Interviewer: WHEN DID YOU FEEL THE MX PLANS WERE NOT UP TO PAR?
Garn: First of all let me explain that ray opposition to the so-called racetrack basing mode as proposed by President Carter had absolutely nothing to do with where it was placed.
Garn: There was a lot of talk in that well, the only reason you and Senator Laxalt opposed it is because they were talking about putting it on the Arizona or the Nevada-Utah border.
Garn: I never did oppose basing the MX in Utah.
Garn: I would have been willing to accept it in my state if it had been in a basing mode that made sense or was survivable.
Garn: So my opposition to the so-called racetrack was very early and the reason I opposed it was that I did not believe that it was survivable.
Garn: And that was the most important part of having a new modernized missile was to make it survivable against a Soviet first strike.
Garn: And when we got testimony from the Air Force in the building of the various silos, or the moveable silos, that the Soviets obviously could add warheads much more rapidly than we could build the decoys.
Garn: They could simply overwhelm it rather easily.
Garn: And on that basis I opposed that particular basing mode.
Interviewer: THE PROBLEM WAS SURVIVABILITY?
Garn: That we could not build sufficient decoys in the so-called racetrack system as rapidly as they could build additional warheads.
Garn: Which has turned out to be true.
Garn: The number of warheads that the Soviet Union now has could have easily overwhelmed all of the various decoys, and they could have put two or three warheads on every single one.
Garn: Therefore it didn't make any difference which one the actual missile was in.
Interviewer: DIRECTS ANSWER FORMAT.
Interviewer: DISCUSS DECOY OR SHELTER TERMINOLOGY.
Interviewer: ASKS SIGNIFICANCE OF SALT II LIMITS ON EXPANSION TO MEET GROWING THREAT.
Garn: The theory was that we could build shelters and we could add shelters, double the amount of the shelters.
Garn: But the Soviets could build warheads much, much faster, at a much lower cost, than we could build shelters.
Garn: In fact it was, even under the terms of SALT II, they could have sufficient long-range intercontinental ballistic missile warheads to target two or three warheads on every single shelter.
Garn: And therefore it made no difference whatsoever which shelter the actual MX missile was housed in.
Interviewer: DID YOU OBJECT OF DESIGN SO INFLUENCED BY ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS?
Garn: No I didn't object to it on that basis because verification is important to both sides in the arms control treaty.
Garn: And we can't say that we insist on verification of Soviet missiles if we don't also allow them reciprocal treatment in verifying ours.
Garn: So it was necessary to be able to verify.
Garn: One of my big objections to the SALT II treaty was that verification regimes were simply not sufficient.
Interviewer: DID YOUR OBJECTIONS TO SALT II HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH YOUR GROWING CONCERN FOR THIS PLAN IN THE DESERTS?
Garn: I would have opposed the racetrack method regardless of SALT II, even if it had been an adequate treaty.
Garn: I still felt that the actual physical design was no adequate and simply would not be survivable and therefore the taxpayers shouldn't spend billions of dollars on a system that would not work.
Interviewer: SENATOR LAXALT AND YOU ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE CONVINCED REAGAN AWAY FROM THIS SYSTEM.
Interviewer: HOW DID YOU DO THAT?
Garn: I was right in the middle of a race for re-election in 1980.
Garn: And my opponent made the issue of MX the major issue in his campaign.
Garn: Over and over again challenged me to say I would lay my body in front of the bulldozers and I would stop MX from coming into the state.
Garn: And I continued to say no.
Garn: I am not opposed to MX coming into the state.
Garn: I am opposed to this particular basing mode.
Garn: And if you elect President Reagan, or then President, candidate for president Reagan, I will have more influence as a Republican senator and will do everything I can to stop that racetrack mode.
Garn: Senator Laxalt was in exactly the same position and had been a close friend of the President, and as a matter of fact, I had a letter that I had helped draft from candidate Reagan, read at the June 1980 Republican Convention where I received the nomination of my party for re-election, and read that letter, that he had concerns about the racetrack mode.
Garn: So after the election in November of 1980 I was re-elected, Sen.
Garn: Laxalt was re-elected, the President was elected to his first term, and we immediately started working with the President on why we felt that it didn't make sense.
Garn: And that it would be a tremendous waste of money to base MX in that particular basing mode.
Garn: And fortunately the President agreed with us.
Garn: In fact I have a picture here in my office on the wall of that very meeting and I'll never forget when we finally got our last opportunity to go down and speak with the President and we were all armed with facts and figures, and all this logic of why it shouldn't go.
Garn: And the President looked at us and he said, "MX will not be based in that particular basing mode anyplace in this country.
Garn: I think it's a Rube Goldberg system, won't work, uses vast amounts of land, and could be overwhelmed by Soviet missiles." And Sen.
Garn: Laxalt at I or me and I looked at him and I said, "Well, I guess we don't have to say another word Mr. President, thank you very much." It was a very brief meeting.
Interviewer: WHEN WAS THAT MEETING?
Garn: Oh I would have to look it up.
Garn: I don't remember the exact, exact date.
Interviewer: WENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE?
Garn: Yes went to the White House, met in the Oval Office.
Interviewer: THEN YOU KNEW IT WAS SAFE?
Garn: Yes.
Interviewer: ASKS IF AIR FORCE TRIED TO PERSUADE HIM BACK FROM HIS POSITION?
Garn: The Air Force was upset.
Garn: There was no doubt about that and I was amazed.
Garn: I said, I can't believe that you want to continue to push for a system like this.
Garn: This is before the President made his decision.
Garn: Obviously once he had they backed off.
Garn: But prior to that decision they worked very hard and lobbied very hard with both Sen.
Garn: Laxalt and I to convince us that it was a survivable mode.
Garn: But then I remember one particular meeting at Defense Appropriations where I asked a question about the number of shelters and how many they would build, and they admitted that in order to keep it survivable they estimated they would at least have to double the number of shelters.
Garn: In the future maybe even triple the number of shelters.
Garn: And then when I brought up how rapidly the Soviets could add warheads, sat there and really looked rather surprised and said, "Well, but we don't really think that they would do that." And I said, "Oh come on, come on, you know they will.
Garn: They're going to build those warheads whether we build MX or not.
Garn: So why should we go to that expense?" They simply didn't have the facts behind them to sell that foolish basing mode.
Interviewer: WOULD RATIFICATION OF SALT II HAVE PREVENTED THE SOVIETS FROM PROLIFERATING WARHEADS?
Garn: No, and that was my major objection to the SALT II treaty.
Garn: It was not really arms control.
Garn: Although it limited the total number of launchers, there was no limitation in that treaty on the number of warheads.
Garn: Now a silo would never kill anyone unless you fell in one.
Garn: A launcher is a silo on the ground, it's a tube on a submarine, it's a bomber, but it doesn't kill anybody.
Garn: So any arms control treaty, in my opinion, to be effective, must limit the lethal warheads.
Garn: SALT II did not do that.
Garn: And although it limited the total number of launchers, the sub limits, without getting into all those sub limits of 850 or 820 of this and 2,350 that, all of the different sub limits, actually allowed very large increases in the number of warheads that both the United States and the Soviet Union could have.
Garn: At the time in very rough numbers they both had 5,000 or 6,000 warheads.
Garn: If you looked at the sub limits in SALT II, both sides could come up with 12 to 13,000 warheads.
Garn: Some even estimated 15 to 16,000.
Garn: That is not arms control.
Garn: And even 10,000 warheads was more than enough to overcome a racetrack system for MX many, many times over.
Garn: So SALT II would not have allowed that racetrack basing mode to be survivable.
Interviewer: ASKS IF REAGAN'S COMING FROM THE WEST MADE HIM MORE SENSITIVE TO THESE CONCERNS.
Garn: I don't think there's any doubt that Western Senators, be they Republic or Democrat, or Western Governors, understand the problems of public land states.
Garn: Most Eastern states and Midwestern states are almost all privately owned.
Garn: Utah is two-thirds owned by the federal government.
Garn: Nevada has an even higher percentage.
Garn: And obviously you resent federal government intrusion into your states when they have such overwhelming control.
Garn: And I am sure that President Reagan was more aware of what that did as a governor, while our governor had control over a third of the state, federal agencies had control over, over two-thirds.
Garn: And there were environmental concerns as well, with a basing mode that consumed such a large amount of land and water.
Garn: Water is also a very, very precious commodity in desert states like Utah and Nevada.
Interviewer: MENTIONS GEN.
Interviewer: BURKE'S STATEMENT THAT GOLF COURSES IN LAS VEGAS USE MORE WATER THAN THIS PROGRAM.
Garn: Oh I think some of the environmental claims were exaggerated.
Garn: I don't have any doubt that he is correct in that.
Garn: But that doesn't mean that there weren't some environmental concerns, and some concerns in that particular area of our two states which are desert areas and have very, very limited sources of water.
Garn: It may be true that the golf courses use more.
Garn: But you got Lake Meade down there to supply the, to water those courses.
Garn: And a lot of people were concerned that for ranchers, what farming went on out there, and draining the aquifers for what water would be needed, would limit that supply.
Garn: And I think that was correct.
Interviewer: REAGAN CANCELLED THE MPS SYSTEM AND THE MX HAS BEEN CURTAILED.
Interviewer: HOW DOES HE RESPOND TO CRITICS WHO SAY THIS HAS HURT OUR DEFENSE?
Garn: Well the critics that make that charge can't have it both ways.
Garn: Those same critics are ones who would not have approved MX basing in the MPS mode in any event.
Garn: I really believe that if the President had, even if he had gone ahead and said that he wanted to base it in that mode, I think there is sufficient factual evidence that Congress would not have approved the vast expenditures that were necessary to build the system that would not be survivable.
Garn: It just didn't make any sense.
Interviewer: BUT GENERALS HECKER AND OTHERS FEEL THEY COULD HAVE GONE AHEAD WITH THE SYSTEM IF THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED, THAT THEY COULD HAVE HAD THEIR CONSENSUS.
Garn: Well I would suggest that US Senators who have been in the body for a number of years might be able to count votes better than a couple of generals who are not in that particular area.
Garn: And I do not believe, I would have loved to haven taken on that fight in the Senate, it would have been very easy to argue against that particular system.
Interviewer: WHY DID HE NOT COME OUT AGAINST THE SYSTEM RIGHT AWAY?
Garn: Well that's a different issue and I still feel that way today.
Garn: I haven't changed my mind and that's what I made clear in some of my opening responses to your questions.
Garn: I didn't oppose MX, in fact I favored building the whole component of MX.
Garn: And I would not have opposed it being in my state, if...it had been in a survivable basing mode.
Garn: I opposed the basing mode, not the MX.
Garn: Because you can't play that game both ways either.
Garn: You can't say you're for a strong national defense, but in order to defend your country, you've got to do it in somebody else's state.
Garn: I rejected the arguments that it would make Utah a target for a Soviet first strike.
Garn: Utah was then and still is a target for a first strike.
Garn: We have Hill Air Force Base which is a very valuable component of the logistics command.
Garn: We have Dugway Proving Grounds.
Garn: We have the largest stock of stored outmoded nerve gas in the country at Tooele Ordnance Depot, and so we are a target.
Garn: And having MX there would not have made us more of a target.
Garn: As a matter of fact, if you have a strong deterrent it was my belief at that time and still is the best way to protect yourself is to have a strong deterrent so that the Soviet Union will not attack anyplace.
Garn: I couldn't sit back in good conscience and say, well, my state won't be attacked, but if some other part of the country is, we are all one United States, participating in the defense of our country jointly.
Garn: So I would still not object to having an MX in Utah if it were in a survivable basing mode.
Interviewer: FRANCES FARLEY FEELS HE DID NOT COME OUT AGAINST BASING MODE EARLIER.
Garn: Well, it's easy for other people to characterize what's going on when they don't have the responsibility for making decisions.
Garn: It's always easy when you're on the outside looking in and have no vote.
Garn: But the point of it is, I tried to make decisions based on facts and not emotion.
Garn: Most of the opponents of MX blindly opposed it before they ever knew what basing mode it would be in.
Garn: We're just opposed.
Garn: And there is a crowd in Utah and around this country who opposes every weapons system automatically without any idea of looking at the fact.
Garn: And I plead guilty to being willing to study things.
Garn: It's just like the INF treaty.
Garn: I would expect to support the INF treaty.
Garn: But you know I'd like to look at it.
Garn: It hasn't been completed yet and I like to read the fine print before I make a decision.
Garn: And on the initial sketchy basing modes, without any facts, as to the number of shelters or costs, and when you're in the Senate you have to vote on those appropriations as well.
Garn: So I plead guilty to taking enough time to fully understand the system, how it would work or not work, and how much it would cost.
Garn: And when that analysis was done, rather than doing it out on an emotional, political basis, test the wind and see which is the best way to go popular, because the overwhelming sentiment in my state was against.
Garn: I was facing re-election and my opponent was saying, lay your body in front of the bulldozers.
Garn: I get disgusted with people who are in positions of authority who constantly make political decisions, and I'm going to always try and make my decisions on the basis of facts and not until I have those facts assembled.
Garn: And unfortunately most of the people, like Mrs. Farley, made up their mind before they ever knew what a racetrack was or what an MX was.
Garn: And they blindly opposed before they looked at the facts.
Garn: And then they can sit back and say, "Well, you didn't come on board soon enough." They don't even want to give you credit for the fact that Senator Laxalt and I are responsible for killing that, that basing mode.
Garn: But on the basis of fact, not emotion.
Interviewer: DID HE FEEL THE REST OF THE COUNTRY WAS PICKING ON UTAH, THAT THE GENERALS FEEL IT IS SO UNPOPULATED IT CAN BE USED?
Garn: There is no doubt that we feel that way often.
Garn: Not just...
Interviewer: COACHES
Garn: There is no doubt that in Utah and Nevada, Idaho, Wyoming, other public lands states, that we often feel picked on by the rest of the country.
Garn: They make an assumption because we have a lot of areas that are not populated, vast areas where you may not average one person per square mile, that put everything that's objectionable out in the those states.
Garn: Whether it's nuclear waste repositories, MXs, or whatever you want to look at.
Garn: Chemical dumps.
Garn: And we obviously resent that.
Garn: And that is one of the difficulties of being a public lands state where two-thirds of your state is owned by the federal government and they say, we already own it we don't have to talk to anybody.
Garn: We can just put it there.
Interviewer: WAS GOVERNMENT ARROGANT TO TELL UTAHANS THIS IS BEST FOR YOU?
Garn: Absolutely.
Garn: We feel that the federal government is often arrogant concerning Western public lands states.
Garn: We experience this in many different areas other than defense issues as well.
Garn: We have the Bureau of Land Management that controls vast areas of our state, Forest service, the National Park Service.
Garn: I remember I used to comment when I was mayor of Salt Lake City that I was not really the mayor, I was just the local manager for the federal government.
Interviewer: IS HE HAPPY WITH THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION COMPROMISE?
Garn: Only to the extent that it was a...
Garn: The Scowcroft Commission report was the best achievable compromise at the time and I support it on that basis.
Garn: But I would have preferred to build the entire 200 MXs.
Interviewer: ASKS ABOUT MIDGETMAN IDEA.
Garn: I am a supporter of building the Midgetman.
Garn: I think it makes a great deal of sense to go back to a single warhead missile that is mobile and therefore more survivable.
Garn: It does create problems, however, for verification, any arms control treaty.
Garn: So I'm a little bit surprised at some of the opponents for MX who were so overwhelmingly in favor of Midgetman because it does compound the problems of verification in any arms control treaty.
Garn: But I personally favor going ahead with Midgetman.
Interviewer: AND RAIL GARRISON?
Garn: The rail garrison presents some very, very difficult problems and I would prefer to go ahead with the Midgetman, particularly when we have limited the number of MXs at this time on the basis that, let's take this interim step to fill in the gap and then go with the Midgetman.
Garn: I would prefer to go with the Midgetman as rapidly as we possibly can.
Interviewer: WHAT ARE PROBLEMS WITH RAIL GARRISON?
Garn: Well one of the problems again is verification.
Garn: Anytime that you talk about moving a missile in whatever form, you greatly compound the problems of verifying it in an arms control treaty.
Interviewer: AND MAKING MIDGETMAN MOBILE?
Garn: That's true.
Garn: There is no doubt that either one compounds the problems of, of verification.
Interviewer: QUOTES SUE DUTSON.
Interviewer: SHE SAYS YOU FEARED SOVIET THREAT, THAT WE NEEDED MISSILES BUILT SOON OR WE'D HAVE TO LEARN TO SPEAK RUSSIAN.
Interviewer: WHERE WAS THIS URGENCY COMING FROM?
Garn: The urgency in the Soviet threat at that time was from the fact that they had originally decided to build very large missiles, SS-18s, with ten 1 million-ton warheads on each of those.
Garn: And have 308 of them, in other words, 308 1 million-ton warheads targeted to this country.
Garn: And we only had the Minuteman III which had three 300 and some odd-thousand tons.
Garn: So they had far more warheads, far greater mega-tonnage.
Garn: And the argument from the other side was well, we chose to build the small one and they chose to build the big one and therefore we must not have needed it.
Garn: They are correct.
Garn: As long as the Soviets didn't have really accurate guidance systems.
Garn: They needed to build those big warheads and I would have preferred our Minuteman, much more accurate and therefore not needing nearly as many warheads or as much accuracy.
Garn: When the threat really intensified was when the Russians were able through, in many case our own technology that they were able to steal, ball bearing machines and so on, to improve their guidance systems where their accuracy was much, much greater.
Garn: Then the SS-18 became a much more serious threat as a first strike in being able to wipe out our Minuteman silos and therefore the Minuteman missiles with those huge warheads, coupled with greater accuracy.
Interviewer: WAS IT FRUSTRATING TO EXPLAIN THESE ISSUES TO PEOPLE WHO JUST DIDN'T WANT TO SEE ANY MORE MISSILES HAPPENING?
Garn: Yes it's very frustrating to try and explain something when you have been through all of the classified briefings that the opponents have not been able to have, and you cannot discuss some of the very highly compartmentalized information that is available to you.
Garn: I spent eight years on the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Garn: I've been on Defense Appropriations all these years.
Garn: And they make arguments that simply are not factual, and yet you have a hard time disputing them because you can't disclose the information that will refute what they are saying.
Garn: So it's, it's very frustrating to deal with somebody who is making a decision almost entirely on the basis of emotion.
Garn: And I understand that.
Garn: I'm the father of seven children and four grandchildren.
Garn: I do not want nuclear war.
Garn: But I happen to think the best way to avoid nuclear war is to be strong enough so that your opponent does not dare attack you.
Garn: And it doesn't avoid it by simply unilaterally or in an arms control treaty that is not fair and equitable, to reduce your arms.
Garn: I think that increases the chance of nuclear war.
Interviewer: ASKS ABOUT AIR FORCE SALES TACTICS.
Garn: Obviously I felt the Air Force was wrong in concept, and when you think someone is wrong in concept, then you don't think they should be selling it at all.
Garn: Therefore I didn't approve of the Air Force attempting to cram it down our throats.
Interviewer: DID HE AND LAXALT MEET WITH VAN CLEAVE WHO WAS REAGAN'S TRANSITION DEFENSE ADVISER?
Garn: Yes, I met with Mr. Van Cleave on many, many...
Interviewer: TRY NOT TO ANSWER YES OR NO.
Garn: Senator Laxalt and I met with Mr. Van Cleave on many different occasions over a long number of years, not only on MX but on other defense issues as well.
Interviewer: WHAT DID YOU SAY TO HIM?
Garn: The same pitch we made to the President, that the racetrack system was simply not survivable and therefore not worthy of spending the dollars on it.
Interviewer: DID REAGAN EXPRESS SOME DOUBT IN SALT LAKE DURING THE CAMPAIGN?
Garn: Oh I remember it well.
Garn: I wrote the statement for the President so that when he came to my state and spoke in my behalf, that he would express at least some opposition or concern.
Garn: He didn't come out against it.
Garn: But he expressed concern.
Garn: I remember some of the words.
Garn: About using vast amounts of land.
Garn: He wanted to seriously question this basing mode.
Interviewer: ASKS IMPACT OF MORMON CHURCH.
Garn: It certainly had an impact at home in influencing a lot of people that had probably been on the fence one way or another, or had not really been involved.
Garn: I think it had very little impact on the decision here in Washington.
Garn: I personally did not think the church should become involved in that specific a decision.
Garn: I think it went beyond the realm of a church to get involved.
Garn: And I say that as a member of that church.
Interviewer: WHY DID THEY DO IT?
Garn: I think the LDS church was ill advised in that statement.
Garn: I think churches should stay with more general moral issues.
Garn: They don't have the background or expertise to make decisions on individual weapons systems and they certainly are not experts in arms control.
Garn: Whether it be my church or any other church.
Interviewer: DID HE MEET WITH SPENCER KIMBALL?
Garn: No, I did not.
Garn: I was not aware that the Church was going to make that decision, was not consulted until I read about it personally in the newspaper.
Interviewer: AIR FORCE CONSIDERS THAT WAS THE TURNING POINT.
Garn: I suppose it sounds like I'm trying to give too much credit to Senator Laxalt and I, and I don't mean to do that, but most of what was going on in Utah was simply not being perceived back here and I really don't think had as much impact as a couple of senators who were close to the President and had to vote on the system and knew that we could stir up filibusters on the floor of the Senate to the appropriations to create this kind of a system.
Interviewer: ASKS HIM TO REPEAT.
Garn: When I say this is sounds like I'm trying to give Senator Laxalt and I too much credit.
Garn: But most of the activities that were going on in, in Utah including the Church statement, were simply not being heard here in Washington.
Garn: Didn't become part of the debate.
Garn: And I would suggest that a couple of Senators who were close to the President, his friends, and had votes on the floor of the Senate, and could mount a filibuster if necessary which we were willing to do, were the final blow in killing MX.
Interviewer: WHO ELSE INFLUENCED THE PRESIDENT?
Garn: It's not a silly question.
Garn: It's just that it's hard to identify people there, and give names.
Garn: There were people in the White House on both sides of that issue.
Garn: But it is ray opinion that most of the people that the President brought with him that were his appointees around him, also agreed that the MX basing mode, the racetrack system or MPS, was not a good system and was not survivable.
Garn: Where he had the existing staff of the Air Force when he came into office, and the professionals back here, the bureaucrats who were in favor of it.
Garn: But I am sure that there were people around him.
Garn: I would not expect that Deaver, Baker, Meese, some of those, certainly would have been involved in influencing him.
Garn: And I think they shared our opinion as well because we had the -- Senator Laxalt and I had the opportunity to speak to them as well before we ever started speaking direction to the President.
Interviewer: HOW COULD THEY COME UP WITH A SYSTEM THAT ISN'T GOOD AFTER TEN YEARS OF INTENSIVE STUDY?
Garn: Because there were no good systems for survivability.
Garn: The Air Force had been studying various methods for many, many years, for over a decade.
Garn: They had considered underground rail.
Garn: They had considered deep underground silos in mountain ranges.
Garn: They had looked at every possibility.
Garn: And it all came to the, down to the point that the Soviets could overwhelm them.
Garn: Finally they came up with MPS and said, Look, if we build enough shelters or decoys as we called them, the Soviets can't hit all of them.
Garn: And if they know that some of the MXs are going to survive and will be aimed back at them, they won't attack.
Garn: Well that sounded good in theory.
Garn: They had no other choices left.
Garn: President Carter signed off on that particular basing mode, and they were stuck with it.
Garn: And then they had to defend it.
Garn: When we later found out how many warheads the Soviet Union could manufacturer, and the point that we could not build shelters fast enough or enough of them to keep ahead of the Soviet Union's manufacture of warheads, it became another victim of not being a survivable system.
Interviewer: DID THE AIR FORCE AND CONGRESS GET INTO THIS BIND BECAUSE CONGRESS NEVER APPROVED MISSILE ON BASIS OF ITS COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY? AND AIR FORCE PLAYED UP SURVIVABILITY ASPECT TO SELL IT?
Garn: I don't think there is any doubt that they had gone so long without having a basing mode, that President Carter felt very strongly that he had to come up with a recommendation.
Garn: That was the best one available.
Garn: They didn't want to admit that it wasn't a good one.
Garn: And so they felt compelled to push it.
Garn: And justify it.
Garn: And think of every reason why they should go ahead with it, despite the fact that it became apparent very quickly that it was not a survivable system.
Interviewer: BUT DIDN'T CARTER THINK THAT BY SUPPORTING MX HE WOULD GET SUPPORT FOR SALT II RATIFICATION?
Garn: President Carter did feel that way because President Carter did feel that he was in trouble on the ratification of a treaty.
Garn: Because so many people felt that it was not a fair and equitable treaty.
Garn: Therefore, if he gave the United States a new missile, that would make us stronger and provide a greater deterrent to the Soviet Union it would help on the political side of selling SALT II.
Garn: Now I happen to think we need the MX as a deterrent for the SS-18 and a replacement for the Minuteman III, but not to try and drum up support for an arms control treaty.
Interviewer: IS CONCERN FOR SURVIVABILITY WHICH IS A TECHNICAL DIFFICULT THING TO DO, OVERRATED?
Garn: Well I have always rejected this so-called destabilizing.
Garn: I get a little bit tired of the opponents of arms control and every weapons system that comes along.
Garn: Anytime we build one it's destabilizing.
Garn: Anything the Soviets do is not.
Garn: I think any real student of the history of the Soviet Union and the United States since the end of World War II will see that the Soviet Union has had a plan and that they build their offensive weapons system and their number of warheads without regard to what we do.
Garn: They proceed methodically ahead, doing it year after year.
Garn: And to say that they have always done it as a response to what we do is baloney.
Garn: It isn't factual.
Garn: When they built the SS-18 and we build the MX and say if you build the MX and deploy it it's destabilizing, the SS-18 was destabilizing.
Garn: And we can't sit back and allow the Soviet Union to gain an overwhelming advantage where they then decide that they can launch a first strike, survive a counterattack and win the war.
Garn: And I think we must maintain at least relative parity between the two nations.
Garn: I am not asking, would not support, trying to gain nuclear superiority.
Garn: The world is safer when both nations are at relative parity and then there would be no reason for either one to attempt to attack the other and think they could survive that first strike.