HOW WAS THE ATOMS FOR PEACE PROJECT PERCEIVED IN THE SOVIET UNION?

At the very beginning, when the Atoms for Peace program was announced by Eisenhower, we in the Soviet Union noticed that it was not accompanied by a proposal for the reduction of nuclear weapons. What's more, Moscow felt that the program set up the potential for creating nuclear weapons in several other countries. And that's how it happened. Under the guise of Atoms for Peace a whole group of countries, but not threshold countries, received the necessary technical potential for the possibility of creating nuclear weapons. As one of the American scientists said, "The nuclear genie was presented to those countries on a plutonium platter."

WAS THERE SOMETHING SIMILAR IN TERMS OF TRANSFERRING NUCLEAR INFORMATION FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES?

As far as I know, and it was been proven, that for military purposes there were no such transmissions of information. We gave out certain information for peaceful purposes, of course, but it was strictly controlled and basically now you can see that the most important countries that are candidates for nuclear power are not allies of the Soviet Union but of the Americans.

WHAT KIND OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION DID THE SOVIET UNION ENGAGE IN?

Now?

NO, I'M TALKING ABOUT AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE '50S.

It's hard for me to answer that question, but... complicated to answer that question, but it seems to me that at that time essentially the Soviet Union didn't have such agreements with its allies for cooperative use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes on the same scale as the United States and the other Western countries. It simply was not in our power to supply technical co-operation to countries in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the same scale as the Americans did.

HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION SEE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ENGLAND? WHAT WAS THE PERCEPTION OF THE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Well, I'd say that when England began its nuclear program, after the adoption of the McMahon Act in 1946, then the American Secretary of Defense, Forrestal, at the height of the Berlin Crisis, considered that the development of nuclear power in England was an investment in western force to be used jointly against the Soviet Union. What's more, the Americans even helped England after the amendment to the McMahon Act in 1958 to become a full nuclear power. And today we see that England has a nuclear force capable of destroying the Soviet Union's major cities, with the help of American missile technology, even Polaris and soon they'll have the Trident. If you want to ask about France, the situation is very similar there. When the McMahon law was amended in '58, Washington made it clear to Paris that it could count on technological help from the United States if they could achieve significant success in developing their own nuclear energy. That is, created their own nuclear weapons.

WHEN THE FRENCH DEVELOPED THEIR WEAPONS THEY CALLED IT "INDEPENDENT DETERRENCE", AND THEY SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT IT'S DIRECTED IN EVERY DIRECTION.

That's a well-known doctrine, "in all azimuths", but there's not much left of it today. I'll give you an example. In '84 a book came out named Britain, Nuclear Deterrent, Peter Mellon. Margaret Thatcher liked this book very much, because it talked about the necessity for the existence of England's future nuclear force. But Peter Mellon wrote in that book that the French nuclear force, and the English as well, are on the western side. Many western experts say, "But the French and English nuclear forces could support either side, not just us." Of course they're on the side of the West. And Peter Mellon writes that the French and English missiles play the same role as the American Pershings and cruise missiles spread all over Europe. That is, directed at the Soviet Union, not at Africa or at Latin America.

SO IN OTHER WORDS THE SOVIETS DON'T RECOGNIZE THE NOTION OF THE FRENCH FORCE BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE BRITISH OR AMERICAN?

I wouldn't say it quite like that, because of course the French developed their nuclear force by themselves, although they had economic help, but it's hard to say because there's such a fine distinction. They say that the Americans gave France help with the latest EVN, participated by establishing contacts between American and French military personnel in the field of nuclear energy. But we consider it an independent force. It belongs to France. But it fulfills practically the same role as the English one. That is, it's aimed in the same direction, not in all directions, but in one, toward the East, at the Soviet Union.

THE NEXT WEAPON TO COME INTO BEING WAS THE CHINESE ONE. HOW DID IT COME TO BE?

That's a very interesting question, and looking at the situation today, in the middle of the '80s, you can see that it couldn't have been otherwise, after the United States repeatedly threatened to use nuclear force in the Far East at the time of the Korean War, the Taiwan issue at the time of the crisis in the '50s on the Island of Matsu and other islands here. Therefore I would say that it's hard to imagine that the Chinese would not have developed nuclear weapons when the other nuclear powers, especially the US were threatening their borders continuously. And would definitely continue to threaten other countries with nuclear weapons.

SOME PEOPLE CONSIDER THAT CHINA DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

I'd say it another way: that thanks to that stricter Soviet approach to the non-proliferation regime, the Chinese didn't develop nuclear weapons as fast as they might have, if the Soviet Union had been more accommodating in maintaining the non-proliferation regime. In short, the Soviet Union slowed down the Chinese on their way to developing a nuclear potential. This distinguishes it from the policies of the United States, which helped to accelerate the development of nuclear potential in England, in the West.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE KIND OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD WITH CHINA IN THE '50S? AND WHAT KIND OF CONTROLS WERE IMPOSED AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE COOPERATION THEN?

As far as I know, it only began with that kind of cooperation in the nuclear field. Only the initial contacts were of that kind, and then they became more directed toward peaceful uses. When we began to feel that the Chinese system might switch over to the development of nuclear weapons, of course we corrected our position in that relationship at once.

THERE WAS A REQUEST FOR SOVIET COOPERATION IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE STRAIT OF TAIWAN IN '58, CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT WAS THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO IT?

To tell the truth, I don't remember. I can't give you a concrete answer. I don't know the facts about those contacts very well.

WHAT DID THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH CHINA TEACH THE SOVIET POLICY ON THE SUBJECT OF PROLIFERATION? AND HOW DOES IT AFFECT ITS POLICIES NOW?

I would say that the very process of proliferation that took place in the '50s and '60s, in the middle of the '60s, demanded not only of the Soviet Union, but also of the United States, a consciousness of an even stronger re-charging of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And of course the more critical problem was not China but Europe, because the proliferation started first in Europe. France, England, and then projects for multilateral nuclear forces. And I think that the main reason was the experience in the European theater, which taught not only the Soviet Union but also the United States the necessity of finding an adequate answer to the challenge of nuclear proliferation.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR ON THE SUBJECT OF PROLIFERATION?

They're absolutely obvious. Obvious because the USA and USSR were in at the inception of a non-proliferation treaty. If nuclear weapons spread all over the world, the risk of nuclear catastrophe is extraordinarily increased. That's in the interest not only of the USSR, but also those of the US. You can imagine what would happen if Iran and Iraq had nuclear weapons; they're carrying on a long war. And the USSR and USA could be drawn into such a conflict. Furthermore, the problem of disarmament would be impossible. Today we can't resolve the problem of disarmament. It's hard when there are only 5 powers, and if there were 10, 15, then it's absurd to even talk about it.

THE NEXT COUNTRY TO EXPLODE THE NUCLEAR CHARGE WAS INDIA. HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION FEEL ABOUT THE INDIAN EXPLOSION?

I've read a lot of Indian literature about that problem, and I'm struck by the writers who have retraced the actions leading up to that. Many people think that India did it for peaceful purposes after the US, in 1979 (1971?) during the India-Pakistan conflict, sent the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the coast of India. And later President Richard Nixon admitted that he had seriously considered the possibility, the choice of using the US nuclear force in the conflict between India and Pakistan, for coercion, to force them to make peace. But what was the Soviet public response and the diplomatic response to the Indian explosion? The Soviet Union was extremely satisfied when India, after that explosion for peaceful purposes, announced that nuclear power would be used exclusively for non-military purposes, that they did not intend to make nuclear weapons. And you know, after almost 12 years, India would have been able to produce them with its nuclear potential, but hasn't. The Soviet Union basically always considered, and considers, that here it is not a policy of non-proliferation, but one with a more global character...that one of the powers doesn't have to...that it's better if an agreement is comprehensive and all countries in the world sign a non-proliferation treaty.

I'M GOING BACK FOR A FEW YEARS. THE SOVIET UNION TERMINATED ITS NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH CHINA IN '59. WHY?

Precisely for reasons associated with the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, when the Soviet Union understood that it couldn't assist another country to develop nuclear weapons. If other countries take that route, like the United States has, then a process of uncontrolled development begins, nuclear potential all over the world.

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THE REASONS THAT MOTIVATED THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN WITH THE US IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION, TO WORK ON A TREATY?

The main reason lay in the fact that with the enlarging of the nuclear club, the problem of disarmament becomes even more difficult, to set limitations for a nuclear disarmament treaty. And in general what's happening is that the more nuclear powers there are, the less security there is, and the more obstacles to nuclear arms limitations there are. That's an axiom that we both understood at that time.

CAN YOU REMEMBER WHAT WERE KHRUSHCHEV'S FEELINGS ABOUT THE TREATY AT THE TIME?

For me, that's past history (before my time). That was a time of very active contact between the US and USSR, beginning in the middle of the '60s, nearer the end of the first half of the '60s when Khrushchev was not in power here. The Caribbean Crisis was a big factor, when the US and USSR signed the test ban treaty in 1963.

APPARENTLY KHRUSHCHEV HAD A CHINESE QUOTE THAT SAID... CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE RUSSIAN OBJECTION TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE?

The main objection was that it gave all the countries of western Europe, primarily West Germany, direct access to nuclear weapons.

WHY WOULD THE NOTION OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE BE SO MUCH MORE DANGEROUS IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET UNION THAN OTHER NOTIONS? WHY WAS THE NOTION OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE SO TROUBLESOME?

The main reason was that the process of creating a multi-national nuclear force would introduce nuclear weapons to all the European countries - West Germany was straining at the bit and didn't hide the fact that it would gain the possibility of pressing the button of American nuclear weaponry. No secret at all. And the Americans understood that.

CAN YOU TELL ME THE RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE RAPACKI PLAN?

The Soviet Union immediately supported the adoption of the Rapacki Plan for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, unlike the US and western powers which in essence turned down the plan, calculating that West Germany, the stationing of nuclear weapons on West German territory, was a strategic advantage to the US.

THERE WAS A FAMOUS PREDICTION MADE BY KENNEDY IN 1963 THAT IN THE '70S THERE WOULD BE 25 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I WONDER IF THERE WERE SIMILAR ESTIMATES MADE BY SOVIETS AT THAT TIME, IN THE '60S, AND HOW HIGH WERE THOSE?

Honestly, I don't remember any exact pronouncements about that number, but we fully agreed with Kennedy at that time and understood that it was completely possible if we didn't conclude a non-proliferation agreement.

WHAT WERE THE COUNTRIES, IF YOU REMEMBER THE LITERATURE OF THE TIME, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WORRIED ABOUT THE MOST? IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION?

It's a paradox that the majority of the countries that were potential proliferators were in the western camp. Sometimes the American said, "But look, they're our friends, our allies. Why should we hold out on them?" And basically all those NATO countries worried us most. Maybe at that time just the western countries. And it's good that the US didn't give in to those who said, "Come on, let's give nuclear arms to the Europeans for their allies." As a matter of fact the USSR doesn't have that kind of relationship with its allies.

WAS THERE EVER A WARINESS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR RE-ARMAMENT OR THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN JAPAN?

Of course there was some worry about that, but Japan fairly quickly withdrew from the rank of great power, during the 1970 talks, not on the eve of the concluding of the agreement on non-proliferation.

THERE IS INDIRECT INFORMATION IN THE WEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION AT ONE TIME CONSIDERED A PRE-EMPTING STRIKE AGAINST CHINA.

I heard about that information that showed up in the western press. Frankly I think that that piece of information was spread in order to damage the relationship between the USSR and China at that period.

THERE WAS A STATEMENT WHICH SORT OF SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DEALS BETTER WITH FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AS PART OF ITS COOPERATION WITH ITS ALLIES. IS THERE SOMETHING IN THIS AREA THAT THE SOVIET UNION FEELS THAT THE WEST COULD HAVE LEARNED?

I think that the western experts have to draw that conclusion from the fact that the Soviet Union has always been stricter on the question of control of fissionable material with its allies, those from whom we had cooperation. And it seems to me that the waste fuels have been returned to the Soviet Union, unlike in the western camp where waste fuels stayed where they had been supplied, in other countries. That's an important fact. What's more, the Soviet Union has always said that it's important to have full control over the actions of a nuclear state. Not only over its exports and imports, but over all actions. And the US only admitted that under Carter at the end of the '70s. But several western countries, FRG and France still don't consider such control of all nuclear activity when they export their material to those countries.

THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN SOUTH AMERICA, MEXICO. WHAT WAS THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IT?

Very interesting that when the agreement was signed in '67 Tlatelolco, then the Soviet Union supported that treaty in principle. The Soviet Union had begun in the '50s and '60s to support the creation of a nuclear free zone. But the reaction of the US was interesting. They had placed nuclear weapons near the border of the Soviet Union and in other territories, and were extraordinarily glad that by the terms of that treaty Tlatelolco the Soviet Union wouldn't be able to put nuclear weapons on the territory of Latin America. That is, take the logical step that the US had taken. That was, of course, very advantageous especially for the US To continue on that subject, I would say first of all that the Soviet Union said right away that it did not agree to have points of transportation of nuclear arms to the Latin American countries; second, the Soviet Union considers that having points where only the members of the pact could explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes is uncertain because there's no difference between explosions for military or peaceful purposes; and third, under Tlatelolco several countries tried to go around the non-proliferation limitations outside the established peaceful jurisdiction - ocean testing, etc. That's what the Soviet Union said.

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE IN THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW BETWEEN A PEACEFUL EXPLOSION AND AN EXPERIMENT?

Actually in the context of the Indian research, exploration, in the Indian example, we didn't talk about the fact that there was no difference. We said that it is very good that India announced that it would not produce weapons after that explosion. We're in agreement, and pleased that in the course of more than 12 years their nuclear program has not developed as fast as it could have.

DURING THE DEBATES AND FOLLOWING THE TREATY DEBATES, THERE WAS A FEELING, AND IT WAS EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL INDIANS, THAT THERE IS ALMOST A RACIST COMPONENT IN THE TREATY.

That's a very interesting remark, interesting from many points of view. Because it was not racist, it doesn't smell of racism. There was another problem. The Indians always say that the treaty discriminated. On one hand it doesn't allow a non-nuclear country to develop nuclear arms, but on the other hand it doesn't impose a heavy obligation on a nuclear power to disarm. Discriminating, not racist. There's no racism in the treaty. And now after 20 years when we see how nuclear disarmament has gotten into a dead-end alley, we should understand that because of that type of policy the treaty hasn't been universally acceptable. And somehow India was right. And today, when we set forth a program of full liquidation of nuclear weapons, we felt solidarity with the Indians, who say, "If nuclear weapons can't be for all, then no one should have them." That is, it's not possible to preserve such a status when some have it and others don't. No way. You can't submit to that. Things will just come to a standstill.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR WHAT IS THE PREVAILING SOVIET OPINION ON THE ABSTRACT, INTELLECTUAL POINT; WHAT IS IT THAT GIVES THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS WITH NUCLEAR ARMS AND PRECLUDE THIS KIND OF RIGHT FROM ANOTHER NATION?

That's a very dangerous contradiction. Peaceful policy for restrained proliferation. Now, after Reykjavik, they are saying that nuclear arms have preserved the peace. That they're valuable. And the developing countries listen attentively. And they say, "If nuclear weapons helped you to keep peace, guarantee your security, then why don't we make nuclear arms too." There's logic to it. The Soviet Union doesn't feel that the purpose of nuclear weapons is to preserve peace. During the post-WWII period, and the Americans admit it, there were more than 20 incidents when the world was at the brink of a nuclear war. When the nuclear threat relaxed, it was felt throughout the world.

WHAT WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S REACTION TO WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR FORCE BY ISRAEL?

I will say that what happened in 1981, when the Israelis bombed the nuclear reactor in Iraq, a peaceful reactor, was a new experience in global military relationships. It was essentially a nuclear act against a non-nuclear country. And the Soviet Union, of course took the position that the Israeli preparations be moderated, be curtailed and that there be no nuclear arms in the Middle East.

IN THE WEST IT WAS SOVIET INTELLIGENCE THAT DISCOVERED AN INTENTION OF PREPARATION FOR NUCLEAR TESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA. WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT IT?

That's a very important precedent which arose in international relations when the Soviet Union gave information on the preparations for a nuclear test in a threshold country to the US And then it was said that Cuba had contributed, had some kind of role in passing on that information, they had gathered the intelligence. It was an unusual attempt to eliminate nuclear testing. I feel that that was an example of what the relationship should be today and in the future, and not only an example but a necessary rule for the leaders of the two sides for the prevention of future proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially test site building in those countries. What's more, I think that through such cooperation there should be as much contact between the US and USSR as possible.

JUST IN JUNE THE USSR CONDEMNED THE PAKISTANI'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HOW DO YOU THINK THIS PROGRAM IS DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIAN ONE?

As well as one can judge from the available facts, Pakistan is intensifying at a faster pace than ... the Western specialists consider that it's putting strong pressure on India. And they actively take advantage of their alliance with the USA; in South Asia they have active allies that receive large quantities of conventional weapons which give them sufficient arms. In reality they make use of the Soviet-American conflict very actively and knowledgeably in order to create a nuclear potential. That's a very, very worrisome situation.

IN RETROSPECT WHAT WAS THE FEELING IN THE USSR ABOUT THE NPT TREATY AND DID IT FULFILL ITS FUNCTION?

That's a very important question for one simple reason, that for 10 years there has been the question of whether or not to extend it. That question won't be resolved only by the USA and the USSR, but also by the majority of the countries that are participants in the treaty. And this brings up the following question: Did the powers fulfill their obligations under Article 6 of the treaty? And we know that until now the arms race has slowed down a little but has not stopped. The non-proliferation treaty was constructed with a balance of obligations between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers. The nuclear powers took on the obligation, asked the non-nuclear powers to take on the obligation not to develop nuclear weapons, but the nuclear powers were asked to take on the duty of nuclear disarmament. Therefore a total ban on testing was written directly into this extraordinary agreement. In the meantime, time has shown that the nuclear powers have not fulfilled their obligations. And all the threshold countries outside the framework of the agreement point to that and say, "What's to be done? So what good is this agreement? The nuclear powers don't observe it." And with such a perspective it's hard to put much hope in the extension of the agreement, a very important agreement, for the next 25 years when it poses such questions. That's an old problem. It was discussed at all the conferences for the non-proliferation agreement. And everywhere that problem remained, came up, and we can't close our eyes to it. There is an appeal to the USA and USSR to work it out so that when the other countries say, "That treaty's not fair, that treaty isn't what we need. They've just provided for themselves and others can't have any weapons." That's the whole problem that persists for the future effective existence and continuation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

WHAT ARE THE COUNTRIES THAT THE USSR IS WORRIED ABOUT IN THE CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE PROLIFERATION?

What's striking is that we're living in a schizophrenic situation. On one hand, the threshold countries which sort of officially don't have nuclear arms; then there is a whole group, and the experts know it - South Africa, Israel, Pakistan - that more or less have nuclear arms but under the table, some just on the point of it. The Soviet Union doesn't draw a distinction between them - those are bad, these are good. Here we have to worry about all of that that are about to challenge nuclear non-proliferation. It would happen in a chain reaction; it wouldn't surprise the West. But it seems to me, it surprises me that there are countries that almost know how to make nuclear weapons in their cellars - South Africa, Israel, Pakistan. And the situation is really very, very troublesome. They have them and they don't. It's not definite, and it's hard to really know what is going on in the area of nuclear utilization. It's necessary that we not lose sight of this fact, not the USSR, USA or the other states.

CAN YOU SPECULATE ON SUCH A CHAIN REACTION? WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF PAKISTAN IS DECLARED A NUCLEAR STATE?

I can say that if Pakistan manages to get itself declared a nuclear state, then there are sure to be answering measures from India. Furthermore, those measures won't be felt only in South Asia, but also they'll affect Israel's approach, which could say openly, "I already have nuclear weapons." Without a doubt, such a posture. And the Latin American countries - Brazil, Argentina. They'll say, "If Pakistan was offended by the nuclear powers and simply declared it wanted help, basically announced it and tested, then what's stopping us?" So that the responding measures will follow instantly, and the whole world will get involved.

I'M DONE. WHAT DID WE MISS?

Well, I wanted to add, and it's the most important thing, things have happened so strangely in our time. We talk about the arms race between the USSR and US, whose fault it is...But the biggest paradox is something else. It's happened that sometimes we forget about what's going on in other countries, in the countries that are trying to develop nuclear arms, who look at the USSR and USA and say, "So you're having an arms race. We'll just build our own in that case." What's striking here is the approach to nuclear arms, especially the US, to limitation, which doesn't take into account the fact that other countries take advantage of our deadlock in negotiations for disarmament, for making their own nuclear preparations. That is, I want to say that in the struggle against proliferation, they're a second front and an obvious, clear one, which much be considered by the powers in the fight against the nuclear threat. If the first front is against the existing nuclear arsenal, then the second front is even more strongly against what's happening. Look at the estimates of all exports from the West, and you can say that if war breaks out, it will break out in the Third World, not at the usual (our) level. Look at what Saperman(?) is proposing, and rightly - to create a Soviet-American center for the transformation of the nuclear conflict between the Third World states. It's an absolute guarantee that if suddenly that process of proliferation breaks loose, the USA and USSR will fly there, to that possible conflict. But let's talk about adventurism. Weinberger talks about it. President Reagan talks about it. Let's say that the danger of adventurism exists. We say that that's also very important. Let's also work together on that aspect. But the most important problem, and I repeat, important, which makes me even more leery, is when I hear coming from Joseph Nye, former US Secretary of State, in that American pragmatic way, "So what's the problem with making a few nuclear bombs in Pakistan, South Africa, Israel. Those are trifles. Those are the little apples in the apple orchard." I wouldn't have thought of it as an orchard if it means a fell nuclear arsenal, as if it's beautiful or something, what the USSR and USA have. That's the problem. Let's get away from that, throwing around apples as if they weren't terrible. We forget that those little apples could make a far larger meal. We felt the breath of Chernobyl this year, and you can imagine what a breath it will be if someone explodes a nuclear bomb, even a little one, in the conflicts between those countries in the Third World. It'll be terrible. The scale would be greater than anything that's happened so far. That's a fact. What should we do? That's important, what can we do? We forget what was said by a leading American scientist in this field, the late Morgenthal, who said that nuclear proliferation is only a continuation of what the nuclear powers are doing. The same evaluation that nuclear weapons are a military plus, invincible security. A political plus for world status. And in the non-nuclear countries they think that. Therefore when we talk about the necessity for nuclear disarmament, fulfillment of Article 6, we should keep it in mind so that non-nuclear countries don't form the opinion that the nuclear powers are going to continue to be such a threat. Necessary, and it seems to me clear that we need not only words about liquidation of nuclear arms in the whole world, but also we need to take active steps in that direction. Without that a non-proliferation treaty isn't worth the trouble. We know that it's already a fragile situation, any explosion inside a certain group of countries will start a chain reaction, uncontrolled proliferation. We should know about the conditions which we will have to live through. That's American pragmatism in this case. Very secure. "Will we live through it? You can get used to nuclear weapons in the USA, England, USSR, China. You can get used to nuclear bombs in the cellars of Israel, South Africa and the rest." As long as we're talking about it, you can say that we're surviving a million-dollar nuclear mess. From such point depths I hope we can come to our senses. Maybe that's just my point of view. But in my opinion the problem is more complicated, more important, fully independent of the problems of disarmament between the nuclear countries. It is clear as day to everyone. Let's get to the essence of the problem. The difference between the approaches of the USSR and USA is that we believe that we can resolve the question of proliferation, and must...

...and the most important is to finally decide how far to check up on each during disarmament, the USSR and USA; do we want to or not. It doesn't depend simply on non-proliferation; it depends on how other countries react to nuclear weapons. Here we need more than words. They might say, "The Americans and Soviets have gone on record as agreeing that having nuclear weapons is forbidden." Very well. But where's the corroboration of the words that the Third World can see? In India Premier Gandhi announced that as long as the arms race is going on, they intend to bring in nuclear weapons. And they plan to. That means that an effective struggle in the future by all the nuclear countries fully depends on the positions of the USA and USSR toward disarmament, how far to limit our arsenals. How can we tell them that nuclear arms are not a plus, but a burden. That they're very bad. We should get rid of them and shouldn't acquire them. We must back up our words with actions. Then we can count on the fact that nuclear proliferation won't happen, and that's how it should be. And if not, then every day when we open the newspaper there'll be some information about explosions in Israel, Pakistan and so forth. We'll think about when they go off, and that then there'll be a nuclear volcano - a volcano of nuclear proliferation. And out life won't be good until we do whatever is necessary for the policy to be effective. Let's begin with the liquidation of our arsenals. This is not propaganda. It's a fact that an important group of countries point out to us. "Take back that genie. Come on. Set an example."

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.