RIGHT, HERR RULE, I'D LIKE TO START TO ASK... START BY ASKING YOU ABOUT THE BACKGROUND TO THE SPEECH WHICH HELMUT SCHMIDT MADE IN... AT THE IAFS IN 1977. WHY DID HE MADE THAT SPEECH AND WHAT HAD LEAD UP TO THAT SPEECH?

Essentially because he was concerned about the super power SALT negotiation passing by the problems of Europe and in particular the challenge posed to the security of Europe by the upgrading of the intermediate-range Soviet ballistic missile capabilities with the introduction of the SS-20 missiles since 1976. He had asked both President Ford and then early in 1977 President Carter to deal with this particular problem, which is tailor-made to the measure of Europe and when he met with a refusal by both American Presidents he thought he had to go public in order to alert the allies and European public opinion to the problem.

HE HAD IN FACT DISCUSSED THIS IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER EARLIER IN THE YEAR, IS THAT CORRECT?

That's correct, in London and in Washington. At the London summit in 1977 which was not just a world economic summit but there was an alliance summit attached to it. He discussed it with President Carter and also with the British Prime Minister and to the French President but mostly with President Carter and he had brought to Washington a memorandum for President Carter in order to make him look at the problem posed to Western Europe by Soviet nuclear tactical superiorities and new modernized Soviet weapon systems.

THANK YOU. LET ME NOW MOVE ON TO THE RESPONSE OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION EVENTUALLY. THEY WERE INITIALLY UNWILLING TO SEE CRUISE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. WHAT LEAD THEM TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS? WHAT LEAD THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO CHANGE ITS MIND?

Well one has first to look at the reasons why they were opposed. The main reason was that they did not want to forgo the chance of a SALT agreement, which in '77 they thought was closer than it actually was. The agreement was only concluded in '79 but they did not want to overload and complicate the negotiation. Then also Harold Brown, Carter's Secretary for Defense, was of the view that the central strategic system of the United States, sea-launched ballistic missile systems and submarines and inter-continental ballistic missiles in North America, together with the American nuclear capable aircraft in Europe were enough to give Western Europe the protection by extended deterrence and that one would not need additional means. Now he had to change his mind later in 1978/79 when a study in the Department of Defense in Washington, new studies confirmed what NATO al.. always had held as... as established wisdom that the American SLBM Poseidon does not have the required accuracy and has a much too high yield in order to be used against small and hard military targets.

THANK YOU. SECRETARY RUHL, I THINK WE, WE GOT THE FIRST HALF OF THAT QUESTION. COULD WE PERHAPS TURN TO THE SECOND HALF WHERE YOU WERE EXPLAINING WHY IT WAS THAT THE AMERICANS CHANGED THEIR MIND ON THIS QUESTION OF CRUISE MISSILES, THE NEED TO DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES.

Well Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, had held the view previously that the strategic central systems like sea-launched ballistic missile systems and submarines and inter-continental ballistic missile systems and heavy bombers and the nuclear capable American aircraft in Europe would be enough to give Europe the protection of extended deterrence and that no other instruments were needed. But then in the course of 1978/79 the Department of Defense in Washington came up with a review of the missile and its characteristics and of aircraft penetration capabilities and probable intrusion raids in attacks on, on the Warsaw Pact and those conclude that the aircraft was too vulnerable to, to go it alone from Europe and that the sea-launched ballistic missile systems did not have the required accuracy for selective flexible strikes against small and hard military targets in the Soviet Union and that therefore one needed other instruments, meaning new land-based ballistic missile systems of medium-range, the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

CAN WE JUST TALK SPECIFICALLY ABOUT PERSHING II. WHAT, WHAT WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSHING II? WHY DID YOU NEED TO HAVE PERSHING II AS WELL AS THE CRUISE?

Well it was considered and it still is military wisdom that the land-based missile system because of its reliability, its command and control facilities, its target acquisition capability and high accuracy is the optimum instrument, the optimum arm to strike at military targets and to limit collateral damage, that you get the optimum combination of accuracy, reliability, penetration capability and low yield only in a land-based ballistic missile system.

OK... AS NATO MOVED TOWARD THE DECISION TO DEPLOY INF, NEW INF, THE ARMS CONTROL STRAND WAS ADDED TO WHAT WAS, WOULD, WOULD BECOME THE DUAL TRACK DECISION. WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR THAT? WHY WAS ARMS CONTROL ADDED?

Well the cause for concern and pre-occupation was as I said the upgrading of the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile capability against Europe by the introduction of the SS-20 missile, which as I said is tailor-made to the measure of Europe, cannot reach North America, and therefore has the effect of threatening Europe with a particular limited threat to the confines of Europe. Now to eliminate this threat you would need arms control. To eliminate deployment you would need arms control because you would need Soviet consent. Counter-deployments could only re-establish a balance or any counter when in power but if you wanted more than counter when in power you needed arms control. It was already for a balance, you need the consent of the other side and for elimination you certain need arms control. This is why the arms control approach was attached to the deployment program.

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, SCHMIDT I THINK WAS IN, INSIST THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILE AS WELL AS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. WHY WAS THIS IMPORTANT?

Well I think the importance jumps to your view once you take a look at the map of Europe. If you only deployed such weapons in one country you would have a rather narrow sector of attack towards the Soviet Union which for ballistic missile systems is not important but for cruise missile systems is important because they can be caught by... by radar and... and shot down. Therefore to open a larger sector of approach by including other countries was a military requirement but then there was a political requirement as well. We cannot load one single country with all the delivery vehicles of... of striking power in retaliation for the implementation of our strategy. We need some risk sharing and we need some practical solidarity and therefore it was thought that the long-range intermediate nuclear forces should not only be deployed to Britain where you have the American F1-11 already and to Germany but that other countries should take part for practical reasons, for strategic operational reasons and for political-psychological reasons too.

I'D LIKE TO MOVE ON NOW PLEASE TO THE PERIOD AFTER THE DUAL TRACK DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO EARLY 1981 WHEN CERTAIN POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES BEGAN TO BE ENCOUNTERED. THIS IS WHEN THE ZERO OPTION, THE SO-CALLED ZERO OPTION, ZERO... SOLUTION EMERGED. CAN YOU TELL US BRIEFLY WHERE THAT CAME FROM? THIS IS SOMETHING OF AN ORPHAN NOW. NOBODY ACKNOWLEDGES TO BEING THE FATHER OF THIS ANY MORE BUT IN YOUR OPINION WHERE DID THE ZERO OPTION COME FROM?

Well it was first invented in Germany during the pre-election days of 1980, before the general election. The Liberal Party at their... at their convention urged that all intermediate-range missile systems be eliminated from Europe, meaning that we should not necessarily deploy American missile systems in order to obtain the removal of Soviet missile systems but that Soviet missile systems should be eliminated voluntarily and that zero on both sides would be the optimum solution to the problem and this is where and how the zero zero option originated. It was a... a ploy... a political ploy in order to, to make the public understand that we did not want missiles at any price but that we wanted some counter when in power in order to eliminate the Soviet missile threat, to eliminate the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile systems from Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union.

AT THIS TIME THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD COME IN. DID THAT, WAS THAT, WOULD, DID THEY CAUSE YOU, YOU IN GERMANY CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS WHEN THEY FIRST CAME IN 1981?

Well the Reagan administration as... as everybody knows was very reluctant to continue the arms control policies of the Carter administration and the first thing President Reagan ordered, even before he... he assumed office was a reappraisal of the entire American arms control approach and of the American armaments policies and all policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Therefore we had an interval between February, January, February '81 and, and the day when Secretary Hague and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed in New York in the fall to resume the Geneva negotiations that had been interrupted just before the American Presidential election of November 1980, and the Reagan administration of course wanted to negotiate from a position of strength, which was not precisely what the Carter administration had done because President Carter had cancelled several strategic armaments programs and President Reagan now wanted to resume these programs and wanted to have time to get all this underway and this created certain difficulties with the European allies who considered, and still do, arms control as an integral part of security policy but by and large agreements were reached within the alliance and negotiations were resumed late in 1981 with the double, with double zero, I mean zero on both sides for INF systems as the Western negotiating objective.

THANK YOU. IN... LATE IN 1982 THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT FELL AND CHANCELLOR KOHL BECAME THE BUNDES COUNCILOR. THEN IN 1983 THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DEPLOYMENT WOULD ACTUALLY GO AHEAD CAME TO THE FORE. WE HAVE IN THE MEANTIME HAD THE "WALK IN THE WOODS" THING. WERE THERE THOSE IN THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATION WHO EVER DOUBTED WHETHER DEPLOYMENT COULD ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE GIVEN THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH IT WAS ENCOUNTERING HERE IN GERMANY?

No, not really because the, the fall of Chancellor Schmidt was the result of a struggle within the Social Democratic Party about his security and defense policies and the Liberal Party then turned to the Christian Democratic opposition in order to salvage alliance policies and to, to maintain a solid foundation for the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore you had two new partners who had set out, as I said, to salvage alliance positions and to maintain the political orientation, including the programs and amongst these programs deployment of American missiles and Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Gancher, the Vice Chancellor and then Liberal party leader made no secret out of their determination to see this thing through, to see this business through and have the American missiles deployed if the Soviets did not remove their missiles and therefore the election was fought on this issue mainly Mr. Vogel, the candidate of the Social Democratic opposition, put his picture on, on electoral posters saying I ask the German people to give me the mandate not to deploy American missiles and the Government said we'll go through with this because this is the only way to, sensible so that compromise with the Soviet Union. We need counter when in power, this is why we need counter-deployment. So there was never a doubt in the Government's mind that they would stand and fall with that decision and there was never a doubt in our minds that we would see this thing through.

THANK YOU...

WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT. IN THE EVENT I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WERE SURPRISED BY THE EASE WITH WHICH THAT ALL WENT THROUGH. I THINK THAT'S CERTAINLY THE EXPERIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN, AND EVERYBODY HEAVED AN ENORMOUS SIGH OF RELIEF, THE RUSSIANS WALKED OUT IN, IN GENEVA AND DIDN'T DO THEMSELVES ANY GOOD, BUT IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT SOMETHING NEW CAME ON THE SCENE WHICH WAS THAT AMERICAN POLICY THEN BEGAN TO CHANGE SOMEWHAT AND YOU HAD THIS, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND SO ON. I WANT TO MOVE RIGHT FORWARD THEN TO THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT OF 1986. CAN I, CAN YOU TELL US HOW THE GERMANS REACTED TO THE NEWS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IN A KIND OF AUCTION OF PROPOSAL AT REYKJAVIK HAD TALKED IN TERMS OF GIVING AWAY LARGE CHUNKS OF THE STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCE?

Well of course we were pre-occupied with a certain development and possibilities which might lead to a denuclearization of European defense and, and abandoning for all practical purposes extended deterrence, but these concerns were more, the more directed at the general philosophy that was professed at Reykjavik than at the actual American ploys in the exchange and the American offers and, and demands. We were in pretty close contact with the American delegation at Reykjavik and before Reykjavik you will remember there had been American-Soviet consultations during the summer, outside the Geneva negotiation, and we had been associated with that and during those consultations it was agreed already prior to Reykjavik that both sides would only keep 100 INF warheads in Europe and 200 worldwide. Therefore we were very close already to the zero/zero level then before Gorbachev and Reagan met at Reykjavik and of course we were in agreement with this because zero/zero and INF is what the German Government and all the allies had always urged upon the Americans and therefore where would we stand if we now wanted to defeat our own purpose? So what was much more critical was the idea which is still on on the American side, to abandon all offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges in the second half of the ten years period considered and that was tabled after Reykjavik at Geneva and still stands for the start negotiation then. It is against this general prospect of doing away with the only reliable and accurate means of carrying out our strategy of flexible response by selective counter-options and providing extended deterrence for Western Europe with appropriate delivery systems and, in an appropriate framework of alliance arrangements it causes concern and therefore we will have to see how the American Government will get off this hook and how Gorbachev will try to keep them attached to it because the Soviet Union is interested in having nuclear threats suspended so they can threaten Western Europe with the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact war machine in the event of an international crisis or tension in Europe and therefore it is not in the Western interest to play into Soviet hands.

CAN I JUST PICK UP ON SOMETHING WHICH YOU SAID THEN AND JUST ASK YOU TO CLARIFY BRIEFLY WHAT YOU MEANT. YOU SAID IT WAS THE GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF WHAT WAS DONE AT REYKJAVIK WHICH ALARMED THE GERMANS. DID YOU MEAN BY THAT THAT IT MARKED A KIND OF COMPLETE BREAK WITH THE STRATEGY WHICH, THE CURRENTLY UNDERSTOOD STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE?

Well I mean that if that vision of abandoning all nuclear weapons and, or even only abandoning all ballistic missile systems for nuclear weapons were to be materialized in agreements with the Soviet Union, then the strategy of flexible response, the current NATO strategy could only be implemented with aircraft and cruise missiles and this means that it could only be implemented with less than optimum means, with less than optimum instruments and there is a concern. It would not constitute a complete breach. It would just mean that we would have to rely on less reliable systems.

THANK YOU. LET ME MOVE NOW TO THE, WHAT IS SOMETIMES CALLED THE DOUBLE ZERO - THESE PHRASES GET THROWN RATHER BUT IN OTHER WORDS THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW BETWEEN MR. SCHULTZ AND MR. SHEVARDNADZE RESULTING IN PROPOSAL FOR REMOVING SHORTER-RANGE INF. WELL AGAIN, WHAT WAS THE, HOW DID THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT FEEL ABOUT THOSE DEVELOPMENTS?

Well you see before Reykjavik, on the 30th of September 1986 the Federal Government made a public statement by which it asked that the ground-based missile systems of ranges between 500 and 150 kms be included in a follow-on negotiation in order to agree on reductions on both sides to lower parity level, meaning asymmetrical reduction since NATO only had the German and allied-held missile systems... no, I have to...

WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO POSE THAT QUESTION AGAIN?

Yes, please.

RIGHT, I... WHAT... I'LL... I'LL SLIGHTLY REPHRASE THE QUESTION. WERE YOU SURPRISED BY THE ALACRITY WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS, THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS GAVE GROUND ON THIS QUESTION?

The alacrity in Gorbachev's movement certainly surprised the alliance. Also we had thought that with a new leadership Soviet diplomacy and Soviet propaganda and Soviet policy in general would become more mobile and would move faster. As you will recall the German Government prior to Reykjavik had asked that ground-based missile systems of ranges between 500 and 150 kms be included in the follow-on negotiation with the objective to reduce them to lower parity levels in order to eliminate the Soviet superiority in this field. Now I still think that this is a worthwhile issue and object for negotiation and Germany will maintain pressure on both sides to negotiate this but Gorbachev of course has tried to take the problem of parity away by, by suggesting that all missile systems be eliminated, that he did in May 1986, and then later in Reykjavik that all nuclear weapons be eliminated. Well anyhow I think that the elimination of missile systems between 1,000 and 500 kms is a good thing. We only had the 72 German Pershing IA in this field and we are ready to relinquish them in order to facilitate an agreement. Anyhow they couldn't stand alone on the landscape of Europe and now the question is what will happen in the future below 500 kms.

CAN I STOP YOU FOR A SECOND THERE AND JUST COME IN AND SAY IS IT NOT FAIR TO SAY THAT WE'VE NOW REACHED THE STAGE WHERE THE INTEREST OF THE GERMANS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE INTERESTS OF OTHER NATO PARTNERS, PARTICULARLY THE BRITISH SLIGHTLY DIVERGE. THE GERMAN POSITION IS THAT THEY RATHER NOW WANT TO GET RID OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE USED IN GERMANY OR EITHER, OR INTRA, IN A INTRA-GERMAN WAY. THE BRITISH, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE RATHER FRIGHTENED OF SLIPPERY SLOPES AND DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE AND SO ON AND WANT TO LET THINGS LIE. IS THAT NOT FAIR?

Well, it is true and not quite correct at the same time. Of course we do have a concern that we'll not be left with a battlefield nuclear weapons for an artillery match in Germany. On the other hand we can understand the concern and we share the concern that there must be no denuclearization of Europe. We cannot, from zero/zero solution to zero/zero solution, abandon our only means of efficient reaction and escalation against conventional superiority attacking Western Europe and in particular Western Germany and we, we need nuclear artillery in order to deter breakthrough concentrations on the ground near the frontiers, frontiers but that doesn't mean that we should now fill up Germany and Western Europe with nuclear delivery means with ranges below 500 kms because we, we are ready to do away with those above 500 kms. Such compensation would not be politically or strategically reasonable. Therefore we urge that a negotiation on, on nuclear weapon systems below 500 kms be not lost out of view. It is not a matter of urgent priority now and we don't want to encourage or set into motion any tendency toward denuclearization of Europe but we must not lose view of, of the problem that you have mentioned and that we have discussed.

YOU REFERRED EARLIER TO NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. YOU REFERRED ALSO TO THE FACT THAT IN SOME PEOPLE'S MINDS THERE WAS A NEED IN THE '70S TO STICK A LAYER OF, OF RESPONSE, A LAYER OF ESCALATION AT A, AT A THEATRE, AT A SORT OF THEATRE LEVEL. DOES THAT MEAN, WHERE DOES THE REMOVAL OF THE PERSHING IIS AND WITH IT THE COUNTER-VEILING POWER... WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AFTER THIS DEAL FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW?

Well it leaves it with cruise missiles, air launch and sea launch, with nuclear-capable aircraft and standard weapons for more secure: penetration to the target and it leaves it with a good old sea-launched ballistic missile but times have changed technically too. The modern sea-launched ballistic missile system, the Trident missile, has much more accuracy and technical reliability in penetrating to the chose target than had the Polaris and even the Poseidon. Therefore you can rely more on the SLDM component in the, in the instrumentarium of flexible response than you could on its predecessors and therefore we have an improved situation here. Then we can further improve aircraft, the penetration capability of aircraft by the stealth technology for example and we can do so with cruise missiles We, we can improve cruise missiles by increasing the speed and cruise missiles are now available in, in versions that, that will go their targets. Therefore the situation is not the same as when NATO decided on the Pershing II ballistic missile. It is slightly improved and they are, there's more prospect of gradual improvement so we will not be left with, we will not be left with inefficient instruments for the implementation of flexible response. We will, we will have renounced the optimum instruments but then the Russians will have renounced the threat tailor-made to the measure of Europe in the SS-20 missile.

HERR RUHL, YOU'RE AN ARTICULATE SPOKESMAN FOR THE... THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT. THE FACT IS HOWEVER THAT THEN THIS IS NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS RATIONALLY ARRIVED AT. IT'S A SERIES OF STRANGE HISTORICAL ACCIDENTS WHICH HAVE SUDDENLY PRODUCED AN OUTCOME. DO YOU THINK THAT LOOKING BACK OVER THIS PERIOD THAT THERE ARE LESSONS THAT THE GERMANS AND PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS CAN TAKE AWAY FROM HOW NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE, SHOULD BE HANDLED AND HOW ...

Well I think... I think the first lesson is that arms control is not a political ploy. Arms control must be considered on its own merit as a means to contribute to strategic military stability in crisis. This means that you must not look for arms control agreements just to have arms control. Arms control agreements have to be concluded in order to sustain the stability of the East-West relationship between Worth Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact or the United States and the Soviet Union global. This is the first lesson. Arms control not for arms control sake but as an instrument of... of reasonable policy with the objective of maintaining and improving strategic stability. The second lesson to be learned is that it's always risky to indulge in what I would call sectorial arms control, meaning that you cut out a small sector of weaponry in which then you will bring your effort to bear to have an arms control agreement because it can be so convened on both sides. I'll give you an example We asked for a separate agreement on intermediate nuclear forces and we are going to get it but we should not lose view of the natural link between ranges above and below 5,500 kms, meaning between intermediate range missiles and intercontinental range missiles because you have inter-continental ballistic missiles with variable ranges, like the new SS-24 and the new SS-25 in the Soviet missile inventory and with only 81 Soviet SS-24s carrying 10 warheads each you could feel the same number of warheads, meaning 8-10, that the Soviet Union would have to take down in implementing an INF agreement eliminating intermediate-range nuclear ballistic forces globally. Therefore you see how important it is to have strategic arms reduction agreements following the INF agreement. This is an important lesson-

RIGHT, I JUST WANT TO ASK YOU TWO MORE QUESTIONS

HERR RUHL IS IT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAS BEEN WELL LEAD BY THE AMERICANS OVER THE LAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS?

By and large yes, I think that both Secretary Haig and Secretary Schultz have made great efforts in mediating the Reagan policies to Europe and therefore giving the Alliance the necessary consensus and solidarity and President Reagan has, of course, I think one has to take a detached look although he's still in office, has brought about a change in the conduct of American policies towards the Soviet Union, and I think essentially the change for the better because it is a more realistic political attitude, it takes into account Soviet military power and the nature of the Soviet State and this is all to the good for the Western Alliance and for Europe. It has of course, also the opposite of redeeming features, and one has to manage all the aspects of Alliance policy and therefore I would say by and large, when you look at the results, his policies have strengthen America militarily, have given America considerable economic upturn that has been paid for with budgetary, monetary and financial liability which I'm not here to discuss. Everybody can see for their own and in the Alliance the Reagan administration has done much to improve consultation and finally it came around on arms control and also as we have seen at Reykjavik in this brief encounter with the fleeting meeting of minds and the vision of a nuclear free world, by and large again I think we stand to get reasonably agreements out of this, so the net result, I would say is positive.

CAN I JUST FINALLY ASK YOU A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS WHICH RANGE OVER THE PERIOD THAT WE'VE COVERED. AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS PERIOD, THERE WAS THE EPISODE OF THE NEUTRON BOMB. HOW IMPORTANT TO US/GERMAN RELATIONS WAS THE FAILURE TO DEPLOY THE NEUTRON BOMB?

Well I think that one has to distinguish between immediate result and the long-term result. The immediate result first was a dramatic misunderstanding and a failure by President Carter to respond properly to the problem. Of course he should have immediately decided to deploy, to produce and deploy, because he had the support of all the European Government and what counted most, he had the support of the Government in whose country the munitions would have to be stored, meaning the Federal Republic of Germany, so he should have ceased the opportunity and done that, and I know that both Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown and Security Adviser... urged him to do so, but he wouldn't do this so this was a capital mistake on President Carter's part. Complicated and confounded the relations with Chancellor Schmidt and it then lead to the idea that one would have to do something else in order to prove Alliance solidarity which was all to the good, so the immediate result was poor but then it contributed to whip up the necessary energies to go through with the duel track decision, and when we look back at the dual track discussion it's an outstanding success of Western Alliance and security policies because it achieved Soviet readiness to do away for the first time in Soviet history with a whole category of important Soviet armaments where they hold a clear superiority over NATO and the rest of Europe and Asia, so I think it is a positive effect, but there's another long term effect and that is that NATO has foregone the option of the reduced blast enhanced radiation weapon and I think that this was a mistake because, if there is a nuclear technology that will reduce collateral damage if nuclear weapons have to be used, then it is the enhanced radiation reduced blast because it's not the kind of radiation that you got from Chernobyl, it is quite different it is controllable, it is limited and it is the appropriate physical quality against mass armored mechanized tanks and concentration of artillery and against pacts operational air bases and ammunition storages. Therefore NATO has foregone a reasonable option in the discussion and the controversy on the quality of the enhanced radiation weapon. Now that has been lost.

FINAL QUESTION, OF COURSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER AGREES WITH YOU AND THAT'S WHY THE AMERICANS HAVE DEVELOPED THE WEAPON. YOU DEFENDED VERY STARKLY YOUR TRITE DECISION AS AN EXAMPLE AS SUCCESSFUL POLICY MAKING IN THE ALLIANCE. THERE IS OF COURSE THE OTHER SIDE TO ALL THAT, WHICH THE INVOLVEMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION AND ALL THAT WAS INVOLVED WITH ALL THAT. NOW WHAT HAPPENED IN TERMS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND NUCLEAR DECISION-MAKING WITHIN NATO, SURELY THE WHOLE CONTEXT IN WHICH THESE THINGS DECISIONS ARE TAKEN HAS BEEN CHANGED AND HAS BEEN CHANGED PERHAPS FOREVER. THE FACT THAT HERR COLE HAS BEEN INFLUENCED BY PUBLIC OPINION ON THESE QUESTIONS RECENTLY SURELY SUGGESTS THAT. IS IT NOT TRUE TO SAY THIS EPISODE, THE EUROPEAN MISSILE CRISIS HAS SHIFTED GROUND OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION POSSIBLY LASTINGLY SO AND THAT NATO WILL HAVE TO TAKE THAT INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE IN A WAY THAT IT NEVER DID IN THE PAST?

I would not disagree with this analysis. It has changed the environment and it is a case of how to manage public opinion and still implement the required political decision because public opinion cannot replace policy and this is a lesson to be learned. I think that we manage public opinion quite well during the deployment phase and if we had stuck with the original proposal that was made for an interim agreement meaning 140 systems would remain on each side. We could have managed that as well, I do not agree at all with those who say we could not have managed it, everything shows that public opinion in Germany and Belgium and the Netherlands and Italy and Britain accepted the facts created and their reason. Then of course Gorbachev took us to the task with his proposals, with the sweeping proposals. We could not work against our own objectives, therefore we accepted that and public opinion is all in favor of this, so we will have to manage now the enthusiasm of public opinion and we have to try to keep public opinion from deluding itself that all is over definitely and that from now on the Soviets will appear unarmed on the political theatres of Europe to play with us.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH HERR RUHL.