Interviewer: AT THE TIME IN THE '50S YOU WERE WITH LE MONDE?
Tatu: Yes, yes, and the first one in Moscow.
Tatu: From '57 to '64.
Interviewer: SO THE FIRST QUESTION, WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV CONSTANTLY EXAGGERATE THE SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITY IN THE LATE '50S?
Tatu: Well he boasted very much about his missiles.
Interviewer: I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO START AGAIN.
Interviewer: USE HIS NAME SO WE KNOW WHO YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT.
Tatu: Yes, Khrushchev boasted very much about his missiles beginning in '57, '58.
Tatu: He exaggerated the kind of missiles he had.
Tatu: He did as if the United States were under threat.
Tatu: But in fact he did not cheat about the number of his missiles, but he just he just had in mind only the missiles against Europe.
Tatu: As a matter of fact Khrushchev did not build up a strong ICBM force.
Tatu: He built up an European force, and that was by the hundreds, the SS-4 and the SS-5, which in fact a couple of them were deployed in Cuba.
Tatu: So he was right in saying he makes, he has many rockets, he does it as sausages, see.
Tatu: He said that in his speeches.
Tatu: But these were not ICBM against the United States.
Tatu: ICBM were built up much later after Khrushchev.
Interviewer: SO I'LL ASK YOU THE SAME QUESTION.
Interviewer: WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV EXAGGERATE SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITY IN THE LATE 1950S?
Tatu: Well, in one aspect he exaggerated because everybody had the impression that he was, he had masses of missiles.
Interviewer: START AGAIN AND USE NAME "KHRUSHCHEV."
Tatu: Oh, I'm sorry.
Tatu: Well, in fact, Khrushchev exaggerated very much the number of his missiles in the sense of ICBM.
Tatu: Everybody believed that he has masses of missiles able to hit the United States territory.
Tatu: In fact he had very little ICBM and those were deployed much later under Brezhnev.
Tatu: But he did not Khrushchev did not exaggerate the number of missiles altogether, because at the time he was building hundreds and hundreds of SS-4 and SS-5, which were rockets able to hit Europe and Asia.
Tatu: And he came up to something like 700 such missiles in 1964.
Tatu: So it was true that he was making rockets like sausages, what he said in one speech.
Tatu: But the only thing was that these were not missiles for the United States.
Tatu: These were not ICBM.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS HIS, WAS HE TRYING TO CONFUSE THE UNITED STATES INTO THINKING THAT HE HAD MORE MISSILES THAN HE REALLY HAD?
Tatu: Probably so, yes, but at the same time he did not conceal the fact that the...
Tatu: he had a huge arsenal against Europe.
Tatu: I remember having listened to him several times in Moscow in those years and he said to every European visitor we, you are our hostages.
Tatu: That means that if the United States attacks us, we will strike Europe.
Tatu: And that meant that he wanted to use deterrence against Europe just to deter the United States.
Interviewer: BUT DIDN'T HE THINK THAT BY EXAGGERATING THE NUMBER OF MISSILES THAT WOULD JUST CAUSE THE UNITED STATES TO BUILD UP ITS ARSENAL FURTHER?
Tatu: Certainly, that was his mistake.
Tatu: Yes he...
Interviewer: START AGAIN.
Tatu: It is true that by exaggerating or just even showing too much the number of his missiles in his arsenal he had a counterproductive result because it incited the United States to build up very strongly.
Tatu: So that was a mistake from his part, certainly.
Tatu: But you know, he want, he was so proud about his force that was the first time the Soviet Union had a new type of weapon, ahead of the United States especially the ICBM and the Sputnik.
Tatu: We...we must not forget that he boasted very much about the Sputnik which were at the time the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States also for that.
Interviewer: OK, GOOD THANK YOU.
Interviewer: KHRUSHCHEV KNEW ABOUT THE U-2 FLIGHTS FOR FOUR YEARS BEFORE 1960.
Interviewer: WHY DID HE WALK OUT OF THE PARIS SUMMIT BEING HELD WITH EISENHOWER?
Tatu: Well, this is a complicated question.
Tatu: I remember that we had strange impressions at the time in Moscow during, just during the days of the U-2 incident.
Tatu: At first he tried to minimize the...impact of this incident.
Tatu: He certainly boasted that he gave the order of shooting down powers with his U-2.
Tatu: But at the same time, he wanted to go to Paris, and in fact he went to Paris and he maybe hoped that Eisenhower would make the apology he wanted.
Tatu: And maybe the real problem was that he had trouble inside the Soviet Union with his Politburo in the communist movement at the time.
Interviewer: DID HE USE THE U-2 INCIDENT AS AN EXCUSE TO BREAK UP THE SUMMIT MEETING? HE WANTED TO BREAK IT UP FOR OTHER REASONS, BUT ...
Tatu: Khrushchev probably did not want to wreck the Summit meeting, but some people around him in the Politburo used this incident to compel him to break the Summit Meeting and to stop the policy of détente which was unpleasant for them.
Tatu: We had the Chinese who exerted an influence at the time still on the communist movement.
Tatu: We had tough people around him in the Politburo, especially Kozlov.
Tatu: Kozlov, was the number two man in the party beginning in 1960.
Tatu: And he was working to replace Khrushchev.
Tatu: In fact, the funny thing is that if Kozlov had not a heart attack in 1963, a couple of months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, he would have been instead of Brezhnev and maybe for 18 years also.
Tatu: And Khrushchev was rather happy with this heart attack, which just expelled outside somebody who was a main nuisance, the main obstacle he had to his own personal power at the time.
Interviewer: SO DO YOU THINK THAT THE U-2 INCIDENT WAS THE FINAL STRAW, THE FINAL EVENT THAT MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR KHRUSHCHEV TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE DÉTENTE AFTER HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING SOVIET MILITARY FORCES?
Tatu: Yes, détente in fact was criticized.
Tatu: Already after the main event of that period '59, the '59 summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, Camp David, you know.
Tatu: So called spirit of Camp David, all that.
Tatu: It was criticized at the very beginning by the Chinese.
Tatu: Then in 1960 we had sort of open break with the Chinese although at this time they were not mentioned by their names, but it was exactly the same, now.
Tatu: And in '62, Khrushchev was under strong pressure from the Chinese, from internal domestic pressure, Kozlov and other people around him, to make, to have a tougher policy towards the west.
Tatu: And he needed very strongly a success.
Tatu: He needed something to gain against the United States particularly.
Tatu: So he tried Berlin in 1961, and it failed.
Tatu: Except that he could build the wall, and but in fact he could not make his, what he called "the peace treaty," between the Soviet Union and East Germany, a peace treaty which would have meant in fact the end of the western powers in West Berlin.
Tatu: And then he tried another approach to the same problem, probably Berlin again.
Tatu: But he tried through Cuba, and he tried to change the balance of forces in his favor, by deploying missiles in Cuba.
Interviewer: THE U-2 INCIDENT ITSELF, WAS THAT OR WAS THAT NOT A PIVOTAL INCIDENT IN PUSHING KHRUSHCHEV AWAY FROM DÉTENTE?
Tatu: Yes, it was the, yes, a turning point, the U-2 incident was the turning point a sort of culmination of the campaign developed by many people around Khrushchev against his détente policy with the United States, and especially since 1959, since the Camp David Summit Meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.
Tatu: The opposition to that policy was developing, and the U-2 incident was a sort of the best opportunity for those people for this campaign, to make definite results.