WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE – TAPES 009100-009101 HIROSHI OTA

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Interviewer:
WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN NPT?
Ota:
I was Director in Charge of Scientific Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy aspect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the Japanese Diet was in the final stage of ratifying the treaty.
Interviewer:
CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES WERE OF THE TREATY FOR JAPAN?
Ota:
Well, as far as the advantages are concerned there was a political one and an economic one. The political one was obvious and that was for Japan to declare to the world that Japan would forever give up the possibility of becoming a nuclear country. And you know, I don't think that it is necessary to explain the... political advantages of such a declaration in the international scene. Among other things Japan was able to emphasize that we don't have any military intention... especially relying on nuclear weapons. And that is to underline the basic Japanese diplomatic posture that successive Japanese government were emphasizing. Now the economic advantage we thought was that by ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty we were able to take advantage of various arrangements and so on for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And we considered that nuclear energy was a very important source of energy which is an alternative to oil. So we thought that by ratifying the treaty it would be easier for Japan to rely on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Now it is very difficult to specify disadvantages. The reason why it took as long as six years for Japan to ratify is related to the basic nature of the treaty and to put it very bluntly, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty classifies the countries of the world into two. One group is nuclear weapon countries and the other non-nuclear weapon countries. And then for a country like Japan it was not very easy to swallow this concept of dividing the types of countries into two. But we thought that it was inevitable. We didn't consider that by declaring not to become a nuclear weapon country we would classify ourselves as a second class country. We thought that there should be a way for Japan to contribute to the world as a n... non-nuclear weapon country. But you can imagine that politically it was not very easy to absorb and then swallow that kind of concept. And that was I believe an... disadvantage of this treaty, treaty as far as Japan was concerned.
Interviewer:
COULD YOU REPEAT THAT A LITTLE BRIEFER? THIS IS THE BUSINESS OF GIVING UP NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, THAT FEELING.
Ota:
To look back I think it is interesting to recall that it was not the opposition parties but it was a section within the Liberal Democratic Party which at first was against this idea of ratifying this country because you know in their eyes this treaty looked like a discriminatory treaty. It did not mean that these this part of the government party was advocating Japan to go nuclear. But the idea was to maintain an option in case of emergency and the--to ratify the Non- Proliferation Treaty meant that Japan would give up even these last options. So that was the difficulty that we had to deal with.
Interviewer:
HOW IMPORTANT WAS NUCLEAR ENERGY TO JAPAN AT THIS POINT AND WHAT DID NPT OFFER JAPAN IN TERMS OF ITS PEACEFUL AND CIVILIAN PROGRAM?
Ota:
Um... At the time of the ratification of the NPT the nuclear energy did not yet play a vital role in the energy mix of Japan but it was obvious that it was going to be. There was alrea... There had already been the first oil crisis and Japan was searching for all possible alternative sources of energy that could replace oil eventually. And the, the nuclear energy looked very hopeful. Now, Japan has been increasing dependency on the nuclear energy steadily. Now it is a little bit less than thirty percent of our total electricity that is produced by the use of nuclear energy. Now to us the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty looked like guarantee...
Interviewer:
START THAT AGAIN...
Ota:
Is something like an international guarantee for Japan--
Interviewer:
I INTERRUPTED YOU.
Ota:
Well that was like for Japan to be given an assurance to go all the way with regards to the peaceful uses. We were afraid that if Japan would refuse to ratify then in important countries like the United States which is supplying almost all the nuclear fuel in the form of low enriched uranium might not cooperate fully with Japan. So we thought that by ratifying the treaty we could get the full cooperation of important partners for our peaceful nuclear program like the United States.

Japanese-American Relations

Interviewer:
WHAT KIND OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WERE YOU RECEIVING FROM THE UNITED STATES AT THAT POINT?
Ota:
At that point we'd... we were not receiving a technical assistance but as I was saying we were relying almost a hundred percent on the United States for the supply of enriched u-uranium. And in that case our dependence on the United States was total.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER TOKAIMURA WHAT DO YOU REMEMBER?
Ota:
Yes. In the course of the first nine months of '77 we had to be engaged in a very difficult negotiation with the US government concerning the of the first nuclear reprocessing plant in Tokaimura. And the Carter administration came up with a policy to take a very severe view on reprocessing. The Carter administration was saying that plutonium was too dangerous to use for peaceful purposes. So they told us to wait until a full review could be made. From our point of view to run this reprocessing plant although it was a small demonstration plant was vital in our nuclear program. So we did not... want to wait for several years you know until whatever international consensus might come up. That's the reason why we, we had a very difficult negotiation with the US government. And then finally after nine months of negotiation in September of '77 a package agreement was reached between our two countries allowing Japan to go ahead with this reprocessing facility. But at the same time Japan — the Japanese government promised on a number of points restraining Japan's nuclear programs concerning especially the use of plutonium. So that was a package that was reached after these difficult months.
Interviewer:
ONE OF THE PEOPLE WE'RE INTERVIEWING IS JOSEPH NYE. CAN YOU TELL ME ANY STORIES OR ANECDOTES ABOUT THE OTHER PEOPLE INVOLVED?
Ota:
Yes... well, Mr. Nye was the chief negotiator on the US side and he was taking a very tough position at first. My personal impression was that when we started these talks the US was mainly thinking about non-proliferation, which was quite a natural thing. Japan was mainly thinking about energy security. There was lack of understanding on the US side on the -- in the importance that Japan was attaching to nuclear -- to energy security. The Japanese government lacked full understanding on the importance the US government was putting on...non-proliferation. As we proceeded in our negotiations we gradually came to have a better understanding of each other's position. So Mr. Nye... a couple of years after these negotiations told me that in the course of negotiations he came to understand what energy security meant to Japan. But at first he said he didn't fully understand it. And at one point you know he was...his position was so tough that we were calling him "Mr. No." You know, Ni in Japan means "there is no." So you know, Mr. Nye almost meant to Japan as "Mr. No." So at one time we gave him a nickname of Mr. No. I don't know whether he knows about it or not. But now I think it is alright to disclose that.

London Suppliers Group

Interviewer:
CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP? HOW DID JAPAN PARTICIPATE?
Ota:
Japan participated in this series of meetings of the London Suppliers Group from the very beginning. At that time Japan was not a full-fledged supplier of nuclear materials or equipment but you know, especially the US government thought that on this issue Japan's participation was indispensible so we did participate. The idea was to try to prevent proliferation through stricter control of export of nuclear related items. And as I mentioned, although Japan was not a major supplier of these items we fully shared the concern of the countries concerned so we fully participated. And again it was not an easy program because we had to explore means to accommodate both the needs to needs for nuclear non-proliferation on the one hand and needs for exports on the other. And so it was not an easy task but all of us shared the basic concern and that was the reason why finally we were able to come up with an agreement.

Japan’s Nuclear Industry

Interviewer:
COULD WE TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT YOUR NUCLEAR PROGRAM? WHY WAS THE REPROCESSING PLANT SO IMPORTANT?
Ota:
It was essential from the point of energy security because through reprocessing we could obtain plutonium which we can make fuller use of in what is called breeder reactors. And from the energy security point of view, breeder reactors are most efficient in the use of nuclear material in the form of plutonium. And you know, if we reprocess and then take out plutonium to be used in breeder reactors then the use of uranium is something like sixty or seventy times more efficient than when uranium is used only in traditional reactors. And that was the reason why reprocessing we considered was vital. And secondly we thought that reprocessing was important as a means to dispose nuclear waste. Of course there are ideas that say that nuclear waste coming out of traditional nuclear reactors can be deposited indefinitely without reprocessing. But you know Japan lacks space and it is very difficult to find out sufficient space to store spent fuel as it is. So from this point of view also we considered that reprocessing was indispensable to Japan.

Nuclear Proliferation in Japan and Abroad

Interviewer:
WAS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION EVEN A CONCERN AT THIS POINT?
Ota:
Yes. Very much so...
Interviewer:
IN JAPAN.
Ota:
We do not have any idea of going nuclear by ourselves. You know, that politically is in--unimaginable for Japan, for the Japanese, for any Japanese government in the future to decide to go nuclear. I don't think such a policy could have any basis for public support in Japan. So we are not worried at all about the possibility of Japan's going nuclear, but Japan is very much concerned about the possibility of proliferation by other countries in the world especially in those areas in the world afflicted by regional conflict like the Middle East or perhaps South Africa or perhaps in South America. And then if any country comes to possess nuclear weapons for the first time then it's impact could be very disturbing. And although it might not immediately and directly affect Japan's own security for the stability of the international political scene... we are very much concerned about any possibility of nuclear proliferation. And that's the reason why Japan is ready to cooperate in any kind of international discussions or explorations toward nuclear non-proliferation.
Interviewer:
AT THE TIME OF THE NPT WAS CHINA A CONCERN? CHINA HAD NOT SIGNED NPT AND WAS SO CLOSE A NEIGHBOR.
Ota:
Well from our point of view... any country which is not a member--party to the NPT--is a source of concern and then especially when it comes to nuclear weapon countries including China and France. Now we are not in my personal view worrying about any immediate threat from China. But... we sincerely hope that China would become a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that China itself would behave according... in accordance with the treaty. And at the same time China... more positively contributed ...to the prevention of proliferation. Although I do not believe that China is for proliferation. China is a very careful country so we do not, we have not witnessed any...
[END OF TAPE 009100]

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Energy

Interviewer:
TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE GOALS OF INFCE WERE ACCOMPLISHED?
Ota:
From Japan's point of view the main purpose of INFCE was very accomplished. The basic purpose of... INFCE was to find out how it was possible to accommodate two basic needs. One, the need for strengthening non-proliferation; and the second need is... need is to promote peaceful uses... of nuclear energy. And from Japan's point of view that purpose was achieved. And you know it was a very... extensive exercise and the final report is very thick. But the gist of this report is that it is possible to pursue and promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy while sharing non-proliferation. And so from that point of view the purpose of INFCE was very much achieved.
Interviewer:
WAS IT ALSO BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO COME AROUND TO UNDERSTANDING YOUR POINT OF VIEW?
Ota:
I think that in the process of INFCE the US came to understand that it was difficult to put a stop to wider use of nuclear energy. And so from our point of view the US position at the very end of INFCE was more accommodating than its position at the beginning of INFCE.
Interviewer:
CAN YOU SUMMARIZE WHAT JAPAN REALLY WANTED FROM INFCE?
Ota:
What Japan wanted from INFCE was that if sufficient care was to be taken to use plutonium as a future source of nuclear energy would not directly mean, you know, increased risk for nuclear proliferation. That was the most important point from our point of view.

President Carter’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

Interviewer:
WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT?
Ota:
Um... From our point of view that act was rather severe and but there are a number of points in the act which were left for... administrative discretion. So we relied upon the position to be taking by the US administration. Later in the course of talks with the US government we found out that the US Congress was taking a very tough position. So it seems clear that from our point of view this Non-proliferation Act of the Carter ad... administration created some problems to Japan. But I believe that we were able to overcome these difficulties and then we were able to come up with a new nuclear cooperation agreement between our two countries.
Interviewer:
LET'S JUST STOP A SECOND.
Ota:
For instance as compare... the most important aspect of this Non-Proliferation Act was to ask partners of the United States in nuclear programs to take very strict measures; much more s... strict than the measures required in the past. And f-for instance, a supplier has a, a, has certain right cons... to make sure that what the supplier supplied was not used to create nuclear weapons. And the number of points that were required increased significantly in the new act. For instance before, storage was no problem. But in the new act the s... the storage of nuclear related materials came to need the approval of the supplier. So before it was up to the you... Japanese nuclear industries where to store nuclear fuels. But under the new act the storage itself had to be approved by the US government. This is one example. So you know... Our concern was that of course we share the US concern for... non-proliferation but nuclear industry is an industry that has to be run on a... day-to-day basis and then if there are too many regulations and controls the smooth operation of a nuclear power plant might severely be damaged. This is one of the concerns on our part.
Interviewer:
WERE THERE ANY OTHER CONCERNS?
Ota:
Well from Japan's point of view you know we were making clear by various means that Japan would not go nuclear. So a number of requirements that are stipulated in the act from Japan's point of view seemed unnecessary. You know the act was unnecessarily severe but perhaps if it were to be applied to count... countries like Brazil or Pakistan which are refusing to ratify the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may-maybe it makes sense. But to countries like Japan and West Germany you know, we didn't think that such severe regulations were necessary. So that was our reaction to this act.
Interviewer:
COULD YOU EXPLAIN ABOUT ARTICLE 9 AND WHY JAPAN WAS NOT--HAD ACTUALLY RENOUNCED...
Ota:
The background of Article 9?
Interviewer:
YES. WHY IT WAS NOT NECESSARY.
Ota:
Oh, I see. It is not just Article 9 of the constitution but for instance we ha... we ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is a basic, basic act in Japan for use of nuclear energy. And it is clearly stipulated that nuclear energy should be used only for peaceful purposes. And then also we have these three non-nuclear principles. So you know, we, we have one principle after another renouncing possible reliance on nu-nuclear weapons. So you know... our frank reaction was if — isn't that enough? You know. Do you still need some more assurance from us? That was our reaction. And then we were very much surprised and actually at one time unhappy when we were told that it was — the US position was not directed to Japan but also to countries like Brazil or Pakistan or other countries which are refusing to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So you know, that seemed to mean that from the US point of view it didn't make any difference whether it was Japan or Brazil or Pakistan. So you know, that we were very unhappy about that kind of recognition. So we tried to emphasize that there is a basic difference between countries like Japan and then, and then West Germany which have clearly stipulated that we were against nuclear proliferation and that we did — renounced nuclear weapons. And at the same time we have a very sub... already a very substantial nuclear program. So we thought that it is totally unfair to treat countries like Japan on the equal basis as other you know count... countries.
Interviewer:
DID YOU HOPE FOR SOME PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT?
Ota:
That was a very difficult point. The... Non-Proliferation Treaty itself is a discriminatory treaty... dividing the countries of the world into two; nuclear weapon states and non-nu... nuclear weapon states and it stipulates obligations and rights in separate packages. Now it was we were not saying that there should be another discriminatory treatment in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy but at least what Japan was saying was that such important factors as whether a, a given country's a party to the NPT or not or whether it has already a very substantial nuclear program or not should very much be taken into consideration. So whether that is considered discrimination or not is up to observe... you know those who observe the issue. But our point of view was that you know, it is not fair to treat you know, all the non- nuclear weapon states on equal footing.

Next 10 Years of the Nuclear Age

Interviewer:
HOW DO YOU ENVISION THE NEXT TEN YEARS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE?
Ota:
I believe that the use of nuclear power in countries like Japan and France would be a-advanced significantly... regardless of the situation of oil. That, that is what I believe. Now in the political-military scene I really do hope that in the course of the next ten years we will not see a second India. That is my sincere hope. By second India, I mean you know India had a nuclear explosion claiming that it was for peaceful purposes. So that means that I really hope that no country would be added to the list of those who have had nuclear explosions.
Interviewer:
DID YOU BELIEVE IT WAS PEACEFUL?
Ota:
Well, you know there is a committee in IAEA to discuss what peaceful uses mean so it's and it's up to the Indians but you know from our point of view it doesn't make any difference. You know, a nuclear explosion is a nuclear explosion and it is very difficult to say that any explosion was for peaceful purposes.
[END OF TAPE 009101 AND TRANSCRIPT]