NOW, FIRST OF ALL, LORD SHERFIELD, WHAT WOULD YOU SAY WERE THE BRITISH REACTIONS TO THE PASSING OF THE MCMAHON ACT?

Well, the passage of the McMahon Act was very bad news. And it came as a considerable shock, um. After all, we had been negotiating to try and establish the same sort of relationship in exchange of information and collaboration on atomic energy for about a year. And it was quite clear that when we saw the terms of this act that it was going to be a major obstacle in the way of re-establishing such collaboration. Eventually one or two ways were found round it but while it was in effect, it was a very serious obstacle. Now collaboration went on in certain fields in which the Americans were interested, but particularly in the control of raw materials from which we got benefit and also in the intelligence field, which is really quite important. But by and large it was very bad news and it did complicate the relationship to a very serious extent for several years.

NOW, YOU WERE IN WASHINGTON AT THE TIME OR SHORTLY AFTER THAT ACT WAS PASSED. WERE YOU INVOLVED IN ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITIES, ATTEMPTING TO GET THAT LEGISLATION CHANGED THAT YOU CAN REMEMBER?

Well it's very delicate business for an embassy in Washington to go around the back of the State Department and the White House and lobby in the Congress. And so we didn't, did not as I remember do a lot of lobbying. Of course, we had no idea that the American government, the administration was not going to inform the Congress of the wartime agreements and the wartime association. It was only later that we discovered that they had kept these agreements from the Congress and when those, some of the senators found out that this had happened, they were very they were considerably upset, I think, by it. Whether it would have made any difference, I'm very doubtful because at that time, the large number of Americans, particularly in the Congress, felt that atomic energy was an American secret which could be kept. And of course, that was quite a false judgment, but they've, that was the, that was their opinion.

DO YOU THINK THAT WAS THE ONLY MOTIVE FOR THE PASSING OF THE MCMAHON ACT? THAT IT WAS AN AMERICAN SECRET THAT COULD BE KEPT?

I think that was the main one, yes, I do.

ATLEE'S GOVERNMENT TOOK A DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH ATOMIC-BOMB DEVELOPMENT, IN QUITE CONSIDERABLE SECRECY. BUT IT WAS REMARKABLE, IN FACT, THAT THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT PROGRAM DIDN'T REALLY CAUSE ANY SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF UPROAR, IN THE PRESS OR WHATEVER. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE REASON FOR THAT WAS?

Well I think that, the decision to go ahead, well, first of all, of course, the decision was to go ahead with an atomic energy program, particularly in the civil field, and of course the route to the reactor, and the route to the bomb, is the same, over a great part of the way. I think the people who knew the informed opinion scientific and political regarded it as a natural, and indeed an inevitable step, that we at, as we were then placed in the world at that time it's... We were, after all, we were the center of the Commonwealth, we'd just won a war, we it was it was a, it was a perfectly natural development. And there was really no opposition to it in the scientific community, except with the two notable exceptions of Professor Blackett and Sir Henry Tizard. And they, for different reasons opposed the decision to go ahead with the with the weapon. But the prime minister, and Ernest Bevin, were quite determined that this was the, something that had to be done, and they arranged that it should be done. And, I of course it was not public knowledge, although it had, it was announced in the House of Commons, in Parliament, but no, nobody really picked it up; it was just, I suppose in the mood of the time, thought to be a natural development.

DO YOU THINK THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE OF THE TIME AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE MCMAHON ACT, HAD ANY DECISION ON ATTLEE'S VIEW ABOUT THE...

Well, it was quite clear that I mean we were going to have to go ahead on our own because we were not going to get within, anyway, in the foreseeable time the type of technological help from the United States which we were on which at one time we were relying.

NOW BY 1954, THERE'D BEEN SOME MOVES TO MAKE AN AMENDMENT TO THE MCMAHON ACT. BUT PEOPLE HAVE TOLD ME THAT IT DIDN'T RESULT IN AN APPRECIABLE FLOW OF INFORMATION FROM THE UNITED STATES. COULD YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE WAY THE ACT HAD BEEN AMENDED, AND WHY IT DIDN'T...

Well, I forget the exact details of what those amendments amounted to. But by that time, the situation had changed considerably. A lot of information had been, had been released, through a process of declassification. And in fact, the declassification process, was really, gave us sufficient to enable us to make agreements and exchange agreements with the members of the Commonwealth with Belgium with France, and so on. So there was enough information, as much as people wanted, really, at that time, available. Then, after all, we'd, we no longer needed information on diffusion, on separation of uranium-235, because we'd built, very successfully, the diffusion plant at Capenhurst, and so on. What we did get at that time, which was very important was the specifications and design of the, of the nuclear submarine reactor, the PWR, and that was a very that was a very valuable step forward in the exchange of information.

YOU WERE SAYING EARLIER THAT IT DIDN'T WORK OUT QUITE RIGHT AT THE TIME. WHY WAS THAT?

What, the submarine reactor? Well, as I remember, the, there was a British admiralty thought that they could improve on the design, and so they made certain alterations to it, but then it, and then they didn't turn out to be quite as successful as they hoped.

EVENTUALLY, IN '57, THE AMENDMENT OF THE MCMAHON ACT WENT TO THE SENATE AND WENT TO THE CONGRESS AND WAS EVENTUALLY PASSED IN '58. WHAT DO YOU THINK WERE THE MAIN REASONS FOR THAT SHIFT IN AMERICAN POLICY?

Well, I think that the whole, the reasoning behind the McMahon Act, the idea that the Am... it was, it was something that the Americans could keep to themselves, and have a monopoly on, and so on, was patently wrong. I mean, after all, we'd by that time not only had our diffusion plant; we were building a, nuclear power reactors, we'd exploded a couple of bombs, and the Russians were well ahead with their program, the French were beginning to; there, the, there, the, there wasn't really any point, in the in the McMahon Act restrictions. On the other hand, the Americans might hope to gain something from the collaboration, as they did when the when the all the information was available, under the weapons program and therefore it was possible to make an a comparison between the progress that had been made in our weapons establishment, and the progress that had been made in the American weapons establishment. It turned out that as far as the basic work and the basic science, and early applied science was concerned, we had not only kept up, but in some respects had gone ahead. Where we were lagging miles behind was in the engineering. So we got the benefit of the engineering technology from the Americans, and they in turn got some basic information which was value to them. So that it wasn't a completely one-way street. And anyway in the context of NATO, in, that the context of the changed world situation the there really wasn't -- anyway by 1955 the American government changed their policy and General Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace program, and the conference at Bermuda, and so that, the whole atmosphere changed.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE SHIFT IN POLICY IN '57 WAS TRIGGERED BY THE EXPLOSION OF THE BRITISH HYDROGEN BOMB IN '57. WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT OR ONLY A SUBSIDIARY ELEMENT?

Well, I would have thought it was a subsidiary; it really just adds another factor to what I've been just been saying, that the fact that we had our bomb, and we knew how, we can make it and do it, made it very pointless, really, for the Americans to try and withhold information.

SEVERAL PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS SOME VAGUE COLLABORATION WITH THE FRENCH PROGRAM WITH THE BRITISH. DO YOU THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF COLLABORATION WITH THE FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM AT ANY TIME?

Well of course in a sense there was a collaboration with the French, from the very beginning, I mean, in 1940 three French scientists came over from France at the time of the fall of France, with some heavy water in baggage; and began immediately to collaborate with our scientists on slow neutron work, which led on to the civil reactor. And then the same scientists went to Canada where they were working in the Canadian facility run by Sir John Cockcroft at Chalk River and they were fully integrated into their program. They then went back to France and there they, a collaboration continued with the British scientists, with whom they were by that time intimately involved. Now the, it was not possible to have a formal collaboration with the French for the reason that we had agreed in the war to that we would under the Quebec Act agreement, collaboration with the Americans, we agreed that we would not release information without prior consultation. Now the Americans were strongly opposed to giving any information to the French, for the very simple reason that the very distinguished French scientist Joliot-Curie who was the was the head of the French organization, was a Communist. And therefore under the atmosphere of the time, the Americans wouldn't have. We, on the other hand, had agreements with the French; they'd joined the war, and it was very embarrassing for us in fact, that we couldn't we had great difficulty in honoring those agreements. Then later there evolved very friendly collaboration when I was chairman of the atomic energy authority in the early '60s I had very good relations with my French colleagues, and un, by that time, of course, Euratom was coming into play, and we had very good relations with them. So, although there wasn't any formal collaborative agreement, in fact the relations with the French were, between us and the French, were good throughout.

SO IN A SENSE, I SUPPOSE WHAT I'M TRYING TO FIND OUT IS... THE FRENCH PROGRAM, FROM '54 TO '56, HAD CLEARLY STARTED AT LEAST AT THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL, STARTED ON A ROAD TOWARDS PLUTONIUM DEVELOPMENT AND WORKING TOWARDS A WEAPONS PROGRAM AND BY THEN YOU SEE THERE WERE STILL RESTRICTIONS ON YOUR INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH THE UNITED STATES. WAS IT EVER CONSIDERED THAT THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH WOULD BE PERHAPS A WAY FORWARD? WAS IT EVER CONSIDERED AT ANY LEVEL DO YOU THINK?

Well, oh, yes. I mean, we were, we were always, I think, thinking about collaboration with the French. Of course, the French, if you're talking about plutonium work, didn't really need information, because Bertrand Goldschmidt who was one of their leading scientists, that was his subject, so they didn't have a, really, a need for the information. And also, you must remember that this was in de Gaulle's time, and by that time, the very highly nationalist attitude of the French towards all defense matters was predominant.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS IT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM THAT THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN NUCLEAR MATTERS WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS RESTORED? WAS THERE ANY SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO THE REPEAL OF THE MCMAHON ACT?

Oh, well now there was continuous negotiation in which I was personally involved, practically throughout, from 1946 onwards to reestablish the collaboration. And various steps were taken as I've said previously, the McMahon Act was a big obstacle, and there was also quite a hostile element to any collaboration in the, in the American Senate, and of course the negotiations were continuously bedeviled by the appearance of the British nuclear spies, and so that the Americans had a very, a fairly valid excuse, on security grounds, against giving us a lot of information. But there was a continuous effort which finally succeeded, in 1958. But there was, as I say, it was almost a continuous negotiation for nearly ten years.

AS YOU SAY YOU WERE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, IS THERE ANYTHING THAT SPRINGS TO MIND, SORT OF PERSONAL STORIES OR AN ANECDOTE--

YOU WERE QUITE INTIMATELY INVOLVED WITH THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS OVER THE REPEAL OF THE MCMAHON ACT. CAN YOU THINK OF ANY ANECDOTES OR STORIES THAT WOULD REVEAL THE MOOD OF THE TIMES AND THE MOOD OF THE AMERICANS?

Well as so often in negotiations of this sort there were different views held in various parts of the United States administration; the State Department and the people we were talking to were on the whole very sympathetic and were anxious to make progress in these negotiations. But on the other hand there were certain senators who were quite hostile to any further collaboration. And the American negotiators of course had to take account of the, of the political atmosphere in which they were working. And of course a lot depends on personalities, and some of the personalities were braver, shall I say, in what they were prepared to concede than others. And so it was a, it was a very interesting time, and if a little frustrating nevertheless there was a great deal of goodwill on the American side.

CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AMERICAN POLITICAL ACTORS ON THE STAGE YOU HAD TO DEAL WITH QUITE A LOT?

Well, there was just hold it for a moment while I think. Names don't always come very easily.

DON'T WORRY. HOW MUCH DID ALDERMASTON, IN YOUR VIEW, RELY ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR THE ACTUAL DESIGN OF THE POLARIS WARHEAD?

Well, I, but the Polaris warhead came after my time. And so I'm really not informed on that at all. What I think is clear is that after 1958 the collaboration in the weapons field between the our weapons establishment and the American weapons establishment was pretty well complete, and as far as I know it continued to be so. So you may say that there was a great deal of benefit from the collaboration to us, and I think some advantage to the United States.

YOU TOLD US A STORY A LITTLE WHILE AGO ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF THE DESIGN FOR THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE REACTOR, THE PWR, FROM THE UNITED STATES TO GREAT BRITAIN.

Well, I, it was of course very largely due, I think, to the influence of Admiral Rickover, who was the, one of the strong men on the American side and it was of course a very valuable acquisition for us, to have the specifications of a, of a working reactor; of course the I think the Admiralty and other British institutions tend to be a little bit affected by what is sometimes called the "not-invented-here" syndrome and I think they, as I remember, they did think they could improve on the American design in certain respects. And this held up the development, I think a little while, because the improvements turned out to be not as great as had been hoped.

YOU WERE CLEARLY VERY FRIENDLY AND HAD A LOT OF CONTACTS WITH SOME OF THE PEOPLE IN THE FRENCH PROGRAM AND WHILST THIS COUNTRY, WHILST THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS GETTING CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT, DESPITE THE MCMAHON ACT, IN REACTOR DESIGN AND SO ON AND SO FORTH, FOR ITS MILITARY PROGRAM. THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE. WHAT WAS THE MOOD, IN YOUR VIEW, OF THE FRENCH SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS WHO WERE PERHAPS SLIGHTLY, WERE THEY AT ALL JEALOUS?

Oh, I suppose they felt rather in the same way as we felt, in relation to the Americans holding back on us. But I think they understood perfectly well that it wasn't we who were holding back on them; it was the Americans who were holding back on both of us. And they also knew perfectly well that under the agreements that we'd made with the United States, we were not in a position to transfer information without any American agreement. I mean, I think it was a perfectly clear situation, which the French with their usual clarity understood perfectly well. Meanwhile the relations between the people involved in London and in Paris were very good, because they were by that time old friends.

YOU ACCOMPANIED ATTLEE WHEN YOU WENT TO WASHINGTON, WHEN ATTLEE WENT TO WASHINGTON AND YOU SPENT FOUR DAYS ON THE PRESIDENTIAL YACHT.

This was the time of the Korean War. Indeed I remember it very well.

HOW, FIRST OF ALL... I MEAN THERE'S TWO OR THREE QUESTIONS I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT. HOW ALARMED WAS ATTLEE REALLY ABOUT THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO USE THE ATOMIC WEAPON IN KOREA?

I don't know what his inner thoughts were; I know what mine were. I thought that it was a storm in a teacup. It ha... it happened in, it was a, it was a, it was a crisis which blew up in the in the course of a House of Commons debate. When a message came, a message came from Washington to the effect that the Americans were considering the use of the atomic weapon against the Chinese in the Korean War. Now, I don't believe that whatever the military... certain members of the American military might have been thinking or planning, that the president had the slightest intention of using the nuclear weapon. But and I suspect, but I don't know, that Attlee realized that. However, it was a very good move, of Attlee's, he immediately the, arranged this meet... trip to Washington; that calmed the House of Commons. We went to Washington, we had took the opportunity of three days of going over a whole number of issues, which had been under discussion with the Americans, such as economic issues, the strategic position, Europe, and there were a great many things were covered. The actual the actual issue which took us there, namely the use of the weapon, was not taken up until the conference was at an end when the prime minister and the president went to, went into a room together for a while and then came out, and announced that they'd agreed that they wouldn't use the bomb without consulting each other. Well Dean Acheson, who was there, and the other Americans realized that this was a, this was impossible, they that to, that the effect on the Congress would be very serious, if Congress being already very suspicious about this whole negotiation. So a form of words was found which it, which was, were put in the communiqué, I can't quote them a form of words was found which enabled Attlee to tell the House of Commons that he was quite satisfied with the assurances that he'd got from the president. And enabled the president to tell the Congress that he hadn't given Attlee any real assurances. So, they, it was a very successful operation it calmed the incident was over. And it was a useful, it was a useful conference from this point of view, that there had been a lot of differences in Anglo-American relations at that time, over Palestine, and there are other difficult issues. And but this conference, in a way, reestablished the idea of a special relationship with the United States, not a word I, expression I use much. Nevertheless, it was, it was clear to the world that the British and American leaders had a long conference together, and had come out with a certain measure of agreement. It sort of put them, it put the record rather straight, and erased the dissensions which had been created over Palestine and other matters.

SO, REALLY, WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS THAT THE NUCLEAR THREAT IN KOREA WAS NEVER AS SERIOUS AS PERHAPS OTHER PEOPLE HAVE MADE OUT.

I never thought so myself. I didn't think that there was knowing Truman, and the Americans involved I was quite convinced in my mind that there was no, really no risk of them agreeing to that. Now, there are, may be, as I say, there may have been those in the American...

COULD YOU ACTUALLY SAY THAT THERE WAS NO RISK OF THE USE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON OR SOMETHING? CAN I GET, CAN WE START IT AGAIN, START THE QUESTION AGAIN. HOW IMPORTANT WAS THAT THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN YOUR VIEW?

In my view the American president and his advisers had no intention of sanctioning the use of an atomic weapon in the Korean War. Now, there may have been other views in the American military establishment but the, President Truman showed very clearly the, that he had complete control over his military advisers, because very shortly afterwards, he recalled MacArthur from the battlefield, so I myself, I can't, I don't know what Mr. Attlee, the prime minister, thought about it, but as an advisor, I was, I did not believe that it was a real crisis.

YOU MENTIONED DEAN ACHESON BEING PRESENT IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WITH TRUMAN ON THAT YACHT. WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE SAID WAS HIS VIEW AND HIS ROLE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN OVER THE WHOLE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR MATTERS AND DEFENSE.

Well, I mean, he was a, he was the most important influence in American foreign policy for a number of years. And so his role was extremely important; the president had complete confidence in him and he was a, he was the, he was the, one of the architect, one of the principal architects of American foreign policy in that, at that time.

WAS HIS INFLUENCE ON THE PRESIDENT PERHAPS A BENEFIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION?

I think it was a benefit. I, because Dean Acheson was at heart a great friend of this country, but also a candid critic and that's a, that's a, that's a good thing for a friend to be, from time to time.

YOU SPENT FOUR DAYS ON THAT YACHT. WHAT WAS THAT LIKE?

Well, we spent two days on the yacht, and a couple in the White House, or in somewhere else. Well, it was a, it was a very agreeable conference the atmosphere was extremely good, very friendly, we knew, we disagreed about a number of things, but that was, that's normal but they were, but they were good discussions. The, there is a brilliant description of that conference in Dean Acheson's memoirs which anybody who is really interested in the subject would do well to read.

WHEN WE MET LAST, YOU SPOKE TO ME ABOUT THE ROLE OF BEVIN IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. WHAT WOULD BE YOUR VIEWS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS POLICY ABOUT UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE?

Well I think Ernest Bevin had a quite clear policy. It was to build up Western strength, and he started with the treaty of Dunkirk, with France: that was the first step. Then he formed a Western European union. That was the next step. Then came the Marshall Plan, and Ernest Bevin was we in the foreign office were, had previous knowledge that this was going to come, so when it, the Harvard speech of General Marshall was made, we were ready to go into action. And it was, it was clearly something which was a major development in American policy, and one which we must immediately take up and welcome. So that was the Marshall Plan. Well, then the next step, of course, was NATO. Now through all this period there was an element in the two elements in American policy advocated by different people, one of which was that they should press for a federal Europe, or a, with which they could then deal as a entity, the implication being that they could then withdraw a little from it. And the, there were those who, on the other hand, I think, understood the sort of attitude which the Labour government at that time were taking. Now, I think that was always a concern in the British administration that the Americans might withdraw, and that would be a very unfortunate development; after all two wars had occurred because the Americans were not involved in Europe, and there was a, certainly there was an anxiety that this shouldn't, American involvement shouldn't cease for a third time, as you might say. So I think that under, the, that explains there was quite a lot of hard argument and negotiation with the Americans at that time but that was one of the reasons why Attlee certainly was not willing to contemplate a federal solution for Europe. Now, a federal the, that's not the same as full collaboration with Europe in every field, but that it was a, it was an important distinction which in the end, of course, faded.

BY '58, THE MCMAHON ACT HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY REPEALED. WHAT SORT OF IMPACT DID THAT HAVE ON RELATIONSHIPS ON THE BRITISH SCIENTISTS OVER HERE? HOW DID THAT AFFECT THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR US COLLEAGUES?

Well, I think there was a measure of obvious satisfaction, particularly with those scientists who were, who were, who were dealing particularly in the, in the weapons field on, in the, in other fields we by that time had got our nuclear weapons, our civil part program going, we'd got our diffusion plant going, we'd got a, first reactors were operating; it was a completely different situation. But of course the object of relations between the American and British scientists were good throughout personal relationships, I mean, at the end of the war, the British scientists who were working in the United States went back to practically all of them came back to, and went on with, got on to their work in England. But the relationships between them, I'm sure, remained at a very friendly and very friendly. Can't say more than that.

YOU SAID SOMETHING JUST NOW THAT WAS QUITE AMUSING, ABOUT THE FACT THAT WHEN SCIENTISTS MEET THEY DON'T SPEND ALL THEIR TIME DISCUSSING THE WEATHER. COULD YOU SAY THAT FOR ME NOW PLEASE?

Well and, of course there were continual contacts between the scientists on both sides, and it in conversations between scientists they don't or necessarily talk about the weather, so some information filters across, I think, in any circumstances. And also and also, of course, the collaboration in the intelligence field continued uninterrupted. And you can't really talk about monitoring the effects of atomic weapons without learning quite a bit about the atomic weapons themselves.

SO WHAT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, WITH THE REPEAL OF THE MCMAHON ACT?

Well, I think that there were two aspects to it. The first aspect is the technological one, of course; if we'd got the advantage of the, of the great developments the Americans made on the engineering side. And secondly there was a, there was a I suppose a sort of psychological, or perhaps political, aspect to it, in that by that time, by '58, we were in NATO, there was complete collaboration in all aspects of the war the American bases had been established in England the, there was a complete military collaboration, except on the nuclear side, which was a notable and rather significant exception. And the, as it were, the withdrawal of that exception made the collaboration complete.

COULD YOU GIVE US ONE OR TWO EXAMPLES OF THE ENGINEERING YOU'VE MENTIONED?

No, I'm not a technical; I'm not an engineer.

IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN THINK OF, A STORY OR AN ANECDOTE? YOU TOLD ME SOMETHING JUST BEFORE THE INTERVIEW, ABOUT HOW YOU ACTUALLY HAD TO GET THE ADMIRAL TO...

Yeah, well, I think I'm sorry, I think not that.

OKAY. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU CAN THINK OF THAT WOULD YOU KNOW...

Not offhand, I don't think so. Well, perhaps I was. Would you...? Should I just tell you this?

YES.

Well I was being shown, I was down in -- what was the name of the damn place? I was, I was with my American colleague in Tennessee where they were, had a number of reactors which were making tritium, among other things, and they were very large installations, and my American colleague said to me, "Well, I'm not supposed to take you in here, but I'm sure you won't understand anything that's going on there, so I don't mind. I don't understand it myself..."

OKAY. THAT'S FINE.