATO. Some years later, eh, I think in '55-'56, we had another crucial debate, namely the question, should the federal army accept nuclear explosives or nuclear warheads or nuclear munitions in the Federal Republic? At that time it was an outcry of a number of the most known and respected scientists. Herr von Weizsäcker the brother of the president, was leading this. And they said this should be avoided under all circumstances. And it was a big campaign under the slogan, "Ohne mich" — "Without me." So we refused to accept this. But one of the main arguments — nearly forgotten meanwhile — was, this will destroy what we intend to defend. And this exactly the same argument you have seen 30 years later. The difference between that time and now is that it's difficult to explain why the population at that time was not so much alarmed. I can only give or try to explain it in the way that eh, the population at that time felt — "we have no authority; we cannot decide; we are to take it as others do it; so we cannot do anything about it." And this has changed. But at that time, as a result, we have accepted eh, even, eh, nuclear armaments on our soil under American decision and under American command.

FIRST OF ALL, THE DEBATE INSIDE THE BUNDESSTADT BETWEEN THE SPD AND THE CDU OVER WHETHER TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE GERMAN FORCES. BUT THERE WAS ALSO A MUCH WIDER DEBATE GOING ON OUTSIDE. THE SPD ORGANIZED A SIGNIFICANT EXTRA PARLIAMENTARY LOBBY AND ACTIVITY. HOW BITTER WAS IT? WHAT SORT OF FEELINGS WERE ENGENDERED?

It was, it was an exciting debate in the Bundesstadt and it... were mass demonstrations in the streets. We have never had since the war I think. But all this brought down, was broken down at the beginning of the Hungary crisis. When the Soviets marched in to Hungary, it was the end of the whole affair because people said, "It's absolutely necessary to defend against these damned bad Soviets." And this happened in '56, and the result was in '57 that for the first time and the only time, CDU became the majority in the parliament. So this was the answer. This was, so to say, the result and decision of the population and our result was in '59 a new program in which we had given up our real connection to Marxism, became an open party. A people's party. Social democratic party. And one year later in '60 we accepted the treaties and the decisions as they have reached. But the beginning of the end and some people at that time said, "You can always rely upon Stalin and his successors. Their actions, they help the conservatives."

WAS IT ALARMING IN ANY WAY? BECAUSE AS YOU SAID THIS WAS REALLY THE FIRST SERIOUS SPLIT THAT HAD OCCURRED IN GERMAN POLITICS, IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS AT ANY RATE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. DID PEOPLE FEEL THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS VERY WORRYING AT ALL?

The psychological development is very difficult to remember from our present point of view. You should not forget that immediately after the war, we had no political interest at all. The only interests we had were, "Do we have some bread, maybe some papers to close the windows, and possibly in addition to that some coal to heat our rooms?" This went on for a rather long time, let me say, '48-'49. After the Federal Republic had started, the interest of the population was really concentrated on jobs, working to get something, as quick as possible get rid of these ruins and rubbles and all these terrible things. And we had a real wave to eat, to eat, to eat and enjoy eating as much as possible. We missed this for a long, long time. After this eating wave, we had a clothing wave. To enjoy new clothiers, and so on. And after the clothing wave, we had a furniture wave. To have better houses and, and furniture and so on. And after this, we started a moving wave. So to get cars and to... to enjoy the freedom to decide for yourself where you are driving. And after this... this was later in the '60s you really started the travelling wave we are still in. But at that time, even if there were thousands and ten thousands of people marching in the streets, it was a minority. It was a minority. And the SPD at that time was not able to organize a political majority in the streets and by the streets. And I think Adenauer was wise enough to realize this and to follow his path even I couldn't share his views at that time.

YOU SAID SOMETHING ABOUT THAT I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU NOW, IS THAT AFTER THE CARTE BLANCHE EXERCISE? I MEAN IT WAS BEING — YOU USED A PHRASE, AND YOU SAID, REALLY YOU SAID YOU WERE GOING TO DESTROY AND THE IMPACT AND THE MEANING OF THE USE OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YOU WERE GOING TO DESTROY WHAT YOU HAD SET OUT TO DEFEND. NOW ADENAUER IN JUSTIFYING GERMAN ENTRY TO THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, PREVIOUSLY HAD SAID THAT IN FACT THAT THIS WOULD GUARANTEE, ONE OF THE REASONS WHY GERMANY SHOULD JOIN THE EDC, WAS THAT THIS WOULD GUARANTEE THAT WEST GERMANY WOULD NOT BE A BATTLEFIELD. AND YET CLEARLY THIS NATO EXERCISE HAD PROVED HIM WRONG. DO YOU THINK THAT WHEN ADENAUER MADE THAT PROMISE THAT HE BELIEVED IT? HE UNDERSTOOD IT? DO YOU THINK THAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE LEADING WEST GERMANY INTO A NUCLEAR ALLIANCE — ULTIMATELY A NUCLEAR ALLIANCE UNDERSTOOD REALLY WHAT THEY WERE DOING, OR DO YOU THINK THEY HAD A — ?

First of all, I think when Carte Blanche was published it was also a pure minority which realized what... what all's going on. Secondly, the government at that time, especially Adenauer argued, I cannot exclude risks, but the best way to avoid the risks, to guarantee the freedom we enjoy is deterrence. And for better deterrence we need nuclear weapons. This is a real guarantee for our freedom and this worked.

WORKED IN WHAT WAY? I MEAN IT WORKED ELECTORALLY?

It worked electorally, undoubtedly and ah, it worked — if you... if you remember what I have tried to say earlier, on the background of the psychological behavior of the population the people wanted to have an excuse, they wanted to convince themselves. They hoped to live peacefully and they said, if this is going wrong, nobody will ask us. We have to live anyway, so we have no decision. OK, let's hope it will be good.

CAN YOU SAY IN MORE DEPTH — THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SPD. I THINK THERE WAS A BI-ELECTION IN RHINE-WESTPHALIA, THE CDU WON QUITE SIGNIFICANT GAINS SHORTLY AFTER THE DEBATE ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, '58 OR '59. THERE WAS A SHIFT IN THE SPD'S POLITICS. AND YOU KNOW, THERE'D BEEN A CHANGE. CAN YOU DESCRIBE FOR US IN SLIGHTLY MORE DETAIL WHY THAT CHANGE OCCURRED AND REALLY WHAT IT REPRESENTED TO THE SPD?

The argument from the CDU was at that time they said all the ways of the socialists will end in Moscow. They are not prepared to give us the necessity to defend ourselves against the Soviets — you have seen how they act in Hungary. So you cannot rely upon that our security is in good hands with the socialists. This was the main tendency, and despite these attacks we said you are talking — you are in favor of the union — reunification. But in fact you are destroying reunification. It became obvious that the majority of the — my fellow countrymen here in the Federal Republic, we're much more interested to live here in security than to take carefully reunification. This was one point. So our resolve at that time was since we failed we had to accept the treaties, we have to accept the rearmament, we have to accept NATO's membership. And we have to start our policy based on these realities to develop a kind of détente, the real nucleus of the later so-called Ostpolitik was a result of what we have accepted as a fact. And was increased — I spoke a little bit earlier about our decision in the year '60. In '61 we had the build-up of the Wall. And this contributed another reality of split. At that time we had to realize that even not the Americans were able to destroy the Wall and to bring people together. So we had to do ourselves something to bring people together and to cross the Wall, if it was indeed impossible to destroy it, to break it away. So since the Allies did nearly nothing, we had to do it ourselves. So this was the beginning of the later policy of détente and Ostpolitik. Ah, and to some degree to accept the other side, the GDR, as a state. You have to negotiate if you want to reach something in favor of the human beings. So this is a real line we have seen from the days of blockade and airlift up to the days where the Wall was started. A period in which at the beginning the Germans have in practice nothing to decide and nothing to say, up to the point at which the Germans started to arrange themselves and to solve some problems which have been created by the split.

YOU SAID EARLIER THAT AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST BERLIN CRISIS AND THE AIRLIFT THAT IN BERLIN THERE WAS REAL ALARM AND FEAR ABOUT THE FUTURE AND ABOUT THE — WHAT EVENTUALLY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO. DID YOU FEEL THE SAME WAY IN THE SECOND BERLIN CRISIS IN '60? WHAT WAS THE — I MEAN THERE WAS A CHANGE THERE ABOUT THE WAY THAT THE GERMAN STATE AND THE GERMAN COUNTRY COULD REACT. WHAT WAS THE FEELING OF THE PEOPLE IN BERLIN? WAS THERE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE THERE AS WELL?

We had the first Berlin crisis let me say in connection with the airlift, the blockade. The second Berlin crisis was in '53 when we had this uprising in East Berlin and in East Germany. At that time some of my American friends feared the military intervention of the Soviets into West Berlin. I told them, don't be worried, nothing would happen. Ah, so we had no fear at that time. When the third Berlin Crisis so to say, in connection with the war came up nobody had any fear in Berlin against the military attack from the Soviet side. It was another crisis. It was a crisis of confidence, especially one year later when Peter Fechter died in public, 50 minutes, crying some centimeters behind the wall. And even an American soldier and an American officer were willing and able to help this poor man. At that time people for the first time realized that the western guarantees really end where the western borders of the three western sectors end. Let's stop talking about the nonsense of four power status, people said at that time. It's useless for us. So you can say in the blockade with the airlift, the people changed their attitude before they considered the three western powers as occupation forces then they realized they became friends in Berlin, in the time of the blockade, and deeply convinced only based on this experience it was later on possible to develop the Federal Republic of Germany and our entrance into the western alliances. And um, in... '61 in this ah, crisis it was a psychological breakdown or nearly breakdown. And when the American special group of 1,500 men were — was received by Vice President Johnson, people were happy, lucky, felt absolutely secure. And after Johnson had left the city they realized we have lost East Berlin.

YES, TWO MORE LAST QUESTIONS. HERR STRAUSS PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT PART IN THAT PARTICULAR PERIOD OF GERMAN POLITICS OVER THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE ISSUES AND NUCLEAR POLICY AND SO ON AND SO FORTH. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT ASSESSMENT? AND WOULD YOU HAVE SAID THAT WITHOUT STRAUSS, AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE AT THAT TIME, GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY MAY HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT?

I do not think that Strauss has played a decisive role at that time. The decisive man was really Adenauer, with his firm intention and will. Strauss played an interesting role. He was a most powerful defender eh, of this policy, and he has pushed the increased the increase of numbers of the Bundeswehr to an extent in which it became even dangerous for the real development of Bundeswehr. But he has not played a decisive role, I think.

DID YOU EVER GET ALARMED BY SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HE WAS SAYING? I MEAN IT SEEMED TO BE THAT ALMOST THE POLICY WAS ONE OF THREATENING THAT THE 1954 ACCORDS WOULD BE BROKEN IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE FULL INTEGRATION INTO GERMANY. DID YOU EVER FEEL THAT THAT WAS A DANGEROUS GAME?

I felt at that time what I feel today, that Strauss is a very powerful man, highly intelligent, highly intelligent. And sometimes it's difficult for him to control himself. And what he is telling and what he has told sometimes, under some alcoholic influence, it was and is clear that he could also take a dangerous way, he is collecting votes on the extreme right. And eh, undoubtedly the majority of my population has decided that they don't want that he would become chancellor. But he belongs to the history mostly.

OK. TWO FINAL QUESTIONS. ONE WAS REALLY — I ASKED YOU WHAT THE SPD'S POLICY WAS AT THE TIME IT WAS PROPOSED THAT GERMANY SHOULD ENTER THE EDC AND THEN NATO. AND YOU ANSWERED THE QUESTION, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, YOU ALSO REFERRED TO THE PRESENT POLICY, AND YOU WENT ON QUITE QUICKLY TO THE SHIFT IN '59. COULD I JUST ASK YOU WHAT THE SPD'S POLICY WAS AT THAT TIME WITHOUT ANY SORT OF GLOSS? IF I JUST ASK YOU NOW, AND SAY AT THE TIME IT WAS PROPOSED THAT GERMANY ENTER THE EDC AND THEN NATO, THE SPD'S POLICY WAS TO OPPOSE THIS, WHY WAS THAT?

The SPD's policy was not to enter NATO, not to enter European community, before we have sound out that it would be impossible or possible to have German reunification. Our policy was German reunification has first priority. And only if this would fail, then let's talk about Western integration.

WHY DO YOU THINK ADENAUER WASN'T PREPARED TO TRY THAT?

No. I'm absolutely — I feel absolutely sure that Adenauer has not the slightest intention for — in favor of unification. His intention and his priority was just the opposite. Let's secure the rest of the free Germany, and let's try to integrate Germany in a way that it would become impossible for my successors, which will be under all circumstances much more weakened people, or much weaker man than I am, let's integrate the Federal Republic in a way that this is unbreakable, unchangeable, unreturnable. And I think he succeeded.

ALL RIGHT. I'D LIKE TO GO BACK TO SOMETHING ELSE AND ASK YOU SOMETHING. YOU TALKED ABOUT THE BERLIN CRISIS AND THE BLOCKADE IN '49. YOU TALKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF IT.

Political eh, no. Blockade was '58—'57 to '47-'48.

'47, '48, RIGHT, SORRY. AND TALKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. ARE THERE ANY ANECDOTES YOU CAN THINK? ANY STORIES YOU REMEMBER THAT SORT OF DEMONSTRATE HOW PEOPLE ACTUALLY FELT AND HOW PEOPLE WERE LIVING IN THE CITY? I MEAN, IS THERE ANYTHING EITHER TRAGIC OR HUMOROUS...?

We had really hungered sometimes. And we were offered to go into the Eastern sector to get some food, potatoes, and coal. And there was not Wall at all, it was free movement. And I think no more than 2,000 or 3,000 of 1.9 million Berliners went to East Berlin. They preferred to have a little bit hunger than to give up their freedom. And this is unforgettable. So it was, we had no electricity. So some cars went out and gave the news, crossing the streets, and people assembled to listen what was going on. But at that time, the Western Berliners really have proven that they are in favor of freedom and want to defend it.