THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT JUST EXCEED THE LIMITS OF SALT II. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO YOU AS A PERSON CONCERNED WITH ARMS LIMITATION?

Of course, the SALT II agreement was concluded pretty long ago and its objective was not a drastic reduction but a limitation of the development of nuclear weapons. However, until the new agreements are signed, I think we should observe the framework of these terms. The violation of these terms which has already happened with the introduction of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs, as well as the recent open violation related to surpassing a limit on bombers, are, among many other things, a demonstration of the intention to subvert all the existing agreements. It's very hard to imagine how we could embark the way to new agreements, more basic and deep, if we undermine principles we've so far agreed on.

THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID, TO MAINTAIN SUCH THING LIKE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WAS THE EARLIER VIOLATION OF SALT II. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR?

The radar installation in Krasnoyarsk is designed for, as it was officially stated by the Soviet government, it is designed for the purposes of space objects observation and verification of the terms of agreement. This use of the radar installation, the one with phase-patterned array is permitted by the 1972 agreement on the limitations of anti-ballistic systems. Naturally enough, this use of the installation excludes any possibility of using it even as a means of early warning, much less as a commanding system of anti-ballistic defense of any kind. We... as for the SALT II agreement, this installation has nothing to do with it at all. Therefore I think that it would be quite possible to agree on all the necessary limitations and requirements, concerning this installations' use if there were a real intention to...as I said... to really maintain the existing terms of agreement. However, today's administration demonstrates its intention to undermine the agreement by any means, thus being interested in the violations from their own side, as well as, I'd say, in overemphasizing or picking out some... formally alleged violations from the other side, instead of solving these problems. To solve this issue would be very easy within the framework of the Consulting Committee, I think.

THERE WAS A STATEMENT BY... THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION THAT USSR HAS TESTED... SATELLITE KILLING CAPABILITIES WHICH ARE PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY. WHAT CAN YOU SAY ABOUT THAT?

First of all, unfortunately, there is no existing agreement that prohibits tests of anti-satellite weapons. True, he use of anti-satellite weapons against satellites designed to control the upholding of existing agreements is prohibited, but regretfully, the tests of the anti-satellite weapons are not. Nevertheless, starting in 1983, the Soviet Union, being aware that the creation of anti-satellite weapons sets a dangerous precedent to the arms race, stopped unilaterally all tests of anti-satellite weapons. Earlier, a system was tested, which in general, was pretty well known to the Americans, and once a variation of this weapon was even adopted by the United States for the Armed Forces. As per today, it's almost three years since the unilateral moratorium of the Soviet Union began, so the Soviet Union does not test, use, or launch any systems of anti-satellite arms. We hope, that in the interests of both countries and the world, we will manage to reach an agreement prohibiting any kind of anti-satellite weapons.

COMING BACK NOW TO REYKJAVIK. IS IT REALLY PRACTICAL TO PERCEIVE OF TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? IS THAT A PROPOSITION THAT CAN BE PERCEIVED AS A REAL ONE IN TODAY'S WORLD?

In my understanding of the nature of nuclear weapons which we discussed very deeply with many American colleagues and internationally, in example, in Rome in 1983 we discussed with many members of a... What if I switch to Russian?

GO AHEAD, START IN RUSSIAN...

In... From my discussions with American colleagues... as well as from my own experience, in particular, from that modest experience which I acquired while working on the mitigation of the consequences of Chernobyl, from all that, I can come to only one conclusion: nuclear weapons in any form or quantity, are definitely suicidal ones, indeed. They are extraordinarily dangerous. They are dangerous enough in a crisis; more than that, there is a dilemma: in order to survive, mankind has to get rid of nuclear weapons. Many countries support this. Japan for example, I think, supports this in full, as well as many other countries. Therefore, it seems to me that this view has gradually begun to prevail in the world. The question is, how practical are the proposals introduced on January 15, 1985 by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. In the beginning, many people considered this an ideal which would be very difficult to achieve. However, in Reykjavik, practical steps were offered. The first step: A fifty percent reduction and elimination of medium-range missiles, which was quite a realistic step, and speaking generally, a rather simple one in terms of control, let's say. To decrease the quantities of weapons dozens of times, to get rid of medium-range weapons, of tactical weapons, weapons of the battlefield, that was also quite a clear step that could be verified by existing methods. Of course, after a certain point, difficulties would emerge when we cross the level of, say, one-tenth; the cooperation of other nuclear powers would be required. New methods of verification should be applied. However, I think that a beginning of this process per se, a process that sets a goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, would serve already as a great healing of the moral climate existing today on our planet. Mankind... we... Our generation has to understand: we will either be remembered (by future generations) as the generation that prepared the biggest disaster in human history, or the generation that in spite of everything, proved to be wise enough to solve this problem. Therefore, the international atmosphere will gradually improve. Apart from it, if we work as hard to realize this process, as we do for the creation of new means of destruction of mankind, or even harder, we undoubtedly will manage to find all the technical means which will allow us to solve this problem.

...and in the same way, the improvement in international relations... will contribute to the possibility. But the goal to eliminate nuclear weapons is the I think, ultimate goal. Of course, step by step, not tomorrow.

IN THE UNITED STATES BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDUSTRY RESIST, ANY CONNECTION... RESIST MAKING ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN WEAPONS AND CIVILIAN POWER PLANTS. WHY DID YOU CONNECT CHERNOBYL TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

I just mentioned my experience because that was an incident which demonstrated the level of problems in fighting even the minimal consequences of destruction and radioactive precipitation, and... minor, really insignificant damages caused by this... break of reactor. Once, for example, I happened to discuss the... with Edward Teller the issue of consequences of a nuclear war. He was talking then, that radioactive fall-out was nonsense, that it would be enough to take a shower, to wash yourself a bit and no problems would remain. I should say that in practical terms it is much more complicated, very complicated, even when the number of victims is very small, even when all the necessary wash-up installations are not destroyed and functioning. Within all these peaceful conditions, it is still a very difficult procedure. Therefore, I have to say that I connect here not these two problems which have definitely a different nature, but the consequences. I'm just telling you about consequences that can be some sort of minimal lesson or reminder to us about the possible (effects) of nuclear war.

IN THE NOTION OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HOW... WHAT WAS THE APPROACH TO SUCH NUCLEAR POWERS AS CHINA OR FRANCE OR ENGLAND?

The governments of these countries have repeatedly stated that after the Soviet Union and the United States significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals, they would be prepared to undertake the same steps. Therefore we, of course, presume that the moment will come when these countries would also go for the significant reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

IN RETROSPECT, DO YOU THINK THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES WERE THE PROPOSALS IN REYKJAVIK FRUITFUL? OR WERE THEY GOING TOO FAR TO ACHIEVE SOME PRACTICAL RESULTS?

I think, after Reykjavik the world, or, at least, the world of peace talks has changed irreversibly... because there are proposals on the table which the Soviet Union has no intention of withdrawing. There are proposals that change the situation radically. They also outline realistic steps. Today, these proposals are, first of all, addressed to the United States' government, but they are also addressed to all the people of the world who can now consider all the possibilities and perspectives opened by real negotiations. Therefore, I think, these proposals will always have a cardinal influence an all future talks. Speaking of the level of their radical nature, many of them were presented more than once as an ultimate goal of the present American administration. President Reagan has stated his desire to eliminate nuclear arms, strategic arms included. He also offered a zero option for Europe. Many political leaders were also talking about it. Therefore I consider the Reykjavik proposals, along with the offer to observe the agreement on anti-ballistic defense for the next ten years and to start immediately negotiations on a nuclear tests ban, as forming quite a realistic basis for realistic deals, for the real talks, not the pretense of talks....

(TRANSLATES)

He's ready to eliminate weapons; and he was for the zero option for Europe, in such case... and many political leaders say same... and I think the majority of governments are in favor of staying with the IBM treaty, and majority of government today to the...CTB. In such case I think it is very solid background for negotiations... for real negotiation.

I THINK... IT SOUNDS ALREADY LIKE A QUESTION, BUT I THINK THAT... THAT REAGAN CAME TO REYKJAVIK TO NEGOTIATE EUROPE, AND THE RUSSIAN POSITION THREW HIM OFF. IN SOME WAYS, PROPOSING THINGS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN HIS MIND RATHER REMOTE AND IMPRACTICAL AT THAT TIME. IN RETROSPECT, DO YOU HAVE A SYMPATHY TO THIS POINT OF VIEW?

I am not understand exactly...

(TRANSLATES)

No, I don't have any sympathy to that, and I do not agree with it, because one of the natural purposes which brought Reagan (to the negotiations) was primarily to discuss problems of the so-called Strategic Initiative. In his opinion, this idea was directed toward making nuclear weapons impotent and outdated, i.e. useless. Therefore, the proposal to fully liquidate (all nuclear arms was quite logical) if you want to use this overcomplicated and unstable way, this uncertain way to confront (a problem of) nuclear arms, wouldn't it be much simpler just to eliminate these nuclear weapons? It would be quite a logical idea. Therefore, it was clear to us that he should expect this sort of discussion anyway. Perhaps, he was not quite prepared for such a revolutionary approach, a... such a revolutionary option, but that was... a demonstration of that very new political thought, which serves today as the basis of the Soviet attitude in international relations.

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AS A SCIENTIST ABOUT SDI?

The Strategic Defense Initiative is in my opinion, quite a complex, I'd say, phenomenon. And a contradictory one. Speaking of it's... objective as stated to the American people, that is, the creation of a shield impenetrable to nuclear arms and the means of their delivery, this objective is unachievable; this is proved by many years of discussions and bolstered by the agreement on anti-ballistic defense limitation. If... speaking of the administration's current interpretation, i.e. limited defensive potential that makes the outcome of a nuclear attack indeterminable, thus stabilizing the existing system of reciprocal restraint, I think, these conclusions are wrong. A limited defense does not stabilize this system, but quite the opposite, it destabilizes it. At the same time, if approached from the opposite point of view, and as far as any agreement is concerned, you always have to consider the interests of the opposite side, the opposite side would always consider such a limited defense as a system capable, above all, to exclude or lessen the effect of retaliatory strike; hence, it is aggressive by definition and undermines stability. Now, they are saying that this system can serve as some sort of insurance policy, political insurance in case of the total elimination of nuclear arms, against some third power or against terrorists, etc. This doesn't seem to be a serious argument, because the total elimination of nuclear weapons would be possible only when accompanied by the most serious limitations of anti-ballistic systems development, especially in space. Well, at last, they are saying sometimes that this system could be ... er,... an exchange... is needed for the purpose of negotiations, serving as a bargaining chip during the negotiations. True, there are sometimes such talks, though in fact, these things are certainly not serious statements... and, therefore... as much as... The conclusion made after the discussions of the 1972 agreement on the anti-ballistic defense negotiations, the one which pointed to the necessity of real limitations (of ABM) as the prerequisite for deep reductions in nuclear arms this conclusion, I think, remains in force.

DOES IT REFLECT THE DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE... POSSIBILITY OF THE SDI BEING EFFECTIVE? FOR MOST PEOPLE WHO FEEL THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST HAVE... MIGHT HAVE EXAGGERATED ITS POSITION ON IT: IT COMES OUT OF THE FEELING THAT IT'S... THAT'S NOT A VERY PROMISING WEAPON SYSTEM...

As I already mentioned the strategic initiative is not based on any integrated military concept. I Therefore, as a full-protecting system of anti-nuclear defense it is certainly ineffective; but as a concept that creates all sorts of new space armaments, that opens the door to space, providing a new substance to the arms race, which subjugates the scientific efforts of a whole group of modern countries with the burden of creating weapons of (mass) destruction, this conception is definitely very dangerous and harmful.

IS IT YOUR FEELING THAT THE SAME TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE NOW SUGGESTED AS POTENTIALLY, DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES CAN BECOME, OFFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES?

There are certainly no reasons, either scientific or technological, to separate the defensive technology from offensive. First, what is defensive technology? It is an attempt to attack the launching missiles. With attacking missiles you may attack any object, having in possession the required information, means of guidance and means of destruction. Therefore, it would be naive, both in terms of science and technology, to divide offense and defense. In reality, these means are definitely mixed.

THAT'S ABOUT MY LINE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT REYKJAVIK. CAN YOU TELL ME SOME OF PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF WORKING WITH YOUR AMERICAN COUNTERPART, NOT SO MUCH ABOUT THE NEGOTIATION ITSELF, BUT WHAT KIND OF SPIRIT, WHAT KIND OF ATTITUDE ON THE PROFESSIONAL LEVEL, THE NON-POLITICAL LEVEL WAS IN REYKJAVIK?

Well, first of all, I worked not on the high level. I was an expert. Therefore I worked only with the night team that acted for ten hours every night in order to fulfill the tasks set by the leaders... the national leaders... It seemed to me... well, my opinion... my personal opinion about Reykjavik... the impression which remained with me also in the future... is that... the President as well as his staff were definitely not prepared for serious negotiations, even to some extent, in technical terms. At the same time, on the lower level there was a will to exclude a possibility of any progress in any negotiations and that was, I think, a prevailing if not a unanimous attitude. Therefore this division of the higher and lower levels caused the essence of difficulties in Reykjavik... These difficulties seem to me to reflect the general situation of today's administration. On one side there is a certain intention to reach some agreements, but on the other hand there is a... a whole... there is a group of individuals who are convinced that any agreement with the Soviet Union is harmful.

OBVIOUSLY THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL. BUT ON THE MILITARY AND SCIENTIFIC LEVEL, IS THERE A SORT OF, IS OF EXCHANGE.... ARE THOSE THE SAME, ARE PEOPLE UNDERSTANDING BOTH THE TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE SAME WAY, OR ARE THERE DIFFERENCES... BETWEEN THE SORT OF THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES...OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES AND THE RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING?

First of all, I don't think that the existing contradictions could be called contradictions between the Soviet or, as you call it, the Russian understanding and the American one. The fact is that the majority of American experts and scientists have today the same notion of the problem as we do. We both understand the necessity of disarmament, we both understand dangers of an arms race in space, and in general, many particularities are equally comprehensible to both of us...Please note, I mention people who certainly do not share our political concept. Although, there is a group of people who are simply against all the agreements. As for these people, it is also quite clear to us that if they are against any agreements, it would be useless to work with them at all. Well, I just divided it somehow into black and white. Though, what I'm really trying to show, is that the problem is, as it seems to me, that today the United States must work out its own definite policy, which would serve the United States interests. As for the Soviet Union, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that "...not for a jot are we interested in having the United States security less than the security of Soviet Union." We are aware that achievement of any agreement is only possible when it serves the interests of both sides as well as all the others'...sides.

ARE YOU TIRED?

No, no...

WHO... WHO ARE IN HIS JUDGEMENT THE GROUPS IN... OR, WHAT GROUP PRINCIPALLY, OR WHAT SUB-GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE THE PRINCIPLE OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT?

Well, now I can talk only on some speculative level, but I imagine, there is a unity of some professionals, such as Richard Perle, such as Weinberger who think for any number of reasons that any agreement with the Soviet Union is negative; and this group is naturally joined by right-wing circles on the basis of their ideologic considerations. At the same time, the same direction conforms the interests of certain circles in industry... in the military-industrial complex, of certain circles in Congress, of certain members of Congress representing interests of the military-industrial complex in a number of committees as well as, to my regret, of some scientific circles who also represent interests of researchers whose career is related to the service in military area.

HOW COME ONE DOESN'T SEE THE SAME KIND OF GROUPINGS IN THE SOVIET UNION?

The group interests in the Soviet Union are in general less represented than in the United States, because the very process of policymaking is here significantly more homogeneous. After all, it considers the basic interests of the Soviet Union before any others. On the other hand, er... the economy...inasmuch as we do not have private industry which would be interested in making profits from developing new military technologies, in terms of economy we are interested conversely, in minimizing our expenditures for defense. So, the economic... all the economic factors work against big military spending. Of course the careers of particular individuals may depend in different ways upon their success in this area, but these are just careers of some particular people. As for group interests, the interests of some mighty financial groups supported by private capital, we don't have this in the Soviet Union. Therefore, in principle, the forces working in the direction of militarization, in the direction of enforcement of... these forces are far weaker here.

BUT IN THE INTERNAL CONSULTATION DO SCIENTISTS AND MILITARY INDUSTRIALISTS IN THIS AREA, DON'T THEY EXPRESS THEIR OPINION SIMILAR TO AMERICAN SCIENTISTS INDUSTRIALISTS AND MILITARY?

As I mentioned before, the question is not just of expressing opinions. The question is one of basic interests. This basic interest... Inasmuch as we don't have a private sector producing weapons, we don't have a basic interest of supporting arms race. The rest is the interests of particular individuals, but as for the interests of individuals... it is much simpler to convince a separate individual; he is much better fit to comprehend the role of national interests, party interests... so, our opinion... you can see, how clearly (our) opinions are expressed, how great is the general support of today's course that is followed... and of the new attitude reflected by this course. These are, mind you, concrete examples: A unilateral moratorium on space weapons testing, a unilateral moratorium on the nuclear weapons testing — all these are concrete...these are examples of concrete steps, which would be enormously hard to undertake in the American conditions, as it also would be hard in our conditions, had we a real ground for inner opposition.

LET ME ASK YOU MORE ABOUT THE TESTING MORATORIUM. FROM A SCIENTIFIC POINT OF VIEW, WHAT DO YOU THINK, WHY ARE THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN VIEWS SO DIFFERENT ON TESTING?

Again, this is not a matter of differences between the Soviet and American points of view. Just look at the history of the struggle for the ending of nuclear testing, and you will see that full agreement on... that the achievement of an agreement on total cessation of nuclear testing was always a goal of all presidents, including the present administration. Recently, though, the point of view of the American administration has changed. It has changed for the same basic reasons: today the economic and ideological factors which… and groups supporting this administration are working against stoppage of the arms race. Therefore, the struggle for the third generation, for the new round of the arms race is actually a struggle for new budgeting, a struggle for... Well, for some, it as an illusion of the creation of superiority, the ideological reason. For others, it is a possibility for new profits the economic reason. Integrating these factors, a new reality of the United States emerges. The Soviet Union adheres to the position that was worked out and agreed upon with the American side many years ago. (It was agreed), that it was necessary to conclude as soon as possible an agreement on total stoppage of nuclear testing, providing that adequate control, quite realistic a condition in terms of today's technology, would be established.

DO YOU THINK THAT... THAT CURRENT MORATORIUM ON TESTING AND THE REFUSAL OF THE AMERICANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CURRENT MORATORIOUM HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH SDI?

Of course to some extent, one of the arguments of the administration, as well as of scientists of the Livermore Laboratory among others, is that the tests are necessary for the purpose of the creation of weapons of third generation, the x-ray lasers, in particular. Therefor, despite the administration's statements that the anti-ballistic defense should be non-nuclear, we know that the nuclear component of this system is being developed; this fact serves as a bold argument against stoppage of nuclear tests. Though, there are some other arguments within the government of the United States. I think that all these arguments are, in general, not serious, from the technological point of view, and that cessation of testing is immediately possible, considering the maintenance of a stable balance (of powers) and a gradual transition to stable non-nuclear peace. However, the argument of the necessity of developing the space nuclear component is the important argument in today's policy of the United States.

BACK TO EUROPE. WHY THE ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS PROMOTED IN REYKJAVIK, WAS NOT ACCEPTED WHEN REAGAN OFFERED IT IN THE FIRST PLACE TO EUROPE?

Well, this is a purely academic question. However, one should admit that the Soviet Union has gone a long way ever since toward a new attitude in international issues; on the other hand, that was also a considerable concession toward the interests of European countries, (I mean) West European countries and the United States. As you understand, we do not now consider the arsenals of France. We also agree to disregard those of England; we agree, as of yet, to not consider the means of forward basing and this big compromise was possible exclusively within the context of all other agreements, i.e. drastic reduction of the strategic armaments, faith to the ABM treaty and cessation of nuclear tests.

WHAT WAS THE PROPOSAL THAT USSR HAD NORMAL DEALING WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE OF (THE SOVIET FORCES?

Well, first, it's quite an arguable question, who has superiority in conventional forces, er, because, in general, uh-m... it is also possible to figure differently the potential of these forces. At the same time, I should say that the Soviet Union is interested, and very much so, in not getting the conventional arms race as a substitute of the nuclear arms race. On the contrary, we are interested in the most substantial reduction of conventional arms too, inasmuch as it is one of the most expensive components of today's military expenditures. Therefore the Soviet Union, as well as countries of the Warsaw Pact have offered repeatedly a number of appeals to the West, to NATO to start immediately... to establish a working committee and to start immediately to work out realistic conditions for drastic reductions of conventional armaments and, above all, their offensive components, their components of dual purpose, etc. Therefore, I think that this is also to some extent, one of the existing myths about the alleged intention of the Soviet Union to maintain its alleged superiority in conventional armaments. No, we are prepared for the most substantial reduction of conventional armaments, we consider it a very important element along with the elimination of chemical warfare, the strengthening of the ban on biological weapons, and all other means of mass destruction.

ARE THERE GOOD WAYS THAT YOU ENVISION AS A SCIENTIST OF VERIFICATION OF THE CURRENT SMALLER WEAPONS--TACTICAL WEAPONS, CRUISE MISSILES AND SUCH, THAT MIGHT CREATE A BIGGER AND BIGGER PROBLEM IN TERMS OF ANY KIND OF FUTURE AGREEMENT?

Of course one should say, that the development of technology turned to the direction that creates more and more problems of... er... control. Therefore, we have to stop immediately and limit the development of military technology. That is what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is repeatedly talking about: about the very immediacy, that the time is running out, that we may reach the point when it will be very difficult to control. On the other hand, I should say that if we muster all those efforts which we are spending today for the creation of means of destruction and information systems that guide and assist these means (to reach the targets), if we muster all of these efforts for the purpose of arms control, I am sure we would be able to achieve it. Just look, it took us one month to establish seismographs near Semipalatinsk, we are ready now to to deploy a whole network (of them), a worldwide network... We are fully aware that today it is possible to register explosions as modest as a hundred kilograms (equivalent), that is, seismology contributes a lot to the area of verification of nuclear tests. We can use existing spacecraft as a means to verify the whole number of agreements. Of course, the matter of cruise missiles is more complicated, but inasmuch as both sides...the Soviet Union has expressed repeatedly its preparedness to accept on-site verification, I think all these means... all these procedures can be worked out and enforced by technical means. We just have to hurry. I agree that it is a very urgent problem.

I WANT TO GO BACK A LITTLE BIT TO THE ...NEGOTIATIONS IN REYKJAVIK PRESIDENT... IS NOT TECHNICALLY CONFIDENT... EVERYBODY WAS EXTREMELY TIRED, EVERYBODY WAS EXHAUSTED...AND IT GOES FOREVER. AND IT'S A BAD MODE OF TRYING TO MAKE A DEAL. DO YOU... WHAT WAS YOUR SENSE ABOUT THIS RELENTLESS...OR, ESSENTIALLY, HARD WORK OF NEGOTIATIONS?

No, I think it is... I think that is the destiny of political leaders and all of... It is hard to expect that a politician can be well versed in every detail... It is important that he could rely on advisers who share his main political attitude, and are thus able to assist him. At the same time, the difficult work of negotiations is truly difficult. But what is most important is a political will. If there is a political drive to really achieve drastic reductions, to get rid of this Damocles' Sword of nuclear arms, this is the main thing. The rest of the work should be carried. Oh, for me? Well... I actually had two jobs. One was a night job at which time we had to discuss all of the details. At that time I was mainly participating as a member of the group which nightly discussed the military problems. But at the same time I also participated in another group that discussed all other problems, including technical... scientific/technological cooperation which I considered very important, as well as being interested in, and general human problems. On the other hand, during the daytime we had...all the time...we had constant contacts with the press trying to explain in detail our position. Therefore the work consumed my days and nights. Though I should say that when one participates in such an historical event, which had an influence on... — I think, Reykjavik will go down in (history)... It already out by experts who would follow given instructions. That's what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was talking about in Reykjavik. He said that it was time to stop the rubbish of enormous numbers of particularities that disturb...er...that creates only an illusion of negotiations in Geneva. It was time to agree in principle. And in principle, the President should have surely reached an agreement with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. And he was... and what prevented him from doing so is a different question. Therefore, I see the problem is in the internal contradictions within the American system. And these are the contradictions which need to be resolved. They should be resolved by the current of the political process in America.

PERSONALLY FOR YOU, HOW WAS IT? IN TERMS OF HARD WORK OR IN TERMS OF WORK?

has gone down in history, there is nothing to argue about it... so, I didn't feel especially tired.

...WITH FOR EXAMPLE, RICHARD PERLE, AND HE HAD AN OPINION ABOUT WHAT MAKES HIM TICK, AS THEY SAY...

I didn't have any informal encounters with Richard Perle, but I have to admit that after several meetings with different representatives of the Administration, be it his deputies or some other representatives of the Administration, say, those in charge of Strategic Defense Initiative, I've got generally a pessimistic impression as a result of these encounters. Inasmuch as they usually tried during these meetings to avoid the principle discussions, trying instead to deal mainly with issues of secondary importance... such as all sorts of accusations... in a word, all those talks were unconstructive in general. Therefore, regretfully, I had very few constructive conversations with representatives of this particular Administration.

I'M PRETTY MUCH DONE. LET ME ASK YOU ONE QUESTION FOR KOBAYASHI. HOW DID YOU RESPOND TO THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO WORK TOGETHER ON SDI. WHAT IS DOES IT TELL YOU ABOUT JAPANESE THINKING ON THE SUBJECT?

Well, I would not try to intervene between the United States and Japan: they are allies; though I would like to say in general, the attempt to involve other countries in developing anti-ballistic defense is also a very controversial one. Because from one side it clearly contradicts the 1972 agreement if they really speak of co-production or technological data exchange. On the other side, it is purely a political process... On the other side... it is, so to say... it is like... a recognition of loyalty... the oath loyalty...as I see this recognition of cooperation, because many governments understand that they would not gain anything positive in technical terms from this deal. Yet on the other hand, again, it is a type of process of involving the resources...the scientific resources, technological resources... in (military matters). This is carried out in a manner which I consider dangerous to the world community; because it brings to the existing systems of relations... to the science which was traditionally... traditionally, the European science was an open one — it imposes additional limitations on it. It imposes additional requirements of secrecy, of concealment, thus ruining science in general. And not only (the exchange of) science between the socialist countries and the capitalist world, but also, in terms of the internal structure of science in the West.

I'M PRETTY MUCH DONE. IF THERE IS ANY SORT OF OBSERVATION THAT COMES TO YOUR MIND ABOUT REYKJAVIK PROCESS AND YOUR PART IN IT THAT WE DIDN'T DEAL WITH? IS THERE SOMETHING THAT YOU THINK IS IMPORTANT AND WE IGNORED ABOUT THE PROCESS IN REYKJAVIK?

No.

CAN YOU JUST TELL ME IN A SORT OF FORMAL WAY WHAT WAS YOUR OFFICIAL CAPACITY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT OFFICIAL CAPACITY DO YOU HAVE IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS OF THE ?

In the negotiations I was expert of...

IN RUSSIAN...

In Reykjavik I was the expert of the Soviet delegation. My official position in the Soviet Union regarding the process of nuclear disarmament... well, sometimes they appoint me as an expert, but in general I am a Chairman of the Committee...of the Public Committee, elected by the scientists... of the Committee of Soviet Scientists Against Nuclear Threat for Peace. This Committee works not only as the (body of) experts, advisers...we also work out different kinds of scientific problems, and we're trying to increase the contributions of scientists in the field of real issues leading to nuclear detente. In particular, we make appropriate scientific research, writing appropriate books... we also deal with concrete issues for example, this cooperative work with the American seismologists in Semipalatinsk.