MR. MCNAMARA, WHAT WAS YOUR MANDATE FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHEN HE ASKED YOU TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE?

It was a very simple one as far as force structure was concerned is...was to examine the military forces which the US had at its disposal taking account of those of its allies as well and determine whether they are adequate in relation to our security requirements.

DID YOU SAY YOU HAD AN ANECDOTE?

You may remember that during the campaign the issue of the missile gap became very prominent. Although I didn't understand it until later, there were two different intelligence estimates of the relative balance between US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. One prepared by the air force and one prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. And at that time there was no central director of intelligence within the government as there was later in the '60s and as there is today. These two different estimates, therefore, stood independently of each other. One of them, the Air Force estimate, was leaked to the congress. It became known publicly. It indicated that the Soviets had a substantial advantage in strategic nuclear forces vis-a-vis the US. And this became a major issue in the campaign. And therefore I felt responsible in accordance with the President requirement that I examine the adequacy of the US military forces to determine the size of that missile gap and the way in which we should act to eliminate it. That was my first order of business when I became secretary on January 20, 1961. And it took me and my deputy, Ross Gilpatric about three or four weeks that yes, there was a gap. But it was exactly the reverse of what had been understood. The balance was substantially in favor of the United States. The total strategic nuclear offensive force of the US at the time, as I recall, was on the order of 6,000 warheads compared to the total Soviet strategic nuclear force of on the order of 300. Now I want to emphasize that this in each case included a small number of missiles. But even with respect to missiles, I think it was clear the US had an advantage. But in total, strategically, the US was much stronger in nuclear offensive forces than was the Soviets. I made the terrible mistake of meeting with a group of the members of the press at the urging of my assistant secretary for public affairs about the time I came to this conclusion, three or four weeks after I'd been sworn in as secretary. He urged me to become acquainted with the press. I did so. I thought it was clearly understood, the session was off the record. The first question of course, was Mr. Secretary, you've been secretary three or four weeks, surely you must have been looking at the missile gap. What do you propose to do about it. And I said, Well gentlemen I have been. It was clearly the first requirement. And I found there was a gap. And there was a dead silence. I said, but it's in our favor. You couldn't hold the door locked. They broke the damn door down. They went out and the headline on the late afternoon edition of the Evening Star says: McNamara declares no missile gap. And the next day, perhaps with tongue in cheek, the Republicans asked that the election be rerun. They asked the President to resign and that I resign. They claimed he had been elected on false premises. Now I want to emphasize that the Air Force put forward that intelligence estimate in good faith. They weren't intentionally trying to mislead anybody. It was illustrative of how little we knew about the Soviets at the time. The amount of information we had on their force structure was very limited. And there was room for difference of opinion. I thought then, and I believe today the Air Force uh. . . misinterpreted the data. My view coincided with that of the Central Intelligence Agency. And I think with hindsight it's very clear that we had strategic nuclear superiority at the time.

YOU DIDN'T KNOW A LOT ABOUT NUCLEAR STRATEGY OR WEAPONS SYSTEMS OR THINGS WHEN YOU...

I did not.

WHO DID YOU CHOOSE TO HIRE AND TO BRING INTO THE SECRETARY"S OFFICE TO EDUCATE YOU?

I was very reluctant to accept President Kennedy's invitation to become Secretary of Defense. And I did so only on the condition that I would be allowed to bring into the department the ablest people I could find. I clearly was not an expert on defense and I felt I needed the brightest minds in the country to assist me to become an expert on defense and I fully intended to be one. He promised me that I could select whomever I chose without any regard to partisan politics. He never once deviated from that promise. And the result was that I recruited what I considered the ablest group of individuals that have ever served in a single cabinet office in the history of our republic. At one single time in the Defense Department we had Gilpatric, Vance -- later Secretary of State, Brown -- later Secretary of Defense, Califano -- later Secretary of HEW, Charles Hitch -- the former president of the University of California, Paul Nitze -- the current arms control negotiator, Bill Bundy... A host of other extraordinarily bright imaginative experience individuals. And they became my tutors. And I hope I was a fast learner. In any event I made it my business to quickly endeavor to understand the fundamentals of strategy in a nuclear age.

YOU TURNED TO A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO HAD OCCUPIED POSITIONS AT RAND. WHAT DID THEY BRING TO YOU?

Well, there were a number of people from RAND, but I recruited them not because they'd been at RAND, but rather because they were extremely bright able people. Charles Hitch was the first I brought in from RAND. He had been a tutor. As a matter of fact he had been a Rhodes scholar and then a tutor at Oxford. He was a tutor of Harold Wilson who later became Prime Minister of Britain. And I mention this only to indicate the quality of his mind and the level of his experience in international affairs. He then went to RAND and he became a security expert at RAND. He was an extraordinarily able tutor of me.

I NEED A WAY TO LEAD INTO OUR DISCUSSION WITH ENTHOVEN ON FORCE STRUCTURE. HE DID PLAY A KEY ROLE ON SOME OF THESE DECISIONS...

In addition to Charlie Hitch we brought in from RAND Allen Enthoven and Harry Rowen who I didn't know and who Charlie Hitch did and who he recommended and whom he brought in to work with him. And the three of them were extremely able. Very knowledgeable, very expert in nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy and they quickly brought me up to speed.

WHAT WERE THE GOALS OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE DECISIONS?

The following Kennedy's request that we examine the military forces of the United States in relation to our foreign policy objectives and taking account of our allies forces determine whether they were adequate in relation to those foreign policy objectives. We... translated the foreign policy objectives into military strategy, translated the military strategy into force structure, and that into defense department budgets. And with respect to the nuclear forces we considered how those forces might be used and in relation to that possible use, considered the size of force we needed and then compared that with the size we had or the size that we were planning to have in the years covering the procurement cycle. Let me go back a bit to stress that nuclear weapons almost since the formation of NATO have been a major element of the NATO military force structure. NATO was formed as I recall, in 1949. Early in the 1950s the NATO powers sought to determine the size of the forces they needed to defend against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. At that time it was estimated that the Soviet Union could field...put into combat a hundred and seventy five divisions, combat divisions. Against those divisions, NATO believed it would need 92 divisions. The reason for the lesser number was that the NATO divisions were larger and stronger, had more fire power etcetera. And the 92 division goal for NATO was accepted in 1952 at Lisbon and became known as the Lisbon Force Goals. However, very quickly by 1954 it became clear that NATO was unwilling to finance the recruitment and equipping of 92 divisions. And Secretary Dulles, the then US Secretary of State proposed in 1954 that nuclear weapons in effect be substituted for conventional forces. Because of budgetary reasons. And he stated quite frankly that was the goal. Get a bigger bang for the buck was the way it was phrased. And at that time, the NATO force goal was reduced from 92 divisions to 30 divisions and in effect the reduction of 62 divisions was justified by the proposal to introduce and build up nuclear forces.

So from early in the '50s the nuclear forces became an essential element of the NATO force structure and the NATO strategy. And the strategy at that time, as it related to Europe was what was called massive retaliation. It was thought that the conventional forces would serve as a trip wire. That almost the smallest conceivable Soviet incursion into NATO territory would trip that wire, trip the conventional forces if you will and lead to an all out nuclear assault upon the Soviet Union. So the first question we had to ask ourselves in 1961, was this a viable strategy and if so were the forces adequate. And we very quickly came to the conclusion it wasn't a viable strategy. I recall that there was a group named,I believe, the Joint Evaluation Subcommittee which had been appointed by President Eisenhower and which consisted of four star officers. And they did nothing but examine the results of a nuclear exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, presumably initiated by NATO. And there were....their conclusions were so devastating that only, literally only one copy of their report was prepared and it was almost impossible to gain access to it. The president and later I as secretary of defense were allowed to have access to it. But essentially no one else. And what the report the showed was: there was no conceivable situation in which NATO could initiate the use of nuclear weapons without the destruction of both the Soviet Union, and Western Europe, and the United States. And that, quite obviously, caused us to doubt the desirability of the strategy of massive retaliation. And it wasn't long after it was early in 1962 that we concluded that strategy should be changed. And President Kennedy authorized me to put forward to the NATO ministers, foreign and defense ministers of NATO meeting in Athens in I believe April 1962. I proposed [a] new strategy known as flexible response. The purpose of which was to insure that it would not be necessary to confront a small Soviet conventional force aggression with the launch of NATO's nuclear forces, but rather to respond to Soviet conventional force aggression with NATO conventional forces. And utilize NATO's nuclear forces only as an action of last resort in the event that the NATO conventional forces were in danger of being overrun. What we were saying to NATO in Athens in 1962 -- and it was very, contravene... controversial was that massive retaliation was a bankrupt strategy. We should move away from that. We should raise the threshold of nuclear retaliation. We should depend primarily on conventional forces. This was extremely controversial. Some exaggerated the danger of nuclear war. Others said that the withdrawal of the threat of early use of nuclear weapons would damage the deterrent and increase the likelihood the Soviets would engage in war. And a third argument was that NATO couldn't afford the increase in conventional forces that would be required. With respect to the latter, I should say that it was true then, and it's true today, that the United States and the western world has consistently overestimated the strength of the Soviet conventional force and consistently underestimated the strength of NATO's conventional forces and therefore exaggerated the imbalance, the conventional force imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO and that has contributed to the support of what I'll call the nuclear option. The nuclear strategy.

The argument was so great in April of '62 over the proposed shift from massive retaliation to flexible response that it wasn't until five years later that the proposal was accepted. It was accepted in 1967 after five years of debate and argument. And moreover, it was accepted in a substantially diluted form. When it was accepted the NATO nations failed to agree to increase their conventional forces as had been proposed even to the limited levels we thought necessary evaluating properly the relative balance of Soviet and NATO conventional forces. And as a result, the threshold of nuclear war was not raised as high as we believed desirable. And to this day, it is far lower than I find acceptable. There is an unacceptable risk of nuclear war today because NATO has failed to carry out the strengthening of conventional forces which we recommended in April of 1962. And the NATO commanders will say today and have said publicly, that they would expect that in the early hours of any military confrontation between east and west to request authority to use nuclear weapons. I think that's a disgraceful state of affairs.

LET'S GO BACK TO SOME OF THE STRATEGIC FORCE DECISIONS. YOU CAME IN ON THE CUSP OF A NEW AGE. THE FORCE STRUCTURE WAS MAINLY BOMBERS. WHAT DID YOU DO ABOUT THE BOMBERS? WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THE BOMBERS? WHAT'S THE CASE FOR MISSILES OVER BOMBERS?

At the time the administration came in missiles were just being put into production. The Eisenhower administration had initiated the design and development and deployment of missiles, quite correctly I think. And it was obvious to us that regardless of what role the bombers would play -- and we thought they would continue to play an important role as they are today. But at that time it was clear that while we needed the bombers and we needed to modernize the bomber force needed to protect it and needed to reduce its vulnerability, nonetheless we should place primary reliance on missiles. And therefore we put great emphasis on the Minuteman missile and the Polaris missile.

WHAT WAS THE UTILITY OF THE MISSILE?

We were placing such emphasis on the missile because two reasons: number one, they were fast. They responded quickly. They would reduce the ability of the adversary to respond with certain of their weapons if our weapons were targeted on theirs. And secondly, there was no known defense against them. The bombers while we believed they could penetrate defenses, those defenses were becoming stronger at all times and they carried the risk that increasing number of bombers would become vulnerable to those defenses. So for both reasons we put great emphasis on the missiles, while, as I suggest, strengthening the bomber force.

DIDN'T YOU INHERIT A FORCE STRUCTURE DESIGN FOR A FIRST-STRIKE?

The issue of whether we did or didn't have first-stike capability and if we didn't whether we should or shouldn't have a first-strike capability was a very important issue, indeed, in the 1960s. It is today, one of the fundamental problems standing in the way of arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. To this day, the Soviets believe that we have over a period of years starting if not in the '50 certainly in the early '60s had a first-strike strategy. And we today, and for a number of years have believed that the Soviets have or are seeking to achieve a first-strike capability. I know the Soviet belief is wrong. We did not have, we do not have, we never intended to have a first-strike capability. I don't believe the Soviets have or are seeking to achieve a first-strike capability. However, each side believes it, and even though the beliefs are irrational and in my opinion incorrect, they must be treated as reality. And this has a tremendous impact on strategy and particularly on arms control agreement. But to go back to the early '60s -- At that time we had on the order of 6,000 strategic warheads. The Soviets had on the order of 300. There were many in the US, some in the military and some not in the military, but many in the US administration who believed that with our 6,000 if we targeted them on the Soviet military forces, particularly their nuclear forces, we could achieve a first-strike. By definition, a first-strike is not only first use in the sense that you initiate the use of the weapons before the opponent has initiated the use of nuclear weapons. But the difference between first use and first-strike is that, by definition, a first-strike is first use that is so overwhelming it... destroys such a high percentage of your opponents retaliatory nuclear force that he cannot inflict unacceptable damage on you. Now...

...Now under that definition, we did not then, do not today, and never had a first-strike capability.

DID YOU FEEL THAT THE SAC OR THE AIR FORCE AT THE TIME YOU CAME INTO THE PENTAGON HAD A FIRST STRIKE PLAN?

The Strategic Air Command was perhaps the most highly disciplined element of the military force. General LeMay did a fantastic job in shaping that command to a standard of perfection that was unequaled elsewhere in the military and that included a very high standard of discipline which means that the strategic air command operations were managed to conform to the directions it received from the highest political authority, the President. However, given the then balance of force - say at 20-to-1 numerical advantage for the US -- there were certainly some in the Strategic Air Command that thought we should...they should develop what might be called a first-strike plan, which would be a plan targeted...uh... targeting our whole force against the Soviet retaliatory force and designed to inflict such damage on it that the force that survived would not have sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on us. And there was such a plan. But, it didn't meet the requirement. The President's requirement or my requirement as to... or call it acceptable damage. Even a small number of surviving Soviet nuclear weapons if delivered on targets in this country, particularly uh..cities would cause such numbers of fatalities as to be totally unacceptable to any responsible political leader. And surely that particular SIOP plan was unacceptable to the President as it was to me.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE SIOP. DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR FIRST BRIEFING IN OMAHA IN FEBRUARY 1961, WHEN YOU FIRST LEARNED WHAT THE WAR PLAN WAS?

In 1961, after having concluded that there was no missile gap or if there was a gap, it was a gap in our favor i visited the headquarters of the strategic air command at Omaha with some of my associates, met with the commander of the air command at the time and went through the SIOP alternatives. I wanted to understand the targeting. The numbers of weapons that would be brought on the targets. The operational plans. The degree of control that the political authorities could exercise over those plans. And I can recall to this day my shock and amazement because basically they were all out plans. Designed to unleash our total force against particular targets. And that would carry with it, so it seemed to me, the results that the joint evaluation subcommittee -- this committee of four 4-star officers had pointed to. That is to say the destruction both of the Warsaw Pact of nations, particularly the Soviet Union, but also the destruction of the...of the United States. And hence, the plan, from my point of view was totally unsatisfactory. Moreover it carried with it an extraordinary amount of peripheral damage. Damage to countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union across which our bombers would have to fly. Endangering the bomber because of the air defenses in those countries which led our targeters to plan to take out those air defenses either by missiles or by bombers in advance of the time that our bombers would pass over. And that caused immense damage to the surrounding nations. So I found the plans quite unsatisfactory. And it led me to conclude that it was going to be necessary to introduce flexibility into the plans -- what I'll call flexible re-targeting. So that very quickly, following a Presidential decision to launch a part of the or all of the strategic air command, targets could be changed in accordance with whatever wishes the President proposed to follow and apply at the time.

AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE ENTIRE SIOP WOULD GO OFF AND NOT ONLY THE SOVIET UNION, BUT CHINA AND EUROPE...

Well I don't...I don't recall this. And if I did I wouldn't wish to mention the specific countries that would have been involved in a SIOP attack. Even in an attack that was planned as far back as 1962, '61.

WE...

By the way, I don't think that China was included, I don't recall that at all. But certainly, as you might expect, it was one might think reasonable when you're sending in an attacking force to attack targets in the Soviet Union, if it had to pass over anti-aircraft sites on the way in it would only be thought to be reasonable to take out those anti-aircraft sites and they might or might not be within the Soviet Union.

WERE YOU HORRIFIED?

Well, I was horrified because it seemed so senseless to me. There was no way that I could conceive of our nation coming out a winner from such an exchange. There was no way in which I could conceive of our nation benefiting from such an exchange. And it led me to conclude then there could be no way to either limit or win a nuclear war.

WHEN YOU FIRST UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE WAR PLAN WAS, WEREN'T YOU CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS SIMPLY TOO MASSIVE A RESPONSE WITHOUT -- I MEAN TOMMY POWER DIDN'T CONVINCE YOU WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO BACK TO US?

No, he didn't, but the joint evaluation subcommittee did.

WERE YOU PRIVY TO THAT AT THAT TIME?

I think so. I think I became privy to that before I went to SAC -- I don't recall exactly. But one didn't have to be a -- didn't have to read the joint evaluation subcommittee report to know that the Soviets would launch all out. There's no question about that. So you could make your own judgement. It was a, you know, they went through extraordinarily onerous approach to obtaining the results. You could do it in two hours on the back of an envelope. It would be just about as accurate.

BUT YOU WERE HORRIFIED?

Absolutely.

I WANT YOU TO SAY THAT.

Well I was shocked at the approach that was being taken. Or let me phrase it differently, I was shocked at the result that would accrue from initiating any one of the SIOP plans each one of which was certain to lead to Soviet retaliation with all the power at their disposal. Now, the power at their disposal, after we had struck them, would be less, substantially less of course, than the power before we struck them. But the power that they very possibly would have after we had struck them was more than any responsible US leader would voluntarily accept directed against his country. It was more than any US leader would draw upon himself by a decision to launch against the Soviets. And it convinced me then that there was no set of circumstances in which we could benefit by initiating an attack on the Soviet Union. A nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

WHAT WAS YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS IN YOUR COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS AT ANN ARBOR IN 1962?

Well, there were in a sense, three messages. The first and the main purpose of the speech was to say, as I had said, I think, a month previously in Ann Ar...in Athens that the US had proposed to NATO a massive shift in nuclear strategy away from massive retaliation to flexible response. And that we believed that this would greatly reduce the risk of nuclear war. It raised the threshold of the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons very substantially. It thereby reduced the risk that those weapons would be used and reduced the risk that the two sides would be destroyed as a result of a nuclear exchange. B, it was to say to the Soviets that it wasn't phrased exactly this way - it was to say that given the tremendous force imbalance, the tremendous force superiority that the US has today of superiority in the ratio of 20-to-1. 6,000 US warheads to 300 strategic offensive nuclear Soviet warheads. We believe it's very much in the interest of both powers were we ever to find our way in a...into a nuclear war that we seek to limit that nuclear war. And that certainly it would be our hope and intention to try to limit it by holding the numbers of warheads launched to far below the total we had available and launching then solely at military targets and we would hope that the initial exchange could be limited to a relatively small number of warheads focused on military targets. And that after that, in some fashion, the war can be terminated. And thirdly it was to say to the Soviets that we thought independent nuclear forces, such as those possessed by France, could be dangerous. And while we didn't put it quite this way, in the speech there was a strong indication that we would not permit the US nuclear forces to be triggered by an independent decision made by France which was withholding its nuclear force from NATO at the time. An independent decision by France to launch part or all of its force against the Soviet Union.

THIS IS A DIRECT MESSAGE TO DE GAULLE ISN'T IT?

Well, it was more a statement perhaps, than a message. And it was a statement for which I was severely criticized at the time. And as a matter of fact, it's a statement that the French haven't forgotten to this day.

BUT YOU COULDN'T HOPE TO LIMIT DAMAGE IN A WAR IF THERE ARE ROWDY PEOPLE WITH THEIR FINGERS ON THE BUTTON.

There was then and I think, to this day, there is danger that if allies take independent decisions with respect to initiating the use of nuclear weapons, there will be unintended responses. And any decision to use nuclear weapons in defense and alliance, whether they by French nuclear weapons, or British nuclear weapons, or US nuclear weapons should represent a decision by the alliance.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE INTERPRETED THIS SPEECH AS AN INDICATION THAT A WAR COULD BE FOUGHT IN A TIDY LITTLE WAY BY AVOIDING CITIES.

Absolutely...absolutely not. With hindsight I'm not even certain that the speech was appropriate for the time. I'm inclined to think on balance it was. But if it was appropriate for the time, it was a very narrow window in the nuclear age -- a very small window in the nuclear age and a very peculiar period in the nuclear age. It was the period when we had this 20-to-1 nuclear superiority and it was a period when we wanted to make clear that it would be in their interest and ours to avoid an all out nuclear exchange by either side. And that was in effect the theme of... one of the three themes of the Ann Arbor speech.

SO WAS IT DAMAGE LIMITING?

It was damage limiting, in that sense. It was -I don't like to use the term damage limiting because it has other connotations. But it was an attempt to ensure that a nuclear war once started would be limited. And as I suggest, I'm not even certain with hindsight that was possible at that time I know it is impossible today -- not with the huge numbers of forces and the wide deployment of forces and the detailed war plans for their use that exist today. It's absolutely impossible. I don't know anybody who thinks that a nuclear war once started today can be limited. But that was our hope then.

BUT A FEW MONTHS AFTER ANN ARBOR YOU TOLD STEWART ALSOP THAT YOU THOUGHT THAT A COUNTERFORCE MOVE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY IF THE SOVIETS -- WHEN THEY DEVELOPED A SECURE RETALIATORY CAPABILITY...

Well...

IT WAS SORT OF A LONG RANGE STRATEGY...IT WASN'T CENTERED ON THE IMBALANCE...

Stewart Alsop came in to see me one day and said, "Bob, I have word that the CIA had information that the Soviets are beginning to harden their missile sites. Isn't that a heck of a mess?" And I said, "Stew, I never comment on CIA reports, but I'll tell you this: If the Soviets are beginning to harden their missile sites, thank God." He thought that was absurd. He went ahead and printed my statement. And I remember Senator Dirksen and perhaps with his tongue in his cheek demanding my resignation. He said, My god, we have a Secretary of Defense that's pleased when the Soviets become stronger. Get him out of there. Of course that isn't what I meant at all. What I meant was -- that what I believed then and believe today is that we must seek to increase what I call crisis stability. And let me take a second to tell what I mean by crisis stability. There's a great danger that in a period of crisis, one side or the other may fear that the other's about to initiate a nuclear attack. And the person who is likely to be the recipient of that attack may feel that in the face of a high probability the attack will be directed against them, they would be better off to launch what's known as a preemptive attack. Seeking to blunt the attack that they expect will be initiated. Now that was exactly the situation that we the US faced in the early 1960s because we had this numerical superiority of 20-to-1. The Soviet missiles that were part of their strategic offensive nuclear force were what were called soft. They were unprotected. They were highly vulnerable to both our missiles and our bombers. And if you had been a Soviet political or military leader sitting there, facing 20 US strategic offensive warheads for every one of yours inferring that those 20 would be directed to your one and you knew your one could be destroyed by one, or two, or three of those 20 you'd be scared to death. And you would think, Well it would be a horrible thing to have a nuclear exchange, but I will be much better off if I launch my 300 before their 6,000 are launched against me. And that's what I call crisis instability. A stimulant to preemption. And what I was trying to convey to Stewart Alsop was that if the Soviet 300 warheads were less vulnerable to our attack there was less likelihood that in a crisis they would fear our attack and less likelihood they would preempt. And more likelihood that together we could avoid a nuclear war. And I believe that was exactly the correct judgement then. And I believe it's the correct judgement today.

YOU ALSO SAID THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE THE SECURITY OF A STABLE RETALIATORY FORCE, THEN A COUNTERFORCE WAR WOULD BE MORE LIKELY BECAUSE THEY WOULDN'T HAVE TO GO FOR CITIES.

Well, if they felt that they had weapons that were going to survive, there was less likelihood they'd direct them initially against cities. They might be willing particularly if we were -- as we were suggesting at Ann Arbor - using only a small portion of our force against their military targets, there was greater likelihood they would direct their surviving force against our military targets. Particularly if they could hold in reserve some survivable force which they later could direct against our cities if this limited exchange didn't prove limited.

WAS YOUR--THE EXTENT YOU HAD TO THINK ABOUT THESE THINGS, DID YOU EVER THINK THAT THE-CAN YOU IMAGINE ANY SITUATION WHERE THE US MIGHT WANT A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE OR A FIRST-STRIKE, OR WAS IT YOUR IDEA TO BE--TO ABSORB A FIRST-STRIKE AND BE DELIBERATE?

In 1962, as I recall I a bomber, I think it was a B-47 bomber on a training mission carrying a nuclear bomb...

LET'S START OVER. WOULD YOU MIND PUTTING YOUR PEN IN YOUR POCKET.

In 1962 there was a--a bomber I believe, a B-47 bomber which was carrying a--a nuclear bomb that crashed in I think South Carolina. And in examining the what happened it became clear obviously that the bomb didn't detonate. However the safeguards against detonation were several but a number of them had been in a sense by-passed by the effects of the accident and it led me to focus on what would have happened had for example the chief of staff of the air force, called me, or the President and said, "Request authority to--to launch the SIOP." And I then went to the President and said, "Mr. President someday General X may call you and say 'Mr. President we're under attack, the Soviets have launched a nuclear attack against us city X has been destroyed, we request your authority to launch SIOP.'" And the President said, "Well Bob, what do you think I ought to say?", and I say "Well, Mr. President I suggest you say to him, 'General, thank you for calling me collect the other chiefs, ask Bob McNamara to join you and come over and meet me in my office.' And the general's likely to say, 'Mr. President you're crazy before I get there you'll be destroyed.' And you say, 'Well General don't worry about that we've got our airborne command post, we have means of insuring that in the event that the President is destroyed, or the White House is destroyed, we may nonetheless retaliate, use our forces to retaliate against the Soviet Union, they know that's one of the strengths of our deterrence. But as I told you get the hell over here and get here fast, and we'll sit down and talk about this." But, I say, "Mr. President, before hang up, tell him that--what you're going to do when he gets here." "Well what is that," the President said, and I said, "well you say to General X, 'Now General when you get here, let me tell me what we're going to do. We're then going to drive out to Andrews air force base and we're going to get into an airplane and we're going to go down there and look at the results of this Soviet attack. And he'll say "Mr. President you're insane, you're absolutely insane, we're under attack, we got to get going, the damn place will be blown up before you even launch." And you say, 'Well that may be General but I want to be absolutely certain I know what happened. I want to know that a Soviet senior leader consciously attacked the United States. I want to know this is not an isolated attack, I want to know what's going to happen next, I want to know whether more missiles are going--or bombs are going to detonate, I want to know what they're trying to do. I am not going to start a nuclear war which I know will destroy this nation if what has happened to date is an accident so you get over here and let's start talking about it.'" Now, the point I was trying to make then, and I think is very relevant today, is there should never be the launch of a nuclear weapon unless you know what you're hoping to achieve by doing so. I think we can agree that there's no way to limit a nuclear war. Once you start a nuclear war, your society is going to be destroyed. That isn't to say one shouldn't launch in the face of an attack, but it is to say, you better never launch other than in the face of attack and you'd better be certain that you know the size of that attack and how it started and what the intent of it was.

WHAT WAS THE AIR FORCE, OR SACS REACTION TO THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH--TO THE--COUNTER FORCE WAS A TERM THAT WE--WAS IN--USED BRIEFLY THEN AND--AND WHAT WAS THEIR REACTION, DID THAT MEAN THEY WANTED MORE WEAPONS TO COUNTER...

Well, the--the air force at various times has--has thought it would be possible to develop a first-strike capability. The Ann Arbor speech was I--as I remember in May of 1962, in November of 162, I wrote a memorandum to the President and the only reason I recall this is, it was a very highly classified memorandum and perhaps a year ago, a man came into talk to me and ask me about the events of 1961 and '62 which I couldn't recall, and he said, well perhaps this will stimulate your memory and he showed me, my memorandum to the President this highly classified document. I said "I can't imagine where you got that." He said, "Well I got it out of the Freedom for Information Act." Now in that memorandum and the reason it was so highly classified among other things was the statement that I made to the President regarding the air force's request for a strategic offensive nuclear force. The--the document subject was a military budget to be put to the Congress in uh--in January 1963, I guess it would have been for fiscal year 1964. And in that document I was making certain recommendations regarding Minuteman missiles and Polaris submarines and B-52 bombers. And I said, "Mr. President I'm going to recommend the following to you but you should understand the air force differs with these recommendations and the air force said to me recently in a memorandum the following..." and then I quoted from the air force memorandum. And in the Air Force memorandum to me it said: We believe we should procure X number of missiles as part of a first-strike force. And I said, "Mr. President, I don't believe we could achieve a first-strike force procuring the number of missiles recommended by the Air Force or any other number of missiles. Moreover, if we could achieve a first-strike force, I don't believe we should, so I recommend against that." Now I mention this because there was a difference of view among military leaders and among civilian leaders at the time. Some believe that we have or should have or could have a first-strike capability. Others, including me, did not.

HOW MANY MISSILES DID THE AIR FORCE WANT?

I've forgotten what they were recommending in November 1962. But I do remember an episode that indicates the number that they were thinking about at that particular time. It was perhaps in May of 1962, the University of California at Berkeley was awarding President Kennedy an honorary agree. Because I had graduated from there, they asked me to join him and receive a degree as well. We flew out together. As we were leaving he said, Let's go down to Vandenberg, which is an Air Force base in California and observe a missile launch. We did. The commanding general of SAC met us on the air strip. We got into his car -- I can still remember the vehicle. It was a large open convertible car. He was sitting in the middle of the back seat. And the President was on one side or the other and I was on the other and the general said to the President, "Now Mr. President when we get the 10,000 Minutemen we'll"...And at that point President Kennedy said, "General what did you say?" "Well," he said, "you didn't let me say it. I was just getting started. I said, when we get the 10,000 Minutemen we will. The President said, "I thought that's what you said." But Bobby said, "We're not ordering 10,000 minutemen are we?" And I said, "No Mr. President, we're ordering 1,000. Now I mention this because that particular officer had recommended that we procure 10,000. The Air Force chief had cut that back from 10,000 to 3,000. And he was recommending 3,000. And I had recommended 1,000 to the President. And that was the number we procured. And by God, that's the number we have today.

THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE WHITE HOUSE WHO FELT WE COULD GET AWAY WITH FEWER?

Yes, that's right. I think Carl Kaysen, if I remember, who was working as part of the national security council staff at the time, believed we could get by with -- I don't recall -- 400 say. And he may well have been right. I'm not arguing that I was right and he was wrong. But I think the difference in approach was that we were dealing with uncertainties. We were procuring missiles, proposing the procurement of missiles in November 1962. Not for November '62 or 1963. We were proposing that we buy missiles that would be produced and deployed at some date in the future which would take roughly 5 to 7 years to translate our order into design and production and deployment. And we had to anticipate the size of the Soviet force that would exist at the time those missiles were deployed 5 to 7 years in the future. It was difficult enough to know the size of the Soviet force that existed in November of '62 at the time we were planning the order. It was next to impossible to know the size of the force, with any accuracy, that would exist at the time our missiles were em... deployed. And therefore, what we did was estimate the Soviet capability to produce missiles during that 5 or 7 year period. And that of course was a very difficult figure to estimate. It led to quite a range of potential error. And within that range of error there was, I'll say, the most probable position. And then there was -- I'll call it the worst case. Well not really the worst case, but the most probable worst case. And as Secretary of Defense I had to take account of the possibility the Soviets would not choose the most probable force level, but the most probable worst case. So I built my proposed procurement of 1,000 missiles on that most probable worst case. I suspect Carl Kaysen built his recommendation on the most probable case, which is understandable but not the basis on which the Secretary of Defense should be making recommendations.

AT SOME POINT WE STOPPED TALKING ABOUT COUNTERFORCE AND BEGAN TALKING ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WHAT DID THAT MEAN?

Assured destruction is the foundation of our deterrent. The rationale goes this way: No rational political leader would initiate the use of nuclear weapons if the other side had nuclear weapons. But --Cut that out. Let me start again. Assured destruction means this: That in this nuclear age we don't believe -- at least I don't believe -- that the Soviets wish large scale war with the west. But confrontations have arisen. Three arose during my seven years: the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Middle East Crisis. They'll undoubtedly arise in the future. It is absolutely essential that in a period of confrontation, tense relationships between east and west that the Soviets understand that were they to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, that would lead to their destruction. That's what assured destruction means. It's our ability to destroy the Soviet Union and our complete confidence that they understand that we have that ability to destroy them that gives us the deterrent. They are deterred by their recognition that no matter what they do or how they do it, with the nuclear force they have if launched against us, our forces will survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on them. I'll call it to assure their destruction. That's the way the words apply...

NOW IS THIS A CAPABILITY OR.... YOU SAID THAT IF THEY WERE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST US THAT WE WOULD..IS THIS A STRATEGY OR A CAPABILITY?

...Deterrence is both a capability and a state of mind. And it's essential that both elements be present. If we have the capability to absorb a Soviet offensive nuclear strike against us and survive with sufficient power to destroy them, but they don't believe it -- That is not a deterrent. They must believe that we have the capability to destroy them and that we will use it to destroy them in the event they strike us. So it is both -- Deterrence is both a capability and a belief and I have every confidence that today (a), we have the capability; and (b), the Soviets know we do and believe we will use it and therefore they are deterred and will continue to be deterred.

BUT WHEN YOU BEGAN TALKING ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION WAS THIS ACCOMPANIED BY ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM OMAHA, ANY CHANGES IN THE SIOP? DID THE WAR PLANS CHANGE?

No...no...What changed was the introduction of greater flexibility in the targeting. We found for example that Polaris missiles could not be re-targeted easily and quickly. And we changed the design...changed the design of the missile and the electronic gear in relation to it so that it could be re-targeted quickly. And we did...we made similar changes in the Minuteman missiles and to some degree in the bomber operational plans to insure that in the event of a situation where the President would wish to launch, that he could very quickly change the targeting. He could withhold forces for example. He could say "Don't target any cities." Or "Don't target anything other than forces ABC" or "don't launch more than one tenth of your force and target it as follows." And the... both the war plans and the and the hardware were adjusted so as to permit that greater flexibility in targeting.

BUT NOTHING CHANGED BETWEEN THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH AND THE TIME YOU STARTED TALKING ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION?

What changed was an increasing understanding that the NATO strategy, if you will, was bankrupt. That massive retaliation was not a strategy which a US President would wish to follow.

NOW WAIT A MINUTE. WE'VE ALREADY GOTTEN RID OF MASSIVE RETALIATION.

No...no. Massive retaliation in effect as NATO strategy wasn't superseded until 1967 when flexible response was finally accepted. But throughout that period, our understanding was evolving I'll give you an illustration. In...at some point, I've forgotten exactly when I believe in 1962 with President Kennedy and later perhaps in '64 with President Johnson -I had long discussions with each President and said in effect that I didn't believe there was any circumstance without any qualification what so ever, in which we should ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Now that was contrary to the NATO strategy which we had proposed for flexible response, not yet accepted by NATO. But even in the strategy we proposed, there were certain circumstances -- those that I call circumstances of last resort -- in which the use of...the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons was called for. But I was saying to the Presidents that even in those circumstances, I cannot conceive of a situation in which it would be in the interest of NATO for you to authorize initiating the use of nuclear weapons. And without qualification, I recommend against this. Now, I mention this because it's an illustration of the evolution of our thinking during those days. And those views were quite heretical and to a considerable degree, are today.

I JUST WANT TO GO BACK TO THE ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WHETHER THIS IS A PROCUREMENT CRITERION OR A STRATEGY.

Oh, no.. .no. It was both a procurement criterion and a strategy. It was a basic philosophic foundation of our military force structure and our military strategy.

BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT IF DETERRENCE FAILS THAT WE WOULD LAUNCH THE ENTIRE SIOP A LA MASSIVE RETALIATION. THERE COULD BE NO MEASURED RESPONSE?

Well, it doesn't mean we wouldn't have a measured response. But we did not believe as the forces grew large that a measured response would lead to any significant reduction in destruction of our society. Because when you're...when you have forces as we did in the latter part of the '60s of something on the order of then we had on the order of 4,800 warheads -- something like that. A lesser number of warheads than we had at the beginning of the decade. The strategic offensive nuclear warheads, but a much higher number of those warheads launched by missiles. And therefore a much higher probability that even a relatively small number of them, say 300, delivered on almost any set of target in the Soviet Union, would destroy the Soviet Union and similarly a small percentage of the Soviet force which was much smaller than ours at the end of the '60 but must have been on the order of -- oh, I've forgotten--say 1,500, 1,800--a relatively small percentage of that, say 20 percent of that, launched against this country would uh..,for all practical purposes, destroy our nation. So, at that point, limiting the size of the launch was relatively unimportant. What was important was never initiating the launch. That's the way to avoid nuclear war. Don't ever start it.

HOW DID YOU DETERMINE HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH IN TERMS OF HOW BIG A FORCE STRUCTURE TO BUILD? I MEAN WHAT CONSTITUTED UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE...

In principle it was very simple. We considered, we must have a force large enough to absorb their attack. Assuming it was a well planned, well executed attack with missile with the accuracy that we ascribe to them, and bombers with the penetration capability we ascribe to them. We determine the number of our weapons that would be destroyed and then we determine the size of force that we would require to inflict unacceptable damage on them and we added those two together and that was the size force we needed to start with. A force large enough to absorb their attack, survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on them. Now, what's unacceptable damage to--to the Soviets? Well, frankly I am certain it was far less than the damage that we defined as unacceptable. In order to insure that our deterrent was sufficiently large to lead them to believe that we would survive with a force sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage to them. We in effect exaggerated their ability to absorb damage and I don't recall the exact figures, I think I defined unacceptable damage as destruction of something on the order of 50 percent of their industrial capability and something on the order of a 100 or a 125 million of their citizens. I [have] forgotten the exact figures. But I know, I believe then and I'm certain now that the I'll call it acceptable damage limits to the Soviets were far below what we defined as unacceptable which simply meant we bought and maintained a much larger force than we needed for deterrence. And we did this to be absolutely certain that (a), they knew we were capable of inflicting this damage on them; and (b), that we had the will to do it; and (c), that they accepted that as unacceptable and therefore as a deterrent.

MAC BUNDY TELLS A STORY ABOUT HOW WHEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS GOING TO DALLAS ON NOVEMBER 22. YOU KNOW HE HAD BEEN THERE ON A CAMPAIGN AND SAID, YOU KNOW "WE'RE GOING TO BE #1... BUT #1 PERIOD." AND HE WAS GOING BACK TO TELL THEM WE WERE #1. WERE YOU AWARE OF THE SPEECH THAT HE WAS...

I uh--I must have been. I don't recall it today.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1963, DID YOU HAVE ANY ASSURANCE THAT WE WERE #1?

One of my constant problems was with the Congress which contrary to conditions today was pushing us then to buy more. Today the Congress is pushing the Defense Department to buy less. And there was a constant pressure from the Congress to buy more particularly in the area of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. And it was necessary for us to continue to repeat that we had more than we needed or we were superior, we used various way--various forms of expression. But I think the words, while technically correct, we certainly were superior in--in November '63, we must have had whatever, say 500 strategic offensive nuclear warheads and they probably didn't have more than maybe 600 by that time. So we had a ratio of 8 or 9 to one, which was surely superior in numerical terms but it was not superior in strategic terms, it was not superior in usable military power. Because neither one of us could initiate the use of that strategic power with benefit to ourselves. So part of what the President might have been planning to say in Dallas and part of what I had said at the time to the Congress, while technically correct was perhaps connoting something we didn't have, usable power. We did not have usable nuclear military power. We had nuclear power to sufficient to fulfill its purpose which was to deter the Soviets from nuclear attack, but we did not have nuclear power that we could use, despite our superiority of 8 or 9 to one, that we could use to achieve political purposes and superiority therefore, in that sense was an--in-- incorrect statement.

YOU SAID 500, THEY HAD 600, YOU MEANT 5,000. WELL WE'VE COVERED THE SAME POINT SEVERAL TIMES, I THINK WE'RE OKAY...BUT THAT WASN'T THE MEGA-TONNAGE GOING DOWN...

...When I'm

WARHEADS...

...Discussing superiority I'm talking about superiority in terms of numbers of warheads. It's--it's very difficult to use any single measure to define adequacy or superiority and offensive nuclear forces. But the most important measures are numbers and accuracy. Frequently mega-tonnage is used. Mega-tonnage is a much less important measure because the destructive power is far more a function of improvements in accuracy than it is in increases in mega-tonnage. Moreover the Soviets many years ago because they were not as technically advanced as we were particularly in the miniaturization of navigation devices and electronic gear chose to build very large launchers which permitted them to de--put into flight very heavy warheads with high mega-tonnage. So the Soviets, traditionally have had per warhead much larger mega-tonnage than we have had and at times not only have they had larger mega-tonnage per warhead but they've have larger mega-tonnage in total. But that did not give them larger destructive power.

WHAT AT ONE POINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY, THE POSTURE STATEMENTS TALK ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE LIMITATIONS... WHAT WAS THE--WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY DAMAGE LIMITATIONS?

Damage limitation could come about either by destroying some of their offensive nuclear forces before they were launched or by strengthening our defenses, the anti-air craft defenses, or by introducing civil defense. And at various times we--we sought to limit damage by each of those measures. I would say very ineffectively.

WAS THERE A--DID YOU RECALL EVER ASKING COMMISSIONING A--FROM HAROLD BROWN OR ANYONE ELSE A COMPREHENSIVE DAMAGE LIMITATION STUDY THAT WOULD GIVE AN INDICATION OF HOW MUCH WE CAN PROTECT THE POPULATION?

Over the years, we periodically examined ways to--to reduce fatalities to the US in the event of a nuclear exchange. At one point in the early 1960s when we had that tremendous numerical advantage of some 6,000 to 300 we considered civil defense as a damage limiting factor. This came as a result of a study of how we might limit damage to the US in the event of a--a nuclear exchange. At other times we made damage limiting studies associated with increasing the strength of our air defense. By the way I should say, that-- that after 2 or 3 years of pursuing a civil defense program we quite rightly judged we'd made an error or at least the circumstances had~ changed and we withdrew support of the program. Similarly after many years of supporting a strong air defense program we concluded that given the substantial increase in the percentage of the Soviet offensive nuclear force represented by missiles that air defenses were not likely to be significant and therefore in contrast to the Soviets which to this day are spending tens of billions of dollars a year on air defense we substantially cut--cut back on air defense in the mid to late '60s. I think it was very wise. All of this was part of a continuing series of damage limitation studies. Those studies included examination of the possible use and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses and we concluded those as well, would not significantly reduce the damage to this country from a Soviet missile attack. And we were therefore very much opposed to putting in place an anti-ballistic missile defense directed to defend the country against Soviet missiles.

THE AIR FORCE GENERAL GLENN KENT FOR ONE DID A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY THAT CONCLUDED THAT THE--IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SAVE--ASSURE 70 PERCENT POPULATION SURVIVAL WITH ALL THESE MEASURES. DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT YOUR REACTION TO THAT WAS?

Well, studies that showed 70 percent survival showed by definition 30 percent loss. And 30 percent loss of say 200 million people in this country is 60 million. It was inconceivable to me that any President would initiate action which was likely to lead to the loss of 60 million people. And I couldn't conceive of us therefore, benefiting from-from expending funds to insure that the loss was quote only unquote 60 million and we didn't.

THESE STUDIES WERE ALSO POSTULATED ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULDN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT THEM...

Well, the--the it was very important when--when tailoring our offensive nuclear force to our requirements, to our strategy of--of maintaining an invulnerable retaliatory capability. It was very important to consider how the Soviets would react to our--our force additions and summarily when considering possible defensive deployments it was very important to consider how the Soviets would react. And the Soviets are no different than we are. They feel they must have a deterrent against our use of our offensive nuclear capability against them for either military or political advantages. As I have said, we never have had a first-strike capability. I know no US President who has ever thought of initiating the use of strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, however, the Soviets feel they must deter us from doing so and therefore if we put up a defensive shield to in some fashion reduce the damage to us from a Soviet offensive attack, they are going to fear that defensive shield is designed to reduce and weaken the their deterrent and they're going to respond to our defensive shield by expanding their offense. Such an old question, but what--that's the way they would react. That's the way we would react. That's they way we told Kosygin in 1967 at Glassboro that we'd react. At that time the Soviets were deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow. We believe they were planning to extend that defense across the face of the Soviet Union. We told Kosygin that were he to do that, perhaps the Congress might think the response should be an anti-ballistic missile defense deployed in the US, but that would not be our response. We would respond by expanding our offensive force. If we had the right size offensive force to maintain a deterrent before he put up a defense, by definition when he put up the defense and made that offensive force less of a deterrent we had to increase the offensive force to maintain the deterrent and that's what we would do.

JUST A QUESTION OF SORT OF MIRROR IMAGE PERCEPTION OR SOMETHING...

It's a question of action and reaction.

WE CAN SAY, LOOK WE'RE ONLY DOING THIS TO LIMIT DAMAGE TO US, BUT THIS THREATENS THE OTHER GUYS ASSURED DESTRUCTION...

Limiting damage to us threatens their deterrent and they as we, will under all circumstances maintain a deterrent.

SAY THAT AGAIN.

Uh-

JUST THE WAY--LIMITING DAMAGE...

We're we to seek to limit damage to ourselves, the Soviets would consider that those actions we can bear deterrent and they would seek to offset our defense by expanding their offense to maintain their deterrent at the same level at which it was before we put our defense in place. That's exactly what we would do in the face of Soviet action to deploy a defense. Each side must maintain a deterrent. A deterrent sufficient to insure that the other under no circumstances feels it would benefit by launching an offensive strike.

SO YOU CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENSE IS REALLY NOT GOING TO WORK...

(a) They probably won't work,technically they're far too complex; (b) they're far too costly; (c) they will simply draw the reaction of the other side which will negate them; (d) they run the risk of introducing instability in a crisis because they lead the other side to believe that they are part of a first-strike strategy and therefore the other side is tempted to pre-empt, to dull that first-strike capability.

COULDN'T--DON'T SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU DO INTRODUCE SOME UNCERTAINTY AND BY INTRODUCING UNCERTAINTY YOU KNOW, THEY DON'T KNOW HOW MANY OTHER MISSILES ARE GOING TO GET THROUGH...

I don't want any--

THAT MAKES FOR A BETTER DETERRENT.

I don't want any uncertainty in connection with nuclear deterrents. I want only certainty. I want certainty in the Soviet mind that if they ever launch they will be destroyed. Under all circumstances there's no set of circumstances that they can hypothesize associated with a Soviet launch that will lead to anything other than destruction. I want that certainty in their minds. That's the foundation of deterrence.

IF THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING A MOVE IN THE UH-THE PERSIAN GULF AND THEY KNOCKED OUT ONE NATO BASE IN TURKEY WITH ONE WEAPON, THAT THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED COMPLETELY, BALL GAME'S OVER.

Well, if we're talking about, we're talking an exchange of nuclear weapons with respect to--to Europe and under those circumstances I want absolute certainty in the Soviet mind that if they launch a nuclear attack on western Europe or North America they will be destroyed. I don't want any uncertainty there. Now, in the case of use of one nuclear weapon by the Soviets against Turkey, uh--uh I want them to feel certain that they're going to get more than they gave. And I think they do and we don--defenses don't enter into that kind of a calculation.

WELL THEN, WHY DIDN'T WE GO BACK TO THE MASSIVE RETALIATION SIOP...IF THAT'S THE WAY YOU FEEL?

Because--because it was increasingly apparent to the Soviets we were unlikely to respond to let's say their pressure on Berlin, in August of '61 with an all out launch against the Soviet Union, of--all out launch of our strategic offensive weapons when we knew that were we to do that the remaining Soviet forces would be launched against us and would destroy us. That's not a credible deterrent. You cannot make a credible deterrent out of an incredible action. And massive retaliation by the early 60s was an incredible action.

BUT IF THE SOVIETS HAD LAUNCHED ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON OR SOMETHING OR IF THERE'S LIMITED EXCHANGE IN EUROPE WOULD THAT HAVE TRIGGERED THE ENTIRE--THE DESTRUCTION OF THE-

Well...

IS THAT CREDIBLE?

Well... quite frankly I think it's very unlikely they would ever think about launching one nuclear weapon in Europe. But, I want to say to you that is a very dangerous thing to do in a nuclear age, 'cause how do we know it's one. We don't know, what--what's happened. One of these things blows up, electronic communications are severed because electro-magnetic effect on the atmosphere, we can't get in touch with our commanders their exaggerated reports of what happens. Emotions rise the likelihood is we think it's not one that nobody can conceive of an attack of one, we think it's ten or a hundred or a thousand. We think that they're going to launch. If they launch one, they'll ten tomorrow or today. So we think, you have to respond with a hundred. That is a very dangerous set of circumstances which I hope they'll never move into.

MR. MCNAMARA, WHAT DID YOU TELL KOSYGIN AT GLASSBORO?

The Glassboro meeting occurred in June of 1967. At that time, the Soviets were deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow; moreover, our Congress had already authorized and appropriated funds for the production and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense in the United States. That made absolutely no sense whatever to me, although the chiefs were in favor of it - Cy Vance..who was my deputy at the time, and I were very much opposed. The President had agreed that we should seek to initiate negotiations with the Soviets leading toward a treaty that would prohibit each side from deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense. And the Kosygin meeting at Glassboro with Johnson was for the purpose of persuading the Soviets to start those negotiations.

MAKE IT A STORY.

The, the morning session concluded, we moved into lunch; the luncheon took place around a small table, perhaps 12, maybe six on each side. The President sat on my left directly across from Kosygin, and the President was becoming very frustrated, seeking to make his argument with Kosygin; finally he turned to me and said, "Bob, for God's sakes, you tell Kosygin what's wrong with their plan." So I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, you don't seem to understand that well, perhaps it's not your intention to initiate large-scale war against the West; we must assume that in other circumstances you would; in any event, we are determined to deter you from ever, under any circumstances, launching your nuclear weapons against the west. We believe in order to deter you we must have a force sufficiently large to absorb your strike, survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on you. That's the way we size our offensive strategic forces. Now, if we had the right size force to achieve that objective before you built your anti-ballistic missile system, then we must expand that force after you build it. And therefore what I'm telling you is, if you proceed with that anti-ballistic missile system deployment, our response will not be, should not be, to deploy a similar system. That would be a waste. I hope we don't do that. But our response will be to expand our offensive weapons in order that we may maintain that deterrent, in order that after you strike us, we'll now have sufficient weapons to launch, against you, to penetrate your defense, accepting that some of them will be destroyed by that defense, and a sufficient number will penetrate to inflict unacceptable damage on you. That will be what we will do. It's not in our interest or in your interest to do that. The way to stop that is for both of us to agree today that we will engage in talks leading to a treaty that will prohibit deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, and which, by the way, we hope, will be followed by a treaty that will limit offensive systems." He absolutely exploded. The blood rose into his face, his veins swelled, he pounded the table, and he said he -- he could barely talk, he was so emotional -- he said, "Defense is moral; offense is immoral!" And he believed it! Now, fortunately they've changed their plea. And apparently so have we -- we're the ones that are saying that today. And we're as wrong as today, we're as wrong today as he was then.

IN BERLIN YOU DIDN'T HESITATE TO SAY, IN PUBLIC, THAT IF WE HAD TO WE WOULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WAS THAT A BLUFF?

I don't think it was a bluff, but it was simply a... statement of the then accepted and official NATO strategy. It was certainly nothing that I contemplated doing at the time, and nothing that I believe the President would have authorized at the time, or nothing that would have been wise at the time. As a matter of fact, I called in one of the senior allied officers -- you may recall that under, at that time the Soviets had dropped what's known as "chaff," which is in effect tin foil, in the atmosphere in order to cause malfunctioning in the navigations systems of our aircraft. And we had to stop all air resupply of Berlin because of this interference with navigation. To offset that reduction of air supply, we expanded the ground convoys along the ground corridors crossing East Germany into Berlin, and then the Soviets instructed the East Germans to stop the ground convoys, which they did, and then we added military escorts to the ground convoys, and on one occasion the Soviets instructed the East Germans to allow a militarily escorted ground convoy to enter the ground corridor into East Germany, but to prohibit it from exiting into West Berlin. We finally got it out, but following that, I asked this senior allied officer to speculate on how the situation would develop what would the Soviets do next and how would we respond? He said, Well, they'll do A and we'll do B, and they'll do C, and we'll do D, and they'll do E, and we'll do F, and they'll then do G, and I said "How will we respond then?" He said, "Well, we'll have to use nuclear weapons." I couldn't believe it -- it just seemed absurd to me. So I then called Lord Mountbatten, who was then chief of the British defense staff, into my office -- I'd known him in the China-Burma-India theatre during World War II, and I'd known him while I was secretary, and I put the same question to him, and he went through A, B, C, D, E, F, and then G, and I said, "And what do we do then?" I said, "You haven't mentioned the use of nuclear weapons." He said, "Are you insane?" Now, Mountbatten, by the way -- that was in 1961 -- but Mountbatten was killed in, I believe November, December, 1978, and he made quite a famous speech in Strasbourg 1978, before he died, and in that speech he said that he never, under any circumstances, would have recommended NATO initiate the use of nuclear weapons. He believed that then, he believed it in '61 as I did in '61.

BUT IT WAS STILL THE POLICY.

It was still the policy. It was the stated policy, absolutely.

BUT EVEN THOUGH YOU DIDN'T BELIEVE IT, YOU STILL HAD TO...

Well, we were...

THE THREAT IS IMPORTANT, ISN'T IT?

Well, I think that, I think the threat is a danger -- but in any event, it was a policy and it was standard routine to refer to it.

IS MAD A CONDITION OR A STRATEGY?

Oh, I think that's semantical I don't wish to argue the point. I think it's a condition. It is a fact that the human mind -- many human minds -- know how to build nuclear weapons; it is a fact that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose a threat to others; it is a fact that the others wish to deter the possessor of those weapons from using them; and that leads to assured destruction a condition. I call it a condition brought about by acquiring a sufficient number of weapons to deter one's opponent from utilizing theirs.

SOME PEOPLE LIKE WOHLSTETTER OR ROWAN SAID THAT YOU HELPED CREATE THE CONDITION BY NOT BUILDING DEFENSE, OR BY NOT MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF REFINING WEAPONS IN TERMS OF ACCURACY OR PUSHING THE CUTTING EDGE OF TECHNOLOGY.

Well, there were certain individuals then, and there are today, who believe that nuclear wars can be fought. I didn't believe it then, I don't believe it today. I have never seen, on paper, a plan for fighting a nuclear war. I've never seen a piece of paper that says that we, NATO, will initiate the use of nuclear weapons by firing one, or ten, or a thousand, against targets A, B, C, D, E, and we expect the Soviets will respond not at all or in some fashion, and we will then do such-and-such, and they'll do such-and-such, and at the end of one hour, or five hours, or five days, we'll be better off than when we started. There is no such plan. It's impossible to conceive of such a plan. And the Wohlstetters, to this day, are trying to say that nuclear warheads are weapons, that they can be used in military operations. That is absolutely wrong! Nuclear warheads are not weapons. They have no military use whatsoever,excepting only to deter one's opponent from using nuclear weapons.

BUT IF THEY HAPPEN TO BE USED FOR WHATEVER REASON, NOBODY IS GOING TO TAKE THE STEPS TO ASSURE THEIR OWN DESTRUCTION.

You, you take a step to assure your destruction when you initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and nobody can tell you how you can avoid that once you initiate it, not Wohlstetter, not anybody. I have never had a person dispute the statement I've just made: that there is not a single piece of paper in the world that shows how you can initiate the use of nuclear weapons with benefit to the initiator; that is to say, without a high probability that the society of the initiator will be destroyed. There is no such plan.

BUT IS IT MORE LIKELY THAT YOU COULD USE THEM IF YOU HAD SMALLER AND MORE REFINED...

No. There is no more likelihood if you do that.

IS THERE UTILITY TO USE OPTIONS AS A BETTER DETERRENT?

No. I don't believe so. The Soviets are not deterred because they think we have an artillery shell that we might use against one or two or ten divisions, instead of Moscow; they're deterred by the knowledge they have that we have a force such that we can absorb their strikes, survive, and inflict unacceptable damage on them. That's what deters them. There is no way to plan the use of a few artillery shells. A few artillery shells will destroy tens of villages, will create a fog of war, a period of uncertainty such that God knows what'll happen. No human being can believe it can stop there. And I don't know any responsible human who does believe it will stop there. Many, many people who disagree with some of the statements I've made on this program -- Al Haig, for example -- would nonetheless agree...that he can't conceive of a limited nuclear war.

WERE YOU AWARE OF HARRY ROWEN AND CARL KAYSEN'S FIRST-STRIKE OPTION DURING THE BERLIN CRISIS?

No, no.

YOU WEREN'T AWARE THAT THEY HAD DEVELOPED...

I... have no recollection -- I don't want to say, "didn't," but I have absolutely no recollection of it. I doubt very much that, if they did develop it ever came to me, and if it ever -- and I doubt very much it ever went to President Kennedy.

WELL, HE DID. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND...

Well... I think contingency planning occurs all the time, and involves responses to a host of unlikely contingencies, in... including unlikely responses. So I don't want, wish to say that Carl Kaysen and Harry Rowen didn't develop a... plan for first use of nuclear weapons in connection with Berlin, but I have absolutely no recollection of it and I'm... certain that there was no discussion between me and the President on applying such a plan.

HE DIDN'T ASK YOU TO PREPARE-

He certainly, he certainly did not.

WAS THAT A SCARY TIME?

Well, it was scary in the sense that we were concerned that the Soviets might miscalculate The Berlin crisis began with the Bay of Pigs, in my opinion, which was a disastrous episode -- I won't go into why it was disastrous but it was disastrous -- and that occurred some 60 or 70 days after the administration took office, in... late March or early April of 1961, and that was followed by... a meeting between Kosygin... rather, Khrushchev and Kennedy, in Vienna, and I guess it was June of 1961, and I think Khrushchev made a serious misjudgment of Kennedy at the time -- judged him to be weak -- and he, in a sense, added that to the Bay of Pigs debacle, in which he concluded, and I think rightly so, that the administration following a CIA plan grossly misjudged the situation in Cuba, and suffered a serious if not military defeat, certainly a serious political defeat. And he put those two episodes together and concluded that with little risk, the Soviets could wrest West Berlin away from the control of NATO, and he was just absolutely wrong -- we didn't intend to allow that to happen, and we had sufficient power to prevent it from happening -- but, in the course of preventing it from happening there was a serious risk they would escalate, and they did escalate through a whole series of moves. They finally stopped when we called up reserves and moved additional forces to Europe. But it might well have gone beyond that, and that was I won't say scary, but it was certainly a matter of great concern.

WHAT IF THE WORST HAD HAPPENED? THE OLD SIOP CALLED FOR MASSIVE RETALIATION.

Well, there was no, there was absolutely no thought given by the President or me, or Secretary Rusk, to the use of nuclear weapons. But there certainly was thought... given to conventional force escalation, which would carry with it very heavy risks, and potential costs.