Interviewer: I WAS STARTED AT THE TIME OF CARTER AND THE DECISION TO BUILD UP THE MX.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC INTENTION OR THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF THE MX MISSILE?
Chervov: Of strategic missiles?
Interviewer: NO, OF MX.
Chervov: Well, at that time we realized perfectly well that such a missile was being developed and that it would be commissioned into service.
Chervov: We thought this missile to be a very important addition to the strategic arsenals of the United States.
Chervov: The American side didn't hide anything from us and we knew perfectly well what sort of a missile it will be.
Chervov: So when the SALT II treaty was negotiated, we wanted to maximally limit the strategic armaments, including some limitations for the MX program.
Chervov: Have we succeeded? I think that at that time both sides were satisfied with the SALT II treaty, which we have subsequently signed.
Chervov: I absolutely disagree with those, who say that the SALT II treaty is worthless, this is not true.
Chervov: Both sides have made enormous efforts to agree to those limits, reach the agreements, which constitute the SALT II treaty.
Chervov: Much work has been done by both sides.
Chervov: If this treaty were ratified, it would have held in check the race in strategic armaments Whether we wanted that or not, but at that time both sides thought that at first there would be no real limitations, no real holding back, because there were no real reductions stipulated by the treaty.
Chervov: Reductions of the sort that we have in the INS treaty.
Chervov: But we were quite certain, that in several years time both sides will reach a definite line, a limit and realize that they must stop strategic nuclear arms buildup.
Chervov: This would have imposed limitations on the MX missiles as well.
Chervov: But if MX miss les were to be preserved, then some submarines and heavy bombers had to be cut.
Chervov: We expected that the SALT II would be followed by SALT III, etc., i.e.
Chervov: we would start real reductions in strategic nuclear arms.
Chervov: I have always held, then as well as now, that the limitations specified by the SALT II treaty should be preserved.
Chervov: They should never be surpassed.
Chervov: They will effectively hold in check the strategic arms race and help reach the agreement on 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.
Chervov: We have already started to work on this next treaty.
Interviewer: FROM THE STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW, HAS MX BEEN CONSIDERED AS A FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON?
Chervov: Certainly.
Chervov: We have always considered such systems to be a first-strike weapon.
Chervov: We were especially worried at the time by the problem of verification the problem of keeping track of MX.
Chervov: We were very concerned what would the American side propose to solve this problem of verification and keeping track of the MX missiles.
Chervov: The MX missile was to be mobile.
Chervov: Before introducing mobile missiles each side has to come up with a verification proposal.
Chervov: You probably remember this controversy and American proposals how to solve this problem.
Chervov: So we have always considered this system to be a first-strike weapon and paid great attention to the verification procedures.
Interviewer: IN THE AMERICAN PRIESTHOOD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THERE IS AN ASSERTION THAT THE MX WERE A RESPONSE TO THE SS-18, SS-19.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF THOSE WEAPONS?
Chervov: Well, to a certain degree that really was a response.
Chervov: If we compare SS-18 and MX, there is no difference.
Chervov: No differences whatsoever in capabilities, tactical and technical characteristics.
Chervov: Both missiles are armed with ten warheads with approximately the same destructive potential.
Chervov: In fact, I would give preference to the MX missile, because it is more accurate.
Chervov: It would be only right to maximally reduce the number of both missiles, impose strict limits on the development of these systems.
Chervov: That is why the Soviet side currently proposes to cut the SS-18 missiles by 50 percent.
Chervov: We are totally agreed with this proposal.
Chervov: As a consequence, the question of somehow limiting the MX missile will arise at the upcoming negotiations in Geneva, though we haven't asked for the MX limitations previously.
Interviewer: YOU KNOW WHAT I AM BOTHERED BY? I AM BOTHERED BY, THAT HE SPEAKS HERE THAT MASS CUT IS BEHIND IN HERE.
Interviewer: THE THING THAT I THINK IS EVEN BETTER, BEING MOSTLY VE SPECIFIC ABOUT BOTH SIDES PROPOSING LIMITS ON THIS KIND OF ROCKETS, OR, IF THE SOVIET UNION WILL PROPOSE A NEW MISSILE POLICY?
Chervov: Right now the situation is as follows: we have reached an agreement to limit the total number of strategic nuclear weapons to 1600 vehicles with 6000 warheads on them.
Chervov: This is recorded in the Soviet-American joint statement.
Chervov: This total number must include the intercontinental ballistic missile ballistic missiles on submarines and heavy bombers armed by nuclear missiles.
Chervov: At the same time, the Soviet side has made a commitment to cut in half its heavy missiles SS-18.
Chervov: This commitment will be sealed by the treaty.
Chervov: Right now we have 308 SS-18 missiles.
Chervov: Cut by 50 percent, it works out to 154 missiles, multiplied by 10, it works out to around 1500 warheads, rather 150 warheads.
Chervov: From now on the arithmetic is quite simple.
Chervov: The limit on warheads is 6000.
Chervov: But we must keep some ballistic missiles on submarines, some missiles on bombers.
Chervov: We find ourselves in a difficult position, if we wish to preserve balanced strategic forces.
Chervov: But the American side is in no less difficult situation.
Chervov: Americans must also adhere to the 6000 warhead limit.
Chervov: It is difficult to preserve the balanced structure of strategic nuclear forces, when only one MX missile has 10 warheads, and then there are Trident-2 etc.
Chervov: So my opinion is that both sides are in equal difficult spots.
Interviewer: IN THIS KIND OF SYSTEM, DOES GENERAL CHERVOV BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR BOTH SIDES TO MOVE TO A SINGLE-HEAD MOBILE STRATEGIC MISSILE – MIDGETMAN?
Chervov: Personally, I prefer single-block mobile warheads, I mean, missiles, intercontinental missiles.
Chervov: My preference is based on the fact, that the stability o: the Soviet-American relations in case of adoption such missiles, would have increased.
Chervov: In this respect I do not quite understand the position of the American government.
Chervov: At first the American side tried to convince us, that both sides should introduce single-block mobile missiles.
Chervov: A special commission, presided by General Scowcroft, looked into this matter and reached those conclusions.
Chervov: We finally agreed with the Americans on this problem.
Chervov: We decided to start a gradual transition to mobile single block missiles.
Chervov: I am very much in favor of this transition.
Chervov: But the American side has suddenly changed its mind.
Chervov: Why? Recently, I have talked with General Scowcroft and asked him what was the matter.
Chervov: General Scowcroft told me, that he was still in favor of the conclusions of his commission, that it would have been much better to deploy single-block mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Chervov: How do you like it? I believe, that we'll still return to this arrangement, to the idea of...
Interviewer: START FROM THE BEGINNING.
Chervov: I think, that both sides will come to the realization, eventually, that it is the mobile single-war head missile, which is much more important from the point of view of stability and trust between the United States and the USSR, that the intercontinental multiple-warhead missile...But this probably lies ahead.
Chervov: This is the future.
Interviewer: BUT WHAT, DO YOU THINK IT MIGHT BE A PROPOSAL FOR A...THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT PROPOSE IN ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS - TO TRY TO BASE THE DETERRENT FORCES ON A RELATIVELY SMALL MOBILE SINGLE-HEAD MISSILE?
Chervov: Well, it is difficult to say at this particular moment.
Chervov: It is difficult to foresee what course negotiations might take.
Chervov: We'll see.
Chervov: A new and very important round of negotiations, dealing with strategic offensive weapons, starts next January.
Chervov: It is difficult to say what turn negotiations would take With any kind of certainty I can only say that a great deal of work is in store for both sides.
Chervov: The task of reaching an agreement has been set before President Reagan and the General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev have decided that the draft of strategic offensive arms limitation treaty should ready by May.
Chervov: The draft will not fall into our laps from the skies.
Chervov: Both sides should do the utmost in working on the draft.
Interviewer: IN THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION, NOT A POLITICAL ONE, BUT IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY FORCES, DOES THE SOVIET UNION FEEL VULNERABLE TO A FIRST STRIKE, TO A US FIRST STRIKE?
Chervov: This possibility has not been taken off the agenda.
Chervov: The threat of war is still pretty real, in spite of the positive changes that have taken place after the Washington summit.
Chervov: I would like to see those positive changes take deep root.
Chervov: Nonetheless, the threat of war has not "been removed.
Chervov: The threat of a first nuclear strike also has not been removed.
Chervov: In this connection, I would like to express my perplexity at the refusal of the American side to take an obligation not to use nuclear missiles as a first strike weapon.
Chervov: If we want trust between our two countries, if we want glasnost and democracy, if we want greater openness in our relations, why does the American side refuse to take such an obligation? This is not a question of rhetoric and propaganda.
Chervov: No, not at all.
Chervov: This would be an obligation before the whole world.
Chervov: The Soviet people can legitimately raise this question.
Interviewer: I HAVE A COLLATERAL QUESTION, IN A SENSE, SHOULD US FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, NOT IN TERMS OF CURRENT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, WHICH I THINK IS EXCLUDED, BUT FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, SHOULD US FEEL ENDANGERED BY A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE?
Chervov: I would like to complete my last statement with the following argument.
Chervov: Robert McNamara wrote recently that the American people are unaware, that the US Government does not want to commit itself not to use nuclear weapons first.
Chervov: If the American people knew, they would have been shocked.
Chervov: That's what Robert McNamara wrote recently.
Chervov: As concerns a first nuclear strike by the Soviet Union, I can repeat once again with full responsibility the well-known statement by the Soviet Government, that the Soviet Union will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
Chervov: This obligation has been taken before the eyes of the whole world.
Chervov: It has been repeated many times by the General Secretary.
Chervov: The Soviet Union just cannot deliver a first strike.
Chervov: Of course, you will try to object, that the Soviet Union has such a capability.
Chervov: Well, capability is one thing, but there are also such things as responsibilities under different treaties and agreements, obligations before the whole world.
Chervov: We have taken an obligation before the whole world and we'll never deliver a first strike.
Interviewer: FIRST, ABOUT THE NO FIRST USE BY THE SOVIET UNION.
Interviewer: DID IT MEAN A SHIFT IN THE SOVIET UNION'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY, OR WAS IT ONLY A DECLARATION OF POLITICAL...
Interviewer: WAS IT ONLY A POLITICAL STATEMENT, OR, DID IT IN FACT AFFECT MILITARY PLANNING?
Chervov: No, it was not only a political statement.
Chervov: This commitment has a serious influence on the military planning, on training of the troops, on the armed forces in general.
Chervov: First of all, we have stricken from all regulations and field manuals of the Soviet Army any mention of a first nuclear strike.
Chervov: Instead, we have put in these regulations and manuals statements to the effect, that the Soviet Union will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
Chervov: We train in that spirit our enlisted men, officers, high-ranking commanding and staff officers.
Chervov: When I open American regulations and manuals, and read about a nuclear first strike option, I have to con elude, that the US Army considers this possibility and trains its personnel accordingly.
Chervov: So is there difference of approaches? I think, that there is.
Interviewer: WHEN, WHEN...
Interviewer: WAS THERE A TIME THAT THE GENERAL CAN IDENTIFY, IN WHICH THIS KIND OF REALIZATION, THAT.
Interviewer: AGAIN, IN THE WORDS OF McNAMARA, THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT WEAPONS, THEY ARE ONLY USEFUL TO PREVENT OTHERS FROM USING THEM, HAS BECOME THE THINKING OF THE SOVIET MILITARY? AT WHAT PERIOD IN TIME, UNDER WHICH SECRETARY WAS IT ESSENTIALLY DECIDED THAT, WELL, IT'S NOT A USABLE WEAPON, IT IS ONLY DETERRENCE?
Chervov: From the very first day of the nuclear weapons appearance in the Soviet Union, the prevailing attitude was, that the nuclear weapons should be abolished and that it should never be used to resolve any question at all, whether political or military.
Chervov: Its use would be disastrous for the whole of humanity.
Chervov: That is why all our proposals always boiled down to abolition of nuclear arms.
Chervov: This position of the Soviet Government has remained unchanged for many years.
Chervov: Well, the military at the beginning considered it possible to use nuclear arms on the battlefield.
Chervov: Perhaps.
Chervov: It may be so.
Chervov: But when strategic nuclear arms were developed and a huge number of land and sea-based missiles accumulated, this has happened in the sixties, the Soviet military, representatives of the Armed Forces have arrived at the conclusion, that the use of these weapons would precipitate Apocalypse.
Interviewer: START FROM THE FIRST PHRASE.
Chervov: I think that the Cuban missile crisis was the watershed event.
Chervov: That was the beginning of the '60s.
Chervov: At the time the Soviet Union had far fewer nuclear warheads and A-bombs, than the United States.
Chervov: If I remember correctly, the balance was 3:1, or even 5:1 in favor of the American side.
Chervov: In spite of such a balance, both sides could have destroyed each other.
Chervov: To my mind, the crisis in the Caribbean was the watershed, when the Soviet military changed their attitude to the use of nuclear arms and espoused the idea, that it should never be used, that it should be banned.
Interviewer: BUT...I THINK IT HAPPENED TO MCNAMARA FOR ONE THING, IT HAPPENED TO SOME MILITARY IN THE STATES, TO OTHERS IT DIDN'T HAPPEN.
Interviewer: IT IS STILL IN AMERICA I THINK, A POINT OF DISCUSSION, IN WHICH THE MILITARY MAYBE ARE MORE CONSERVATIVE, THAN THE CIVILIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGISTS.
Interviewer: IS THERE THIS KIND OF DEBATE BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRATEGISTS OR WITHIN THE MILITARY? THIS KIND OF DEBATE IS VERY PUBLIC I THE UNITED STATES.
Interviewer: IS IT A PART OF THE SOVIET THINKING?
Chervov: I can say with a degree of assurance, that there a no such debates.
Chervov: We, the military, know much better than anyone else what the nuclear weapons represent, their destructive power, capable of wiping out humanity.
Chervov: So there is absolutely no need to try and convince us, the Soviet military, that a nuclear war would mean the end of the planet Earth.
Chervov: I am quite sure, that the American military also understand this point.
Interviewer: I AM COMING UP TO THE EUROPEAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE INF AGREEMENT.
Interviewer: WERE THE SOVIET MILITARY AWARE THAT THE SS-20 WILL BECOME SUCH A POLITICAL ISSUE, OR WERE THEY SURPRISED BY IT?
Chervov: This is rather a complicated question and it is very difficult to answer it in a few words.
Chervov: I witnessed these events.
Chervov: In 1976 we have started modernization of our intermediate missiles in Europe and installation of the new SS-20 missiles.
Chervov: At that time, there was no hint of a possibility of some kind of a political crisis anywhere in sight.
Chervov: I mean, that the military and strategic situation in Europe has not changed, the military balance was not upset.
Chervov: Some Western leaders have confirmed this point.
Chervov: Among some others, I recall the statement of Chancellor Schmidt, which he made in January of 198I.
Chervov: This was after some controversy over the double zero option The Chancellor was asked whether the Soviet Union was upsetting the military balance and strategic parity in Europe by installing the SS-20 missiles.
Chervov: The Chancellor answered, that the Soviet Union was not.
Chervov: At the time the military balance was preserved.
Chervov: He voiced some concerns that the parity might suffer in perspective, in future, but that at the time of the interview it was intact.
Chervov: But when the installation of Pershings started, it became quite obvious, that both sides can go too far.
Chervov: By this I mean that it looked like there would be a significant buildup of missiles, increase in number of warheads, decrease in the time, necessary for the missile to reach its target.
Chervov: It looked like the danger of nuclear war in Europe increased.
Chervov: The situation was quite worrisome; we had to find a solution as quickly as possible.
Chervov: Well, today we know the bottom line.
Chervov: The problem has been solved.
Interviewer: WAS THE GENERAL IN THAT DELEGATION THAT LEFT GENEVA, WHEN THE PERSHINGS II WERE INTRODUCED AND HOW DID HE FEEL AT THE TIME?
Chervov: No, I was not a member of this delegation.
Chervov: I have to deal with these problems right here, in the Soviet Union.
Chervov: Other officials took part in this delegation.
Chervov: As concerns my feelings at the time, I can tell you that I was certain, that the negotiations would resume.
Chervov: And I was not mistaken.
Chervov: The negotiations have subsequently resumed and brought good results.
Interviewer: WHAT WERE THE DIFFERENCES IN THINKING THAT ALLOWED THE NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME? THERE WAS A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW.
Interviewer: BUT WHAT WAS IN THE CENTER OF THINKING THAT PERMITTED THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REJOIN.
Chervov: The main change that has taken place was the realization, that Europe had to get rid of nuclear weapons.
Chervov: There are just too many nuclear weapons around.
Chervov: And when there are so many nuclear weapons, a mere accident might set them off.
Chervov: This would be disastrous.
Chervov: So our main effort was directed towards finding a compromise with the American side.
Interviewer: COULD YOU START THE SENTENCE AGAIN? WE HAVE A BACKGROUND NOISE.
Chervov: The major thrust of our thinking was directed at getting rid of nuclear arms in Europe.
Chervov: Too many nuclear weapons were concentrated in Europe.
Chervov: Europe was sitting on a powder keg.
Chervov: We had to disburden Europe of nuclear weapons.
Chervov: So all our efforts were directed at finding a compromise with the American side.
Chervov: And we have found it.
Interviewer: THE BASIC IDEA...
Interviewer: WELL, YOU HAVE BEEN TO GENEVA, REYKJAVIK, WASHINGTON...
Chervov: I didn't have a chance to go to Reykjavik, but I was present at the summit in Geneva and in Washington.
Interviewer: WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT IN SOME PRACTICAL TERMS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT?
Chervov: In my opinion the main achievement was in the acknowledgement by both leaders that there should be no nuclear war that it is impossible to win a nuclear war that neither side should seek military superiority over the other.
Chervov: I consider those points to be the most important ones.
Interviewer: YES.
Interviewer: DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, I AM JUMPING BACK A LITTLE BIT, THERE WAS THIS, WHAT'S BECAME FAMOUS IN THE UNITED STATES AS A "TALK IN THE WOODS".
Interviewer: WHY WASN'T THAT PROPOSAL, UNOFFICIAL AS IT WAS, PICKED UP?
Chervov: I was in Bonn recently, talked once again with Kvisinsky over there.
Chervov: Well.
Chervov: I said that "talk in the woods" could have been very well realized at that time.
Chervov: Kvitsinsky became thoughtful for a moment and said that without any doubt the implementation of the "talk in the woods" would have been a very good thing, as it would have saved a lot of time.
Chervov: But I did not work out.
Chervov: I think that it didn't work out because of several reasons.
Chervov: The question has risen who had proposed the "talk in the woods" in the first place, Nitze or Kvitsinsky? Kvitsinsky assures me that it was the initiative of Paul Nitze.
Chervov: But, as it's very well known, Paul Nitze has refused to acknowledge it.
Interviewer: HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE IN '81 TO REJECT THE "ZERO OPTION", IN '85 TO ADOPT IT? THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY A SHIFT WHICH IS MORE THAN TACTICAL.
Chervov: This is, undoubtedly, a very interesting question.
Chervov: What was in the way of adopting the "zero option" back in '81? I'll be candid with you.
Chervov: The major obstacle was represented by the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France.
Chervov: After all, they number more that 1000 warheads together.
Chervov: And they are not on the Moon, but right here in Europe.
Chervov: You are also probably aware what they are aimed at.
Chervov: It is simple impossible for us not to consider them together with NATO's arsenals, when tallying the balance of nuclear forces in Europe.
Chervov: Back in '81 we considered this to be the major obstacle.
Chervov: If the American side were willing to find a compromise at that time and, by the way, the "talk in the woods" was an at tempt to reach a compromise on nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France, and if Americans had agreed to that compromise at the time, the problem would have been solved.
Chervov: But it didn't work out this way, unfortunately.
Chervov: So, that was the major obstacle Now, you may ask why do we agree to adopt the "zero option" in '85.
Chervov: Well, some changes in our political thinking have taken place.
Chervov: We have also reassessed the balance of strategic forces in the world; we have decided to temporarily disregard the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France.
Chervov: But only temporarily, mind you, and only in order to reach an agreement with the Americans.
Chervov: After all, someone must take the first step; someone must make the first concession to make the agreement possible.
Chervov: The Soviet Union took it upon itself to make the first step.
Chervov: And if I may say so, we have made a major concession in the negotiations by temporarily disregarding the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France.
Chervov: This is the result of the new political thinking of the Soviet Government, which has permitted us to work out a treaty with the American side.
Interviewer: DOES ANYBODY IN THE SOVIET MILITARY FEEL THAT MAYBE THEY WENT TOO FAR?
Chervov: I do not think so.
Chervov: Well, some concerns are voiced our country.
Chervov: It is only yesterday or the day before yesterday that I was on the Soviet TV.
Chervov: I was asked why does the Soviet Union have, to scrap more missiles, more warheads, what is the reason for that, whether we are not going too far in our concession to the detriment of our security.
Chervov: Well, I must say that we are really scrapping almost two-and-a-half times as many warheads.
Chervov: So what? What if we are scrapping mere warheads? But is it not true, that our security increases, as well as the security of the American side and of the whole world, for that matter? When we remove around three thousand missiles and a considerable number of warheads, security of all sides concerned can only increase and stability is strengthened.
Chervov: But I must stress here once again the fact of existence of the nuclear arsenal; of Great Britain and France.
Chervov: These arms are aimed at us.
Chervov: After we have reached the 50 percent reduction in negotiations with the American side and will be pressing for further cuts, we expect Great Britain and France to join us.
Chervov: I hope that leaders of those two countries will correctly assess the new strategic situation.
Chervov: That is what I would like to say.
Interviewer: WHAT WOULD BE SOME OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CAN INFLUENCE THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH DECISIONS?
Chervov: I think that the influence will be exercised by the Soviet Union and by the United States together.
Chervov: And our major argument will be the 50 percent reduction in our strategic potentials plus an agreement to pursue further cuts.
Chervov: I think, that if under those circumstances leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States ask British and French leaders to go along with the Soviet-American missile treaty it will prove to be the decisive influence.
Interviewer: LET ME SHIFT VERY FAST TO STAR WARS.
Interviewer: IN 1980 PRESIDENT REAGAN STARTED A TREMENDOUS BUILD-UP OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR.
Interviewer: HOW DID THE SOVIET MILITARY FEEL AT THE TIME?
Chervov: We considered it to be a vain undertaking.
Chervov: We were absolutely sure that irrespective of the massive build-up by the American side of the strategic, tactical or any other armaments, the United States will not be able to gain military superiority or guarantee a 100 percent security for its territory.
Chervov: So the build-up is to no avail.
Chervov: By the same token, the Soviet Union also will not be able to reach military superiority or guarantee total security for its territory.
Chervov: It is impossible in the present situation.
Chervov: Our two countries find themselves faced with complete uselessness of the arms race.
Chervov: It can solve no problems.
Chervov: It is an unnecessary waste of dollars, billions of dollars.
Chervov: We must stop doing it.
Chervov: It is obvious, that the process of re-evaluation of the wasteful arms race is now taking place in our both countries.
Interviewer: C: INTERPRETER: WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF THE PERSPECTIVES OF SHIFTING THE CONFLICT INTO SPACE?
Chervov: First of all, we saw right away that this would represent a new channel for the arms race.
Chervov: The most dangerous thing now is the shift of arms race into outer space.
Chervov: Right from the beginning of this controversy we started to ask ourselves whether it was possible to reduce strategic arms in this new situation.
Chervov: And also, the question about the treaty of '72 has immediately arisen.
Chervov: We went right back to it: wait a minute; we have already discussed this problem with the American administration back in '72.
Chervov: So it was not something new, when President Reagan announced his "Star Wars" back in '83 in the hope of shifting the arms race into the outer space.
Chervov: We have drawn a conclusion if this happens, there will be no reductions in the strategic offensive weapons.
Chervov: In this case a very uncertain and and very complicated future is in store for us from the point of view of mutual security and arms reductions.
Interviewer: WHAT ABOUT, SORT OF, SOVIET EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION: THE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS? THE AMERICANS USUALLY CITE SATELLITE, ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW..., BATTLE-MANAGEMENT RADARS AND SO ON.
Interviewer: HOW DOES THAT COMPARE AND CONTRAST WITH “STAR WARS”?
Chervov: A lot of disinformation is out there on these questions and it only serves to mislead people.
Chervov: Let's take for instance, the anti-missile region around Moscow.
Chervov: This is in keeping with the treaty on anti-missile defense.
Chervov: We have agreed with the American side to have one such region each.
Chervov: So at present time our anti-missile region is deployed around Moscow.
Chervov: The American side has a similar region on the Grand Forks base.
Chervov: Americans insist, that they have dismantled missiles there.
Chervov: This is not exactly so.
Chervov: The reason, that it is not exactly right, is that the radar systems are operating, are on 24-hour duty.
Chervov: The missile and the launchers are in storage.
Chervov: So what? What is the difference between a dollar that is in my pocket and the one in a bank? No difference at all.
Chervov: At any moment the anti-missile systems can be redeployed on the Grand Forks base.
Chervov: Neither side can accuse the other of any violations, so far both sides are within the anti-missile defense limits.
Chervov: Now, as concerns various radar stations, including mobile radar stations, which are allegedly being deployed by the Soviet Union in the regions of Moscow and Gomel in violation of the anti-missile defense treaty.
Chervov: I have already clarified this question in the United States, in Washington.
Chervov: We have invited American observers to visit the regions of Gomel and Moscow.
Chervov: They have been there between the 18th and the 22nd of December of 1987.
Chervov: They looked around.
Chervov: Everything, but everything was at their disposal.
Chervov: They photographed everything left no stone unturned, high and low.
Chervov: They went and saw whatever they wanted.
Chervov: Everything was at their disposal.
Chervov: They promised to make an unbiased report I will not venture a guess as to what kind of evidence they were looking for.
Chervov: But I can tell you, that there are no violations of the anti-missile defense treaty, and never have been.
Chervov: Those radar stations were used as measuring equipment at the training ground of Sary-Shagan.
Chervov: The American side took an exception to that.
Chervov: One station was physically liquidated-- blown up at Sary-Shagan.
Chervov: Two other stations were dismantled and the trucks they were mounted on were handed over to state enterprises in Moscow and Gomel.
Chervov: That is all.
Chervov: The American side had the opportunity to check it out for themselves.
Chervov: What can be more concrete, than inspection of the sites? Nothing.
Chervov: Let those observers who carried out the inspection, report to the American Government and to the American people whether they have discovered a violation or not.
Chervov: I would like to finish this discussion on SDI with the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who said that we are firmly against launching of nuclear arms into space.
Chervov: The Soviet Union will never be the first to introduce nuclear arms into space.
Chervov: We call upon the American side to follow suit.
Interviewer: TWO MORE SHORT THINGS.
Interviewer: I KNOW THAT...
Chervov: Two, right? When will you broadcast this?
Interviewer: WE'LL BROADCAST IT IN UNITED KINGDOM IN THE SUMMER, IN THE STATES - NEXT WINTER, A YEAR FROM NOW.
Chervov: I see.
Interviewer: AND SOME TIME SHORTLY AFTER US, IN JAPAN.
Interviewer: BY THE WAY, TELL THE GENERAL, THAT I WAS FILMING IN THE GRAND FORKS ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO.
Interviewer: NOTHING WILL FLY OUT OF THERE EVER.
Chervov: I know that.
Chervov: But the radar station is working, right?
Interviewer: YES.
Chervov: This is an ABM station.
Interviewer: YES.
Interviewer: BUT THIS ABM SITE IS AS DEAD AS ANYTHING CAN BE IN MILITARY TERMS.
Chervov: This is very good.
Chervov: I know all this.
Chervov: This site is laid up, but this is…
Interviewer: WE HAVE USED IT IN A PROGRAM THAT YOU PARTICIPATED IN.
Interviewer: WE HAVE USED IT IN A SEQUEL AS THE RESULT OF SALT I.
Interviewer: IT WILL BE THE LAST ANSWER TO "STAR WARS" BEFORE I...
Interviewer: FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, DOES HE BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE "STAR WARS” SCENARIOS, AMERICAN SCENARIOS HAVE ANY VALIDITY?
Chervov: The question is not very clear to me.
Chervov: From the military point of view? I think that 80 percent of SDI is a military program, and so it can be considered only from the military point of view.
Chervov: All the experiments that have been carried out recently and are planned in the future, especially experiment Delta 181, must be considered from the military point of view.
Interviewer: THE QUESTION IS WHETHER HE BELIEVES THAT ANY OF THE MANY SOVIET SCIENTISTS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE SYSTEMS WILL WORK.
Interviewer: THE QUESTION IS WHETHER HE BELIEVES THAT ANY, THAT ONE OF THE SYSTEMS MAYBE MORE...MIGHT BECOME OF MILITARY SEQUENCE...?
Chervov: Some components might.
Chervov: I disagree here with the Soviet scientists.
Chervov: I have my own point of view in this matter.
Interviewer: CAN HE ELABORATE ON IT A LITTLE BIT?
Chervov: Well, first of all, the SDI program provides for a multi-echelon anti-missile defense of the whole territory of a country.
Chervov: There is the land-based component of the anti-missile defense, air-borne component and the space-based component.
Chervov: As concerns the land-based component, there is no problem.
Chervov: It is quite real and can be deployed, if the American side decided to violate the ABM treaty.
Chervov: As concerns the airborne anti-missile defense, in all probability it will be based on the ASAT system which will destabilize the balance of forces.
Chervov: As concerns the space-based anti-missile defense, the most important and the most dangerous part of it constitute anti-satellite systems, capable of destroying satellites of the other side.
Chervov: Are such systems possible? Quite possible.
Chervov: But what does destruction of the most important satellites of the other side mean? It means that the other side is rendered blind, deaf and mute, i.e.
Chervov: the other side is rendered incapable to retaliate.
Chervov: This increases the threat of a nuclear war.
Chervov: That is how I see it.
Chervov: Is such an eventuality possible, quite possible.
Interviewer: WHAT SHOULD BE THE SOVIET RESPONSE?
Chervov: The General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has already spoken on several occasions about our response.
Chervov: We will not try and compete with Americans in developing our own SDI.
Chervov: We will find other ways, some asymmetric type response to guarantee our security.
Chervov: And I am quite sure that we have the potential to find such responses.
Interviewer: CAN YOU SAY A WORD MORE ABOUT ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AND THEN I HAVE ONLY MY LAST QUESTION.
Interviewer: SO IT IS ADDITIONAL LAST QUESTION.
Chervov: There is a whole variety of possible asymmetric responses.
Chervov: We are doing fundamental research in this area and the results of this research indicate that such a response is feasible.
Chervov: At this time it would be unwise to divulge our options.
Chervov: I am also quite sure, that the American side knows perfectly well, that the Soviet Union will be able to find a way to deliver a retaliatory strike without introducing nuclear arms into space.
Interviewer: LAST QUESTION THAT I ASK EVERYBODY...
Chervov: Another one!
Interviewer: WHAT IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT?
Chervov: What conflict? So far there is no conflict.
Interviewer: WELL, THEN WHAT ARE THE CONTRADICTIONS?
Chervov: Ah, contradictions.
Chervov: Well, I would like to name 1987 the "year of trust.” The first signs of trust between the Soviet Union and the United States have appeared in 1987.
Chervov: We must know each other better, trust each other more, have more meetings at all levels.
Chervov: Then we'll start understanding each other better.
Chervov: And I am certain, that our planet will then become an easier place to live in, not only for our two countries, but for other countries as well.
Chervov: The more mutual understanding between our two countries, the better.
Chervov: Right now there is no mutual understanding.
Chervov: But the most important thing is to actually put into practice the accords achieved in Washington.
Chervov: Implementation of the accords achieved in Washington can radically improve the overall situation in the world as well as significantly improve the Soviet-American relations.
Interviewer: HOW DID HE FEEL WHEN THEY SIGNED THE AGREEMENT IN WASHINGTON? IN TERMS OF HIS OWN...?
Chervov: I was present at the ceremony of signing the accords.
Chervov: I felt proud of the Soviet Union and of the United States.
Chervov: We have worked very hard on this treaty.
Chervov: In Washington I have worked in a group of experts-advisers, headed by Marshal Akhromeyev.
Chervov: We have not slept for three nights.
Chervov: But despite fatigue we were very proud of our two countries.
Chervov: Thank you very much.
Interviewer: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
Chervov: I have one favor to ask of you.
Chervov: You are a representative of the media.
Chervov: You shape public opinion in your country.
Chervov: Improvement of Soviet-American relations depends to a large extent on journalists, correspondents, media representatives.
Chervov: I hope that your influence will help improve our relations.